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
The American Historical Review



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In This Issue

The February issue of the *AHR* each year features the address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association by the AHA's outgoing president. This year's address is followed by four articles. The first deals with business and governments in the early twentieth century. The other three articles make up Part I of a two-part *AHR* Forum on "The International 1968." As always, these are followed by our book review section, which includes several featured reviews.

Presidential Address

Gabrielle M. Spiegel's Presidential Address, "The Task of the Historian," is an intellectual tour de force, offering an account of the emergence of poststructuralism as a central concern of historians in the last few decades, an account that is both sophisticated and timely. She situates its emergence in the wake of the Holocaust, which for "second-generation" intellectuals—those who did not experience its horrors but had to contemplate them nevertheless—created a rupture or absence that could only be filled with language. For these thinkers, however, language offered no stable meanings, no fixed representations, no direct access to this terrible past. Quite the contrary. Influenced by the "linguistic turn," many historians subscribed to the belief "that our apprehension of the world, both past and present, arrives only through the lens of language's precoded perceptions," but that these were always subject to the instabilities and indeterminacies inherent in language. Spiegel explores the impact of poststructuralism on historians, and notes its waning influence in recent years, a trend she largely endorses. But she concludes with a powerful argument for preserving some of its core features, especially those that derive from the psychological rupture she evoked at the beginning of her address. For, she observes, the contemporary world is itself marked by multiple ruptures, especially when we consider it in terms of the transnational experiences of migration, diasporas, uprooting, exile, expatriation, and the like. "Whither history," she asks, in the face of these fragmented accounts of the displaced? Preserving the insights of poststructuralism into the slippages, gaps, and multiplicities inherent in language will, she concludes, help us "solicit those fragmented inner narratives to emerge from their silences."

Article

In "The Petroleum War of 1910: Standard Oil, Austria, and the Limits of the Multinational Corporation," **Alison Frank** offers a case study of the interaction of gov-

ernment and multinational business in the early years of the twentieth century. She focuses on an episode that pitted Standard Oil, in league with the U.S. State Department, against Austria, which was seeking to drive Standard's Austrian subsidiary, Vacuum Oil, out of business. Standard's success in securing the State Department's protection—despite the fact that at just this moment Standard Oil was facing dissolution by the government for violating federal antitrust law—illustrates the intimate connection between diplomacy and economic activity in the prewar era. It also reveals that even multinational corporations maintained national affiliations and could claim to represent national interests. As much as corporations insisted upon their autonomy and loudly resisted government intervention, when necessary they readily turned to the government for support and protection. Frank's article illustrates the multiple connections between oil producers and refining industries in Austria, France, and the United States, and thus adds to the growing scholarship on transnational history. At the same time, however, it points out the limits of those transnational linkages, suggesting the enduring importance of "international," as opposed to transnational, history.

AHR Forum

February's issue also contains the first part of an *AHR* Forum on "The International 1968," planned to coincide with the fortieth anniversary of that year of revolt, mass protests, and social upheaval across much of the world. The first article, "The Rise and Fall of an International Counterculture, 1960–1975," by **Jeremi Suri**, presents both a context and an interpretation of that momentous year, emphasizing how the international counterculture challenged contemporary assumptions about the "good life" across diverse societies. He argues that Cold War policies, usually condemned for thwarting social change, actually encouraged and legitimized this counterculture. State leaders endorsed expanded educational opportunities and cultural innovations in order to more effectively compete against international adversaries. They made broad ideological claims that they could not fulfill. In nearly every major society, young men and women asked why government policies did not produce the promised outcomes, why their country was falling short. Scholars frequently treat the social history of the counterculture as something separate from the political history of the Cold War, but Suri asserts that the two were in fact deeply intertwined. Cold War ideas, resources, and institutions made the counterculture. His article offers a transnational history of social and political change and suggests some legacies of the 1960s for the twenty-first century.

Timothy S. Brown's "'1968' East and West: Divided Germany as a Case Study in Transnational History" examines youth rebellion in the two Germanies, capitalist West and communist East. Brown explores two sets of critical connections: those between the two Germanies, and those between these countries and the wider world, including the bloc systems of which they were members. Like Suri, Brown argues that "1968" cannot be understood in terms of the nation-state, not only because of the importance of transnational influences on local events, but also because the con-

tentious events of that year were linked to a globalizing imagined community that cut across national boundaries. By identifying transnational vectors of influence, analyzing their modes of transmission, and exploring how they meshed with local concerns, goals, traditions, and histories, this article offers a new perspective on the history of postwar Germany and the international 1968.

The last article in Part I of this Forum is "Japan 1968: The Performance of Violence and the Theater of Protest," by **William Marotti**. He begins by noting that the early 1960s saw mass protests and strikes against the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. While these failed to secure the protesters' goals, events such as the Vietnam War, Chinese nuclear tests, and conflict with North Korea pointed to 1970, when the treaty was scheduled for renewal, as a potentially explosive date. By 1967, however, public concern was waning and the opposition was in disarray. The outburst of large-scale protest in late 1967 and 1968 thus came as something of a surprise, inaugurating a period of renewed popular mobilization, nationwide university seizures, and threats to the government's very existence. Marotti sees in this period the emergence of a new kind of politics of physical confrontation with the state. These confrontations attracted increasing public attention and ultimately created a space where new forms of activism could arise, spaces in which, somewhat paradoxically, non-violent tactics could again become effective. Not only activists but ordinary people increasingly found the will and means for political engagement. In October 1968, however, the cycle was reversed, with the state successfully pushing back against demonstrators, enabling the isolation and suppression of dissent.

The second part of this Forum will appear in the April issue, with articles on Latin America, feminism, Russia, and youth tourism.

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With this issue, we recognize an important changing of the guard at the *AHR*. Sarah Knott, who has served brilliantly as Associate Editor, is ending her three-year term a semester early for the best of personal reasons. Her successor is Konstantin Dierks. Like Sarah, he is a historian of Early America and the Atlantic World who brings a wide range of historical knowledge and appreciation to this demanding and crucial position.



GABRIELLE M. SPIEGEL

Presidential Address

The Task of the Historian

GABRIELLE M. SPIEGEL

TRADITIONALLY, FOR HISTORIANS, the ethical core of our professional commitment has been a belief that our arduous, often tedious labor yields some authentic knowledge of the dead "other," a knowledge admittedly shaped by the historian's own perceptions and biases, but nonetheless retaining a degree of autonomy, in the sense that it cannot be made entirely to bend to the historian's will. This founding belief in the irreducible otherness of the past conferred on history its proper function, which was to recover that past in as close an approximation of "how it actually was" as possible. In the interest of preserving the autonomy of the past, the historian practiced modesty as a supreme ethical virtue, discreetly holding in abeyance his or her own beliefs, prejudices, and presuppositions.

Yet this traditional understanding of the nature, epistemological grounding, truth-value, and goals of historical research faced a significant challenge beginning in the late 1960s and the 1970s with the emergence of what came to be known as the "linguistic turn," the belief that language is the constitutive agent of human consciousness and the social production of meaning, and that our apprehension of the world, both past and present, arrives only through the lens of language's pre-coded perceptions. Moreover, language, once understood as a relatively neutral medium of communication, sufficiently transparent to convey a reasonably accurate sense of reality, itself had been reconceptualized with the emergence of structural linguistics or semiotics, a movement that began with the publication in 1916 of Ferdinand de Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics*. Far from reflecting the social world of which it is a part, language, Saussure argued, precedes the world and makes it intelligible according to its own rules of signification. Since for Saussure such rules are inherently arbitrary, in the sense of being social conventions implicitly understood in different ways by differing linguistic communities, the idea of an objective universe existing independently of speech and universally comprehensible despite one's membership in any particular language system is an illusion.¹

I would like to thank Nancy Partner, Robert Stein, David Bell, Nathan Connolly, Clifton Crais, Lucienne Bloch, Amanda Anderson, Ruth Leys, and members of the History Department seminar at Johns Hopkins University for their advice on how to frame the talk and for their cogent comments on earlier versions of this article. While they did not necessarily agree with all the arguments set forth here, their careful reading of the article and insight into its intentions were invaluable to me as I wrote and rewrote it. Some of the material was earlier published in "Revising the Past/Revisiting the Present: How Change Happens in Historiography," *History and Theory*, Theme Issue, 46, no. 4 (December 1907): 1-19.

¹ Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye in

Such was the “semiotic challenge” posed to the practice of historiography by the rise of structural linguistics and continuing with the successive emergence of structuralism, semiotics, and poststructuralism, including the elaboration of deconstruction.² The principal impact of these cognate developments was felt most intensely in the period after World War II; after 1965 they assumed the name “linguistic turn,” a term disseminated by the pragmatic philosopher Richard Rorty in his essay “Metaphysical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy” and generalized to various disciplines throughout the course of the seventies and after.³ Whether or not the linguistic turn constituted the kind of epistemological crisis for historiography that several of my predecessors in this office believed, it is clear that it represented a massive change in our understanding of the nature of historical reality, the methods of research we deployed in seeking to recover the past, and the nature of the truth claims that could be asserted about the product of our labors. Never entirely accepted in the full range of its claims, it nonetheless had a significant impact on how historians construed their basic tasks and the procedures and language in which they were conducted.

collaboration with Albert Riedlinger, trans. with an introduction and notes by Wade Baskin (New York, 1966), 67ff. Positions like these made it easy for critics such as Perez Zagorin to argue that postmodernism “is a philosophy of linguistic idealism . . . [which] denies both the ability of language or discourse to refer to an independent world of facts and things and the determinacy or decidability of textual meanings. By the same token it also dismisses the possibility of objective knowledge and truth as goals of inquiry.” In Zagorin’s view, this represents a fundamental misreading of Saussure, who never abandoned the notion of the referential relation of signs to things, even if signs as such were inherently “arbitrary.” See Zagorin, “History, the Referent, and Narrative: Reflections on Postmodernism Now,” *History and Theory* 38 (1999): 7. For a response to Zagorin, on the grounds that postmodernism is not anti-realist but rather anti-representationalist, see Keith Jenkins, “A Postmodern Reply to Perez Zagorin,” *History and Theory* 39 (2000): 182ff. Although Zagorin is correct that Saussure believed in the constative or referential function of signs within given speech communities, he is surely wrong in his charge of linguistic idealism, since, as Jason A. Frank has pointed out, “the emphasis in [linguistic turn] historiography has been on written language, tropes, socially structured speech patterns and the practices of literary production and consumption, rather than on the self-sufficiency of ‘ideas’ existing free of material embodiment.” Frank, “History and the Necessary Limits of Theory” (unpublished Field Paper in Historiography and the Problematics of Historical Knowledge, Johns Hopkins University), 8.

² On these developments, see my article “History, Historicism and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages,” *Speculum* 65 (1990): 59–86, reprinted in Gabrielle M. Spiegel, *The Past as Text: The Theory and Practice of Medieval Historiography* (Baltimore, 1997), 3–28.

³ The essay was published in Richard Rorty, ed., *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method* (Chicago, 1967). Rorty, of course, was working within the tradition of analytic philosophy, a tradition that to a certain extent ran parallel to that arising from Saussurean linguistics, and one that was also highly influential in the work of historians such as John Pocock and Quentin Skinner and the “school” of political thought that their work fostered. As an aside, it might be worth pointing out that even Rorty, whose 1965 article is generally credited with having introduced the notion of a fundamental “linguistic turn” in philosophy and related disciplines, retreated from his original position on its enduring significance. In a retrospective essay, “Twenty-Five Years Later,” Rorty confessed that the importance he attributed to the phenomenon of the “linguistic turn” seemed to him already in 1975—the date of an initial retrospective essay (“Ten Years Later”)—“to have been little more than a tempest in an academic teapot,” and now appears “positively antique.” Indeed, he asserts, his earlier assumption that “the problems of philosophy are problems of language strikes me as confused,” primarily, he explains, because he “is no longer inclined to think there is such as thing as ‘language’ in any sense which makes it possible to speak of ‘problems of language.’” Rorty, “Twenty-Five Years Later,” in Rorty, ed., *The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method—With Two Retrospective Essays* (Chicago, 1992), 371. For Rorty, in a statement that appears to me to be deeply symptomatic of a much broader response at present to the “linguistic turn,” what now counts as philosophically interesting and legitimate is “problems connected to what [Ian] Hacking calls ‘interfacing.’ These are problems about ‘the relation of mind and reality, or language and reality, viewed as the relation between a medium of representation and what is purportedly represented.’” *Ibid.*, 371.

Anyone who has lived through the last four decades of change in historiographical praxis can appreciate the need to investigate how such a profound transformation in the nature and understanding of historical work, both in practice and in theory, could have taken place. The reason for doing so now is that we all sense that this profound change has run its course. As Michael Roth recently noted, "for the last decade or so, recognition has been spreading that the linguistic turn that had motivated much advanced work in the humanities is over. The massive tide of language that connected analytic philosophy with pragmatism, anthropology with social history, philosophy of science with deconstruction, has receded; we are now able to look across the sand to see what might be worth salvaging before the next waves of theory and research begin to pound the shore."⁴ But to determine what might be worth saving, we need some explanation of how and why this sea change in history occurred; what motivated it; what governed the rhythms of its acceptance, dissemination, and decline; and what its implications are for our continuing practice, even as we sense that the hold of poststructuralism and postmodernism on current historiography is diminishing.⁵ What, if any, shared epistemologies, methodologies, and questions might exist between the fundamental postulates of the linguistic turn and the new foci of historical work on the immediate horizon? An appreciation of the determining constituents of this rather extreme case of historiographical change may offer some insights into what remains valuable as we move forward into a new era of historical concerns, one that is already, and increasingly will be, adapted to the new global environment in which we currently live.

Before broaching the question of what "caused," in some sense still to be discovered, the rise of linguistic turn historiography, we would do well to consider more generally what historical practice consists of, for any change in practice, even one as startling and deep-rooted as the linguistic turn, necessarily occurs initially within the confines of normal historiographical practice, and thus must be seen against the background of its routines.

One of the most significant characteristics of the contemporary practice of history, important for the points I wish eventually to make, derives from the central paradox of historical writing as analyzed by Michel de Certeau. In de Certeau's opinion, modern Western history essentially begins with a decisive differentiation between the present and the past. Like modern medicine, whose birth was contemporaneous with that of modern historiography, the practice of history becomes possible only when a dead corpse is opened to investigation, made legible such that it can be translated into that which can be written within a space of language.⁶ His-

⁴ Michael Roth, "Ebb Tide," review of Frank Ankersmit, *Sublime Historical Experience*, *History and Theory* 46 (2007): 66.

⁵ I should acknowledge that the extent to which the profession as a whole adopted the "linguistic turn" is probably exaggerated here, although I think the prevalence of studies of "discourse," the spread of feminist concepts of gender, and the rise of postcolonial theory and history bear witness to the fact that its impact was far wider than might be thought merely from examining the work of those directly engaged with debating "theory" or doing intellectual history. However, it remains true that the actual number of historians actively engaged with these questions was probably relatively small in comparison to the field as a whole. Nonetheless, it did represent a significant challenge to historians' traditional ways of conceiving history and had a discernible impact on the nature of the truth claims and epistemological objectivity that historians felt comfortable in asserting.

⁶ Interestingly, the Greek *autopsia* ("to see for oneself"), as it appears in Herodotus and other ancient historians, originally referred to facts narrated by the historian to which he was himself an

torians must draw a line between what is dead (past) and what is not, and therefore they posit death as a total social fact, in contrast to tradition, which figures a lived body of traditional knowledge, passed down in gestures, habits, unspoken but nonetheless real memories borne by living societies. For de Certeau, discourse about the past has as the very condition of its possibility the status of being discourse about the dead, a discourse with which historians fill the void between past and present created by history's founding gesture of rupture.⁷ In that sense, the basic principle of modern historiography is the disappearance of the past from the present, its movement from visibility to invisibility. The historian's task becomes, therefore, what Hugo von Hofmannsthal defined as "reading what was never written."⁸ It is in this moment that the past is saved, "not in being returned to what once existed, but instead, precisely in being transformed into something that never was, in being 'read as what was never written.'"⁹ From that perspective, the principal relation of the historian to the past is an engagement with absence.

The fact that historians must construct the objects of their investigation does not mean, however, that they are necessarily free of the past or that the findings so generated are merely fictive postulates. Historians escape neither the survival of former structures nor the weight of an endlessly present past—an "inertia" that traditionalists were wont to call "continuity." But it does mean that in contemporary historiography, the sign of history has become less the real than the intelligible, an intelligibility achieved through the production of historiographical discourse according to narrativist principles, hence always flirting with the "fictive" that is intrinsic to the operation of narrative. In this process, the historical "referent" (or what used to be called the "real," the "true," the "fact") is not so much obliterated as displaced. No longer a "given" of the past that offers itself to the historian's gaze, the referent is something constantly re-created in the recurring movement between past and present, hence ever-changing as that relationship itself is modified *in* the present.

If we acknowledge that history is the product of contemporary mental representations of the absent past that bear within them strong ideological and/or political imprints—and it seems unlikely that any historian would today disagree with this, whether framed in terms of discourse, social location, or some other form of the historian's fashioning—then it seems logical to include within the determinants of historical practice the impress of individual psychological forces in the coding and decoding of those socially generated norms and discourses. To be sure, there were forces within the intellectual traditions of European philosophy and history that shaped the course of these developments as well, together with powerful social changes at work, but my interest here is in the psychological roots of the linguistic turn, however realized through additional channels of thought.¹⁰

eyewitness, indicating an etymological link between the investigation of the past and postmortem examination.

⁷ Michel de Certeau, *The Writing of History*, trans. Tom Conley (New York, 1988), 5.

⁸ The phrase of Hofmannsthal is cited in Walter Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, 7 vols. (Frankfurt am Main, 1972–1989), 1: pt. 3, 1238. I am indebted to Daniel Heller-Roazen for this reference.

⁹ See the discussion of this in Daniel Heller-Roazen, "Introduction," in Giorgio Agamben, *Potentialities*, ed. and trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, Calif., 1999), 1.

¹⁰ In that sense, one cannot legitimately account for Derrida's deconstructive turn without taking into

In attempting to discover the possible psychic roots of the linguistic turn that so challenged our understanding of history, I would like to begin with what I have elsewhere argued are the psychic roots of poststructuralism, and of Derridean deconstruction in particular, which I consider to have been the basic articulation of poststructuralism's—and hence the linguistic turn's—most important principles.¹¹ Although there certainly were strands of deconstruction that differed from Derrida's, and, more generally, principles of postmodernism that addressed quite different concerns, for the purposes of this argument I will take Derridean deconstruction as the key expression of the impulses at work in generating the linguistic turn.¹²

We may legitimately take, I believe, the hallmark of deconstruction to have been a new and deeply counterintuitive understanding of the relationship between language and reality—counterintuitive in the sense that deconstruction's framing of that relationship interposes so many layers of mediation that what we experience as “reality” is seen to be a socially (that is, linguistically) constituted artifact or “effect” of the particular language systems we inhabit, thereby undermining materialist theories of experience and the ideas of causality and agency inherent in them. Moreover, deconstruction proposes an inherent instability at the core of language that places the determination of meaning ultimately beyond our reach, for every text, in the broad sense that deconstruction understands that term, founders ultimately on its own indeterminacy, its aporia, the “impasse beyond all possible transaction,” as Derrida defines it, “which is connected with the multiplicity of meanings embedded within the uniqueness of textual inscription.”¹³ The psychic destabilization produced by such a problematizing of the relationship between *res* and *verba* (object and word), together with the decentering of language and thus of those who author and authorize it, suggests that deconstruction represents not only a rupture in the traditions of Western philosophy and history, but a psychic response to those traditions that is itself founded in rupture.¹⁴

It is my belief that Derrida alchemized into philosophy a psychology deeply

account the impact of his reading of Husserl and his confrontation with Heidegger, but my concern here is less with the specifically philosophical constituents of his thought than with the impulses that led him to reformulate philosophy in a specific deconstructive fashion.

¹¹ See my “Orations of the Dean/Silences of the Living: The Sociology of the Linguistic Turn,” in Spiegel, *The Past as Text*, 29–43.

¹² I am, of course, aware of the fact that the French theorist who in all likelihood most influenced historians was the early (that is, archaeological, or pre-genealogical) Foucault, rather than Derrida or even Lyotard. This was in part because Foucault committed himself to working out the implications of semiotics within history itself, through a study of modern epistemological regimes, or epistemes. Moreover, Foucault's notion of discourse operating within a microphysics of power, and his demonstration of the very power of discourse itself, had enormous appeal in terms of its ability to join cultural and social history within a single framework. However, to the extent that the “linguistic turn” expressed fundamental questions arising within the framework of poststructuralism, I believe that Derrida, rather than Foucault, is a better guide to what might have motivated its emergence, since Foucault remained, at least in his early phases, highly structuralist in his deployment of discourse.

¹³ Jacques Derrida, “Shibboleth,” in Geoffrey Hartman and Sanford Budick, eds., *Midrash and Literature* (New Haven, Conn., 1986), 323.

¹⁴ As Derrida himself noted, deconstruction proposes the notion of a “decentered structure,” that is, a structure whose decentering is the result of “the event I called a rupture, itself, in turn, an effect of the coming into consciousness of the ‘structurality of structure.’” See Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1978), 278. Derrida does not, however, specify the “event” he calls a rupture, merely—and somewhat tautologically—presenting it as an effect of an emerging awareness of structure's struc-

marked by the Holocaust—marked by but not part of its experiential domain—in which the Holocaust figures as the absent origin that Derrida himself did so much to theorize. This is to argue that, living at a moment burdened with the inescapable consciousness of the Holocaust, Derrida emerged into the history of philosophy as a theoretician of linguistic “play,” a time synonymous with the “moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse.”¹⁵

Derrida belonged both by birth and by self-conscious identification to that “second generation” of the post-Holocaust world on whose psyche had been indelibly inscribed an event in which it did not participate, but which nonetheless constitutes the underlying narrative of the lives of its members.¹⁶ Theirs was, first and foremost, a world of silence, a “silence,” as French psychologist Nadine Fresco tells us in her brilliant evocation of the psychology of the second generation, that “swallowed up the past, all the past.”¹⁷ The parents of these children

transmitted only the wound to their children, to whom the memory had been refused and who grew up in the compact world of the unspeakable, amid litanies of silence . . . Life was now the *trace*, molded by death . . . The past has been utterly burnt away at the center of their lives . . . They feel their existence as a sort of exile, not from a place in the present or future, but from a time now gone forever, which would have been that of identity itself.¹⁸

They feel themselves to be “deported from meaning, their resident permits withdrawn, expelled from a lost paradise, abolished in a death in turn dissolved, dissi-

tutality, or constructed nature. One is tempted to see this as a compelling example of the intellectual displacement of a psychological phenomenon.

¹⁵ Ibid., 292, 289. For Derrida, the articulation of “play” is central to that process of alchemization that makes writing “after Auschwitz” possible. Indeed, in a highly displaced form, this is precisely the starting point of Derrida’s critique of what he calls the “structuralist thematic of broken immediacy”: “This structuralist thematic of broken immediacy is therefore the saddened, *negative*, nostalgic, guilty, Rousseauistic side of the thinking of play whose other side would be Nietzschean *affirmation*, that is the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth, and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation. This affirmation then determines the non center otherwise than as loss of the center.” It probably should be noted that Derrida has repeatedly protested that “it is totally false to suggest that deconstruction is a suspension of reference . . . I never cease to be surprised by critics who see my work as a declaration that there is nothing beyond language . . . What I call text implies all the structures called ‘real,’ ‘economic,’ ‘historical,’ ‘socio-institutional,’ in short all possible referents . . . ‘There is nothing outside of the text’ . . . does not mean that all referents are suspended, denied, or enclosed in a book, as people have claimed, or have been naive enough to believe and to have accused me of believing. But it does mean that every referent and all reality has the structure of a differential trace . . . and that one cannot refer to this ‘real’ except in an interpretive experience.” Cited in Jenkins, “A Postmodern Reply to Perez Zagorin,” 190–191. See also Jacques Derrida, “Deconstructions: The Im-possible,” in Sylvère Lotringer and Sande Cohen, eds., *French Theory in America* (New York, 2001), 13–31.

¹⁶ Technically, of course, Derrida, having been born in 1930, was a bit old to be properly classified as a member of the second generation. Indeed, in 1942 he was expelled from school as a result of the lowering to 7 percent of the *numerus clausus* of Jews allowed to attend. Between then and the end of the war, he attended a school run by Jews in Algiers, experiencing in that sense the war and the anti-semitism of the Pétain regime. Nonetheless, in relation to the Holocaust and the experiences of European Jews, Derrida’s childhood in Algiers, I believe, maintains a comparable position of marginality and belatedness that informs the psychology of the second generation.

¹⁷ Nadine Fresco, “Remembering the Unknown,” *International Review of Psychoanalysis* 11 (1984): 419.

¹⁸ Ibid., 420–421.

pated . . . deported from a self that ought to have been that of another. Death is merely a matter of *substitution*.”¹⁹

It is a generation lost between the “orations” of dead bodies piled up at Auschwitz, which spoke tellingly but tragically, and the silences imposed by its elders, who literally could not “speak” the Holocaust (which was, in any case, in all senses of the word unspeakable). From their parents, this generation received only, in Erika Apfelbaum’s words, “un heritage en formes d’absences” (a legacy in the form of absences).²⁰ And linked to the notion of absence in the work of French writers of the second generation, as Ellen Fine has demonstrated, are repeated evocations of void, lack, blank, gap, and abyss. “La mémoire absente,” in the novels of Henri Raczymow, is “la mémoire trouée”: hollowed out, fragmented, ruptured.²¹

Perhaps most striking of all in the work of these writers is their sense of the utter inadequacy of language. “The world of Auschwitz,” in George Steiner’s famous remark, “lies outside speech as it lies outside reason.”²² Language “after Auschwitz” is language in a condition of severe diminishment and decline, and no one has argued more forcefully than Steiner the corruption—indeed the ruin—of language as a result of the political bestiality of our age.²³ And yet, for those who come after, there is nothing but language. As the protagonist in Elie Wiesel’s novel *The Fifth Son* states: “Born after the war I endure its effects. I suffer from an Event I did not even experience . . . From a past that has made History tremble, I have retained only words.”²⁴

Both for those who survived and for those who came after, the Holocaust appears to exceed the representational capacity of language, and thus to cast suspicion on the ability of words to convey reality.²⁵ And for the second generation, the question is not even how to speak but, more profoundly, if one has a right to speak, a delegitimation of the speaking self that, turned outward, interrogates the authority, the privilege of all speech. Which, of course, is precisely what Derrida and deconstruction does in the attack on logocentrism.

It is not difficult to see the parallels between this psychology of the “second generation” and the basic tenets of poststructuralism: the feeling of life as a trace, haunted by an absent presence; its sense of indeterminacy; a belief in the ultimate undecidability of language (its aporia, in Derrida’s sense); the transgressive approaches to knowledge and authority; and, perhaps most powerfully, the conviction of the ultimately intransitive, self-reflective character of language, which seems to have lost its power to represent anything outside itself, hence to have lost its ability, finally, to signify. In its profound commitment to a fractured, fragmented, and end-

¹⁹ Ibid., 420–423.

²⁰ Quoted in Ellen S. Fine, “The Absent Memory: The Act of Writing in Post-Holocaust French Literature,” in Berel Lang, ed., *Writing and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1988), 44.

²¹ Ibid., 45.

²² George Steiner, *Language and Silence: Essays on Language, Literature, and the Inhuman* (New York, 1986), 123.

²³ Ibid., 4.

²⁴ Quoted in Fine, “The Absent Memory,” 41.

²⁵ The “unrepresentable” nature of the Holocaust is the subject of a considerable literature, beginning with the essays collected in Saul Friedlander, *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution”* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992). See also his *Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe* (Bloomington Ind., 1993), as well as Lang, *Writing and the Holocaust*, and Dominick LaCapra, *Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994).

lessly deferred, hence displaced, understanding of language and the (im)possibilities of meaning, poststructuralism shares with the "second generation" the anguish of belatedness, the scars of an unhealed wound of absent memory, and the legacy of silence.

It is clear as well that the sense of loss that subtends this psychology of the second generation is not confined to individuals, nor to Jews, but constitutes an entire generation's understanding of the wreck of history attendant upon the war and the revelations of its horrors. Furthermore, I should point out that I am not the only historian to argue on behalf of the probable link between post-Holocaust and postmodern consciousness, a phenomenon that began with Habermas's articulation of the general sense that "there [in Auschwitz] something happened that up to now nobody considered even possible . . . Auschwitz has changed the basis for the continuity of the condition of life within history."²⁶ Such a link is also implicit in Lyotard's metonymic use of "the jews" in *Heidegger and "the jews"* as the very figure of postmodernity, that is, of precisely what can no longer be "phrased" "after Auschwitz"—the "excess" that disrupts and puts into question all former categories of being and knowledge.²⁷ In this country, scholars such as Dominick LaCapra and Eric Santner have also insisted upon the crucial role of the Holocaust and its aftermath as, in LaCapra's terms, "a divider between modernism and postmodernism."²⁸ Santner argues even more forcefully that "the postmodern destabilization of certain fundamental cultural norms and notions, above all those dealing with self-identity and community, cannot be understood without reference to the ethical and intellectual imperatives of life 'after Auschwitz.'"²⁹ Both point to the prominence of themes of loss, death, impoverishment, and mourning that pervade much of postmodern criticism and writing. In that sense, the emergence of poststructuralism under the sign of the linguistic turn bespoke the end of the confident, optimistic era of European Enlightenment with its faith in the continual progress of human history under the aegis of scientific learning and methods and, not least among them, scientific history.

It is worth noting how tied to the experiences of a single generation the transformations effected by poststructuralism and the linguistic turn appear to be, which in turn helps to explain the timing of its advent in the seventies and eighties, rather than in the years immediately following the war. The preoccupations of the surviving postwar generation lay with rebuilding Europe, and in America with the emerging Cold War conflict and the rise of McCarthyism. Apart, perhaps, from the refugee historians themselves, whose impact on the development of German and European history in this country was noted by David Pinkney in his presidential address of 1980, leaders of the historical profession took surprisingly little note of the possible impact that the war and its aftermath might have on the practice of history.³⁰ As Europe struggled to reconstitute its social fabric, social history reigned supreme, a fact sig-

²⁶ Cited in the introduction to Friedlander, *Probing the Limits of Representation*, 2.

²⁷ Jean-François Lyotard, *Heidegger and "the jews,"* trans. Andreas Michel and Mark Roberts, introduction by David Carroll (Minneapolis, 1990).

²⁸ LaCapra, *Representing the Holocaust*, 188.

²⁹ Eric L. Santner, *Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in Postwar Germany* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1990), xiv.

³⁰ David H. Pinkney, "American Historians on the European Past," 1980 AHA Presidential Address, *American Historical Review* 86, no. 1 (February 1981): 3–4.

naled by the dominance of Annaliste historiography throughout the continent and the United States and the prestige of social history more generally everywhere.³¹

Not until the mid-sixties to the mid-seventies, that is, with the maturing of the second generation, did the psychology that I have sought to describe begin to come into play. The first mention of the term "postmodern" in an AHA presidential address does not appear until 1978, with William J. Bouwsma's address on "The Renaissance and the Drama of Western History," who notes it only to confess that "I am . . . bewildered by the suggestion that we have now entered into a 'postmodern' age." Bouwsma did acknowledge that

the epistemological decisions embedded in language are thus the pre-condition of human apprehension of an external world; culture in this sense is prior to both materialism and idealism, which represent contrary efforts to assign ontological status to—in the language of sociology, to legitimize—a world whose actual source in the creativity of man violates the all-too-human need for transcendence . . . Beyond this, history as construction often tends to be a misleading and sometimes pernicious reification.³²

A decade later, in 1989, David Harlan clearly labeled the emergence of post-structuralism an epistemological crisis for historical study in the pages of the *American Historical Review*, asserting that the linguistic turn has "questioned our belief in a fixed and determinable past, compromised the possibility of historical representation, and undermined our ability to locate ourselves in time. The result of all this has been to reduce historical knowledge to a tissue of remnants and fabrications concealing, it is said, an essential absence."³³ By 1997, Joyce Appleby, in her presidential address on "The Power of History," forthrightly declared that poststructuralism and the linguistic turn had created an epistemological crisis among historians and their publics and argued on behalf of a balanced return to the importance of social history, one that continued to acknowledge the interpretive power of post-structuralist theories of discourse and what she called "language's insinuating codes" and their shaping force in the cultural formation of the individual and society, but simultaneously sought to have historians appreciate that history "has an irreducible positivistic element" and that its power derives from the persistence of the past in the present, compelling us to reconstruct it.³⁴

Today, some thirty years or so after the introduction of poststructuralism and the "linguistic turn," there is a growing sense of dissatisfaction with its overly systematic account of the operation of language in the domain of human endeavors of all kinds, even among those committed to its fundamental postulates and insights. As William

³¹ For excellent descriptions of how the rise of social history occurred, see Geoff Eley, *A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2005), and William H. Sewell, *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, 2005). See also the AHR Forum on Eley's book and Eley's response, *American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (April 2008): 391–437.

³² William J. Bouwsma, "The Renaissance and the Drama of Western History," 1978 AHA Presidential Address, *American Historical Review* 84, no. 1 (February 1979): 5, 11.

³³ David Harlan, "Intellectual History and the Return of Literature," *American Historical Review* 94, no. 3 (June 1989): 581.

³⁴ Joyce Appleby, "The Power of History," 1997 AHA Presidential Address, *American Historical Review* 103, no. 1 (February 1998): 12, 14. Appleby joined with Lynn Hunt and Margaret Jacob in an attempt to redress what they saw as poststructuralism's exaggeratedly "ironic, perhaps even despairing view of the world, one that, in its extreme forms, offers little role for history as previously known"; Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, *Telling the Truth about History* (New York, 1994), 207.

Sewell has noted, there has been "a pervasive reaction against the concept of culture as a system of symbols and meanings, inclining rather to the belief that culture is a sphere of practical activity shot through by willful action, power relations, struggle, contradiction and change."³⁵ In this view, culture emerges less as a systematic structure than as a repertoire of competencies, a "tool kit," a regime of practical rationality, or a set of strategies guiding action, whereby symbols/signs are mobilized to identify those aspects of the agent's experience which, in this process, are made meaningful, that is, experientially "real."

Culture, thereby, is recast as a "performative term," one realized only processually as "signs put to work" to "reference" and interpret the world.³⁶ Historical investigation, from this perspective, takes practice (not structure) as the starting point of social analysis, since practice emerges here as the space in which a meaningful intersection between discursive constitution and individual initiative occurs. This initiative is, in the first instance, cognitive, a subject's ongoing reformulation of values, priorities, interests, and behaviors in terms provided, but not governed, by available discourses or languages (i.e., sign systems).³⁷

In light of the accumulating discontent with poststructuralism and its model of language as the constituent of human culture and behavior, it is fair to say that the "semiotic challenge" has been addressed, absorbed, and—most important—that the dominant concerns of historical thought and writing are currently undergoing a process of alteration, although the precise direction in which we are moving and the modes and methodologies by which historical research and writing will be framed are difficult to discern. Still, we need to pose the question: Whither history? If we have, indeed, as Nancy Partner now argues, entered the post-postmodern period, what does this include, and what is being left behind? What remains relevant and useful for the directions in which historiographical practice is likely to move, and to what extent does our understanding of the forces and conditions that fostered the linguistic turn in the first place inform these developments? As she notes, it is highly unlikely that we will return to "quasi-scientific realism, naïve empiricism, or any of the pre-postmodern assumptions that informed the writing of history."³⁸ Nor is it likely that most historians will answer the call to "sublime historical experience" recently issued by F. R. Ankersmit.³⁹ Candidates for new topics of central concern, set forth, for example, by Michael Roth, include "ethics, intensity, postcolonialism, empire, the sacred, cosmopolitanism, trauma and animals."⁴⁰ "All these proposed

³⁵ William Sewell, "The Concept(s) of Culture," in Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, eds., *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture* (Berkeley, Calif., 1999), 44.

³⁶ Ibid., 45. See also Richard Biernacki, "Language and the Shift from Signs to Practices in Cultural Inquiry," *History and Theory* 30 (2000): 289–310.

³⁷ For a much fuller discussion of current revisions to the poststructuralist understanding of subjectivity, see my introduction to Gabrielle M. Spiegel, ed., *Practicing History: New Directions in Historical Writing after the Linguistic Turn* (London, 2005), 11–18.

³⁸ Nancy Partner, "Narrative Persistence: The Post-Postmodern Life of Narrative Theory," in Frank Ankersmit, Ewa Domanska, and Hans Kellner, eds., *Re-Figuring Hayden White* (forthcoming from Stanford University Press), 2. I would like to thank Professor Partner for sharing this essay with me before its publication.

³⁹ See Frank Ankersmit, *Sublime Historical Experience* (Stanford, Calif., 2005).

⁴⁰ Roth, "Ebb Tide," 66. To this list one might add the study of affects, which seems to be experiencing something of a boom at the moment. It might also be pointed out that Roth's list of "new" topics of consideration includes many matters that were already the subject of intense investigation during the

new topics," Partner remarks, "share a common desire to escape language, restore a pure and immediate connection with the past or at least some central aspect of experience and generally deny the power of language to contaminate 'history' with its own uncontrollable meanings."⁴¹

We can agree, I think, that the historical concerns of the next generation will be quite different, as is usually the case, especially in periods of rapid change such as we have been experiencing over the last few decades, not least in the realm of technology and the spread of global capital. Yet it is not equally clear to me that the fundamental insights of poststructuralism are—or should be—so easily jettisoned. If, as I have argued, deconstruction, poststructuralism, and some varieties of postmodernism in their psychic impulses enact a philosophy of rupture and displacement, to what extent are the insights generated by them still valuable for what is likely be the dominant concern of historians in the coming generation? This is not to argue that there is a fundamental continuity in the psychological shaping or intellectual goals of the rising generation, or that its members are necessarily bound to the agendas earlier generated by the war and its aftermath. Only that we can and should continue to appreciate and employ what poststructuralism has taught us by and in its enactment of the complex tensions that shape the contemporary world. The question is to identify what remains valuable in the legacy of the linguistic turn, at least insofar as there exists, or might exist, an underlying commonality between the nature and needs of historical thought and writing under the sign of the linguistic turn and the new historiographical agendas in the process of being crafted by historians now and in the coming years.

It seems probable that as our consciousness of the penetration of global capitalism and its impact on all forms of social formation grows, historical writing will increasingly be influenced by the problematics fostered by this development and will, therefore, create new objects of investigation. This is already apparent in the growing concern with questions of diaspora, migration, immigration, and the rapidly developing field of transnational history, with its focus on what Françoise Lionnet has termed "minority cultures," which deploys a global perspective that emphasizes the basic hybridity of global cultures in the postcolonial and postmodern world.⁴²

That the field of "transnationalism" should appear as the sign of this shift in consciousness, a field in part promoted by the movement of new groups of scholars into the profession, is hardly unexpected and may be seen as one of the social determinants of this reorientation and revision in current historiography. And since the signal characteristic of these new fields of inquiry is that they entail the study of discontinuities in the experiences of, and displacements of location in, the lives of their subjects as a result of migration, exile, war, and the like, perhaps it is also apposite to inquire into the losses experienced in the process of migration, exile, and diasporic movement. Such a question might interrogate, and seek to nuance, the rather triumphalist tone of current work on transnationalism, with its celebration of

high tide of poststructuralism and postmodernism. Thus the extent to which this list genuinely reflects new agendas is somewhat problematic. For what I see as more likely candidates for new areas of historical inquiry, see below.

⁴¹ Partner, "Narrative Persistence," 2–3.

⁴² See Françoise Lionnet and Shu-mei Shih, eds., *Minor Transnationalism* (Durham, N.C., 2005).

fluidity and hybridity, multiplicity and mobility, by inquiring into the sense of loss of cultural identity that often accompanies displacement from one's homeland, language, and culture.

More pertinent still is the utility of certain insights proffered by poststructuralism to the enormously expanding field of diaspora studies, for that field shares with the post-Holocaust generation a legacy in terms of the very notion of "diaspora," which seems now, however, to function as a covering term and concept employed to characterize cultures of displacement in the broadest possible sense, such as (to borrow James Clifford's accounting) *border, travel, creolization, transculturation, hybridity, and transnational migrant circuits*.⁴³ To these might be added *exile, expatriation, post-coloniality, migrancy, globality, and transnationality*.⁴⁴ The one common thread that runs through these various characterizations of "diaspora" is that of "de-territorialized identities."⁴⁵ According to this view, "de-territorialization" paradoxically occurs as diasporic peoples root themselves physically in their "hostlands," but refuse (or are refused) assimilation to them, producing a sense of dual belonging and cultural consciousness that resists locating identity fully in either home- or hostland. In this context, Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett points out, diasporic discourse is strong on displacement, detachment, uprooting, and dispersion—on "disarticulation"—but is less clear about how re-articulation takes place: how the local is produced and what forms it takes in the space of dispersal, or how, precisely, it relates to the culture of origin.⁴⁶ As a conceptual device, the idea of "de-territorialized identity" seems to reflect the recognition that in the context of a world increasingly marked by migrations, cultural as well as economic globalization, intermarriage, and unbounded intercommunication, questions of home, community, allegiance, and hence identity are constantly being redefined. At the same time, it provides an analytical framework that allows scholars to talk about these processes from a global perspective, one independent of the nation-state as the framing unit of discussion.

⁴³ James Clifford, "Diasporas," *Cultural Anthropology* 9 (1994): 303. For an extraordinary list of what currently is counted as a "diaspora," one need only go to Wikipedia's List of Diasporas, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_diasporas, where the term is applied to a host of population movements and displacements in relation to peoples and phenomena as diverse as, to name only a few, the Albanians, Basques, Chechens, Sikhs, Fiji Islanders, Vikings, Lebanese, Indians (South Asians), Chinese, Koreans, Tibetans, Ukrainians, Portuguese, Irish, Tamil, Palestinians, and the "hip-hop" diaspora (i.e., musical forms associated with hip-hop culture and rap music, known in Europe as "Spaghetti funk"!)." "Diaspora" is also employed metaphorically, as William Safran points out, to characterize *alien residents, political refugees, and ethnic and racial minorities*, thus adding to the already overly rich stew of referents. See Safran, "Diasporas in Modern Societies: Myths of Homeland and Return," *Diaspora* 1 (1991): 83–99. At its furthest definitional reach, "diaspora" has even been applied to what Gayatri Spivak calls "microelectronic diasporas" generated by digital technologies that allow widely dispersed people to imagine and thus to constitute themselves as a voluntary community based on self-selection and communication, a community that possessed no common homeland in the past nor seeks to create one in the future other than that imaginatively enabled by the Internet; Spivak, "Who Claims Alterity?" in Barbara Kruger and Phil Mariani, eds., *Remaking History* (Seattle, 1989), 276. As Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett points out, "the instantaneity of telecommunication produces an extreme case of physical distance and social proximity under conditions of disembodied presence and the immateriality of place"—entirely routes without roots. Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, "Spaces of Dispersal," *Cultural Anthropology* 9, no. 3 (1994): 342.

⁴⁴ See the interesting discussion of the term in Brent Hayes Edwards, "The Uses of Diaspora," *Social Text* 66 (2001): 45–73. Edwards also provides a valuable sketch of the evolution of the term as applied to the African diaspora in relation to changing historical needs and contexts.

⁴⁵ See, for example, Steven Vertovec, "Three Meanings of 'Diaspora,' Exemplified among South Asian Religions," *Diaspora* 6 (1997): 1.

⁴⁶ Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, "Spaces of Dispersal," 339.

This, in turn, poses the question of the relationship, real or imagined, of “diaspora” as a form of consciousness to the nation-state, traditionally considered to function as the place where individual and social identities are shaped. Indeed, the new conceptual field of “diaspora” would appear to function as a means of transvaluing the term, which for much of its history was a mark of failure in relation to the normative ideal of the nation-state, but now betokens a privileged transcendence of national identity in favor of transnational bonds. The widespread use of “diaspora” in the field of Africana studies offers the most illuminating example here, both because it possesses the most complex relationship to a notion of “homeland” (forming what has been called a “stateless diaspora,” that is, one without a *common* country of origin, language, religion, or culture) and because it represents the most pervasive use of the term “diaspora” in current academic circles.

The “stateless power” of “diaspora,” as Khachig Tölölyan has shown, resides in “a heightened awareness of the rewards as well as the burdens of multiple belonging, and in the exemplary grappling with the paradoxes of such belonging.”⁴⁷ Diaspora communities, in this sense, must actively reproduce an identity with “homeland” and maintain contact with it or, where it does not exist, with a mythical notion of homeland, since a commitment, real or imagined, to multilocality is a central feature of diasporic consciousness. Thus, as Arjun Appadurai and Carol Breckenridge point out, “diasporas always leave a trail of collective memory about another place and time and create new maps of desire and of attachment,” the result of which is not necessarily the consolidation of identities, but more often the fracturing of memories.⁴⁸ One analytic feature of the concept of diaspora, therefore, is that it is fundamentally dialogic, constantly negotiating a willed relationship between “here” and “there” tantamount, as well, to the relationship between “now” and “then,” the present and the past, presence and absence. In that sense, I would argue, diaspora studies and its related fields of transnationalism, immigration, and migration history are fundamentally concerned, as in the case of poststructuralism, with the problematics of displacement and absent or fractured memory. To the extent that this is true, they are involved, *by definition*, in questions of displaced persons and absent memory, and any notions of identity and subjectivity that they seek to deploy necessarily will be dependent on an understanding of memory as constructed narrative, and hence on language as the ultimate bearer of the particular form of historical consciousness entailed in diasporic being. It is here that I see the continuing utility of poststructuralist notions of the constitutive force of language in the shaping of identity and the relationship between the self/subject and experience.

Given this, the new historiography doubtless will also require a revised understanding of subjectivity as something more than the discursively constituted “subject positions” framed in poststructuralist theory, but also something other than a wholly re-centered humanist subject.⁴⁹ Although recent literature on the topics of self and

⁴⁷ Khachig Tölölyan, “Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless in the Transnational Moment,” *Diaspora* 5 (1996): 8.

⁴⁸ Arjun Appadurai and Carol Breckenridge, “On Moving Targets,” *Public Culture* 2 (1989): i. Cited in Vertovec, “Three Meanings of ‘Diaspora,’” 9.

⁴⁹ For a discussion of what I have called the return of an actor-centered or “neo-phenomenological” understanding of subjectivity and agency, one that highlights the disjunction between culturally given meanings and the individual uses of them in contingent, historically conditioned ways, see my intro-

agency has been sharply critical of the fracturing, decentering effects of poststructuralist formulations, I see scant evidence of an appeal to return to pre-linguistic turn notions of the centered, humanist subject. Rather, what Amanda Anderson has called the “post-poststructuralist turn to subjectivity” might approach the human actor in both past and present, she argues, by means of a “postconventional” understanding of identity and its formation.⁵⁰ In her account, this takes the form of a rationally governed and continually refashioned sense of self, informed by self-reflective and self-critical understandings arrived at through dialogue with both the self and others. Such an approach seeks to restore to human agents the depth psychology, self-awareness, and rationality capable of governing behavior, but it also includes “a recognition of the historical conditions”—including the discursive—“out of which beliefs and values emerge, as well as the possibility for the ongoing recognition of the many forces (psychological, social and political) that can thwart, undermine, or delay the[ir] achievements.”⁵¹

In light of this, one might speculate that however one construes the generational locus of the new work on transnationalism and diaspora studies, it remains the case that the much more diverse cultural and intellectual global field within which it operates introduces complexities that historians in the past for the most part were not forced to address, and for which there are few guides at present. If work in these fields can be seen from one perspective as innovative ways of dealing with and reformulating earlier questions that arose in the context of the identity politics of the civil rights and post-civil rights era, then how does the affirmation of multiple belonging or plural citizenship complicate the story, seeing national boundaries as permeable and not necessarily constitutive of identity?⁵² If not from the nation, society, or domicile, from where does social identity derive its shape? If we are at once citizens of the world and citizens and subjects of specific nations, how are the contradictions implicit in this form of multilocality negotiated on both the individual and the collective level?

We live in a moment of great cultural instability and uncertainty. As historians, we struggle to know the absent and the other, to affirm a right to words and to speech. Like Derrida, we are “trying to write the question: (what is) meaning to say?”⁵³ Precisely what instruments we will deploy in the pursuit of our historical labors is not entirely clear. But I persist in believing that there is one thing that deconstruction has taught us, more powerfully than any other strategy of reading that I know of, and that is to listen to silence. As historians of the past, we are constantly engaged in attending, as Paul Zumthor has written, “to the discourse of some invisible other that

duction to *Practicing History*, 11–18. A particularly cogent examination of this problem and its implications for historiography can be found in a collection of articles by William H. Sewell, Jr., in his *Logics of History*. Particularly useful among them are “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency and Transformation” (124–151) and “Concept(s) of Culture” (152–174). For a list of some recent bibliography on this topic, see also my contribution to the *AHR* Forum on Geoff Eley’s book, “Comment on *A Crooked Line*,” *American Historical Review* 113, no. 2 (April 2008): 406–416.

⁵⁰ Amanda Anderson, *The Way We Argue Now: A Study in the Cultures of Theory* (Princeton, N.J., 2006), 172.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 122.

⁵² I am indebted to Nathan Connolly for the specific formulation of these questions.

⁵³ Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1981), 14.

speaks to us from some deathbed, of which the exact location is unknown. We strive to hear the echo of a voice which, somewhere, probes, knocks against the world's silences, begins again, is stifled."⁵⁴ Our most fundamental task as historians, I would argue, is to solicit those fragmented inner narratives to emerge from their silences. In the last analysis, what is the past but a once material existence now silenced, extant only as sign and as sign drawing to itself chains of conflicting interpretations that hover over its absent presence and compete for possession of the relics, seeking to invest traces of significance upon the bodies of the dead.

⁵⁴ Paul Zumthor, *Speaking of the Middle Ages*, trans. Sarah White (Lincoln, Nebr., 1986), 37.

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The Petroleum War of 1910: Standard Oil, Austria, and the Limits of the Multinational Corporation

ALISON FRANK

"THE PROPRIETOR OF STOCK," ADAM SMITH CONTENTED in 1776, "is properly a citizen of the world, and is not necessarily attached to any particular country." The mobility of the stockholder, like that of the merchant—who Smith likewise noted was "not necessarily the citizen of any particular country"—challenged the modern state trying to develop its own economy. The stockholder could invest abroad to avoid paying an obnoxious tax; worse yet, "a very trifling disgust will make [the merchant] remove his capital, and together with it all the industry which it supports, from one country to another."¹ In the twenty-first century, this observation has inspired studies of international economic activity that, despite myriad disagreements, tend to agree that "globalization challenges the importance of the nation-state and alters the balance of power between states and markets in favor of the latter," and that the major beneficiaries of this phenomenon are multinational corporations.² Even in the Golden Age of global commerce that preceded the First World War, however, merchants and stockholders could not, in every instance, simply turn tail and flee over a "trifling disgust." Instead, they had to negotiate terms and reach settlements with a profusion of imperial, national, provincial, and local governments.³ This was particularly true of the oil industry, which had reached global proportions by that time. From 1910 to 1912, two of the world's most powerful corporate entities—"the best known of all international companies," the Standard Oil Trust, and the second-larg-

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¹ Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* (London, 1776). Stockholder: Book V, chap. II, art. 2, para. 6; Merchant: Book III, chap. IV, para. 24.

² Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels Petersson, *Globalization: A Short History*, trans. Dona Geyer (Princeton, N.J., 2005), 6.

³ Frederick Cooper, "What Is the Concept of Globalization Good For? An African Historian's Perspective," *African Affairs* 100 (2001): 194. Cooper notes: "for all the growth in international trade in recent decades, as a percentage of world GDP it has only barely regained levels found before the First World War." Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson argue that "world capital markets were almost certainly as well integrated in the 1890s as they were in the 1990s." O'Rourke and Williamson, "When Did Globalisation Begin?" *European Review of Economic History* 6 (2002): 4. See also David Armitage, "Is There a Pre-History of Globalization?" in Deborah Cohen and Maura O'Connor, eds., *Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective* (New York, 2004), 165–176.

est country by population in Europe, Austria-Hungary—engaged in a bitter, protracted dispute that Austria's leading daily newspaper dubbed a "Petroleum War."⁴ On the surface a conflict about Austria's regulation of Standard's activities within the empire, the Petroleum War epitomized the fundamental riddle of capitalist development in this period: even powerful multinational corporations with global pretensions were associated with—and in some instances beholden to—national governments. To the extent that the turn of the century was a globalized age, and most historians accept that it was, international capitalism did not diminish the significance of states.

The outcome of the Petroleum War would lead Standard's chief diplomat, William Herbert Libby, to conclude, "American capital invested abroad—even in accord with the strictest treaty provisos—may be subjected to the most arbitrary and inequitable treatment by a foreign government, because neither the American Executive nor the Department of State is vested with any discretionary power to adopt—whatever the crisis—suitable retaliatory action or adequate industrial reprisals."⁵ Libby's indignation reminds us that more than oil was at stake in this dispute. At its heart lay two incompatible approaches to the question of sovereignty—in particular, the nature of foreign stockholders' rights in a domestically incorporated joint stock company. It was not, strictly speaking, Standard that had run into trouble in Austria, but rather a Viennese subsidiary that was legally an Austrian company, and not an American one at all. This raised the question of how to determine a company's "nationality." Was it based on the firm's legal site of incorporation? The citizenship of its board of directors, or of its major shareholders? The location of its production facilities, or of its consumer markets? The answer to these questions was more than academic: access to the largest consumer markets in Europe hung in the balance. To prod the State Department into action, Standard argued that not just oil revenue, but in fact all American stockholders' foreign investments were at risk.

Libby's dilemma exposes the fluidity between companies' national and multinational identification at the same time that it demonstrates the value of stubbornly international business history. Capitalism in this period, despite individual companies' penchants for border-crossing, was deeply national—even if the historical community increasingly recognizes its effects as transnational. Heads of corporations and heads of state alike operated in a paradoxical political and economic climate characterized by what Eric Hobsbawm called "the strange schizophrenia of the capitalist world economy"—at once internationalist and organized around national economies.⁶ Multinational corporations—in particular, oil companies—could get caught between the international markets in which they operated and the national governments whose support they sometimes needed to protect their extended opera-

⁴ Mira Wilkins, *The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business Abroad from the Colonial Era to 1914* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), 62. Austria-Hungary, with a population of 49,418,600, had more residents than all of South America (48,946,437). *The Library Atlas of the World*, vol. 2: *Foreign Countries* (Chicago, 1912), 110. "Der Petroleumkrieg," *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), September 24, 1910.

⁵ William Herbert Libby to Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox, December 20, 1912, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 59, College Park, Md., Decimal File 1910-1929 [hereafter NARA, RG 59], Box 4462, 363.113 V 13/95.

⁶ Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914* (New York, 1989), 40, 41, 54. See also Charles Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era," *American Historical Review* 105, no. 3 (June 2000): 808.

tions. Like other multinational firms, oil companies often functioned through subsidiaries founded as “national” joint stock companies and incorporated according to the regulations of a particular state.⁷ These companies were beholden to stockholders and run by merchants who, according to Smith, were stateless—but they were taxed and regulated locally.⁸

In countless ways, oil companies’ successful operations depended on the benevolence of states. Vertically integrated oil companies had to secure access to crude oil in areas of production, transport that oil to refining facilities, and arrange for the distribution of refined products to consumer markets; sometimes each of these stages occurred on a different continent. And in each context, oil companies had to navigate through wide varieties of tax regimes, tariffs on crude and/or refined products, procedures for granting concessions, regulations controlling exploration and extraction rights, laws linking mineral rights to or dividing them from land ownership, labor laws, and widely diverse levels of infrastructure enabling or limiting distribution, including railroads. This created not only situations where state interference could become a matter of more than “trifling disgust” for corporations, but also situations in which only proactive state support could enable corporations to continue operation.

To say that states were, in the words of Hobsbawm, the “basic building-blocks” of the capitalist world economy, however, is not to say that they were monolithic or even consistent in representing “national interest.”⁹ After all, Standard Oil’s request for State Department assistance on behalf of its Austrian subsidiary was synchronous with the Justice Department’s prosecution of Standard Oil before the Supreme Court. The same federal government that made Standard the target of investigation and prosecution at home aggressively advocated its foreign operations—even borrowing Libby’s language to make its case. The extended confrontation between Standard, the U.S. Department of State, Austria-Hungary, and Austrian refiners thus exposes both the interdependence of diplomats and captains of industry, governments and nongovernmental organizations (including for-profit corporations), and also their ability to take different positions in different contexts.

The Petroleum War was waged not only between states, but also within and across them, and to study it requires breaking down barriers between state and non-state agents. In both Austria and the United States, a dizzying array of actors, some outward-looking, some inward-looking, some governmental, some private, participated in this dispute. Within the imperial government in Vienna, there were no fewer than five ministries responsible for overseeing various aspects of the oil industry. Alternately at odds with and beholden to the imperial government were Galician crude oil producers, Galician petroleum refiners, other Austrian petroleum refiners, Aus-

⁷ Alice Teichova, “Multinationals in Perspective,” in Alice Teichova, Maurice Lévy-Leboyer, and Helga Nussbaum, eds., *Multinational Enterprise in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, 1986), 364.

⁸ Practical considerations such as “transport costs and other transaction costs” also hampered the mobility of multinational corporations. Dani Rodrik, “Symposium on Globalization in Perspective: An Introduction,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 12, no. 4 (1998): 4. Factors tying multinational corporations to a particular area include “the control and exploitation of . . . raw material,” “domination of the entire world market or part of it for a certain product,” the evasion of “tariffs which would be imposed were the goods imported,” and acquiring “a foothold in one country by participating in its economic life for further expansion to other countries.” Teichova, “Multinationals in Perspective,” 367.

⁹ Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*, 40.

trian consumers, and Austrian petroleum wholesalers and retailers. An equally wide range of persons and institutions were involved on the American side. Standard acted within Austria through its Austrian subsidiary, Vacuum Oil Company AG, Vienna, but let Libby direct its negotiations with the State Department in Washington, D.C., directly from his Manhattan office. Within the State Department, responsibility for managing the crisis was shared by the newly minted Division of Near Eastern Affairs, the Bureau of Trade Relations, the Counselor's Office, and the ambassador in Vienna. Libby looked to Congress for further assistance, and the State Department tried to involve the Department of the Treasury. The various participants had motivations, incentives, goals, and perspectives that varied synchronically from those of their allies and opponents, and diachronically, based both on external circumstances and on the experience they gained during this protracted dispute. Attempts to present a united front when interests and incentives were not only diverse but in fact irreconcilable were characteristic of European and American diplomatic relations in this period. They reflect asymmetric relationships and unexpected alliances that arose within the oil industry and in its interaction with states—relationships that complicate the notion of national interest.

Grouping historical actors according to their interests in petroleum creates links across national boundaries and nearly impermeable divisions within nation-states. A country's leading oil companies, engaged in merciless struggles with other countries' leading oil companies for global markets and access to production, could claim to need and deserve government support abroad. However, even if national governments were inclined to protect purportedly "national" industries from "foreign" competition, they were less able to discern a "universal" or "national" interest in those same companies' domestic activities. Too many different groups—producers, refiners, distributors, wholesale and retail merchants, consumers—could claim to represent that interest best. Underneath the façade of national interest—a phrase used generously by all the protagonists in this dispute—lay complex and unbalanced internal struggles for both economic power and moral authority. Nevertheless, to succeed in international markets, even companies as powerful as Standard Oil found that they needed to link their business interest to the putative national interest when calling on the state for support. Even states as prominent in their advocacy of the free market as the United States were willing to use diplomacy to promote their own business interests abroad.

THE PETROLEUM WAR OF 1910 WAS POSSIBLE thanks to a historical circumstance that is easily forgotten: in that distant age, both the United States and Austria-Hungary were oil-producing states whose petroleum production vastly exceeded domestic demand.¹⁰ Thanks to its Galician oilfields, Austria-Hungary was, after the United States and the Russian Empire, the world's third-largest oil-producing country, ac-

¹⁰ Harold Williamson and Arnold Daum, *The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination, 1859–1899* (Evanston, Ill., 1959), 108–124. By the early 1880s, petroleum represented the United States' fourth most valuable export; *ibid.*, 338. Ralph Hidy and Muriel Hidy, *Pioneering in Big Business, 1882–1911* (New York, 1955), 124. The Hidy and Hidy volume is the first in a four-volume series, *History of Standard Oil Company* (New Jersey), made possible when, in 1947, Standard Oil agreed to open its own records to scholars over whose work it would have no control. According to the archivist responsible

counting for 5 percent of global oil production in 1908.¹¹ At that time, the United States was unchallenged as the global leader in oil production (with over 60 percent), and the Standard Oil Trust dominated the U.S. and western European markets.¹² Thanks to recent discoveries of major new oilfields at Spindletop (1901), Masjid-i-Suleiman (1908), and Tampico (1910), newcomers Texas, Persia, and Mexico were just beginning to join the ranks of global production leaders. The oil industry of 1910 featured not only different producers, but also different products and different problems. One hundred years ago, crude oil's most useful, profitable, and widespread refined product was not gasoline or fuel oil but kerosene, used to light the homes and public buildings of rural Europe and America long after it had been replaced by gas and electricity in their major cities.¹³ In an era in which the world's petroleum resources truly seemed limitless, securing control over markets with high demand was a greater competitive challenge than securing access to productive oil fields. Competition was particularly fierce in Europe.

Analysts at the French investment bank Le Crédit Lyonnais reported in 1908 that Galicia was the last European bastion of resistance to the American trust, other competitors appearing "to have found it more practical to get along with [their] powerful rival."¹⁴ When Austrian refiners suffering from their own problems with domestic oversupply targeted Germany and France, they did not fundamentally threaten Standard's position. But the looming dissolution of the Trust back in the United States added a new dimension to Standard's concerns. Despite its reputation for omnipotence, Standard Oil worried, according to John D. Rockefeller's biographer, that "its monopoly was swiftly crumbling at home and overseas." After the federal circuit court in St. Louis ruled against the Trust in late 1909, and before the Supreme Court's anticipated confirmation of that decision was announced in May of 1911, Standard's authority at home and abroad seemed vulnerable to an unparalleled degree.¹⁵ Austria's entry into the western European market exacerbated Standard's fear that its carefully constructed control was fragile and threatened with collapse. Under competition not only from the organization of Austrian oil export-

for the Exxon/Mobil papers at the University of Texas, the papers referenced by the Hidys have since disappeared; it would therefore be impossible to reproduce their work.

¹¹ The erstwhile Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, which marked Austria-Hungary's border with the Russian Empire, is now divided between Poland and Ukraine. In 1895, the U.S. produced 51 percent of the world's petroleum, Russia 44 percent, and Austria-Hungary 1.4 percent. In 1909, the United States produced 61 percent, Russia 22 percent, and Austria-Hungary 5 percent. Robert Schwarz, ed., *Petroleum-Vademecum: International Petroleum Tables*, 7th ed. (Berlin, 1930), 2-5. On the Galician oil industry, see Alison Frank, *Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005).

¹² By 1908, Standard controlled an estimated 75 percent of the kerosene market in western Europe. Wilkins, *The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise*, 83; Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering in Big Business*, 565; Michael Smith, *The Emergence of Modern Business Enterprise in France, 1800-1930* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), 424.

¹³ In 1904, illuminating oil accounted for 58 percent of the total output of major refinery products in the U.S. In 1909, 64.2 percent of illuminating oil produced in the U.S. was exported. However, whereas kerosene distribution grew by only 2.5 times between 1899 and 1919, fuel oil distribution in the U.S. domestic market grew by 2,500 percent. Williamson and Daum, *The American Petroleum Industry*, 168, 169.

¹⁴ "Note sur les Pétroles de Galicie," June 1908, Archives historiques du Crédit Lyonnais [hereafter AHCL], Direction des études économiques et financières [hereafter DEEF], 30167, Étude no. 303.2, 13.

¹⁵ Ron Chernow, *Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr.* (New York, 1998), 431, 554.

ers, the Aktiengesellschaft für Österreichische-Ungarische Mineralölprodukte (OLEX), but also from the European Petroleum Union, British Petroleum, and Russian oil companies, Standard participated in “intensified trade tactics” to defend its European market share, turning 1910 into a year of struggle that the editor of the *Petroleum Review* believed would “commercially far outshine not a few international differences.”¹⁶

The conflict between the Austrian government and Standard erupted in the Austrian province of Galicia, where petroleum production dated back to the 1850s. Standard grew interested in Galicia in the 1890s, following the discovery of new beds in the Boryslaw basin that had caused a sudden and dramatic increase in Galician production and the plummeting of Standard’s sales in the monarchy.¹⁷ Anticipating resistance to the “standardization” of Europe’s domestic markets, the Trust expanded abroad under the name of one of its affiliates (in which it had acquired a 75 percent interest upon the foundation of the Standard Oil Trust in 1882): the Rochester, New York-based Vacuum Oil Company.¹⁸ Vacuum Oil Company AG, Vienna, was duly chartered, under Austrian laws of incorporation, in 1899.¹⁹ In 1904, driven by high tariffs on refined products designed to protect Galician crude oil producers and in response to the creation of OLEX, it built a large refinery in Czechowitz-Dzieditz/Czechowice-Dziedzice, in Austrian Silesia.²⁰ By 1910, Vacuum had about \$3 million (U.S.) invested in manufacturing plants and equipment in Austria-Hungary, not including liquid capital for commercial purposes.²¹

The mere presence of a Standard Oil subsidiary on Austrian soil did not inevitably lead to a diplomatic dispute. In 1910, however, the Austrian petroleum industry had reached a point of crisis that its participants recognized they could not resolve themselves. Vacuum’s competitive tactics had intensified difficulties for Austrian refiners that dated back to the alleviation of a Galician overproduction crisis at the beginning of the twentieth century. When overproduction had threatened to drive producers out of business, the central government initiated an ambitious program to raise crude oil prices by constructing the largest oil refinery in non-Russian Europe, converting all public lines of the Austrian state railway from coal power to petroleum, and purchasing 1.5 million tons of crude oil annually—approximately 75 percent of all the crude expected to be produced in Galicia in the year the agreement was reached—at a rate nearly double its market value at the time.²² By raising the market

¹⁶ *Petroleum Review* (London) 35, no. 513 (October 7, 1911): 235–236.

¹⁷ Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering in Big Business*, 131.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 46–47, 110; Williamson and Daum, *The American Petroleum Industry*, 476.

¹⁹ When founded in 1899, it had 200,000 Austrian crowns in capital; by 1908, capitalization had increased to 20,000,000 crowns. “Vacuum Oil Company Aktien Gesellschaft à Buda Pest,” October 1919, AHCL, DEEF, 30166, Note no. 4807, 1–2.

²⁰ Another subsidiary, Vacuum Oil Company Reszvenytársaság, Budapest, built a refinery in Almásfüzitő, Hungary. Wilkins, *The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise*, 87; Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering in Big Business*, 513. Vacuum’s director estimated the capacity of the two refineries together at about 13 percent of Austro-Hungarian production. Letter from George Washington Hooker to Charles Denby, General Consul of the United States, June 15, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 25024/5.

²¹ Recognizing the importance of transportation and storage of petroleum, Standard also owned a 40 percent interest in the Galician Crude Oil Transport and Storage Company. Libby to Knox, June 15, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 25024. Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering in Big Business*, 513.

²² Stefan Sulimirski, “Stanisław Szczepanowski, Zyciorys,” *Przemysł Naftowy* 4, no. 11 (June 1929): 324–326; Bankers Trust Company, *The Sixth Country in Europe* (New York, 1927), 10; Frank, *Oil Empire*, 165–169.

price for crude oil, however, the imperial government created serious problems for refiners, which were unable to pass on the increase to their customers.²³ These substantial problems notwithstanding, when Austrian refiners learned that Standard Oil had entered their market (several years after the fact), they blamed their woes on the presumed interference of so powerful a rival.²⁴

Austrian refiners believed that Standard was using Vacuum to drive them out of their own domestic market.²⁵ According to Ludwig Neurath, the director of a leading Viennese bank (the Österreichische Credit-Anstalt für Handel und Gewerbe), Vacuum overbid other Austrian refineries' purchase offers for crude oil and underbid their prices for refined products.²⁶ While the Austrian industry was troubled by its own internal flaws (most prominent among them a lack of sufficient organization on the part of either producers or refiners), Neurath argued in a 1910 exposé that the primary cause of its "chaotic condition" was the "business politics of Standard Oil Company, which uses its Austro-Hungarian subsidiary, Vacuum Oil Company, to carry on in the most intense manner its destructive politics in a battle against the domestic petroleum industry."²⁷ The trouble had started when, driven by stagnant domestic consumption and rapidly increasing production, Austrian refiners learned at the beginning of the twentieth century what Standard had long realized: access to export markets was the most significant question of the day.²⁸ Without established export markets, efficient transportation, or adequate storage facilities, Galician refiners fell victim to every dramatic alteration in local or global production and the resulting shifts in prices. Economic analysts employed by the Crédit Lyonnais an-

²³ The Austrian government strongly pressured refiners to offer stable and low consumer prices. Testimony of Sektionschef Brosche (Handelsministerium), "Enquete über die Krise in der Mineralölindustrie," Österreichisches Staatsarchiv [hereafter ÖStA], Ministerium für öffentliche Arbeiten [hereafter MföA], F664, Z1079 XIV 1910, 10.

²⁴ Viceroy Michał Bobrzyński feared that three English companies that had purchased nearly three dozen wells along with connected pipelines in 1910 might have acquired them "at the expense of the American Standard Company." Tsentral'nyi Derzhavnyi Istorychnyi Arkhiv Ukrainy, f.146, op. 6, sp. 1338, no. 245.

²⁵ Both contemporary business analysts at the French bank Le Crédit Lyonnais and historians of Standard's European operations agree. "Note sur les Pétroles de Galicie," June 1908, AHCL, DEEF, 30167, Étude no. 303.2, 15–16; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., *Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), 439.

²⁶ Ludwig Neurath, "Massnahmen zur Sanierung der Lage der österr. Petroleumindustrie," March 5, 1910, ÖStA, MföA, F664, Z354. The Credit-Anstalt had been involved in attempts to organize the industry since at least 1902. "The Condition of the Galician Petroleum Industry," *Petroleum Review*, September 26, 1908, 181–182, and October 10, 1908, 199–200. Neurath, a "remarkable specialist in the petroleum industry," was a member of the governing board of thirty-one industrial enterprises. Bernard Michel, *Banques et banquiers en Autriche au début du 20e siècle* (Paris, 1976), 147, 160.

²⁷ Neurath, "Massnahmen zur Sanierung der Lage der österr. Petroleumindustrie."

²⁸ In 1909, Austria consumed only 14 percent of its own petroleum production. Galician production had exceeded Austro-Hungarian consumption every year since 1895. Joseph Mendel and Robert Schwarz, eds., *Internationale Petroleumstatistik*, vol. 2: *Oesterreich-Ungarn* (Vienna, 1912), 10. For an argument that Austria-Hungary's low level of consumption was best explained by its burdensome tax on petroleum consumption, see "Petroleum Consumption in Austria-Hungary," *Petroleum Review*, July 6, 1907, 19. The policy of inflating domestic prices in order to subsidize lower prices abroad did not help. R. Zaloziecki, "A Review of the Galician Petroleum Industry in 1898," *Petroleum Industrial and Technical Review*, February 18, 1899, 9–12. On the overproduction crisis, see Frank, *Oil Empire*, 140, 149–155, 169–172. On Austria's consumption more broadly, see John Komlos, *The Habsburg Monarchy as a Customs Union: Economic Development in Austria-Hungary in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, N.J., 1983), 6. The Austrian overproduction crisis was only one part of a larger glut of oil initiated by an economic depression and drop in demand for oil in the Russian Empire that began in 1900. Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York, 1991), 117.

anticipated that Austrian petroleum exports to Germany and France would lead to a battle with Standard, and they did not believe it was one that Austrian refiners could win.²⁹ A large part of the problem for Austrian refiners was that freight costs on the Austrian railroads were notoriously uncompetitive. Since Standard could ship oil from the United States across the Atlantic to ports in Europe—including Hamburg—more cheaply than Austrian companies could send it via rail, Austrian refiners could match Standard's prices only by selling at a loss.³⁰ At the height of overproduction, Austrian refiners were offering refined products in France at a price well below the amount charged by French refiners, hoping that by selling at a loss they might secure a foothold in the market.³¹ Consistent with a general tendency to hold John Rockefeller personally responsible for Standard's every step, Austrian producer/refiner William MacGarvey complained that Rockefeller "will not allow us in any country in Europe!"³² Neurath confirmed that a decade's worth of negotiations with the Americans over European export markets had led to naught.³³

Vacuum, not surprisingly, had a different perspective on the origins of its dispute with Austrian refiners. OLEX was a joint stock company that organized the export activities of Austrian refiners by "centralizing offers, allocating orders, and seeking to develop foreign sales."³⁴ It served only those Austrian refiners who agreed to abide by the production quotas apportioned to its members. Although many Galician refiners did not participate in OLEX, its clientele included the most powerful refining companies within Austria.³⁵ Vacuum was dissatisfied with its proposed allotment, and subsequently refused to participate. Given that the Galician refiners who controlled OLEX's board of directors were openly known to be engaged in a "battle against competition from Vacuum Oil," Vacuum's complaints that its allotment was punitively small are credible.³⁶ When sudden increases in production in 1909 led to

²⁹ "Note sur les Pétroles de Galicie," June 2008, AHCL, DEEF, 30167, Étude no. 303.2, 11–12.

³⁰ In 1898, Galician petroleum was sold in Germany at prices between 17.05 and 19.80 francs, while U.S. refined oil was sold in Hamburg at 16 francs. "Prix de Revient du Pétrole Raffiné en Galicie," in "Gisements Pétrolifères de Schodnica (Galicie): Concessions de Messieurs Wolski et Odrzywolski," March 30, 1898, AHCL, DEEF, 25245, 3–4. The cost of shipping Standard's oil across the Atlantic dropped sharply with the introduction of oceangoing steam tankers in 1886. Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering in Big Business*, 145–146. Thanks to the spread of steamships and the drops in freight rates, the transportation of a ton of wheat from New York to Mannheim cost no more than the transport of the same from Berlin to Kassel. Sebastian Conrad, *Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen Kaiserreich* (Munich, 2006), 39.

³¹ According to the *Journal du Pétrole*, Austro-Hungarian refiners sold petroleum for 18–22 crowns/100 kg within the monarchy, but for only 3.5 crowns/100 kg in export markets. "Note sur les Pétroles de Galicie," June 1908, AHCL, DEEF, 30167, Étude no. 303.2, 10–11; *Journal du Pétrole*, March 1, 1908, 11.

³² "Enquete über die Krise in der Mineralölindustrie," 15. MacGarvey was born in Canada and emigrated to Galicia in the 1880s. He was Austrian by neither citizenship nor nationality, but only by business interest—the relevant category here.

³³ Neurath, "Massnahmen zur Sanierung der Lage der österr. Petroleumindustrie."

³⁴ "Note sur les Pétroles de Galicie," June 1908, AHCL, DEEF, 30167, Étude no. 303.2, 14. Controlling shares in OLEX were owned by the Deutsche Erdöl-AG, which was in turn charged with managing the oil interests of one of the largest German banks, the Disconto-Gesellschaft. Rivalries with Standard Oil in the German market can therefore be assumed to have played some role in discrimination against Vacuum in the setting of export quotas. For a more thorough explanation of the relationship between the Disconto-Gesellschaft, Deutsche Erdöl-AG, and OLEX, see Chandler, *Scale and Scope*, 438–440.

³⁵ "Stés pétrolifères en Galicie," AHCL, DEEF, 22085, folder MB3.

³⁶ The directors of Vacuum Oil Company AG (Vienna), Julius Weiss and George W. Hooker, claimed that they had been allotted only 110 cars of refined petroleum per year for domestic distribution,

a dramatic drop in crude oil prices, Galician producers, lacking adequate storage facilities and facing the prospect of bankruptcy, toyed with the idea of reaching an agreement with Vacuum for storage of their crude oil. This would have put an end to the favorable prices that refiners enjoyed, and it would have enabled Vacuum to elude the restrictions that OLEX was trying to enforce.³⁷

Recognizing that they could not win a battle with Standard on their own, refiners called on the imperial government to take action. Their faith that it would do so reflects a general consensus in Austria that the government was obliged to support domestic industry through the bureaucracy rather than the legislature. Imperial Austrian bureaucracy, dubbed *Bürokrätinismus* (bureau-cretinism) by the acerbic Viennese wit Karl Kraus, has a bad reputation. One prominent historian of Austria could praise it only in its inefficiency, noting that "the propensity of bureaucracy to stumble over red tape engendered that 'absolutism mitigated by *Schlamperei* [sloppiness],' whose loopholes made life bearable in what might otherwise have been an oppressive state."³⁸ Such criticism notwithstanding, the imperial bureaucracy was also a cornerstone of Austrian society—in particular after the Great Depression of 1873–1896. In its aftermath, Austria moved toward a form of organized capitalism, defined by the Austrian economic historian Franz Baltzarek as "that form of economic order which bid free competitive capitalism adieu, and represented a concentrated, internally bureaucratized economic order organized through business associations and secured by state interventions."³⁹ According to legal historian David Gerber, in the post-depression environment, "government activity seemed to many to be the only way out of the economic doldrums."⁴⁰

True to this model, the government's reaction was swift. Prime Minister Richard Baron Bienenrath asked each of the relevant ministries to submit suggestions for action.⁴¹ The minister of foreign affairs, Alois Count Aerenthal, was responsible for managing any diplomatic repercussions of a trade war with a company that the Americans claimed as their own. The minister of public works, August Ritt, ran a state-owned oil refinery in Drohobycz that was the largest purchaser of crude oil in the empire and the largest non-Russian refinery in Europe. The minister of railways, Ludwig Wrba, controlled access to tank cars, switching lines, fill stations, and other installations that enabled oil refiners to transport crude and refined oil products via rail. The minister of commerce, Richard Weiskirchner, was responsible for granting concessions to and regulating the operation of refineries and distribution organi-

while "other refineries of the same capacity were allowed a quantity of 2500 cars." Weiss and Hooker to Richard Kerens, U.S. Ambassador in Vienna, July 23, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 363.115 V 13.

³⁷ Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering in Big Business*, 513. On the other hand, backed by Standard and its "unlimited financial resources," Vacuum would have been able to provide sufficient storage facilities to make price collapse caused by overproduction a thing of the past. "The Standard in Galicia," *Petroleum Review*, June 19, 1909, 357–358, 366.

³⁸ William Johnston, *The Austrian Mind* (Berkeley, Calif., 1972), 48, 50.

³⁹ Franz Baltzarek, "Franz Klein als Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitiker," in Herbert Hofmeister, ed., *Forschungsband Franz Klein: Leben und Wirken* (Vienna, 1988), 173.

⁴⁰ David Gerber, "The Origins of European Competition Law in Fin-de-Siècle Austria," *American Journal of Legal History* 36, no. 4 (October 1992): 414.

⁴¹ "Amtserinnerung betreffend die von der Regierung zum Schutze der heimischen Petroleumindustrie zu ergreifenden Massnahmen," June 18, 1910, ÖStA, Ministerrats-Präsidium [hereafter MP], 2462.

zations. The minister of finance, Leon Ritter von Biliński, set taxation laws that applied to oil production, refining, sales, and consumption. The minister for Galicia, Władysław Ritter von Dułęba, was responsible for representing the interests of the empire's only significant oil-producing province. A conference held at the Finance Ministry on June 8, 1910, brought them all together to consider "drastic measures for the protection of the home petroleum industry."⁴² Molding a *lex specialis* that would simultaneously punish Standard's cronies and leave everyone else unharmed required all the creative talents that the administration could muster. Discussion quickly focused on a confidential proposed revision of petroleum freight tariff policy that had been circulated by Railway Minister Wrba. Wrba's proposal included new conditions determining eligibility for long-established discounts on shipping petroleum products that neither Vacuum nor any other refinery under the influence of Standard could possibly satisfy.⁴³ The Railway Ministry, boasting that "at the time of the existence of the private railways, such a measure would have been impossible," may have been motivated in part by a desire to demonstrate its own usefulness.⁴⁴ Other ministries were at a loss to suggest better alternatives, and given the urgent need to "free Austrian refineries from the pressure of American competition as much as possible," they followed Wrba's plan to manipulate railway tariffs.⁴⁵ Without mentioning Standard or Vacuum by name, the new regulations were designed to drive Vacuum and its allied refineries out of business.

In only two weeks, new tariff rules increased freight costs for the targeted refineries by 70 percent and more.⁴⁶ Vacuum estimated that the higher prices alone would cost it \$1,000 (U.S.) per day, and the Railway Ministry predicted that "given such extraordinary freight increases, the named refiners will hardly be in a position to maintain operations."⁴⁷ But the discriminatory measures did not end there. In mid-June, the Railway Ministry canceled the hauling contract that allowed Vacuum to use tank cars on state railways, as well as contracts allowing the company to connect its storage tanks with the government-owned filling pipes required to load crude oil into tank cars. Most crippling to Vacuum's daily operations, on September 10, the Railway Ministry put into effect the cancellation of a contract that allowed Vacuum to use a switch connection between its refinery at Dzieditz/Dziedzice and the railway.⁴⁸ The refinery was then effectively cut off from the rest of the world. Ironically, Standard Oil faced elimination from the Austrian market thanks to discriminatory limits on access to railways.

The Petroleum War was possible only because of the nineteenth century's trans-

⁴² Weiss and Hooker to Kerens, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 363.115 V 13.

⁴³ "Tarifmaßnahmen zur Unterstützung der heimischen Petroleumindustrie," May 30, 1910, ÖStA, MföA, F664, Z634.

⁴⁴ "Antrag, betreffend teilweise Aenderung der Petroleumtarife der k.k. österr. Staatsbahnen," May 29, 1910, ÖStA, MföA, F664, Z634. The Railway Ministry was created in 1896. Walter Goldinger, "Die Zentralverwaltung in Cisleithanien—Die zivile gemeinsame Zentralverwaltung," in Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, vol. 2: *Verwaltung und Rechtswesen* (Vienna, 1975), 146.

⁴⁵ Ritt's and Weiskirchner's responses to Bienenrth's request for position statements, June 9 and 10, 1910, ÖStA, MP, Z2411.

⁴⁶ "Resumé über die Besprechungen des Ministerialtarifkomitees vom 1. und 6. Juni 1910, betreffend Maßnahmen zur Unterstützung der heimischen Petroleumindustrie," ÖStA, MföA, F664, Z634.

⁴⁷ "Antrag, betreffend teilweise Aenderung der Petroleumtarife der k.k. österr. Staatsbahnen," *ibid.*

⁴⁸ Charles Everest to Knox, New York, October 26, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/37.

portation revolution: Standard's competitiveness in Europe was dependent on steamships; Austria's ability to fight Standard at home and compete with it abroad was dependent on railroads. While historians and economists are rightly inclined to trumpet the many accomplishments of the railroad, this episode reminds us that railroads were also a tool for the uneven dispensation of economic power—not just by virtue of their existence in some places and not in others, but also by virtue of their manipulation. The irony of a story about discriminatory railroad pricing used against, rather than by, Standard was appreciated by outside observers, who, at a distance, were able to derive a measure of amusement from the whole conflict. The *Times* of London noted that Austria applied “methods of administrative chicanery and railway discrimination strikingly similar to those which made the name of the Standard Oil Company a byword in the United States.” Under the motto that imitation is the highest form of flattery, it went on to observe: “The tactics of the Austrian authorities are as indefensible, or as defensible, as are those of the Standard Oil Company; but, as a sense of humour is not always an asset in business and diplomacy,” the State Department had “made diplomatic representations to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office on behalf of the American . . . interests affected by Austrian flattery of Mr. Rockefeller.”⁴⁹ The *Times* was alluding to Rockefeller's own record of having “expanded his position in refining by ‘raising rivals’ costs.”⁵⁰ It was not by offering refined products at impossibly low prices that Rockefeller was able to secure Standard's dominance in the domestic oil industry, but rather by colluding with those railroads that together controlled the transportation of crude oil from and to points of production and refining. According to economists Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein, “Standard and the railroads, by cooperating with one another, did something jointly that neither of them could do separately—they created a monopoly.” Their analysis shows “that it was petroleum transportation, not refining, that was monopolized and that the profits earned by Standard in refining should be thought of as merely a share of the monopoly profits from the transportation cartel.”⁵¹ Austria's best model in using railroads to hamstring Vacuum Oil was Standard Oil itself.

Rockefeller's infamous octopus, the Standard Oil Trust, was one of the most powerful corporations in the world at the time, but it was also surrounded by enemies. Ida Tarbell's denunciation of Rockefeller had already been published in multiple editions, and was available in bookstores across the United States.⁵² In Washington, members of Congress had been enacting legislation directed at curbing Standard's business operations since 1906, and their antipathy showed no sign of abating; in addition, dozens of individual states had initiated lawsuits against the Trust.⁵³ The federal government had filed a suit to dissolve the company under the

⁴⁹ “Hungarian Finance: The Failure of the Loan Negotiations,” *Times* (London), September 15, 1910, 5.

⁵⁰ Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein, “Monopolization by ‘Raising Rivals’ Costs’: The Standard Oil Case,” *Journal of Law and Economics* 39, no. 1 (April 1996): 23.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 24, 27; Johnson, “Public Policy and Concentration in the Petroleum Industry, 1870–1911,” in *Oil's First Century: Papers Given at the Centennial Seminar on the History of the Petroleum Industry*, Harvard Business School, November 13–14, 1959 (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 47.

⁵² Ida Tarbell, *The History of the Standard Oil Company* (New York, 1904).

⁵³ Lawsuits were pending in Kentucky, Tennessee, Kansas, Missouri, West Virginia, Connecticut, Ohio, Arkansas, Maryland, Texas, and Oklahoma. Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering in Big Business*, 674–676,




FIGURE 1: "Next!" This cartoon by Udo J. Keppler, which was published in *Puck* on September 7, 1904, depicts Standard Oil as an octopus whose tentacles have already grabbed the steel, copper, and shipping industries, an unidentified statehouse, and the U.S. Capitol; another tentacle is poised to capture the White House. The last three tentacles stretch out across the Atlantic, presumably toward Europe. Color lithograph, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division Washington, D.C., LC-USZC4-435 (color film copy transparency).

terms of the Sherman Antitrust Act in November of 1906 that would surpass in documentation and expense anything previously seen in the United States.⁵⁴ The Trust's last hope of avoiding dissolution was put to the test when arguments before the Supreme Court began on March 14, 1910.⁵⁵ All of America—the public, state and federal government, state and circuit courts—had lost patience with the incomparable strength that Standard Oil's predatory practices, sophisticated networks, deep pockets, and general business acumen had allowed it to build up across the country. It was this perceived tension between the U.S. government and Standard Oil that convinced Austrian officials that they could take action against Standard's Austrian subsidiary, Vacuum Oil, with impunity. But when the Austrian imperial government assumed that discriminatory measures taken against Standard Oil on foreign soil would be welcome to a government prosecuting Standard at home, it was gravely mistaken. Far from greeting the Austrian measures as assistance in punishing a greedy multinational corporation, the State Department opposed them as unfair attacks on an important U.S. business interest.

In the context of battles with larger rivals, the asymmetric conflict between the Standard Oil Trust and Austrian refiners might well have been dismissed by Standard

684; Allan Nevins, *Study in Power: John D. Rockefeller, Industrialist and Philanthropist*, 2 vols. (New York, 1953), 2: 356.

⁵⁴ Chernow, *Titan*, 538. Before it even reached the Supreme Court, the case had cost an estimated \$4 million and produced a court record of approximately 11.5 million words. "Millions Spent in Oil Prosecution," *New York Times*, January 16, 1909, 14.

⁵⁵ "Oil Fight Begins in Supreme Court," *New York Times*, March 15, 1910, 3.

as “trifling.” Standard did not, however, simply shut down its Austrian operations in disgust and move elsewhere. On the contrary, Vacuum responded to the discriminatory measures by calling on another government for support: that of the majority of its stockholders, the United States. It did this not by appealing directly to the U.S. ambassador in Vienna, but rather by turning to Standard Oil and its chief diplomat, William Herbert Libby. Libby, who had worked for Standard Oil for thirty-two years and had represented its foreign interests since he was first sent to the Far East in 1882, barraged the secretary of state with letters demanding that Vacuum’s interests be taken up by the U.S. government.⁵⁶ According to Ralph and Muriel Hidy, “No agent of Standard Oil journeyed further, saw more prominent people, or had a greater influence” than Libby. He was “a personable and cultivated representative, an experienced merchant of oil, an astute observer of trade conditions, an able judge of men, and a tenacious negotiator.”⁵⁷ Much of the diplomatic language that the State Department used in its communications with Austria-Hungary throughout this dispute actually originated with Libby.

Libby’s success in galvanizing the State Department into action demonstrates that even though the breakup of the Trust was less than a year away, the U.S. government was not indifferent to Standard’s treatment abroad. A German newspaper warned that the Viennese suggestion “that the American government does not appear to attend to Vacuum Oil Co., because ‘the hatred of Standard Oil Co. in America is so great that no one in Washington wants to lift a finger to help it,’ directly contradicts the real facts, and such an erroneous perception of circumstances could lead to a very dangerous tight-rope dance.”⁵⁸ Since the attack on Standard within Austria took place in the context of presumed U.S. indifference to the company’s fate, it reminds us that the breakup of the Trust—anticipated for several years before it was formally mandated by the Supreme Court on May 15, 1911—had repercussions beyond the United States: America’s business was everybody’s business.⁵⁹ Reconnecting the dissolution of the Standard Oil Trust with the treatment of Standard Oil outside the U.S. can help us meet Thomas Bender’s call to “imagine an American historical narrative that situates the United States more fully in its larger transnational and intercultural global context.”⁶⁰ By pursuing its interests in Austria, Standard Oil was not only protecting its market share there, but also demonstrating that the dissolution of the Trust at home should not be interpreted as Standard’s vul-

⁵⁶ Correspondence between Libby and the secretary of state from June 20, 1910, until the spring of 1912 in NARA, RG 59, Boxes 4461 and 4462. Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering in Big Business*, 137. Libby continued to lobby on behalf of Vacuum Oil in 1911 after the breakup of the Trust, supporting the claim that “co-ordination of the activities of [the successors to the Trust] continued through common ownership and by virtue of long-established relationships which no legal decree could destroy overnight.” Arthur Johnson, “Continuity and Change in Government-Business Relations,” in John Braeman, Robert Bremner, and Everett Walters, eds., *Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America* (Columbus, Ohio, 1965), 201.

⁵⁷ Hidy and Hidy, *Pioneering in Big Business*, 136.

⁵⁸ Dmd 14, f. 44, L’vivs’ka Naukova Biblioteka im. Stefanyka, L’viv, Ukraine.

⁵⁹ “Standard Oil Company Must Dissolve in 6 Months,” *New York Times*, May 16, 1911, 1. For greater reflection on “the integration of the United States into the capitalist world economy” and the opportunities it affords transnational history, see Ian Tyrell, “American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History,” *American Historical Review* 96, no. 4 (October 1991): 1044–1050.

⁶⁰ Thomas Bender, “Introduction: Historians, the Nation, and the Plenitude of Narratives,” in Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley, Calif., 2002), 10.

nerability abroad. Ironically, however, this “transnational” context highlights the great relevance of “nationalist” thinking and state support.

To move the State Department to action, Libby argued that more than Vacuum’s business interest was at stake. Vacuum was “the most important American enterprise in that Empire,” and other American businessmen would watch its fate closely.⁶¹ U.S. officials agreed that Vacuum’s vulnerability to Austrian persecution would set a perilous example. Only two days after it received Libby’s initial complaint, the State Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs received a cablegram from the U.S. consul general in Vienna, Charles Harvey Denby, Jr.⁶² In the inelegant language of telegraph communications, Denby warned that “if equality of opportunity American capital in this important matter is not maintained precedent will be established dangerous other American interests.” The Austrians, he continued, assumed that their actions “towards this American group . . . will be agreeable the Government of the United States.”⁶³ Assistant Secretary of State Huntington Wilson responded by instructing Ambassador Richard C. Kerens to “make immediate representation to the Austro-Hungarian government requesting that the proposed repressive measures be suspended”—a proposal very much in keeping with Kerens’s personal inclination.⁶⁴ Standard could hardly have hoped for a more sympathetic representative in Vienna.

Kerens had a long history in both business and politics.⁶⁵ He was a board member of Edward Doheny’s Mexican Petroleum Company and had spent ten years on the Continental Railway Commission; Doheny’s biographer called him a stellar example of “the rising class of western businessmen.”⁶⁶ He served on the Republican National Committee for decades.⁶⁷ In return for his loyalty, President William Howard Taft appointed him to a “diplomatic post of the first rank”—ambassador to Austria-Hungary—shortly after his inauguration in 1909.⁶⁸ Standard had in Kerens a staunch Republican and a lifelong defender of the spirit of enterprise who, in his many years in business, had relied more than once on personal connections with well-placed politicians—and with representatives of Standard Oil.⁶⁹ But Kerens’s reliance on

⁶¹ The phrase originates in a letter from Libby to Knox (October 26, 1910) and was adopted by the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (October 31, 1910). NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.113 V 13/37.

⁶² Denby had been transferred to the U.S. consulate in Vienna in 1909 from Shanghai, where he had been U.S. consul general.

⁶³ Denby to Knox, June 18, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 25024/1.

⁶⁴ Huntington Wilson to Kerens, Washington, D.C., June 22, 1910, *ibid.*

⁶⁵ Francis Weber, *Encyclopedia of California’s Catholic Heritage, 1769–1999* (Mission Hills, Calif., 2001), 973.

⁶⁶ John A. Caruso, “The Pan American Railway,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 31, no. 4 (November 1951): 613; Dan La Botz, *Edward L. Doheny: Petroleum, Power, and Politics in the United States and Mexico* (New York, 1991), 14. Kerens was a principal stockholder and director of the Inter-Mountain Oil Company, capitalized at \$10 million in 1902. “To Develop Oil Lands in Wyoming,” *New York Times*, September 7, 1901, 12.

⁶⁷ Kerens worked tirelessly on the presidential campaigns of both Benjamin Harrison and William Howard Taft. His senatorial campaigns in Missouri were hindered by suspicion among his fellow Republicans of his “militant” Catholicism. Correspondence between Thomas Benson Whitledge and Kerens, Edward Rozier, and Benjamin Cahoon, 1874–1908, Thomas Benson Whitledge Papers, R276, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, University of Missouri–Rolla. Kerens was a “militant champion of strict interpretation of the laws of the Roman Catholic Church throughout his life.” “Is Divorce Good Behavior? Court Must Settle Point,” *New York Times*, October 13, 1929, M4.

⁶⁸ “Many Plums to Give,” *New York Times*, November 16, 1909, 5.

⁶⁹ For example, Kerens called on Russell Harrison to intervene with the secretary of war on behalf of one of his companies. Kerens to Harrison, St. Louis, Mo., August 15, 1891, Harrison, R. B. Mss., Manuscripts Department, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington. In 1902, Kerens recom-

friendly and informal relationships to get favorable results did not stand him in good stead within the Austrian diplomatic environment.⁷⁰ Although the Viennese post may have been a pleasant one thanks to the imperial capital's social and cultural standing, Austro-American diplomatic relations were not a priority for either country.⁷¹ Nor was Austria-Hungary willing to bend protocol to suit Kerens. Diplomatic procedure mandated that all his correspondence go through the Foreign Office. Although Vacuum was regularly referred to as an "American" company in internal ministerial correspondence, Foreign Minister Aerenthal rebuffed Kerens's efforts to broker an agreement by repeating ad nauseam that Vacuum was a domestic company, and thus relations between Austria and Vacuum did not fall under the purview of a foreign ambassador—or of the foreign minister. Even the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Trade Relations had to admit internally that "this policy is purely a domestic affair and is none of the business of the United States."⁷² Nevertheless, while Aerenthal appeared to be an impenetrable wall allowing no intercourse between the U.S. embassy and his own government, he diligently forwarded Kerens's increasingly impatient appeals to Prime Minister Bienert.⁷³ Bienert in turn forwarded them to the relevant Austrian ministries (Commerce, Finance, Public Works, Railways, and Galicia), and it was Minister of Commerce Weiskirchner, in consul-

mended to Doheny that they "sell a half interest" of the Mexican Petroleum Company either to Standard or to an affiliate. Kerens expected to be able to "get Mr. [Henry Clay] Pierce to go down there [Mexico] with me" to share in his "greatest delight . . . good hunting." Kerens to Doheny, Chicago, July 20, 1902, Archival Center, Archdiocese of Los Angeles, Papers of Carrie Estelle and Edward L. Doheny. Kerens peppered his correspondence with phrases such as "I will, of course, stand by the friends who have stood by me" and "I will help in any way I can, and stand squarely by my friends." Kerens to Whitley, October 6, 1896, and February 23, 1903, Whitley Papers.

⁷⁰ This is not to say that personalities and individual relationships were insignificant. J. Schwegel, an Austrian imperial consul for Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia in Winnipeg, privately offered a possible explanation to Kerens in the summer of 1911: "I had the impression that a great deal of ill feeling in this affair on the part of our Government has been caused by the insolent manner in which some of the representatives of the American Company have been behaving, thus making it difficult for our Government to give in, no matter how peacefully inclined at heart." Kerens to Wilson, Elkins, W.Va., August 28, 1911, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/84; J. Schwegel to Kerens, Bolzano, July 9, 1911, *ibid*.

⁷¹ Almost all of the press coverage of Ambassador Kerens in the United States revolved around social events, such as the *début*, and later the engagement, of his daughter Gladys. "Fashion's Fads and Fancies," *Washington Post*, August 1, 1910, 7. Diplomatic relations between Austria-Hungary and the United States had been temperate since the revolutions of 1848; the two states interacted only to resolve minor disagreements over immigration or the filling of diplomatic posts. Harry Hanak, "Die Einstellung Grossbritanniens und der Vereinigten Staaten zu Österreich(-Ungarn)," in Wandruszka and Urbanitsch, *Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848–1918*, vol. 6, pt. 2: *Die Habsburgermonarchie im System der Internationalen Beziehungen* (Vienna, 1993), 557. The most common source of conflicts was whether it was appropriate for naturalized U.S. citizens who had previously been citizens of Austria-Hungary to be compelled to fulfill outstanding obligations to serve in the Austro-Hungarian military if they returned to Austria-Hungary. Rudolf Agstner has surmised that the monthly reports sent by consuls in the 1890s "probably ended up unread in a drawer." Agstner, "From Apalachicola to Wilkes-Barre: Austria(-Hungary) and Its Consulates in the United States of America, 1820–1917," *Austrian History Yearbook* 38 (2006): 167. Nicole Phelps argues that nearly all diplomatic communication between the U.S. and Austria-Hungary can be grouped into one of three categories: conflicts over diplomatic ceremony, disputes over trade (primarily over tariffs), and migration-related issues. Phelps, "Sovereignty, Citizenship, and the New Liberal Order: US-Habsburg Relations and the Transformation of International Politics, 1880–1924" (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 2008).

⁷² Charles Pepper, "Standard Oil Case in Austria-Hungary," stamped as received August 20, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 25024/21.

⁷³ Aerenthal to Bienert, November 3, 1910, ÖStA, Finanzministerium [hereafter FM], Präs. Z2111.

tation with a Standing Interministerial Committee for Petroleum Affairs created to handle this affair, who drafted the responses that Aerenthal would render into more diplomatic language and then send on to Kerens.⁷⁴ Because of this insistence that no direct communication between the U.S. ambassador and the relevant Austrian ministries could take place, each side spent considerable energy trying to divine the "true" positions of decision-makers in the other country. And throughout the dispute, the State Department found itself relying and acting on information gathered and interpreted by representatives of Standard Oil.

JUST AS KERENS WAS SURPRISED BY Austria-Hungary's refusal to grant him any jurisdiction over what it argued was a purely domestic matter, so, too, was the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry shocked to discover that the U.S. government felt any sense of obligation to protect Standard Oil. Was it not true that, as a government-friendly newspaper noted, "in the Union itself, a war of extermination is being waged against the tyrannous supremacy of the oil trust"?⁷⁵ Heinrich Ritter Löwenthal von Linau, legation counselor in the Austro-Hungarian embassy in Washington, D.C., noted in a confidential letter to Aerenthal, "It seems to me self-evident, that the higher powers in the current federal government, in so far as they are concerned with such matters at all, allow themselves to be led by the effort to accord the same powerful Trust, against which they, in the real or imagined electoral interest of the Republican Party, claim to proceed with all the strength of the law in their own country, the greatest possible signs of affection on foreign soil."⁷⁶ From the perspective of the Taft administration, the overlying principle of the case was not the fight against Standard's monopoly within the United States, but rather the administration's support of U.S. businesses abroad, a policy known to its critics as "Dollar Diplomacy."

President Taft boasted in 1909 that his Republican administration was "lending all proper support to legitimate and beneficial American enterprises in foreign countries," and that the State Department would soon reveal itself to be "a thoroughly efficient instrument in the furtherance of foreign trade and of American interest abroad."⁷⁷ Taft's proclaimed advocacy of U.S. businesses overseas was taken as a

⁷⁴ "Regierungsmassnahmen gegen die Vacuum Oil Company," July 23, 1910, ÖStA, MföA, F664, Z874-XIV, ex. 1910; or "Neuerliche Intervention der amerikanischen Botschaft in Angelegenheit der Vacuum Oil Company," November 21, 1910, ÖStA, FM, 85817. Other examples include FM, Z76227, October 19, 1910, and ÖStA, MföA, F664, Z981.

⁷⁵ "Die Vorgänge in der Petroleumindustrie," *Neues Wiener Tagblatt* (Vienna), October 9, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.113 V 13/36.

⁷⁶ Heinrich Löwenthal von Linau to Aerenthal, Washington, D.C., November 10, 1911, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Austria [hereafter HHStA], Ministerium des Äußern [hereafter MdA], Administrative Registratur [hereafter AR], F97/10, Handelsartikel-Petroleum, folder 97 Petroleum 69c.

⁷⁷ Wilkins, *The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise*, 74. Rockefeller had endorsed Taft in the 1908 election: "He is not a man, I judge, . . . to impede the return of prosperity by advocating measures subversive of industrial progress." Chernow, *Titan*, 553. This attitude was politically contingent, and not a constant feature of U.S. foreign policy. George Gibb and Evelyn Knowlton insist that "at no time in the 1912-1917 period was effective diplomatic action taken to back Jersey Standard in its efforts to acquire oil reserves in the face of determined resistance from strong competitors and strong foreign governments," which reflects a change in U.S. foreign policy once Woodrow Wilson replaced Taft as president. The Wilson administration's opposition to "economic imperialism" and its belief that the U.S. government was duty-bound to "free [foreign, but particularly Latin American] countries of foreign

matter of policy by the secretary of state, Philander Chase Knox, who, according to his assistant secretary of state, Huntington Wilson, "gave a new definiteness, intelligibility and practicalness to American diplomacy."⁷⁸ Nevertheless, the State Department weighed the merits of individual cases carefully before "drawing off for the protection of a foreign enterprise a measure of the national prestige and power entrusted by the people to its care."⁷⁹ And, despite Consul General Denby's urgings in June of 1910 and the Bureau of Trade Relations' eagerness to show "that we do not neglect our commercial interests abroad whatever legal action we may feel it desirable to take at home in regard to some of them," the State Department was slow to consider any action beyond diplomatic appeals to Foreign Minister Aehrenthal.⁸⁰ So, although Charles Pepper of the Bureau of Trade Relations argued in August that "a growing tendency has been shown on the part of foreign governments to take advantage of domestic affairs of this kind [i.e., the breakup of the Trust] to injure American enterprise abroad and it is well at every opportunity to let them understand that the United States will not tolerate such a course," Assistant Secretary of State Wilson replied laconically: "Pretty small real American interest and pretty weak case—so far shown. I think we should go not too zealously."⁸¹ Wilson's main concern was to ensure that the share of European oil markets held by companies shipping oil from the United States did not decrease—not to guarantee that Vacuum could maintain its business operations within Austria-Hungary. Libby had presented Standard's own goal as "to safeguard to the fullest extent practicable the supremacy of American Petroleum" in Europe—but would this goal be served by defending Vacuum Oil?⁸² To negotiate a deal that would help Vacuum within Austria but hurt Standard in the much larger German market, for example, appeared senseless: "There would not be much advantage," Pepper noted, "in helping the Vacuum Oil Company to settle the controversy on a basis which would result in the Standard Oil Company decreasing its shipments from the United States to the German and other markets."⁸³ The State Department politely forwarded Libby's stream of protests to Kerens, but did nothing throughout the summer to raise the stakes.

In October 1910, however, veteran State Department official Alvey Augustus Adee ominously cabled Kerens that he hoped for a speedy "friendly solution of this controversy" so that "it will not be necessary to proceed to measures of trade retaliation which otherwise this Government would undoubtedly be bound to sup-

domination" made it largely unwilling to use the State Department or the U.S. military as a tool to advance U.S. business abroad. George Sweet Gibb and Evelyn H. Knowlton, *The Resurgent Years, 1911–1927* (New York, 1956), 107; Wilkins, *The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise*, 166. According to Günter Bischof, on the eve of the First World War, "the question was only whether the USA would ever intervene in European affairs in order to secure its export markets." Bischof, "Das amerikanische Jahrhundert: Europas Niedergang-Amerikas Aufstieg," *Zeitgeschichte* 28 (March–April 2001): 75–95. This incident suggests that the State Department had already determined that it should, but that it had difficulty finding the means to act on that determination.

⁷⁸ Huntington Wilson, "The Relation of Government to Foreign Investment," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 68 (November 1916): 299.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 300.

⁸⁰ Pepper to Wilson, July 14, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 25024/7.

⁸¹ Pepper, "Standard Oil Case in Austria-Hungary," and Wilson's penciled marginalia on a memo from Pepper to Wilson, August 19, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4461, 25024/21.

⁸² Libby to Knox, New York, June 6, 1911, *ibid.*, 363.115 V 13/80.

⁸³ Pepper, "Standard Oil Case in Austria-Hungary," 5.

port.”⁸⁴ The change of attitude that produced this telegram can be explained only by reference to developments not in Washington or Vienna, but rather in France. At the same time that the Austrian government had targeted Vacuum, it had taken the same discriminatory measures against another company rumored to be closely allied with the Americans: the Petroleum Licht und Kraft Gesellschaft (Petroleum Light and Power Company), better known as Limanowa, after the Galician town where its refinery was located. Limanowa’s organization paralleled Vacuum’s—although it was officially incorporated in Austria (hence the German name), its stockholders were French. It had been founded in 1904 by Desmarais Frères, one of France’s most important petroleum refiners, after an increase in French import duties on foreign crude made it more profitable to refine near the source.⁸⁵ Allegations of collusion between Vacuum and Limanowa were reported widely in both Austrian government documents and the international press. For example, an article in the *London Times* asserted, “This company [Limanowa], in which some £500,000 of French capital are invested . . . is understood to have been working in some kind of unconfessed relationship with the Austrian branch of the Standard Oil Company of America, known as the Vacuum Oil Company.”⁸⁶

Diplomatic relations with France, unlike those with the United States, were a high priority for Austria-Hungary—and they were already strained. Ever since Austria-Hungary had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, French public opinion and French diplomacy had been united in anticipation of a coming confrontation with the Habsburg monarchy.⁸⁷ But Austria-Hungary’s Foreign Ministry saw no reason why its dispute with Vacuum should cause tension with France. Austria’s government ministers were convinced that Limanowa was merely a puppet of Vacuum, and ultimately of Standard, and that it therefore was an agent of Standard’s interest, not France’s. Back in June, the minister of foreign affairs had instructed Albert Count Nemes, minister plenipotentiary at the monarchy’s embassy in Paris, to explain to the French government that “France’s interests not only are not injured by our measures [against Limanowa], but are, rather, identical to ours, since France certainly has no reason to support the creation of a global monopoly whose impact would affect its economic life as much as ours.”⁸⁸ Limanowa’s directors did not agree. Once again, how to assess the “true” national affiliation of a corporation became a matter of bitter dispute. Did Limanowa’s board and shareholders make it “French”? Did its incorporation in Vienna and its refinery’s location make it Austrian? Did its reported alliance with Standard make it an American imposter?

The French press was not concerned with such sophistry. Throughout the late summer, French newspapers were abuzz with a campaign to discredit Austria and

⁸⁴ Alvey Augustus Adey to Kerens, Washington, D.C., October 12, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/32.

⁸⁵ Smith, *Emergence of Modern Business*, 425. It had 12 million crowns in capital, a 150,000-ton-capacity refinery in Limanowa, and reservoirs in Borysław, Berlin, Wrocław/Breslau, Leipzig, and Düsseldorf. “Petroleum Licht und Kraft Gesellschaft à Vienne,” August 1919, AHCL, DEEF, 30167, Note no. 4802; “Stés pétrolifères en Galicie,” AHCL, DEEF, 22085, folder MB3.

⁸⁶ “Hungarian Finance.”

⁸⁷ Jean Béranger, “Die Österreichpolitik Frankreichs von 1848 bis 1918,” in Wandruszka and Urbanitsch, *Die Habsburgermonarchie im System der Internationalen Beziehungen*, 535.

⁸⁸ Aerenthal to Albert Count Nemes, June 21, 1910, HHStA, MdA, AR, F97/10, Handelsartikel-Petroleum, folder 97 Petroleum 69a, Z38376/2191.

to associate Limanowa's maltreatment with a Hungarian loan that France was poised to underwrite.⁸⁹ In an article tellingly titled "Certain Countries Too Often Forget That French Capital Is One of the Elements of Our Power," the outraged journalists at *Le Matin* protested: "It is impossible to comprehend how French capital could provide prosperity in a country where French enterprises are harassed in this manner."⁹⁰ *Le Gaulois* was equally hostile, claiming that "The [Austrian] government . . . should know that, financially and commercially, we have all the means to respond to the unjustifiable provocation to which our national interests are subjected."⁹¹ *L'Information* charged, "The measure was obviously brutal and of such a method that it constitutes a flagrant attack on liberty of commerce and the rights of nations."⁹² Although the Austrian ambassador in Paris dismissed the rumblings of the press as "an attempt to exploit a presented opportunity to squeeze out subventions," the French government soon followed through.⁹³ In mid-September, the Hungarian loan negotiations, which Hungarian finance minister László Lukács had assumed were sure to end favorably, failed.⁹⁴ Limanowa's director warned the Ministry of Finance that he expected punitive tariffs on Austrian petroleum products imported into France to go into effect no later than October 26, unless Limanowa's eligibility for reduced crude oil freight charges, their use of the filling stands in Boryslaw, and their access to railway cars for the transport of refined products were restored.⁹⁵

This proved to be an effective tactic, and even while punitive measures against Vacuum continued unabated, by November the Standing Interministerial Committee for Petroleum Affairs thought that it was time to ease off on Limanowa without losing face.⁹⁶ Austria-Hungary was forced to admit that it had miscalculated on two counts. Not only did France steadfastly refuse to acknowledge that its interests and Austria-Hungary's were "identical," but the Austrian petroleum refiners that the

⁸⁹ Analyses of and clippings from the French press are in ÖStA, FM, Z62775, 69236, 69525, 71345, and 71346, and in NARA, RG 59, Box 4462. The Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs collected newspaper clippings on the "guerre du pétrole" from the following papers: *L'Action Française*, *L'Agence Fournier*, *L'Aurore*, *Côte de la Bourse et de la Banque*, *L'Écho de Paris*, *L'Éclair*, *Le Figaro*, *Financial News*, *Le Gaulois*, *Gil Blas*, *L'Information*, *Journal des Débats*, *Journal Officiel*, *La Liberté*, *Paris-Journal*, *Le Petit Parisien*, *La Petite République*, *Le Radical*, *La Reforme Économique*, *La République Française*, *Le Temps*. HHStA, MdA, AR, F97/10, Handelsartikel-Petroleum, folder 97 Petroleum 69b.

⁹⁰ "On oublie trop dans certains pays que l'épargne française est un des éléments de notre puissance," *Le Matin*, September 17, 1910, clipping in "Ausschnitte Pariser Blätter über die Press-Kampagne gegen Oesterreich-Ungarn," September 26, 1910, ÖStA, FM, Z71345. Strictly speaking, the Austrian government persecuting Vacuum was completely separate from the Hungarian government seeking the loan. Following the reorganization of the empire into two separate parts in 1867, the finances of Austria and Hungary were connected only when it came to paying for the military, the foreign service, and the administration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

⁹¹ "Une industrie française: L'Affaire de la Limanowa," *Le Gaulois*, September 17, 1910, clipping in ÖStA, FM, Z71345.

⁹² *L'Information*, October 7, 1910, clipping in HHStA, MdA, AR, F97/10, Handelsartikel-Petroleum, folder 97 Petroleum 69b. The clipping is labeled only *L'Information*, but this is almost certainly the French daily *L'Information financière, économique, et politique*, which was published in Paris from 1899 until 1985.

⁹³ K. u. k. Embassy in Paris, Report no. 17 G, August 6, 1910, ÖStA, FM, Z62775.

⁹⁴ "Hungarian Finance."

⁹⁵ Report of October 24, 1910, ÖStA, MP, 2411.

⁹⁶ "Beseitigung der den Betrieb der Raffinerie der Petroleum Licht- und Kraftgesellschaft behindernden Maßnahmen," November 5, 1910, ÖStA, MföA, Präs Z1989, ex. 1910. It was essential that any agreement not amount to a "humiliating declaration" on Austria's part. Biliński to Aerenthal, November 10, 1910, ÖStA, FM, Präs. Z2111.

government was ostensibly trying to protect were unwilling to cooperate with one another—or with their government. The whole premise of the Austrian plan was that punitive measures would force Vacuum (and Limanowa) to accept the price spectrum and market share allocation determined by the block of petroleum refiners who participated in OLEX. When that same block of refiners collapsed in October, the government had an opportunity to declare that it would change its policy based on a transformed domestic situation, rather than because of French pressure.⁹⁷ On November 3, 1910, representatives of Limanowa signed a declaration promising not to cooperate with Vacuum in any way that could help the company evade government measures taken against it, and pledging to work together with the other domestic refineries to regulate the sale of petroleum products in the Austrian and French markets. In a move that reflected Austria's acknowledgment that French and American accusations of "chicanery" might have some merit, Limanowa also agreed to refrain from suing the Austrian administration over the "procedures" in effect up to October 31, 1910.⁹⁸ Despite the resistance of leading Austrian refiners, which threatened to stymie further negotiations, lay off workers, and close down if the deal involved conceding a decrease in Austrian refined oil exports to France, the Railway Ministry rescinded the measures against Limanowa.⁹⁹

The French press magnanimously blamed the whole affair on the "excess of zeal of subaltern employees."¹⁰⁰ That the agreement amounted to little more than a complete capitulation on Austria's part can be surmised by the government's response to a letter sent by a group of major Galician refiners to Dułęba, the minister for Galicia, complaining of Limanowa's resumption of cutthroat tactics (such as dumping refined products in Galicia and upper Hungary). Although Dułęba himself was sympathetic, the Finance Ministry responded blandly, "The Interministerial Petroleum Committee is aware of this dumping on the part of Limanowa . . . and has discussed it. No special measures were taken."¹⁰¹ And so ended, rather ignominiously, the Austrian government's measures against what it referred to as "the French Company," Limanowa.

Fear that the United States would follow France's example led to heightened skepticism in the liberal Austrian press. At the same time that the French press took up Limanowa's case, the *Neue Freie Presse* argued in a September article titled "The Petroleum War" that "it would be unprecedented folly for two states which are in no particular opposed to each other to let diplomatic difficulties arise all on account of a few stockholders of petroleum shares." The newspaper condemned the Austrian government for "resort[ing] to unexampled action against private interests."¹⁰² Pub-

⁹⁷ Report of October 24, 1910, ÖStA, MP, 2411.

⁹⁸ Note from Limanowa, November 3, 1910, appended to file "Beseitigung," ÖStA, FM, Präs. Z2111.

⁹⁹ Austrian refiners to FM and Handelsministerium, October 28, 1910, ÖStA, FM, Z79052. Reports from FM and Eisenbahnministerium, November 24, 1910, *ibid.*, FM, Präs Z2217.

¹⁰⁰ "Beilegung der Differenzen mit der Petroleum-Licht- und Kraft-Gesellschaft LIMANOVA," December 7, 1910, ÖStA, FM, Z90481. Stéphen Pichon, the foreign minister of France, asked the French ambassador in Vienna (at Aerenthal's request) to make a public statement expressing his satisfaction with the conclusion of the affair. Note Verbale no. A/124, December 7, 1910, HHStA, MdÄ, AR, F97/10, Handelsartikel-Petroleum, folder 97 Petroleum 69a.

¹⁰¹ Dułęba to Ritt, December 10, 1910, ÖStA, MföA, F828, Z2488-XVII, ex. 1910; Dułęba to Biliński, December 10, 1910, ÖStA, FM, Z90639.

¹⁰² "Der Petroleumkrieg," *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), September 24, 1910. Translation by U.S. State Department in NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/33.

lic pressure to negotiate was high in Austria—not so much out of a sense of affinity with the United States, but because consumers' interests did not appear to be served by the precedent of government discrimination against individual businesses, in particular when that discrimination was expected, short-term, to result in higher petroleum prices.

Despite the misgivings of the *Neue Freie Presse*, however, the danger of U.S. retaliation was never very grave. After "careful reexamination," and having witnessed the alacrity with which France had defended Limanowa, Assistant Secretary of State Wilson instructed Kerens in September to threaten "appropriate retaliatory measures" if the persecution of Vacuum was not suspended, and suggested that he "confer with [the] French Ambassador."¹⁰³ This more aggressive course of action was approved by State Department counselor Henry Hoyt, who, while admitting that "we would, of course, hold Austrians here under an American corporation to that rule," nevertheless believed that "in all such matters the Austrian government seems to be invariably unfriendly as well as tyrannical and unprincipled."¹⁰⁴ The problem with the State Department's new forceful tone, however, was that there was little behind it. In late October, the head of the Division for Near Eastern Affairs, Evan E. Young, confessed to Hoyt, "we have gone about as far as we safely can in intimating that we may be compelled to adopt retaliatory measures."¹⁰⁵ Even though Adee instructed Kerens to "leave with the Austrian authorities an impression that the controversy is now reaching a critical stage," this was little more than bluster, since the State Department was not itself authorized to take action against Austria.¹⁰⁶ France had taken advantage of its traditional status as a financial power on which Austria-Hungary depended for loans. The State Department, however, could fall back only on trade agreements which it knew that Austria-Hungary had not, strictly speaking, violated.

Nevertheless, Minister of Finance Biliński oversaw negotiations with Vacuum starting in December 1910 that led Kerens to predict in early January that "all repressive measures" would be removed "within a period of eight days."¹⁰⁷ In a longer letter, Kerens happily reported that Vacuum's directors believed it "would be in a better position than ever before to carry on its business in Austria-Hungary" since "they had made extraordinary preparations, by the storage of large quantities of crude oil and otherwise, for the contest which then seemed inevitable in order to adjust the caotic [*sic*] conditions that existed in the Austrian oil industry."¹⁰⁸ But Kerens's proud claims that the matter was "virtually closed so far as our Government is concerned" and that "its outcome should have a beneficial influence upon other American investments and interests in Austria-Hungary" were premature. The Austrians had not given in; they had merely shifted from a tactic of confrontation to one of cunctation. From February 1911 through the fall of 1912, Libby repeatedly complained that the repressive measures the Austrians had promised to lift were still

¹⁰³ Wilson to Kerens, Washington, D.C., September 16, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/28.

¹⁰⁴ H. M. Hoyt to Wilson, September 16, 1910, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/28.

¹⁰⁵ Young to Hoyt, October 31, 1910, *ibid.*, 363.115 V 13/37.

¹⁰⁶ Adee to Kerens, November 1, 1910, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Kerens to Secretary of State, Vienna, January 5, 1911, *ibid.*, 363.115 V 13/55.

¹⁰⁸ Kerens to Secretary of State, Vienna, December 31, 1910, *ibid.*, 363.115 V 13/57.

functionally in place. He lamented, "our enemies have been very active, and we doubt if there has been since then any serious intention on the part of the Austrian Government to restore to Vacuum the rights of which it has been so long and so unjustly deprived." He estimated that Vacuum had lost well over \$1,000,000 to date, based on a revised estimated daily loss of \$2,000.¹⁰⁹

Upon Libby's request, the State Department instructed Kerens to "declare that [the U.S.] must reserve to itself the full liberty, and without notice, hereafter to inaugurate such measures of industrial retaliation as may be found expedient from time to time to meet the exigencies of the situation."¹¹⁰ At the same time, State Department solicitor Joshua Reuben Clark reminded Libby that "the statement as to retaliation was a threat and that in all human probability the Austrian Government was perfectly aware that it was at the present time but an empty threat, and that they would conduct themselves accordingly."¹¹¹ Kerens soon came to agree that a "more determined attitude would have to be assumed by the United States in order to bring about a satisfactory settlement of the cases."¹¹² Consequently, in January 1912—again at Libby's suggestion—Acting Secretary of State Huntington Wilson appealed to the secretary of the treasury to consider reprisals against the Austrian government.¹¹³ He hoped to convince "the Treasury Department, through the Collector of Customs at New York, [to] retaliate against the commercial, and perhaps navigation, interests of Austria by rigidly enforcing laws which it is alleged are now rather liberally construed."¹¹⁴ Both Libby and the Bureau of Trade Relations continued to pester the Treasury Department throughout the spring of 1912, but in July had still not received the "clean-cut, unequivocal, detailed statement of just what it is in a position to do."¹¹⁵

By the late fall of 1912, Austria-Hungary's delaying tactics had paid off: Vacuum was ready to give up.¹¹⁶ On November 27, 1912, with Treasury Department and congressional action still pending, Vacuum's president in Rochester, Charles Everest, and representatives of the Austrian government signed a contract "disposing of all the controverted points between the parties" and limiting Vacuum's Austrian sales to 1,500 wagons of kerosene and 100 wagons of gasoline a year.¹¹⁷ The claim that "this protracted, irritating and very expensive controversy" was settled was con-

¹⁰⁹ Kerens to Secretary of State, Vienna, January 6, 1911, *ibid.*, 363.115 V 13/58; Libby to Secretary of State, New York, April 16, 1912, *ibid.*, 363.115 V 13/88. Libby also noted that the actual losses of Vacuum for 1911 alone were \$465,000, not including the "loss of interest on the large capital invested and of normal commercial profits." On January 9, 1911, before a recently concluded agreement received "final and official sanction," the Austrian government fell—Ritt, Wrba, Duleba, and the sympathetic Biliński were all replaced. The transition affected neither Austria-Hungary's relations with the United States nor government policy regarding this dispute, but it provided an excuse for further delays.

¹¹⁰ Knox to Kerens, Washington, D.C., March 28, 1911, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/72.

¹¹¹ Clark summarizing interview with Mr. Libby, March 24, 1911, *ibid.*

¹¹² Kerens to Knox, Vienna, March 30, 1911, *ibid.*, 363.115 V 13/77.

¹¹³ Wilson to Franklin MacVeagh, January 19, 1912, *ibid.*, 363.115 V 13/84.

¹¹⁴ John Ball Osborne (Chief, Bureau of Trade Relations) to Chandler P. Anderson (Counselor, Department of State), January 12, 1912, *ibid.*, 363.115 V 13/85.

¹¹⁵ Osborne to Lester H. Woolsey (Assistant Solicitor), July 22, 1912, *ibid.*, 363.115 V 13/93.

¹¹⁶ HM to MdÄ, November 29, 1912, HHStA, MdÄ, AR, F 97/10, Handelsartikel-Petroleum, folder 97 Petroleum 69c.

¹¹⁷ Denby to Aerenthal, Vienna, November 27, 1912, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/94. Austria agreed to remove all restrictions imposed on Vacuum; Vacuum agreed to withdraw its lawsuits against Austria. HM to MdÄ, November 29, 1912, HHStA, MdÄ, Administrative Registratur, F97/10, Handelsartikel-Petroleum, folder 97 Petroleum 69c.

firmed by William Herbert Libby, the final arbiter in both his own and the State Department's opinion, on December 20, 1912.¹¹⁸

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN MORE THAN A DOZEN different agents of policy and practice involved in the Petroleum War sheds light on the entangled history of national governments and multinational corporations struggling to preserve their own autonomy in the caudal years of a "globalized" age. It exposes some of the key strengths and weaknesses of the two protagonists: the Austrian government and the Standard Oil Trust. If the former excelled at diplomacy, it was unable to coordinate the large and vital industry it so boldly defended against external enemies, leaving it prey to internal disruptions, disorganization, and inefficiency. If the latter had mastered the "intensified trade tactics" it had fruitfully used to gain dominance at home and abroad, it had not learned to rein in the excessive competitive zeal that kept it engaged in a dispute with what would ultimately prove to be a minor player in the global oil industry.¹¹⁹ But the Petroleum War also offers broader lessons that challenge binary juxtapositions of states and markets. First, it illuminates the intimate connection between diplomacy and economic activity in the context of waning European political authority (at least in the case of Austria-Hungary) and waxing American commercial might. Second, it explores the differences between government support for the activities of multinational corporations (and in particular oil companies) at home and abroad. Although corporations played a large part in extending the economic influence of the United States in this period, they did not do so without government support.

The notion of a free market is not one that operated powerfully on either side of the 1910 Petroleum War. Despite free market rhetoric, businesses—even businesses as powerful as Standard Oil—relied on diplomatic and regulatory support from their governments. According to historian Paul Sabin, "A free market has never existed in the United States, and it never will. In fact, government action is indispensable to the very functioning of capitalism. Even when the direct regulatory role diminishes, government action shapes economic outcomes through tax policy, property rights, and labor law."¹²⁰ In 1910, the U.S. and Austrian governments shared the view that it was their responsibility to defend their respective nations' position in international oil markets. The Petroleum War thus suggests parallels in the relationship between business and government in two states whose assessments of the relative value of a "free market" are generally portrayed as inconsistent. Both sides viewed their interventions not as attacks on a truly "free" market, but rather as defensive measures against an opponent who was, in essence, cheating. From the

¹¹⁸ Libby to Secretary of State, New York, December 20, 1912, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/95.

¹¹⁹ Of course, in 1910, neither Standard nor Galician producers knew that the Galician oilfields had begun an inexorable decline. Nevertheless, the recent discoveries of major new oilfields in the Middle East, the Far East, and the New World confirmed that the future of oil exploration would not be in continental Europe. In 1910, Europe produced 28.8 percent of the world's petroleum; ten years later (1920), only 5.6 percent. "Erdölförderung der Weltteile und einzelnen Länder von 1910–1925 in 1000 Tonnen," in Schwarz, *Petroleum-Vademecum*, 16–17.

¹²⁰ Paul Sabin, *Crude Politics: The California Oil Market, 1900–1940* (Berkeley, Calif., 2005), xv.

Austrian government's perspective, defending Austrian business interests against the unfair, dishonorable, and "tyrannical" practices developed by the "Americans" (that is, Standard and Vacuum) was by no means a violation of "business ethics" (*Geschäftsmoral*).¹²¹

For the Americans, on the other hand, Austria was itself "tyrannical" and unreliable, and blatantly disregarded basic principles of fairness in business. Standard argued, and the State Department came to believe, that this dispute had negative implications for U.S. investments abroad. Huntington Wilson noted that the government's relation to foreign investment was defined simultaneously by its "general obligation to protect the citizens' rights, and authority to control the citizens' course by giving great or little protection, or none at all." Without government guarantees, American investors would have little security when investing abroad, and the absence of such guarantees would effectively prohibit "foreign investment in all countries except those of the highest credit and stability."¹²² If Austria-Hungary qualified as such a country at the beginning of this dispute, it hardly did so by the end. As unfair as its actions were—and even the Imperial Royal Supreme Court in Vienna agreed that they were illegal—they proved effective in buying time.¹²³ Libby thought the lesson of the entire affair was one that revealed more American weakness than Austrian.¹²⁴ What the United States needed was the will to take the same kind of rapid administrative measures that Austria had taken.

Victoria de Grazia has argued in *Irresistible Empire* that "America's hegemony was built on European territory" when it displaced Europe's authority as the "center of vast imperial wealth" and "astute commercial know-how."¹²⁵ But the Petroleum War reminds us that the trajectory so skillfully traced by de Grazia was invisible to Austria-Hungary in 1910. Insecurity about the economic might of the United States notwithstanding, Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in this dispute suggests a sense of operating from a position of strength, not weakness. In 1909, Galician production had reached its all-time peak. That its decline would be rapid and steady was unsuspected when the Petroleum War began, and unproven even when it ended. The region had experienced temporary declines in the past, and more optimistic observ-

¹²¹ "Maßnahmen zur Unterstützung der heimischen Petroleumindustrie," Vienna, June 16, 1910, ÖStA, MföA, F664, Z634.

¹²² Wilson, "The Relation of Government to Foreign Investment," 298.

¹²³ The Imperial Royal Supreme Court decision is available in translation in NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.115 V 13/87. The legal case was based on the details of Austrian contract law and the question of whether the Railway Ministry was legally entitled to cancel contracts before they were due to expire. The Supreme Court's ultimate decision in favor of Vacuum was an embarrassment to the Austrian government; Vacuum's agreement to withdraw its legal right to recrimination was a key component of the final settlement.

¹²⁴ Libby to Secretary of State, New York, December 20, 1912, NARA, RG 59, Box 4462, 363.114 V 13/95.

¹²⁵ Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through 20th-Century Europe* (Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 3–5. According to Richard Leopold, reference to the United States as a world power began with John Bassett Moore's 1903 contribution of "The United States as a World-Power (1885–1902)" to the *Cambridge Modern History*'s seventh volume, and became further popularized by Archibald Cary Coolidge and John Latané in 1906–1907. Leopold, "The Emergence of America as a World Power: Some Second Thoughts," in Braeman, Bremner, and Walters, *Change and Continuity in Twentieth-Century America*, 4.

ers were confident that new fields would be found in neighboring areas to replace those that became exhausted.¹²⁶

Austria's willingness to endure years of diplomatic strain in order to maintain punitive measures taken without legislative backing showed its commitment to proping up its own domestic industry—and its general lack of fear of the political and even financial power of the United States. That lack of fear, however, did not mean a complete lack of respect. According to Ernest May, “among powerful groups in all continental lands, there was . . . irritation over American economic competition, animosity toward American ideas, and some alarm at a prospective American menace.”¹²⁷ Austria-Hungary was not willing to challenge the State Department openly, or to proclaim boldly its indifference to retaliatory action. Rather, it dangled the possibility of an agreement before Vacuum's nose for two long years, always promising that a cancellation of the discriminatory measures was at hand. Austria's diplomatic savvy and administrative creativity enabled it to fend off the State Department successfully. This sort of passive resistance was another weapon in the arsenal of Europeans who resented the growing power of the American economy.

Austria-Hungary's “tight-rope dance” was required not only out of respect for foreign relations with the United States, however, but also because the question of how to defend the petroleum-related interests of the monarchy's own subjects was a very delicate one. Refiners included some of the more powerful financial interests in Vienna and Budapest; according to a Ministry of Trade estimate, the refining industry represented 250 million crowns of invested domestic capital, and employed 18,000–20,000 workers.¹²⁸ Measures taken in refineries' interests would not necessarily benefit either their suppliers or their customers. Austrian refiners' ability to compete with Standard was hampered not only by Standard's deep pockets and aggressive tactics, but also by artificially high crude oil prices manufactured by the government to support the Galician oil-production industry. Despite the traditional view that the Habsburg economy was rent asunder by “ideological and nationalistic motives,” the story of the Petroleum War of 1910 reveals no sign of nationally or even provincially based interest groups within the monarchy itself.¹²⁹ There were conflicts of interest, but they were between those who profited from high crude oil prices (producers) and low crude oil prices (refiners) or those who profited from high prices for refined products (refiners) and low prices for refined products (distributors, consumers). Only on the international stage were these deep divisions hidden behind

¹²⁶ Engineer Stefan Bartoszewicz held out hope for the industry's recovery well into the 1920s. Bartoszewicz, “Rozwój przemysłu naftowego w Polsce i jego przyszłość,” *Przemysł Naftowy* 3, no. 19 (October 10, 1928): 533. By 1912, however, signs of exhaustion were present for those willing to see them: oil production had fallen by more than 40 percent from its 1909 peak. Robert Schwarz, ed., *Petroleum-Vademecum: International Petroleum Tables*, 6th ed. (Berlin, 1929), 178. The *Times* noted presciently, “The Galician field is passing through a crisis which in the opinion of eminent authorities foreshadows the final wane of the field as an important producer.” “Petroleum Industry: World-Wide Exploratory Work,” *Times* (London), January 22, 1912, 22.

¹²⁷ Ernest R. May, *Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, 1991), 189.

¹²⁸ “Enquete über die Krise in der Mineralölindustrie,” 6.

¹²⁹ Herbert Matis, “National Identity and Economic Conditions in Twentieth-Century Austria,” in Alice Teichova, Herbert Matis, and Jaroslav Pátek, eds., *Economic Change and the National Question in Twentieth-Century Europe* (New York, 2000), 230.

a united Austrian front representing the combined energies of the Viennese government and the oil industry it defended against the “Americans” and Standard.

In general, scholars have agreed that “the presence of multinational corporations contributed to a smooth functioning of the international economic system” in the last years before the First World War. As Akira Iriye has explained, “the growth of multinational enterprises . . . served to develop transnational interests and solidarities conducive to international order.”¹³⁰ This Petroleum War suggests that a multinational company’s own transnational interests did not necessarily prevent it from generating nationalistic animosities in the various countries in which it operated. It shows both the connections between American and European markets and the limits of shared interests and perspectives. The Petroleum War of 1910 is therefore an example of both international (“between nations”) and transnational (“across national boundaries”) history.¹³¹ Although the Austrian Foreign Ministry and the U.S. State Department did not describe their dispute using this vocabulary, the question of whether the Petroleum War was international or transnational was itself a bone of contention between them. To what extent was the United States entitled to intervene in or even comment on a dispute between the Austrian government and a company incorporated within Austria, given that its shareholders were American citizens? Although Aerenthal insisted on Vacuum’s “Austrian” status for legal reasons, there was never any doubt on either side of this debate that Vacuum was in some meaningful sense an American company. Even when proprietors of stock moved from state to state, they took their nationality with them.

Both Austria and the United States understood the limits of the “multinationalism” of enterprise—that, in the words of Charles Maier, “although firms plant branches abroad and aspire to international activity, they are clearly rooted in a home country.”¹³² Austria’s expectation that it could challenge Standard with impunity was based on its mistaken assumption that the State Department would tolerate—or even appreciate—foreign attacks on a company targeted for prosecution at home. The State Department could not allow such presumption to stand. By the end of this dispute, it was clear to everyone involved that mobility of capital did not always mean that corporations were more powerful than states. Sometimes it meant that they needed states’ help more than ever before.

¹³⁰ Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley, Calif., 2002), 130.

¹³¹ Akira Iriye, “Internationalizing International History,” in Bender, *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, 51.

¹³² Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History,” 822.

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AHR Forum
The International 1968, Part I

Introduction

Two thousand and eight marked the fortieth anniversary of a remarkable year, a year that has come to stand for a decade which, to rephrase Paul Kantner's memorable quip, we can only remember if we weren't there. Two months late, we present the first part of a two-part *AHR Forum*, "The International 1968," an act of historical recovery and analysis by seven historians who, whether they were there or not, offer a range of perspectives on the politics, the protests, the social and cultural transformations, and the historical significance of that tumultuous year. Of course, 1968 was marked by more than youth protests, popular mobilization, and manifestations of the counterculture. It was also a year of assassinations (Martin Luther King, Jr.; Robert F. Kennedy), the Tet offensive in Vietnam, Richard Nixon's election as president, the publication of the papal encyclical *Humanae Vitae* (condemning birth control), the peak of the Cultural Revolution in China, and the decision of the United States to go off the gold standard, among other notable events. One might argue that in light of the subsequent course of history, these and other developments had a greater impact than the student uprisings and youth culture that we associate with that year. But our focus in this Forum is largely on the dramatic movements that, rightly or wrongly, captured media attention at the time and remain emblematic of the spirit of the era. Although the articles differ in subject and approach, they collectively make the point that these upheavals were hardly trivial or inconsequential. They were manifestations of large-scale social, cultural, and political transformations; they challenged the very nature of contemporary political culture. And their context was transnational, if not global.

Indeed, like many recent articles in this journal, the essays in this Forum take a perspective that is both transnational and international in reach. Thus, by and large, the better-known "events," including those that shook Paris and Morningside Heights in the spring, do not occupy center stage in what follows. Rather, the authors look at the European scene as a whole, both East and West, or the global trends that made up the counterculture, or the protests in such places as Japan and Latin America—regions that do not usually figure on the imaginary map of "the sixties." What they demonstrate is that even when protests were local in origin, scope, and cause, there were international and transnational forces at play, suggesting that the radical and youth movements of the time were harbingers of the globalizing dynamic that would characterize subsequent decades. At the same time, an issue that perhaps divides some of the authors is how much we can describe and explain protests in local

terms and how much they were inspired and indeed motivated by global trends. Jeremi Suri, for example, argues for a transnational counterculture, which in fostering disillusionment and discontent among millions, regardless of national identity, created the conditions for mass protest. In Latin America, on the other hand, Jeff Gould (whose article will appear in Part II of the Forum, in the April issue) shows that demonstrators in Mexico, Uruguay, and Brazil, while identifying in part with anti-American and anti-imperialistic causes, had reasons for taking action that were local in nature and mostly independent from cultural trends and global causes.

If one axis of difference in analyzing "1968" lies between the poles of the local and the global, another is configured in terms of culture versus politics. At the time, of course, there were those in "the movement" who insisted that a commitment to politics, and especially militant political action, should prevail over cultural concerns, while others believed that only radically different cultural choices or "lifestyles"—pastoral, utopian, communal, personal, or sexual—and decidedly *not* politics, could create the conditions for a new world. Most historians, it would seem, have gone beyond this rather dogmatic either/or, recognizing that culture and politics are always intertwined. In this Forum, however, some of the contributors put a greater accent on politics and political action, while others focus more on the cultural transformations that came to be known as the counterculture. Does this amount to a fundamental difference that is both methodological and interpretive? Perhaps so. For these accounts offer significant variations on how we should assess the mix of the cultural and the political, variations that offer the opportunity to debate the degree to which cultural change either merely provided the background for the upheavals of the sixties or defined the very essence of this contentious period.

In the first article, "The Rise and Fall of an International Counterculture, 1960–1975," which itself serves as a kind of introduction to the topic, Jeremi Suri makes the claim that "the sixties" were fundamentally cultural in nature. While he notes the importance of street protests and dissident movements, whose grievances and goals were largely political, he asserts that their challenge was more cultural than political in nature. Those involved were contesting not only their leaders' ideologies and policies but, more fundamentally, their values. This was consonant with what he sees as a feature of the period: the profound and widespread discontent and disillusionment, in both the West and the East, stemming from Cold War ideologies and policies that promised more than they could deliver. Not only did these raise expectations for a better life, but governments also sponsored and created educational and cultural opportunities that allowed millions of mostly young people to perceive and appreciate the gap between these idealistic expectations and reality. The result, in essence, was the counterculture.

In "'1968' East and West: Divided Germany as a Case Study in Transnational History," Timothy S. Brown offers an analysis that handles the mix of culture and politics in a somewhat different way. He depicts a generation of young Germans who, though divided by the "Iron Curtain," rival regimes, and competing ideologies, were united in the cultural values they embraced. Although their political protests were quite different in nature—as different as the political systems they challenged—they were equally swept up by the countercultural forces of antiauthoritarianism, rock music, communalism, and the like. But there were particular determinants to how

these forces played out in each country. In the west, Brown argues, the international counterculture—or what he calls the “big 1968”—reinforced and invigorated the local movement, and thus “broaden[ed] the possibilities for popular action from below, pushing back the boundaries of the permissible and creating democratic space in the political and cultural landscape of the Federal Republic.” The experience in the east was quite different; there, the creative potential of culture ran up against the obstacles of political repression and the absence of an open public sphere. The result was not a new style of politics, as in the west, but rather a generational drift into the apolitical nonconformism of the “dropout.”

In the final article in Part I of this Forum, politics—especially mass mobilization and militant action—occupies the foreground. “Japan 1968: The Performance of Violence and the Theater of Protest,” by William Marotti, provides a close analysis of a decade of popular protest against Japan’s ties to the U.S., and especially over the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Culminating in a wave of demonstrations in late 1967 and early 1968, these strikes, seizures, marches, and rallies served to broaden the scope of political participation, and created new forms of political activism as well. While militants often dominated the scene and certainly captured the attention of the media, the events also provided increasing numbers of ordinary people with the motivation and means for political engagement. Marotti’s street-level view of these events in Japan allows him to demonstrate something that was clearly true in other contexts around the world: the very dynamics of popular mobilization, including the inevitable repressive reaction by the state, was an important factor in creating and perpetuating the new style of political activism that we associate with “1968.”

In April’s issue, Part II of “The International 1968” will include articles on the issue of gender in 1968, protests in Latin America, the situation in the Soviet Union in that year, and youth tourism.

AHR Forum
The Rise and Fall of an International
Counterculture, 1960–1975

JEREMI SURI

IN *THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE*—BETTY FRIEDAN'S 1963 attack on domesticity—the author describes how she “gradually, without seeing it clearly for quite a while . . . came to realize that something is very wrong with the way American women are trying to live their lives today.”¹ Despite the outward appearance of wealth and contentment, Friedan argued that the Cold War was killing happiness. Women, in particular, faced strong public pressures to conform with a family image that emphasized a finely manicured suburban home, pampered children, and an ever-present “housewife heroine.”² This was the asserted core of the good American life. This was the cradle of freedom. This was, in the words of Adlai Stevenson, the “assignment” for “wives and mothers”: “Western marriage and motherhood are yet another instance of the emergence of individual freedom in our Western society. Their basis is the recognition in women as well as men of the primacy of personality and individuality.”³

Friedan disagreed, and she was not alone. Surveys, interviews, and observations revealed that countless women suffered from a problem that had no name within the standard lexicon of society at the time. They had achieved the “good life,” and yet they felt unfulfilled. Friedan quoted one particularly articulate young mother:

I've tried everything women are supposed to do—hobbies, gardening, pickling, canning, being very social with my neighbors, joining committees, running PTA teas. I can do it all, and I like it, but it doesn't leave you anything to think about—any feeling of who you are. I never had any career ambitions. I love the kids and Bob and my home. There's no problem you can even put a name to. But I'm desperate. I begin to feel I have no personality.⁴

I would like to thank my friends and colleagues who commented on the ideas and arguments in this article. This list includes, among others, Thomas Borstelmann, Chen Jian, Frank Costigliola, John Gaddis, Petra Goedde, Maurice Isserman, William Jones, Peniel Joseph, Martin Klimke, Melvyn Leffler, Douglas Little, Fredrik Logevall, Brenda Gayle Plummer, Andrew Rotter, Ruud van Dijk, Jeremy Varon, and Odd Arne Westad. I am grateful for the guidance provided by the anonymous reviewers and superb editorial staff at the *American Historical Review*.

¹ Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (1963; repr., New York, 1983), 11.

² *Ibid.*, 33–68. For an insightful analysis of Friedan's writing and advocacy, and the limits of her vision for social change, see Daniel Horowitz, *Betty Friedan and the Making of "The Feminine Mystique": The American Left, the Cold War, and Modern Feminism* (Amherst, Mass., 2000).

³ Adlai E. Stevenson, “A Purpose for Modern Woman,” *Women's Home Companion*, September 1955, 30–31, excerpted at http://www.wwnorton.com/college/history/archive/resources/documents/ch32_04.htm (accessed December 7, 2008).

⁴ Quoted in Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique*, 21.

These were the words of the counterculture emerging within the United States, Western Europe, and many other societies during the middle 1960s. Existential angst was not unique to the period, but it became pervasive in a context of heightened promises about a better life and strong fears about the political implications of social deviance. Ideological competition in the Cold War encouraged citizens to look beyond material factors alone, and to seek a deeper meaning in their daily activities. Many women, however, did not feel freer in the modern kitchens that U.S. vice-president Richard Nixon extolled as a symbol of capitalist accomplishment.⁵ Many men did not feel freer as they went to their daily jobs in the large-scale industries that underwrote the costs of new global responsibilities. Many students did not feel freer as they attended mass institutions of higher education, particularly universities.⁶ An international counterculture developed in response to dissatisfaction with the dominant culture of the Cold War. On the model of Friedan's writing, it gave voice to criticisms of the basic social assumptions—about work, marriage, and family—connected to the politics of the era.⁷

The claims of the international counterculture were not unique. Many of the criticisms of patriarchy, racism, injustice, and imperialism that they voiced had long histories—histories that 1960s activists benefited from, whether they acknowledged them or not. Many of the strategies that they employed—community organizing, nonviolent demonstrations, public spectacle and humor, and selective terror—also had strong antecedents. The aims and techniques of the counterculture were radical, but also traditional. They deployed a very usable political past.⁸

The international counterculture also reflected many decades of cultural rebellion within Europe and North America. Bohemian subcultures in large urban communities had, at least since the early twentieth century, nurtured groups of young artists who challenged the standard etiquette and aesthetics of "Western civilization." Modern art, literature, and music emerged from these communities, as did new personal habits. Sexual liberation and the social uses of new drugs became identifying characteristics for these cultural groups. Their behavior embodied political dissent, but it centered more directly on cultural rebellion and experimentation.⁹

In the decades after World War II, cultural rebellion became common again in

⁵ On the famous Khrushchev-Nixon "kitchen debate" of 1959, see William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York, 2003), 416–418.

⁶ See Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003), 88–130.

⁷ Theodore Roszak popularized the term "counter culture" in his book *The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition* (Garden City, N.Y., 1969). My use of "counterculture" draws on Roszak, but places it in a broader historical and geographic framework.

⁸ See Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (New York, 2002), esp. 341–365; Donald Sassoon, *One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1998), esp. 275–322; William H. Chafe, *The Unfinished Journey: America since World War II*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1991), esp. 111–176; James T. Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945–74* (New York, 1996), esp. 10–60, 375–457.

⁹ The literature on this topic is, of course, enormous. See, among many others, Mary Louise Roberts, *Disruptive Acts: The New Woman in Fin-de-Siècle France* (Chicago, 2002); Venita Datta, "A Bohemian Festival: La Fête de la Vache Enragée," *Journal of Contemporary History* 28, no. 2 (April 1993): 195–213; Eric D. Weitz, *Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy* (Princeton, N.J., 2007), 207–330; Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 201–219; Christine Stansell, *American Moderns: Bohemian New York and the Creation of a New Century* (New York, 2000); Paula S. Fass, *The Damned and the Beautiful: American Youth in the 1920s* (New York, 1979).

urbanized industrial societies—capitalist and communist—where groups of young citizens articulated feelings of “alienation.” Rock music, beat poetry, and abstract expressionist art voiced common criticisms of how the pressures of social conformity destroyed individualism. Through these media, and others, many European and American youth sought to reassert their individuality and their connection to something they viewed as “nature,” as opposed to the “unnatural” industrial world advertised around them. Similarly, advocates of free living, free love, and free drugs claimed that they were returning human beings to the pursuit of pleasure, rather than state-manipulated wealth and power. By the early 1960s, these cultural critiques had attained widespread public recognition on both sides of the Atlantic. They were oppositional, but they were not overtly politically threatening—at least not yet.¹⁰

What made the international counterculture of the 1960s unique was its social composition and its geographic breadth, expanding considerably on its cultural antecedents. Unlike prior movements, this one included thousands of self-defined participants from the most visible and privileged parts of society. They were more explicitly politicized than their bohemian predecessors. Young college students, in particular, studying at institutions designed in a Cold War context to train the next generation of state leaders, rejected not just the policies of their elders, but the very assumptions upon which their elders had built their authority. These were not the dispossessed demanding more access to resources, or the cultural fringe searching for freedom, but the empowered questioning their own power. The international counterculture had an intensely self-critical quality that its proponents defined as “authenticity”; its detractors viewed it as suicide.¹¹

The search for “authenticity” against established habits of power spread with astonishing speed across societies. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was overwhelmed in late 1968 to find that countercultural activities were evident and politically disruptive on every continent. The CIA’s report to the president on “Restless Youth” described a “world-wide phenomenon” that had undermined allies such as West Germany, Japan, and South Korea. Dissent was also causing internal conflict in the so-called “Communist Bloc” (especially Czechoslovakia, Poland, China, and the Soviet Union) and disorder in “third world” societies (Argentina, Chile, Egypt, and Tunisia, among others).¹² Prior moments of revolution had had an international quality, but the simultaneity of countercultural activities in so many societies in 1968 made that year seem unprecedented in promise and peril for those living through it.¹³

¹⁰ For excellent accounts of the connection between cultural criticism in the 1950s and the international counterculture of the 1960s, see Mark Hamilton Lytle, *America’s Uncivil Wars: The Sixties Era from Elvis to the Fall of Richard Nixon* (New York, 2006), esp. 44–71, 194–216; Godfrey Hodgson, *America in Our Time: From World War II to Nixon—What Happened and Why* (London, 1976), 326–352; Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York, 2005), 390–449; William Jay Risch, “Soviet ‘Flower Children’: Hippies and the Youth Counter-Culture in 1970s L’viv,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 40, no. 3 (July 2005): 565–584.

¹¹ On the importance of “authenticity,” see Doug Rossinow, *The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity, and the New Left in America* (New York, 1998). On the alleged suicidal quality of the counterculture, see Jürgen Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston, 1970).

¹² CIA report, “Restless Youth,” September 1968, Folder: Youth and Student Movements, Box 13, Files of Walt W. Rostow, National Security File, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Tex.

¹³ On this point, see Mark Kurlansky, *1968: The Year That Rocked the World* (New York, 2004).

These judgments were, of course, exaggerated. For all of its radicalism, the international counterculture had many limitations. Dissent was evident in many societies, but its bark was often worse than its bite. How much of a difference did it make to have protesting students on the streets? They caused immediate disruptions, but did they change much? Was the counterculture more a creature of the media, as Todd Gitlin argued, than a grassroots social force?¹⁴ The hegemony of political conservatism in so many societies after 1968 has reinforced these doubts.¹⁵

The international counterculture was, in fact, complicit in many of the elements of society that it criticized. It was not a call for revolution, despite its rhetoric, as much as it was a movement for rapid and personal reform within existing social and political structures. This is what Rudi Dutschke meant by his famous dictum about the “long march through the institutions.”¹⁶ Recent historians have picked up on this, and they have emphasized the “spirit” of 1968 more than the politics—the transformed daily behaviors and interpersonal interactions that emerged during this period. Young people started to dress differently, they began to talk differently, and, yes, they had sex differently during the 1960s. The old ways never returned. Gerd-Rainer Horn convincingly shows that this “liberating” moment endured as the counterculture became part of mainstream youth and adult culture.¹⁷ It soon became a commodified touchstone of prosperity. Gerard DeGroot reminds readers that these changes were far less organized than the movements themselves. To understand the international counterculture, he contends, we must avoid the urge to ascribe coherence to the era. We can have no grand narratives of 1968.¹⁸

In this context one must, however, distinguish the counterculture from various other resistance movements. Many citizens residing in colonial and postcolonial territories had long opposed the great power politics that, in their eyes, contributed to imperial domination over their societies. Nationalist leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru in India, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam were not part of the counterculture because they never accepted the basic institutions that were connected to it—the Cold War universities, the corporate media, and the dominant international political allocations of power. The same could be said for many domestic actors within Western societies, particularly early civil rights activists. Although figures such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., supported the basic tenets of liberal democracy, others—including Robert F. Williams in the United States and Frantz Fanon in Algeria—did not. They were not part of the counterculture because they advocated full-scale revolution. Social and political change was not enough for

¹⁴ Todd Gitlin, *The Whole World Is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left* (Berkeley, Calif., 1980).

¹⁵ See especially Rick Perlstein, *Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus* (New York, 2001).

¹⁶ Rudi Dutschke's Tagebuch, 17. Juni 1967, in Dutschke, *Mein langer Marsch: Reden, Schriften und Tagebücher aus zwanzig Jahren* (Hamburg, 1980), 70; Ingo Cornils, “‘The Struggle Continues’: Rudi Dutschke's Long March,” in Gerard J. DeGroot, ed., *Student Protest: The Sixties and After* (New York, 1998), 104–112.

¹⁷ Gerd-Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976* (Oxford, 2007), 1, 231–238.

¹⁸ Gerard J. DeGroot, *The Sixties Unplugged: An International History of the Decade of Myth and Madness* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008), esp. chap. 1.

them; they wanted to destroy society and rebuild it from the ground up. That was much more than countercultural activists stood for in practice.¹⁹

THE ENORMOUS INFLUENCE OF THE COUNTERCULTURE derived from its powerful presence within mainstream society. By the middle of the 1960s, Friedan's problem with no name had become a focus of discussion among leading journalists, intellectuals, and even policymakers. Unlike the third world nationalists or domestic radicals whom one could dismiss as extreme figures, the suburban housewives, corporate employees, and college students who questioned basic social assumptions were core political constituencies. They were the future of each society—the people whom leaders claimed to serve. These “children of a generally affluent generation—West or East,” according to CIA director Richard Helms, were “deeply engrossed in the search for some newer means of arriving at moral values.” “For the moment,” Helms warned President Lyndon B. Johnson, “they seem to have settled on a reaffirmation of the dignity of the individual. Most commentators agree that Society's values are in flux; if this is so, restless youth are symptomatic of a deeper current than their numbers alone suggest.” The president's special assistant for national security affairs, Walt Rostow, affirmed this judgment, pointing to the “conflict of ‘ardent youth’ and big machines, causing increasing numbers of young people to ask: ‘Where do I fit?’”²⁰

These sentiments were widely shared across societies. As early as 1960, West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer lamented what he called the “most important problem of our epoch”—the “inner political” weakness and superficiality of daily life in the Cold War. East-West rivalries and the nuclear arms race encouraged what he derided as an empty “materialism.” He longed to reawaken public interest in what he called the “Christian” belief in the simple devout life, free from military tensions, superficial consumerism, and impersonal bureaucratic institutions.²¹ One of Adenauer's rivals and successors, Willy Brandt, shared this perspective. In September 1968, when he served as West German foreign minister, Brandt observed that “Young people in many of our countries do not understand why we, the older ones, cannot cope with the problems of an age dominated by science. Not force, but reason alone, can give them an answer.” Brandt argued that peace between Cold War rivals

¹⁹ See Timothy B. Tyson, *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2000); David Macey, *Frantz Fanon: A Life* (London, 2000).

²⁰ Notes of Cabinet Meeting, September 18, 1968, and Attachment A, Folder: Cabinet Meeting, 9/18/68, Box 15, Cabinet Papers, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Tex. Martin Klimke offers an excellent discussion of these materials and the Johnson administration's views of the counterculture: *The “Other” Alliance: Global Protest and Student Unrest in West Germany and the United States, 1962–1972* (Princeton, N.J., forthcoming), chaps. 5–6.

²¹ Konrad Adenauer an dem Herrn Staatssekretär, December 9, 1960, Ordnung III/50, Adenauer Nachlaß, Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Rhöndorf, Germany. See also *Ansprache des Bundeskanzlers auf dem Festakt anlässlich der 10. Sommertagung des Politischen Clubs an der Evangelischen Akademie, Tutzing, July 19, 1963* (Unkorrigiertes Manuskript), 02.31, 1963/Band 1, Reden, Interviews, Aufsätze, Adenauer Nachlaß; Adenauer Rede in der Freien Universität, West Berlin, December 5, 1958, 16.25, 1958/Band 2, Adenauer Nachlaß; Maria Mitchell, “Materialism and Secularism: CDU Politicians and National Socialism, 1945–1949,” *Journal of Modern History* 67, no. 2 (June 1995): 287–307.



FIGURE 1: Civil rights marchers in Madison, Wisconsin. Courtesy of the UW-Madison Archives.

was necessary for restoring domestic tranquility among a young discontented generation of citizens.²²

Soviet leaders had similar concerns about the evidence of growing public disillusionment, despite the repressive control over information in their country. The official Soviet youth journal, *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, called attention to problems with the "psychology of contemporary young people." These young citizens had apparently lost the combination of pervasive fear and intensive nationalism that had motivated conformity, and even public enthusiasm, during the years after the Second World War.²³ A public survey conducted by Soviet authorities in 1964 revealed that more than four out of every five students refused, despite severe threats, to heed the leadership's call for the cultivation of "virgin lands" and other patriotic communist projects. Government leaders, particularly KGB director Yuri Andropov, became obsessed with the regime's domestic vulnerabilities.²⁴

²² Speech by Willy Brandt at the Conference of Non-Nuclear States in Genf, September 3, 1968, Box 288, Egon Bahrs Nachlaß, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn, Germany. See also Bahr Entwurf für *Christ und Welt*, February 1965, Box 9B, *ibid.*; Bahr an Brandt, November 15, 1966, Box 352, *ibid.*

²³ *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, April 27, 1961.

²⁴ "Molodezh ukhodit iz kolhozov v goroda," December 1, 1964, Box 80-1-497, Fond 300, Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Open Society Archives, Central European University, Budapest,

An uprising by citizens in the Georgian city of Novocherkassk confirmed these fears. On June 2, 1962, local workers, joined by their families and area youth, seized Communist Party headquarters and the central police station. They demanded reduced food prices, better work conditions, and, most significant, a change in political leadership. In the eyes of many protesters, local authorities were out of touch with the needs and wants of society. They enforced an ideological order that contributed to growing public discontent. To control unrest in Novocherkassk and its "spillover" into other areas, the Soviet army deployed brute force, killing sixteen civilians and injuring many more as soldiers fired into crowds of demonstrators. Soviet leaders put down the protests, but they never recovered from the anger and resentment inflamed by these events.²⁵

Despite the violence, the citizens who challenged established authorities in the Soviet Union, West Germany, the United States, and other countries lived better lives than prior generations had. These were privileged men and women who had unprecedented access to consumer goods, education, and leisure time. They also lived relatively secure lives, even in communist societies, generally free from the domestic terror of the Stalinist years in the Soviet Union and the deprivations of economic depression in the United States and Western Europe. This was a revolt, in many cases, of the privileged against the leaders who conferred privileges. Such a judgment should not detract from the seriousness or the meaning of the demonstrations. Privileged people can also be progressive actors. The deeper point is that young citizens in the 1960s could organize and protest, as their elders often could not, because their social conditions were so much more secure.

The counterculture was not about material needs. It focused on unrealized spiritual and ideological demands that citizens believed were being stymied by the Cold War and its dominant leaders. Competition between capitalism and communism limited the perceived space for creative programs that combined or subverted the two systems. Foreign interventions also diverted resources and energies from domestic reforms. Most damning, the inherited logics of military and diplomatic strategy gave legitimacy to a group of Cold War "wise men," while undermining the respectability of innovative political leaders who were not "present at the creation."²⁶

The experience of World War II and its aftermath provided figures from that generation with a political gravity that younger citizens acknowledged but also resented. Students for a Democratic Society in the United States was one of many

Hungary. See also "Molodezh Sovetskogo Soiuza," November 5–6, 1962, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, Box 80-1-497, Fond 300, *ibid.*; Michael Scammell, ed., *The Solzhenitsyn Files: Secret Soviet Documents Reveal One Man's Fight against the Monolith*, trans. under the supervision of Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (Chicago, 1995), esp. xvii–xxxv. For a superb discussion of the "Soviet Sixties," see Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2007), 163–191.

²⁵ For the best account of the events in Novocherkassk, see Samuel H. Baron, *Bloody Saturday in the Soviet Union: Novocherkassk, 1962* (Stanford, Calif., 2001), esp. 1–127. On the legitimacy crisis confronting Soviet leaders in the 1960s, see Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 163–191; Jeremi Suri, "The Promise and Failure of 'Developed Socialism': The Soviet 'Thaw' and the Crucible of the Prague Spring, 1964–1972," *Contemporary European History* 15, no. 2 (May 2006): 133–158.

²⁶ For more on the Cold War "wise men," see Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York, 1986). The penetrating phrase "present at the creation" comes, of course, from Dean Acheson's memoirs, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York, 1969).




FIGURE 2: Lyndon Johnson delivering a speech at Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1965. LBJ Library Photo by Yoichi Okamoto.

groups to proclaim that the world faced new challenges—civil rights, nuclear arms control, decolonization, and others—that the elder statesmen, for all their experience, were unprepared to address. According to this argument, the “wise men” emphasized toughness rather than peaceful cooperation. The “wise men” focused on military power, not social change. Most of all, the “wise men” were part of a conservative old culture of suits and big band dances, not a new culture of jeans and rock ‘n’ roll. The “wise men” sought to preserve their way of life against challenges from within; the new men and women sought to transform basic assumptions about politics, foreign policy, and daily life. The new men and women also sought to consume a popular culture of personal freedom more fully, without the traditional restrictions imposed by an inherited culture of self-control and public discipline. Dissent was ideological, and it was fun.²⁷

Dissent from within the mainstream shook the foundations of political power, but it did not bring the walls tumbling down. Quite the contrary, widespread protests elicited new acts of political reinforcement by leaders around the world, often in collaboration with one another. This is the paradox of government stability in the late 1960s amid so much internal unrest. In fact, not a single major government was overthrown by protesters in 1968. Almost every government leader was traumatized by the demonstrations, but also inspired to take strong countermeasures. This, in part, is how political conservatism, rather than the New Left, became hegemonic in the 1970s. The counterculture’s mainstream roots raised expectations for extensive political reform, but those expectations were ultimately a victim of the coercive leverage exerted by the figures who dominated the mainstream and the resources at its disposal. Rapid political change required something much more akin to social revolution than what the international counterculture could offer.²⁸

PRIVILEGED CITIZENS, BENEFITING FROM improved material lives, had rising social and cultural expectations. Relative stability and prosperity encouraged increasing demands. The political moderation that supported stability and prosperity came under attack for its very moderation. This is precisely what Alexis de Tocqueville meant a century earlier when he pointed to the perils of reform after decades of war and deprivation. The promise of a better life encouraged growing demands among an educated generation of men and women that gradual social improvement could not sustain. Suburban wives had much more than their mothers, but it was not enough. West German students lived more secure lives than their parents, but it was not enough. Soviet laborers had better working conditions than their predecessors, but it was not enough. Citizens blamed their leaders, not their unrealistic expectations, for the limits in their lives.²⁹

²⁷ See Students for a Democratic Society, *The Port Huron Statement* (New York, 1962), esp. 1–9; Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York, 1987); Paul Berman, *A Tale of Two Utopias: The Political Journey of the Generation of 1968* (New York, 1996).

²⁸ Suri, *Power and Protest*, 213–259; Jeremi Suri, “Détente and Its Discontents,” in Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., *Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008), 227–245.

²⁹ On the role of affluence, not deprivation, in the counterculture, see Arthur Marwick, *The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958–c.1974* (Oxford, 1998), esp.

These popular frustrations were not only a reaction to the Cold War. They were inspired by Cold War rhetoric and encouraged by Cold War leaders—often the same figures the counterculture would later attack. Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev offers the best example of this dynamic. In his famous “secret speech” of February 1956, he exposed the horrors of Stalinist rule in the Soviet Union and legitimized freer public expression. Khrushchev explained that the fear and terror of prior years, accompanied by a vicious Stalinist “cult,” were “a serious obstacle in the path of Soviet social development.”³⁰ Excessive repression had undermined communist ideals, and it had weakened the Soviet Union in its competition with the United States. Losing its best minds to the Gulag, Moscow could not hope to match Western creativity. The Soviet Union needed to encourage limited new freedoms for the sake of Cold War competition.

Following this logic, Khrushchev temporarily opened up the communist system, encouraging more innovation and achievement. He disbanded the Gulags, sending prisoners home with amnesty so they could contribute to society. He created new “science cities” where scholars could conduct research with generous resources and freer access to information than they had enjoyed before. Most significant, Khrushchev allowed authors, including Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, to publish literature that he believed would discredit the Stalinist past and inspire new hope. “In the last years,” Khrushchev explained, “when we managed to free ourselves of the harmful practice of the cult of the individual and took several proper steps in the sphere of internal and external policies, everyone saw how activity grew before their very eyes, how the creative activity of the broad working masses developed, how favorably all this acted upon the development of economy and culture.”³¹ Khrushchev promised that his program of openness—“the thaw,” as many referred to it—would produce the first truly communist society. It would “erase the essential distinctions between town and country and later on between mental and physical labor.”³²

Khrushchev’s policies allowed more freedom for Soviet citizens, and they catapulted popular expectations. He expected to strengthen Soviet rule through these means. Instead, he nurtured a dissident counterculture. Free of Stalinist terror, citizens could congregate and share their criticisms of the regime. They could organize low-level resistance, often by refusing to follow orders or by dropping out of mandatory activities. Most troublesome for Khrushchev and his colleagues in the Kremlin, citizens felt empowered to question the basic legitimacy of the regime. Solzhenitsyn, the former Gulag prisoner whose writing Khrushchev initially approved for publication, made the Gulag into a metaphor for the Soviet Union as a whole. One

80–95. See also Alexis de Tocqueville, *L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution* (1856; repr., Paris, 1952), esp. 226–231.

³⁰ Nikita Khrushchev, Special Report to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, February 24–25, 1956, translated by the U.S. State Department, reprinted in Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, intro., commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw, ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston, 1970), 612–613.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Nikita Khrushchev, “Report on the Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Delivered at the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” October 18, 1961, trans. Soviet Novosti Press Agency (London, 1961), 23. See also Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 270–299, 507–528; Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 123–162; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary* (New York, 2006), 138–157, 241–262.

of his protagonists, Ivan Denisovich Shukhov, employed the existential language that became a hallmark of the counterculture, and its attacks on leaders such as Khrushchev:

Shukhov stared at the ceiling and said nothing. He no longer knew whether he wanted to be free or not. To begin with, he'd wanted it very much, and counted up every evening how many days he still had to serve. Then he'd got fed up with it. And still later it had gradually dawned on him that people like himself were not allowed to go home but were packed off into exile. And there was no knowing where the living was easier—here or there. The one thing he might want to ask God for was to let him go home. But *they* wouldn't let him go home.³³

The public circulation of Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, and the enormous attention that it drew, inspired countless other attacks on Soviet authority from scientists, students, and ordinary citizens. Zhores Medvedev, a Soviet biologist who criticized the regime, called Solzhenitsyn's writing "a literary miracle" that had "everybody" talking.³⁴ "It has become clear," one reader of *Ivan Denisovich* explained in 1962, "that since the appearance of Solzhenitsyn's book we will never again be able to write as we have done till now."³⁵

The government-authorized publication of Solzhenitsyn's book reflected the Cold War pressures on Khrushchev to encourage creativity and some public openness. The work's reception, however, undermined Khrushchev's purposes—namely the protection of his authority and the strengthening of the communist system. Cold War politics, in this sense, created a contradictory Cold War culture. The attempt to ensure power through openness undermined power. The pressures on leaders to encourage innovation undermined leaders. International Cold War competition created space for the emergence of widespread dissent, even in communist societies.

Khrushchev's predicament was emblematic, but hardly unique. In West Berlin—the strategic center for Soviet-American conflict—a similar dynamic took shape. At the end of the Second World War, the United States and the newly created Federal Republic of (West) Germany collaborated to sponsor a self-consciously democratic school: the Free University. Unlike its German counterparts, this institution encouraged student governance. It also emphasized experimental courses and approaches to teaching. The Free University set a new model for post-fascist education in Germany, and it also served as a showcase for the freedom and dynamism that the sponsoring governments intended to display in West Berlin. The Free University was part of a cultural "magnet" strategy, designed to encourage citizens living under repressive communist rule to embrace liberal capitalism. In the unique context of West Berlin—where citizens from the eastern and western halves of the city could interact before the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961—this involved the direct attraction of East German men and women through the Free University. Between 1949 and 1961, more than a third of the students attending the institution were

³³ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, trans. H. T. Willetts (1962; repr., New York, 1991), 178.

³⁴ Zhores A. Medvedev, *Ten Years after Ivan Denisovich*, trans. Hilary Sternberg (New York, 1973), 4, 6.

³⁵ Gregori Baklanov quoted in Cornelia Gerstenmaier, *The Voices of the Silent*, trans. Susan Hecker (New York, 1972), 67. For more evidence of Solzhenitsyn's enormous influence among Soviet citizens, see Leopold Labedz, ed., *Solzhenitsyn: A Documentary Record*, enlarged ed. (Bloomington, Ind., 1973).

citizens of the communist state.³⁶ Democratic education at the Free University helped to subvert communist authority. The freedom and wealth on display at this institution encouraged disgruntled East Germans—particularly the young and ambitious—to defect to the West. In the late 1950s, more than one hundred communist citizens fled to the Federal Republic each day. Many of them were enrolled at the Free University.³⁷

The most famous of these student refugees was Rudolf “Rudi” Dutschke. He came from the East German province of Brandenburg. The communist government had barred him from higher education when he refused to participate in mandatory military service during the late 1950s. As a consequence, Dutschke attended the Free University—the only postsecondary institution from which he was not barred. In 1961 he fled to West Berlin, continuing his studies in sociology, philosophy, and political science at the Free University.³⁸

Dutschke’s defection was a Cold War victory for the West, but it also produced a profound challenge to Cold War policy. By the second half of the 1960s, he had become a leader of student protests against the West German government, American influence, and what he called the elements of “fascism” built into capitalist democracy. He condemned the Federal Republic’s conservative political culture, its support for repressive foreign regimes (especially the shah’s monarchy in Iran), and Bonn’s association with the brutal U.S. war in Vietnam. In his diary, Dutschke expressed his desire to create a “third front,” a counterculture, to challenge the dominant capitalist and communist authorities.³⁹ Mao Zedong, Che Guevara, and idealized images of brave Vietnamese peasant fighters became inspirational symbols for a revolution against not just established political leaders, but the basic habits of society. Dutschke proclaimed a “historic opening” for a global “emancipatory struggle and national self-determination.”⁴⁰

Dutschke’s words articulated the frustrations of many young educated citizens throughout Western Europe who wanted more idealism and less association with Cold War ventures in Vietnam and other venues. In February 1968, ten thousand people from various U.S.-allied countries attended a student-organized “Vietnam Congress” at the Free University, designed to mobilize participants for “solidarity” and “revolutionary struggle.” Public protests spread throughout the continent, employing the “third front” rhetoric of Dutschke and others.⁴¹

In the United States, public demonstrations focused on the Vietnam War and

³⁶ See James F. Tent, *The Free University of Berlin: A Political History* (Bloomington, Ind., 1988), 1–176. On the American “magnet” strategy in Europe, see Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif., 1992), 235–237; John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, rev. ed. (New York, 2005), 64–69.

³⁷ Alexandra Richie, *Faust’s Metropolis: A History of Berlin* (New York, 1998), 715–716.

³⁸ See Ulrich Chaussy, *Die drei Leben des Rudi Dutschke: Eine Biographie* (Berlin, 1993); Gretchen Dutschke, *Wir hatten ein barbarisches, schönes Leben: Rudi Dutschke, eine Biographie* (Cologne, 1996); Bernd Rabehl, *Rudi Dutschke: Revolutionär im geteilten Deutschland* (Dresden, 2002).

³⁹ Rudi Dutschkes Tagebuch, 17. Juni 1967, 70.

⁴⁰ Dutschke, “Rebellion der Studenten” (1968), in Dutschke, *Mein langer Marsch*, 68–69. See also Jeremi Suri, “The Cultural Contradictions of Cold War Education: The Case of West Berlin,” *Cold War History* 4, no. 3 (April 2004): 1–20.

⁴¹ Dutschke, *Mein langer Marsch*, 122, 71–72. See also Gerhard Bauß, *Die Studentenbewegung der sechziger Jahre in der Bundesrepublik und Westberlin* (Cologne, 1977), 95; Bernd Rabehl, *Am Ende der Utopie: Die politische Geschichte der Freien Universität Berlin* (Berlin, 1988), 256–268.

civil rights, but they also employed the attacks on Cold War “imperialism” and “fascism” that animated the counterculture in Western Europe. Anti-war protesters on university campuses throughout the United States looked to third world revolutionaries for examples of “liberation.” Advocates of Black Power took inspiration from nationalist movements in Africa that attacked the foreign and domestic “colonialism” of white rule. Dutschke’s “third front” became the solution of choice for citizens struggling with the frustrations of unfulfilled expectations during a decade of unprecedented social improvements.⁴²

For all the violence in Vietnam and other parts of the third world, the international system had become more stable and less prone to nuclear crisis in the 1960s. For all the continued racism in the United States and other societies, laws and attitudes had, in fact, changed in powerful ways to protect traditionally disenfranchised groups. This was significant progress, encouraged by Cold War competition. In their desire to make their societies stronger, more creative, and more attractive, leaders worked to make their societies better. Promises of reform in this ideologically overheated environment, however, mobilized citizens beyond the aims of their leaders. Solzhenitsyn’s readers and Dutschke’s followers were empowered by the Cold War reforms they condemned as insufficient. The Cold War provided space for the counterculture at universities, in public literature, and in other social settings. It even encouraged a counterculture that showcased freedom and creativity.⁴³

By the end of the 1960s, creativity had turned to revolt in nearly every major state. The countries most deeply penetrated by the Cold War confronted pervasive dissent and disaffection, especially among the young. Attempts by leaders to mobilize their publics for domestic reform and international competition had produced spiraling domestic contention and aspirations to international solidarity among critics. The Cold War had globalized a set of ideological debates, and now a cohort of ideological dissidents.⁴⁴

HERBERT MARCUSE, A GERMAN ÉMIGRÉ to the United States who became one of the most recognized philosophers of the counterculture, articulated and promoted the common revolt against Cold War authority. He described what he perceived as the “genuine solidarity” among “young radicals” that drew its “elemental, instinctual, creative force” from guerrilla fighters in the third world and the Chinese Cultural

⁴² For some of the many excellent new studies on the connections between civil rights, Black Power, and third world liberation movements, see Peniel E. Joseph, *Waiting 'til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America* (New York, 2006), esp. 68–94, 276–295; Kevin K. Gaines, *American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006), esp. 244–273; Brenda Gayle Plummer, “Introduction,” in Plummer, ed., *Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1988* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2003), 1–20; Penny M. Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), esp. 148–222; Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), esp. 135–221; Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, N.J., 2000), esp. 203–248.

⁴³ On the encouragement of the “rebel” image as a symbol of American freedom in the Cold War, see Leerom Medovoi, *Rebels: Youth and the Cold War Origins of Identity* (Durham, N.C., 2005), esp. 1–51.

⁴⁴ This point follows the analysis in Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, 2005), esp. 110–206.

Revolution, not the traditional centers of influence. Western claims of progress had, according to Marcuse, lost their popular appeal.⁴⁵

Drawing on his earlier studies with the Frankfurt School of critical theory, Marcuse's argument was cultural in two senses. First, he contended that modern "industrial society" repressed personal happiness. Deconstructing the ideological architecture of both Soviet communism and Western liberal capitalism, he emphasized how the state-directed pursuit of material abundance prevented the free and "natural" exploration of individual fulfillment. Disciplined "civilization," according to this argument, denatured human beings, denying their basic sexual instinct—what Marcuse called, borrowing from Sigmund Freud, "Eros."⁴⁶

Marcuse condemned the "one-dimensional thought and behavior" that dominated all Cold War thinking.⁴⁷ "Does not the threat of an atomic catastrophe which would wipe out the human race," he asked, "also serve to protect the very forces which perpetuate this danger? The efforts to prevent such a catastrophe overshadow the search for its potential causes in contemporary industrial society . . . We submit to the peaceful production of the means of destruction, to perfection of waste, to being educated for a defense which deforms the defenders and that which they defend."⁴⁸

If a repressive cultural apparatus inscribed the Cold War in modern society, Marcuse believed that escape could come only from a cultural revolt. This was the second and more explosive part of his argument. In rhetoric and image, it affected many citizens who never read a word of his prose. Marcuse advocated the "free development of human needs and faculties."⁴⁹ In his utopia, technology would find use in abolishing poverty, not extending the risks of destruction. "Socially necessary labor would be diverted to the construction of an aesthetic rather than repressive environment, to parks and gardens rather than highways and parking lots, to the creation of areas of withdrawal."⁵⁰ Marcuse called for renewing humanity through a rejection of bombs and machines, and an embrace of art and sex. Aesthetic and bodily experimentation would manifest a "great refusal" and stimulate a powerful "radical imagination."⁵¹

In the late 1960s, Marcuse also associated artistic and sexual liberation with violence. He expressed admiration for peasant revolutionaries in Vietnam, the Congo, and other parts of the third world whose actions became cultural capital for "turning the wheel of progress to another direction."⁵² "The spread of guerrilla warfare at the height of the technological century" was, Marcuse wrote, "a symbolic event: the energy of the human body rebels against intolerable repression and throws itself

⁴⁵ Herbert Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation* (Boston, 1969), 86, 88.

⁴⁶ Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (1955; repr., Boston, 1966), esp. 21–54, 197–221; Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis* (New York, 1958), esp. 169–170.

⁴⁷ Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (1964; repr., Boston, 1991), 12; Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, 197–221.

⁴⁸ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, xli.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 220–221.

⁵⁰ Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation*, 90.

⁵¹ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 63; Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation*, 44–45. See also Douglas Kellner, *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism* (London, 1984), 174–189.

⁵² Herbert Marcuse, "Political Preface 1966," in Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, xvii.

against the engines of repression.”⁵³ He observed “a strong element of spontaneity, even anarchism,” in third world rebellions. It was a “sensitivity against domination: the feeling, the awareness, that the joy of freedom and the need to be free must precede liberation.”⁵⁴

The hypermasculine revolutionary raising his weapon against the ghost-faced great powers was a culturally emotive image of rebellion, now given powerful intellectual legitimacy by the philosophical language of the Frankfurt School. Most protesters did not read Marcuse closely, if at all, but he became an international advertiser for romantic ideas of liberation through sex and violence. He provided the philosophical text for the Che Guevara posters that pervaded radical communities by the end of the 1960s. One contemporary observer described Marcuse’s radical celebrity:

I was standing in the midst of a noisy, happy crowd of students in an auditorium at Brandeis [University], waiting for a concert to begin, when word suddenly came up the line: Marcuse’s here! At once there was a hush, and people divided themselves up to clear a path. A tall, erect, vividly forceful man passed down the aisle, smiling here and there to friends, radiant yet curiously aloof, rather like an aristocrat who was a popular hero as well . . . The students held their breaths and gazed at him with awe. After he had got to his seat, they relaxed again, flux and chaos returned, but only for a moment, till everyone could find his place; it was as if Marcuse’s very presence had given a structure to events.⁵⁵

In his attention to the connections between cultural liberation and violence, Marcuse was on to something. The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed escalating violence in many societies. Nearly everywhere, established authorities found themselves under siege. National leaders could not travel within large sections of their own countries, for fear of embarrassing protests and personal attacks. Local figures—mayors, businesspeople, and teachers—confronted unprecedented challenges from citizens, customers, and students. Drug usage and crime rose across communities.⁵⁶ British foreign secretary Michael Stewart captured the sense of widespread domestic upheaval when he confided to his diary: “The 10:pm television news presents a depressing picture.” “The great difficulty of the world,” Stewart lamented, “is the moral deficiencies of what should be the free world . . . Germany distracted, France selfish, ourselves aimless, U.S.A. in torment.”⁵⁷ The CIA confirmed this dark assessment, predicting: “The social and political malaise that underlies much of present-day dissidence will not be speedily cured; there are, in fact, striking parallels between the situation today and the conditions of cynicism, despair, and disposition toward violence which existed after World War I and which later helped produce Fascism and National Socialism on the Continent.”⁵⁸

The turn to violence among members of the counterculture, and their opponents,

⁵³ Ibid., xix.

⁵⁴ Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation*, 89.

⁵⁵ Marshall Berman, Review of *One-Dimensional Man*, *Partisan Review* 31, no. 4 (Fall 1964): 617.

⁵⁶ For the data on the cross-national increase in crime during the late 1960s, see Ted Robert Gurr and Erika Gurr, “Crime in Western Societies, 1945–1974,” <http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR07769> (accessed December 1, 2008).

⁵⁷ Michael Stewart, handwritten diary, April 17, 1968, Box STWT 8/1/5, Churchill Archives Center, Churchill College, Cambridge, England.

⁵⁸ CIA report, “Restless Youth.”

in various societies created nightmarish premonitions. It also severed many of the connections between moderate leaders and critics who had supported political reform in prior years. In place of the collaboration between Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and President Lyndon Johnson, open war among the supporters of figures such as Black Power advocate Stokely Carmichael and southern segregationist George Wallace dominated the years after 1967. Violent altercations, riots, and even acts of terrorism engulfed major cities across the United States, Western Europe, and other parts of the world. Cultural dissent produced domestic bloodletting and death. The violence of foreign wars in Vietnam and other venues had now come home.⁵⁹

This descent into violence, although shocking, was the extension of the debates begun earlier in the 1960s. If the dominant Cold War culture was stagnant and repressive, as critics claimed, it had to be destroyed and replaced. Overcoming the stubborn resistance of entrenched figures required force. Public violence appeared as a necessary tool to unseat violent oppressors. This is where the image of peasant revolutionaries in Vietnam looked so appealing. This is where the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" in China, initially triggered by Mao Zedong, offered inspiration. Here was a society violently turning itself upside down to eradicate vestiges of an old culture. Here was a society that made violence a purifying force, cleansing itself of "backward" traditions. The Chinese Cultural Revolution was, in fact, one of the most brutal and self-defeating political enterprises of the twentieth century.⁶⁰ Its shrill attacks on established wisdom, however, made it attractive for those seeking to change the basic relations between citizens in society. Herbert Marcuse was only one of many to point to China as a model for "liberation."⁶¹

Countercultural groups formed in the early 1970s that treated violence as a means for proving cultural authenticity in an international environment filled with lies. Putting one's life (and the lives of others) on the line demonstrated a depth of personal courage and truthfulness that these critics claimed Cold War society lacked. Instead of working with the "machine" for personal benefit, intelligent young men and women pledged to place their bodies, literally, on the gears—to stop the normal functioning of society with their blood. The Weather Underground embodied this idealization of violence in the United States. Formed in 1969 to promote an "armed struggle" against capitalist society, the group declared the need for "a movement that fights, not just talks about fighting." The Red Army Faction emerged in West Germany as a more deadly counterpart. First organized in 1970, it proclaimed: "We will not talk about armed propaganda, we will do it."⁶²

These two groups, and similar groups in other countries, mixed countercultural politics with paramilitary behavior. They lived communal lifestyles, but they enforced military discipline. They called for political openness, but they violently attacked their critics. They tried to appeal to the public, but they were prepared to kill in-

⁵⁹ On the discourse surrounding the "war at home," see Michael S. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s* (New Haven, Conn., 1995), 292–336; Tom Wicker, *One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream* (New York, 1991), esp. 569–648.

⁶⁰ See, among many recent books, Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006); Joseph W. Esherick, Paul G. Pickowicz, and Andrew G. Walder, eds., *The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History* (Stanford, Calif., 2006).

⁶¹ Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberation*, viii.

⁶² Quotations from Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley, Calif., 2004), 21.



FIGURE 3: National Guard troops on the University of Wisconsin–Madison campus, 1969. Courtesy of the UW-Madison Archives.

nocent, even sympathetic, citizens in the pursuit of their cause. This is the point at which some rebels turned into petty terrorists. This is also the point at which violence grew from a tool for resistance into a defining element of the counterculture. It took on symbolic value as a total rejection of standard, “civilized” authority. It became a marker of status for a small group of men and women who came to think of themselves as guerrilla fighters, battling to save society from itself.⁶³

This domestic terrorism elicited firm reactions from state authorities and their supporters. They deployed overwhelming force against what they perceived as an apocalyptic threat—violent revolution from within, and domestic terrorism against innocent civilians. State authorities also discredited violent critics by denying them obvious influence on policy. The United States continued to fight in Vietnam, despite resistance at home, for another four years. The Soviet Union ordered an invasion of Czechoslovakia to repress the reforming government there, despite strong opposition to such a move within the Eastern Bloc. The West German government maintained its close partnership with Washington, despite widespread anti-American sentiment. Countercultural violence sparked a backlash that raised resistance to change in both domestic and foreign policy.⁶⁴

The backlash was often much more violent than the initial countercultural attacks. The August 1968 Democratic Party Convention in Chicago offered the most publicized evidence for this dynamic. As groups such as the Youth International Party (“Yippies”) converged on the city to condemn mainstream politics, and the Democratic Party’s continued support for the Vietnam War in particular, local police prepared to attack the protesters. Abbie Hoffman and other countercultural critics

⁶³ See the excellent analysis of this point in *ibid.*, esp. 196–289.

⁶⁴ See Suri, *Power and Protest*, 213–259.

mocked and provoked the police, but the response by law enforcement was out of proportion to the instigation. Mayor Richard Daley mobilized his entire police force, as well as National Guard soldiers, for demonstrations that never included more than seven thousand protesters. Determined to preempt countercultural violence, the Chicago police attacked the crowds with nightsticks and other implements. They did not wait for the young men and women in the streets to become disruptive. State authorities violently crushed a perceived threat from politically engaged citizens.⁶⁵

Events in Chicago mirrored the expansion of police powers in West Germany and other democratic societies. Countercultural disorder created a perceived “emergency” that justified violent, often undemocratic, reactions. Police forces entered university campuses, business offices, and private homes to search for evidence of brewing conspiracy. Domestic intelligence agencies—most notoriously the FBI in the United States—increased their surveillance of suspected individuals. Washington, D.C., West Berlin, Paris, and Mexico City came under virtual martial law during periods of heightened unrest, as regular army soldiers walked the streets to ensure order. The violent backlash against the counterculture militarized daily life in the Cold War.⁶⁶

In the communist countries, where politics were already militarized, the domestic deployment of armed forces also expanded. Chairman Mao Zedong had initiated the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China. As the country careened into chaos during the late 1960s, however, he turned to the People’s Liberation Army to restore order and ensure his continued power. Mao used the military to repress the Red Guards he had sent into the streets. Despite his earlier calls for breaking traditional institutions, he warned in 1968 of emerging “anarchy.” To reverse this course, he affirmed that “the army is the fundamental pillar of the Cultural Revolution.”⁶⁷

The Soviet Union never returned to the terror of the Stalinist years, but under the leadership of General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, the KGB stepped up its efforts to identify, discredit, and eliminate dissident voices in the early 1970s. The Kremlin’s tolerance for domestic criticism diminished as the regime grew more anxious about internal unrest. Brezhnev, in particular, relied on the image of a strengthening Soviet military to bolster his legitimacy (including countless medals he awarded himself) and protect communist authority. The counterculture attacked militarization, but ironically, it inspired more of the same.⁶⁸

IF LEADERS PROMISING TO “PAY ANY PRICE” and build communism dominated the early 1960s, figures pledged to “law and order” shaped the early 1970s. President Richard Nixon popularized the phrase in the United States, but his counterparts in West

⁶⁵ See the balanced and evocative book by David Farber, *Chicago '68* (Chicago, 1988).

⁶⁶ See Michael W. Flamm, *Law and Order: Street Crime, Civil Unrest, and the Crisis of Liberalism in the 1960s* (New York, 2005), 162–178; Melvin Small, *The Presidency of Richard Nixon* (Lawrence, Kans., 1999), 153–183; Suri, *Power and Protest*, 164–212.

⁶⁷ *People’s Daily* editorial, March 1, 1968, in Jerome Ch’en, ed., *Mao Papers: Anthology and Bibliography* (New York, 1970), 152; Simon Leys, *The Chairman’s New Clothes: Mao and the Cultural Revolution*, trans. Carol Appleyard and Patrick Goode (New York, 1977), 106–107.

⁶⁸ See Dmitrii Volkogonov, *Sem’ vozhdai: Galereia liderov SSSR*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1995), 2: esp. 41–42; Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 192–226; Suri, “The Promise and Failure of ‘Developed Socialism,’” 150–158.

Germany, the Soviet Union, and other countries used similar terms. In the wake of the counterculture, leaders rebuilt their authority around commitments to restore rationality, reasonableness, and domestic peace. As best we can tell, this is what a “silent majority” of people wanted in many societies, following years of upheaval and violence. Nixon captured this sentiment in his inaugural address of January 20, 1969. Addressing “America’s youth” and “the people of the world,” the new president argued: “We cannot learn from one another until we stop shouting at one another—until we speak quietly enough so that our words can be heard as well as our voices.” “For all our people,” Nixon continued, “we will set as our goal the decent order that makes progress possible and our lives secure.”⁶⁹ Nixon’s words received favorable attention at home and abroad, including in China, where Mao was seeking to rein in the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and open relations with the United States.⁷⁰

“Law and order” was not just a reaction to disorder and upheaval. It represented a widespread and deep-seated response to the events of the late 1960s that was much more than a counter to the counterculture. It opened a new “culture war” by rejecting *both* the standard ideological rhetoric of the Cold War and the oppositional claims of figures such as Betty Friedan, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and Rudi Dutschke. In place of these polarities, a powerful spiritual discourse emerged that invoked the fundamentalist language of Armageddon and salvation in defense of family and country. Reacting to what one scholar calls the “cultural disorientation” of the late 1960s—especially the sexual revolution—religious leaders such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson emerged as prominent oracles for citizens who longed to return to something they identified as “normal” in a world undergoing dizzying change. Evangelical religious institutions proliferated, offering easy access and strong advocacy for basic “family values.” As activists turned against traditional political institutions, the largest evangelical Protestant denomination in the United States, the Southern Baptist Convention, witnessed an astronomical 23 percent growth in its membership. A popular quest for moral certainty in public professions of religious faith strongly accompanied demands for law and order on city streets.⁷¹

The rise of Christian fundamentalism was not exclusively a creature of the political right, but it had a strong bias in that direction within both the United States and Western Europe. If the politics of the left—“old” and “new”—had promised steady social progress through state-based reforms, the Christian-infused right of the 1970s pointed to the mess these programs had created, and the need for a return to

⁶⁹ Richard Nixon, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1969, in *Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard Nixon, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President*, 6 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1971–1975), 1: 1–2. On the “Silent Majority,” see Matthew D. Lassiter, *The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South* (Princeton, N.J., 2006), esp. 225–323; Rick Perlstein, *Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America* (New York, 2008), esp. 445–523; Dan T. Carter, *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics*, 2nd ed. (Baton Rouge, La., 2000), esp. 324–414; Bruce J. Schulman, *The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics* (New York, 2001), esp. 23–117.

⁷⁰ See “Mao Zedong’s Comments on an Article by Commentator of *Renmin ribao* and *Hongqi*, January 1969,” translated in *Cold War International History Bulletin* 11 (Winter 1998): 161; “Mao Zedong’s Speech at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese Communist Party’s Ninth Central Committee, 28 April 1969,” *ibid.*, 164–165.

⁷¹ Paul Boyer, “The Evangelical Resurgence in 1970s American Protestantism,” in Schulman and Zelizer, *Rightward Bound*, 29–51. See also Matthew D. Lassiter, “Inventing Family Values,” *ibid.*, 13–28.

basic beliefs. Christian fundamentalist groups and their political allies used newspapers, magazines, radio, and television to advocate a simple message of salvation through God, family, and nation. For politicians—many non-Christian and non-devout—this rhetoric served as an effective magnet for votes from anxious and disgruntled citizens. A decade after 1968, the so-called “neoconservatives” in the United States tapped into this sentiment when they promoted a political program that hinged upon the evangelical imagery of a “born again” “morning in America,” and a candidate—Ronald Reagan—who in 1976 and 1980 rejected both the liberal promises of the Democratic Party and the Cold War cautions of mainstream Republicans. Reagan turned the contested memories of the 1960s into fodder for a cultural program that self-consciously fused Christian fundamentalism with neoconservative politics.⁷²

Christian fundamentalists and neoconservatives told activists such as Betty Friedan that they were indeed mistaken to expect happiness in Cold War suburbia. They were also wrong to pursue an alternative form of liberation. Instead, they should accept their lives as they were, and protect their families against worse possibilities.⁷³

THIS WAS THE CONTEXT FOR THE FOREIGN POLICY of détente in the 1970s. Scholars of détente generally point to the importance of near nuclear parity and a general balance of power in bringing the United States and the Soviet Union to embrace more stable relations. They also point to the growing rift between Moscow and Beijing, and the opening this created for Washington to position itself between these two states. American desperation to end the Vietnam War surely contributed to détente as well, encouraging citizens and leaders in the United States to accept a less ideologically strident foreign policy.⁷⁴

President Richard Nixon and his special assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, embraced these strategic transformations and attempted to turn them to the United States' advantage. They sought to use improved great power relations for more effective leverage over local events around the globe, with less direct American force. This was the basis for the “Nixon Doctrine,” designed to avoid making countries “so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam.”⁷⁵ Amid powerful domestic and allied dissent against American interventions, détente was an attempt to compensate for internal

⁷² See Sean Wilentz, *The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974–2008* (New York, 2008); James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York, 2004), esp. 1–149; Joseph Crespino, *In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution* (Princeton, N.J., 2007), esp. 205–266; Kevin M. Kruse, *White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism* (Princeton, N.J., 2005), esp. 234–258.

⁷³ See Marjorie J. Spruill, “Gender and America's Right Turn,” in Schulman and Zelizer, *Rightward Bound*, 71–89; Donald T. Critchlow, *Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman's Crusade* (Princeton, N.J., 2005), esp. 212–242.

⁷⁴ See Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 2004), esp. 55–67; Zubok, *A Failed Empire*, 192–226; Robert D. Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy* (New York, 1989), esp. 52–74; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 272–341; Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C., 1994).

⁷⁵ Richard Nixon, Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen, July 25, 1969, in *Public Papers of the*



FIGURE 4: Richard and Pat Nixon at tea with Zhou Enlai, February 1972. Courtesy of Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace.

weakness with diplomatic acumen. It was a reaction to domestic pressures for peace and fears of continued Cold War militarization. “We were,” Kissinger explained, “in a delicate balancing act: to be committed to peace without letting the quest for it become a form of moral disarmament, surrendering all other values; to be prepared to defend freedom while making clear that unconstrained rivalry could risk everything, including freedom, in a nuclear holocaust.”⁷⁶

In his memoirs, Kissinger immediately turns from this description of détente to a discussion about the need to “outmaneuver” domestic dissent—from “liberals” who wanted to see more commitment to peace and reform in American actions, and “conservatives” who demanded stronger confrontation with communism.⁷⁷ Political leaders in West Germany, Great Britain, and other states faced similarly dichotomous pressures. The counterculture’s attack on Cold War assumptions, and the backlash against this challenge, inflamed these debates. The domestic violence and extremism of the period made it difficult to build bridges between points of view.

Presidents: Richard Nixon, 1: 548. For a fuller statement of the “Nixon Doctrine,” see Nixon, Annual Foreign Policy Report, February 18, 1970, *ibid.*, 2: 118–119.

⁷⁶ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, 1979), 1254.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 1255.

In contrast to their predecessors, leaders in the 1970s had to formulate international policy as their authority was being deeply contested at home. Nixon and West German chancellor Willy Brandt, two of the most powerful international leaders of the 1970s, both resigned from office because of domestic scandals, inflamed by public distrust of leaders. The making of détente reflected the unmaking of the Cold War consensus. Elite politics were transformed by the transnational consequences of the counterculture.

Kissinger admitted this. When asked in 1971 “where the administration wants to end up after four years,” he invoked both the crisis of values and the new international environment that characterized the period. “This administration came into office when the intellectual capital of US postwar policy had been used up and when the conditions determining postwar US policy had been altered,” he explained.

We had to adjust our foreign policy to the new facts of life. It is beyond the physical and psychological capacity of the US to make itself responsible for every part of the world. We hope in the first term to clear away the underbush of the old period. In the second term, we could try to construct a new international settlement—which will be more stable, less crisis-conscious, and less dependent on decisions in one capital.⁷⁸

The “underbush of the old period” included the assumptions about omnipotent power that the counterculture condemned. Constructing a “new international settlement” meant applying “law and order” to foreign policy, providing a framework for rationality, reasonableness, and moderation in the relations between societies—despite contrary pressures at home. Frequent “back-channel” communications between leaders would encourage cooperation, establish basic norms for international conduct, and insulate policy from domestic interference. This was an effort, Kissinger and Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin agreed, to make international civility “irreversible.”⁷⁹

The two superpowers formalized their commitment to international “law and order,” rather than revolutionary change, in the Agreement on Basic Principles—officially “The Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”—signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972. The document spoke explicitly about “rules of conduct” that would ensure “peaceful coexistence” and avoid any “dangerous exacerbation” of relations.⁸⁰ It encouraged consultation among state leaders, and it diminished the importance of ideology, nationalism, and other moral claims. The Agreement on Basic Principles aimed to silence Cold Warriors and countercultural critics at the same time.

⁷⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Fellows of the Harvard Center for International Affairs, December 7, 1971, Kissinger Transcripts, Digital National Security Archive, http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnas&rft_dat=xri:dnas:article:CKT00401 (accessed December 1, 2008).

⁷⁹ Memorandum of Conversation between Leonid Brezhnev, Anatoly Dobrynin, Henry Kissinger, et al., Moscow, October 24, 1974, 11:00am–2:00pm, Folder: 11/74, Japan, Korea, USSR, Box A6, Kissinger-Scowcroft Files, Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Mich. See also Memorandum of Conversation between Leonid Brezhnev, Anatoly Dobrynin, Henry Kissinger, et al., Moscow, October 26, 1974, 7:10pm–10:20pm, *ibid.* These two documents are also reprinted in William Burr, ed., *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow* (New York, 1998), 327–355.

⁸⁰ “Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” May 29, 1972, reprinted in *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* 66 (June 26, 1972): 898–899.

In addition to basic strategic considerations, détente represented an effort to build a new culture for international affairs. It was the foreign mirror of domestic change. Internal discontent and disorder forced leaders to reconceptualize their foreign policy aims and capabilities. Challenges to assumed Cold War values motivated policies that did not hinge on traditional ideological claims. Men such as Kissinger and Dobrynin feared the backlash as much as the counterculture, and they worked to craft a new middle ground. They emphasized “law and order” in the international system. They attempted to isolate policy from public influence. They defined themselves against both the counterculture of the late 1960s and its opponents. Neo-conservatives would later condemn détente for its moral obtuseness, but they shared its desire to rescue cultural authority from domestic dissent.⁸¹

BETTY FRIEDAN’S FAMOUS ATTACK ON DOMESTICITY was about more than feminism. Her words captured an emerging revolt against authority around the world. Unlike most prior resistance to the dominant Cold War ideas and policies, this rebellion came from within—from the universities, the literary circles, and even the bedrooms of mainstream society. This was Friedan’s central insight. Those who appeared to benefit most from the politics of the time were dissatisfied. They were empowered, because of their social centrality, to demand more. They were motivated, because of their rising expectations, to reject cultural limitations.

In the 1960s and 1970s, an international counterculture, composed of numerous local groups, exposed the problem that had no name. The counterculture did more than just challenge existing authority; it also questioned the basic assumptions about the “good life” that underpinned social order. The Cold War policies condemned for stagnating social change actually encouraged and legitimized this counterculture. State leaders sponsored education and innovation for more effective competition against international adversaries. They also made broad ideological claims that they could not fulfill. Citizens, particularly privileged young citizens, now had the means and the motivation to challenge their leaders for failing to meet their stated goals. In nearly every major society, men and women asked why government policies had not produced the promised outcomes, why their country was falling short. A wide spectrum of citizens—from street protesters to communist dissidents—questioned not just the competence of their leaders, but also their values.

This was the central contradiction of the Cold War between 1960 and 1975. The pressures for international competition enabled domestic contention. As states built external strength, they diminished their internal cohesiveness. Scholars frequently treat the social history of the counterculture as something separate from the political history of the Cold War, but the two were, in fact, deeply intertwined. Cold War ideas, resources, and institutions made the counterculture. The counterculture, in turn, unmade these ideas, resources, and institutions. The backlash against the counterculture furthered this process by contributing to widespread violence and division. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Cold War became more stable in traditional areas of great power conflict, but it grew more disruptive within societies.

⁸¹ See Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 2007), esp. 197–248.

Although the counterculture did not revolutionize the world, it exerted a powerful influence on Cold War policies. Leaders abandoned grand ideological projects and turned to promises of “law and order” and spiritual renewal. At home and abroad, they emphasized rationality and reasonableness. Détente rejected the old political assumptions as well as the radical calls for something new. The international counterculture was both a product of the Cold War and an agent in its transformation.

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"1968" East and West:
Divided Germany as a Case Study in Transnational History

TIMOTHY S. BROWN

THE YOUTH REBELLIONS OF THE LATE 1960s—associated in the popular and scholarly consciousness with the year 1968—were part of a global event. They embraced, in differing forms, the capitalist West as well as the communist East, the countries of the Third World as well as those of the First and Second. The term "1968" has become a shorthand not only for a particular series of events—social unrest in locations as diverse as Mexico and China, France and Japan, Czechoslovakia and the United States—but for a certain type of interconnectedness closely associated with the process of globalization shaping the contemporary world. Yet the study of "1968" poses a set of profound conceptual and practical difficulties. Alongside the basic problem of analyzing an ill-defined "event" with amorphous contours, decentralized agency, and (in most cases) little lasting institutional signature, there is the question of how exactly its "globality" is to be studied. However global in scope and orientation, "1968" was played out in and around specific national contexts, and it is to these that we must look to understand the larger, world event. Yet the nation-state cannot function as our primary frame of reference, not only because of the importance of transnational influences in shaping local events, but because of how intimately "1968" was linked to the creation of globalizing imagined communities that cut across national boundaries.¹

Work on "1968" has increasingly emphasized comparative perspectives and the investigation of transnational linkages; yet it has also exhibited a tendency to take the "global" somewhat for granted. That is, the global—whether it is understood to function as a "spirit" or *Zeitgeist*, as an ideological orientation or commitment among actors, or simply as a conjunctural fact—is often treated as little more than a product of the nation-state multiplied. Perhaps this is unavoidable to a certain extent, and indeed, maybe it makes sense if the goal is to demonstrate fundamental similarities across national cases. Yet this approach does not help us very much in writing about

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¹ On "1968" as involving an "imagined community of global revolt," see Simon Prince, "The Global Revolt of 1968 and Northern Ireland," *Historical Journal* 49, no. 3 (September 2006): 851–875; Prince, *Northern Ireland's '68: Civil Rights, Global Revolt and the Origins of the Troubles* (Dublin, 2008).

individual national cases, nor does it give us a very concrete understanding of how globality functioned in them. A more useful approach is one in which the globality of "1968" does not merely become a function of "one, two, many nation-states," but is understood to arise out of the interplay of global factors at the local level. This approach entails two complementary lines of inquiry. First, we must identify transnational influences, analyzing their mode of transmission and exploring how they articulated with local concerns, goals, traditions, and histories. This entails a focus not only on modes of transfer, but on the conditions governing the reception of what is transferred. Second, we must examine how local actors imagined themselves into the world, creating alternative cognitive maps that corresponded to a new type of politics. This approach—situating the local within the global while locating the global at work locally—can enable us to place the history of individual nation-states in the new perspective provided by an enlarged frame of reference, while capturing, in a concrete way, something of the globality of "1968."²

THE GLOBAL FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE LOCAL in a particularly profound way in divided Germany. Lying as it did on either side of the "Iron Curtain," divided Germany—by which is meant East Germany and West Germany, the two states created by the Cold War superpowers atop the ruins of the German state defeated in World War II—holds some special advantages as a case study. In the Federal Republic, the global, transnational aspects of "1968" were writ particularly large. The core group of militants who radicalized the West German student movement, leading it into an escalating series of conflicts with the authorities, were motivated by an explicit set of linkages. Some of these—including the desire to import the struggle of the Third World against imperialism into the heart of the metropole—were a general part of the world youth rebellion, at least in the West; others—such as the link between the Cold War (of which the U.S. war in Vietnam was a part) and the partition of Germany and Berlin—were specific to Germany. Their young counterparts in the east also understood themselves as part of a global community, a community that included not only the student movements of the West and the anti-imperialist revolutionaries of the Third World, but also young people pursuing a democratic socialist alternative in the East.

Both Germanies also took part in an international cultural revolution that has figured prominently in much of the recent literature. International networks of consumption and cultural exchange drew the Federal Republic of Germany into the web of global youth culture, a youth culture that in turn played a key role in the construction of political identities. A similar situation existed in the German Democratic Republic, where, despite intermittent state repression, Western music and fash-

² See George Katsiaficas, *The Imagination of the New Left: A Global Analysis of 1968* (Boston, 1987); Gerd-Rainer Horn, *The Spirit of '68: Rebellion in Western Europe and North America, 1956–1976* (Oxford, 2006); Jeremy Varon, *Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army faction, and Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies* (Berkeley, Calif., 2004); Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution in the Age of Détente* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003); Robert V. Daniels, *Year of the Heroic Guerrilla: World Revolution and Counterrevolution in 1968* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989); Carole Fink et al., eds., *1968: The World Transformed* (Cambridge, 1998); Wolfgang Kraushaar, *1968: Das Jahr das alles verändert hat* (Munich, 1998).

ion—as well as home-grown variants—became increasingly popular from the mid-sixties on. The question of how and to what extent this youth cultural wave was linked to specific political protest movements—or the extent to which it is to be seen as “political” in its own right—has been the subject of debate; but it is clear that by the late 1960s, international youth culture had become so closely intertwined with anti-authoritarian left-wing politics that the two were increasingly seen, by both friend and foe, as synonymous. One task must therefore be to examine the interplay between the elements of the international counterculture, on the one hand, and the ideas of the global New Left, on the other, for their relationship varied from location to location.³

It is helpful in this regard to think in terms of two “1968s.” The “big 1968” is the emancipatory complex made up of international youth culture, on the one hand, and an associated set of anti-authoritarian ideas, on the other; the “small 1968” is the form the larger complex takes in an individual national setting. Thus, for example, when we refer to the “East German 1968,” we understand an event that bears resemblance to other events elsewhere around the same time and is connected to them to a greater or lesser extent by more or less organic linkages—an event in which actors understand themselves as part of a global phenomenon and partake of ideas and practices in general circulation. Yet we also understand an event in which both the valence of the political ideas of the “big 1968” and the conditions governing the reception of transnational youth culture are subtly but decisively different than they are elsewhere. Attention to this distinction between the “big” and the “small” must be central to any attempt to write a history of “1968” in a particular nation-state, for it is out of their intersection that the particular shape of events emerges.⁴

This is one reason why “1968” must be seen and analyzed in a wider temporal dimension; not only did the political “big events” take place on their own timetables—in West Germany it took more than a decade for the key events of the late sixties (the most important of which arguably took place in 1967) to be retroactively fitted into the scheme of a world-revolutionary “1968,” and in East Germany other caesurae (1953, 1965, 1971, 1989) loom large—but the reception and processing of international popular culture, the speed and extent to which it could become connected with an emancipatory politics, was decisively affected by local cultural-political conditions. In the German Democratic Republic, some of the key caesurae having to do with the possibility of an emancipatory breakout (e.g., 1965, 1971) relate precisely to the regime’s attempts to come to terms with the local reception of global popular culture. This makes the problem of “1968” in the German Democratic Republic—no less than in the Federal Republic of Germany—a transnational-historical one; for it was around the issue of reception—primarily of Western popular culture,

³ See the essays in Axel Schildt and Detlef Siegfried, eds., *Between Marx and Coca-Cola: Youth Cultures in Changing European Societies* (New York, 2006); see also Uta Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley, Calif., 2000); and Detlef Siegfried, *Time Is on My Side: Konsum und Politik in der westdeutschen Jugendkultur der 60er Jahre* (Hamburg, 2006).

⁴ I am grateful to Florian Havemann for suggesting the nomenclature “big” and “small” to me in a conversation in Berlin in the spring of 2005.

but also of the political ideas of the Western New Left—that some of the most salient political conflicts in the GDR circa 1968 were organized.⁵

A key question in considering the effect of transnational influences has to do with the extent to which they are able to have an impact—that is, the extent to which the possibility exists for their use. Here “1968” takes on, alongside the temporal, a spatial dimension, and not only because of the salience of border-crossing patterns and connections; the possibility of pursuing a democratic-emancipatory politics was decisively influenced by the amount of political space available. The more totalizing the claims of a regime—the more it aimed at monopolizing public discourse and social organization (as in the Stalinist dictatorships of the Eastern Bloc)—the less space existed for initiative from below. The extent to which the emancipatory impulses of the 1960s (the “big 1968”) could articulate with an emancipatory local politics (the “small 1968”) was in large part a function of the degree to which the state was willing and able to use force to suppress alternative politics. This is one important reason why “the sixties” manifested themselves differently in different locations; local conditions not only determined the prospects for the development of a political movement, but shaped the sorts of claims that could be made by particular movements.⁶

This is one reason why the transnational element cannot refer simply or even primarily to connections *between* the two Germanies, as vital, striking, and little-studied as these are. A more important element of the transnational—and one that makes a new approach useful for scholars working on “1968” in places other than divided Germany—has to do with the parallel interactions of the two Germanies with the broader world. That is, if we understand the nation-state as a nodal point at which global influences coalesce in response to unique local conditions, then alongside the comparative question (How was “1968” different in the two Germanies?) and the trans-German or trans-bloc question (How did the two Germanies interact with each other in terms of the interchange of activists, culture, and ideas?), we are able to ask a truly transnational question, which is also a global/local one: How did elements of the “big 1968” (and for that matter other global currents) manifest themselves in two related but different spatial locations? How did they help create the respective “small 1968” in each half of divided Germany?

This question is somewhat easier to answer in the case of the Federal Republic, where the watershed importance of events is widely acknowledged, the interconnectedness readily apparent, and the evidentiary base rich. The broad thrust of organizations and agendas aimed at opening up the authoritarian political culture of the Federal Republic in the 1960s was contained under the rubric of the “extra-parliamentary opposition” (APO). The APO represented the confluence of elements of the 1950s West German peace and anti-nuclear movements with a broad-based opposition to the authoritarian tendencies of the Federal Republic in the 1960s,

⁵ See Timothy S. Brown, “East Germany,” in Martin Klimke and Joachim Scharloth, eds., *1968 in Europe: A Handbook on National Perspectives and Transnational Dimensions of 1960/70s European Protest Movements* (New York, 2008).

⁶ Thus, argues Arthur Marwick, the “measured judgment” practiced by the authorities in the Western democracies played an important role in allowing the cultural revolution of the 1960s to go forward; see Marwick, “Youth Culture and the Cultural Revolution of the Long Sixties,” in Schildt and Siegfried, *Between Marx and Coca-Cola*, 39–58, 53.

crystallized around the issue of the so-called Emergency Laws (*Notstandsgesetz*) pursued by the government as a "safeguard" against future "civil unrest." Opposition to the Emergency Laws and what they represented was widespread, not only among youth, but among a spectrum of intellectual opinion, captured most famously in the polemic of the philosopher Karl Jaspers published in 1966, *Where Is the Federal Republic Going?*⁷

The chief organizational vehicle of the APO—and of the broader rebellion of West German youth with which it was connected—was the Socialist German Student League (SDS). Originally the youth organization of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the SDS was expelled from its parent organization in 1961 for its opposition to the latter's official rejection of revolutionary Marxism in favor of establishment-friendly reformism. The ruling partnership between the SPD and the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the so-called Grand Alliance of 1966 created the perceived need for an extra-parliamentary opposition, since the SPD, it was argued, was now incapable as a governing party of mounting effective opposition to Germany's ruling elites. The youth response to state repression, drastically accelerated from 1966–1967 with the growth of the APO into a full-fledged protest movement, proceeded in parallel with a growing recognition of West German society's failure to punish those responsible for the catastrophe of the Third Reich. The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials of 1963–1965 focused a new and long-overdue spotlight on the crimes of the Nazi era. The presence of former Nazis in high places—not least among them Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, who became head of the SPD-CDU coalition government in 1966—lent weight to the arguments of those who charged that the West German state was a morally rotten Cold War construct pursuing an official ideology of anti-communism on behalf of an American occupying power.⁸

The history of "1968" in West Germany illustrates the limitations of an organization-centric approach to history, for it is really a history less of SDS per se than of a series of interventions on SDS by a small group of individuals who fundamentally altered the nature of the politics it pursued. This group embodied two complementary types of radicalism. One was associated with the name of Rudi Dutschke, the charismatic spokesman and firebrand of the SDS. Like his chief colleague Bernd Rabehl, Dutschke was not from West but from East Germany. A student at the Free University in West Berlin, he was stranded by the building of the Berlin Wall in August 1961. An opponent of Stalinism and critic of the East German state, he believed strongly in the promise of Marxism and hoped to revitalize it. The other key strain of radicalism was associated with Dieter Kunzelmann, the product of a West German bohemia dedicated to breaking down the boundaries between art and life. Kunzelmann was chief theorist of the collective of Munich painters known as the Gruppe SPUR, a group that scandalized the Munich bourgeoisie successfully

⁷ Karl Jaspers, *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik? Tatsachen, Gefahren, Chancen* (Munich, 1966).

⁸ On the formation of the extra-parliamentary opposition, see Michael A. Schmidtke, "Cultural Revolution or Cultural Shock? Student Radicalism and 1968 in Germany," *Rethinking 1968: The United States & Western Europe*, Special Issue, *South Central Review* 16, no. 4 (Winter 1999–Spring 2000): 77–89; on the issue of the Nazi past, see also the essays in Philipp Gassert and Alan Steinweis, eds., *Coping with the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and Generational Conflict, 1955–1975* (New York, 2006).

enough to see its members, Kunzelmann included, brought up on trial for obscenity and other charges.⁹

In 1961, the Gruppe SPUR became the West German affiliate of the Situationist International. Offering a radical, total critique of Western consumer capitalism and bureaucratic eastern communism, situationism emphasized the transformation of consciousness through satire, bluffs, and provocation—whatever was necessary, in short—to break through the blinding “spectacle” staged by modern technocratic society. Kunzelmann left the Gruppe SPUR the following year but subsequently played a key role in infusing these tactics into the West German student movement. The group he helped found, Subversive Aktion, was joined by Dutschke and Rabehl at the beginning of 1964. Together they attempted to combine a situationist politics of provocation with an active revolutionary program, a task in which they were influenced by the Provo movement in the Netherlands and by the unfolding politics of direct action in the civil rights movement of the American South and the free speech movement in Berkeley.¹⁰

This eclectic mix of influences crystallized in connection with a key field of engagement: the Third World. One of the first public actions of Subversive Aktion was to help organize a protest against the visit of African strongman Moïse Tshombe in December 1964. The former head of the breakaway Katanga province in the newly decolonized Congo, Tshombe had been involved in the death of the country’s first democratically elected prime minister, Patrice Lumumba. Heavily supported by Western mining interests, having received aid from the Belgian military as well as from a motley collection of mercenaries (among them former members of Germany’s Hitler-era Waffen SS), Tshombe symbolized the worst of the past at work in the present. His visit to the Berlin Wall, where he was photographed looking solemnly out over the border separating the free world from the world of communist oppression, symbolized the moral bankruptcy of a Cold War capable of transforming a dictator into a friend of democracy. The protests against Tshombe—one in Munich on December 14, a second in West Berlin on December 18—were aimed against his abysmal human rights record; but they were also protests against the persistence of colonial domination in the Third World, against the straitjacket of the bloc system, and against the stifling anti-communism of West Germany. In this sense they brought together the global and the local, a fusion strikingly captured in the blunt rhetorical question posed in the flyer created for the protest: “What business does the murderer Tshombe have here?”¹¹

Knowledge of Third World human rights issues, carried by journalism, photos,

⁹ See Rudi Dutschke, *Aufrecht gehen: Eine fragmentarische Autobiographie*, ed. Ulf Wolter (Frankfurt am Main, 1981). On the question of “the different mentalité” of refugees from the GDR, see Siegfried, *Time Is on My Side*, 195–199; on Dieter Kunzelmann, see Mia Lee, “Art as a Revolutionary Medium during the Cold War: Gruppe Spur and Fluxus,” in Timothy S. Brown and Lorena Anton, eds., *Between the Avant-Garde and the Everyday: Subversive Politics in Europe, 1958–2008* (forthcoming from Berghahn Books); see also Diedrich Diederichsen, “Persecution and Self-Persecution: The SPUR Group and Its Texts—The Neo-Avant-Garde in the Province of Postfascism,” *Grey Room* 26 (Winter 2007): 56–71.

¹⁰ Schmidtke, “Cultural Revolution or Cultural Shock?” 83.

¹¹ “Was hat der Mörder Tschombe bei uns zu suchen?” in Frank Böckelmann and Herbert Nagel, eds., *Subversive Aktion: Der Sinn der Organisation ist ihr Scheitern* (Frankfurt, 1976), 281. On the situation in the Congo, see David N. Gibbs, *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention: Mines, Money, and U.S. Policy in the Congo Crisis* (Chicago, 1991).

and film, became increasingly available in West Germany in the 1960s.¹² Equally important, however, was an often overlooked connection with the Third World: foreign students. A growing presence on West German campuses in the 1960s, international students played a major role in putting Third World issues on the West German student agenda.¹³ Their involvement in the protests against Tshombe was especially striking; foreign students dogged Tshombe with shouts of "Murderer!" during his appearance before wealthy industrialists in Düsseldorf on December 17 and made up some 150 of the 800 protesters in West Berlin the next day.¹⁴ African students, marching shoulder to shoulder with whites, appear prominently in photographs of the December 18 protest in West Berlin.¹⁵ These foreign students, Rudi Dutschke noted approvingly in his diary, helped turn what had originally been planned as a "silent demonstration" on December 18 into an assault on public order involving catcalls, thrown tomatoes, and scuffles with the police. "Our friends from the Third World stepped into the breach," he wrote afterward, "and the Germans had to follow."¹⁶

Dutschke later located the real beginning of the West German student revolt precisely at this moment—the moment at which, following Third World students "into the breach" in physical defiance of the police, young Germans achieved a psychological breakthrough in their relationship with authority.¹⁷ Dutschke's romantic attachment to the Third World is clear; but equally clear is the fact that the Third World did not make its appearance in the West German "1968" in the form of a fantasy borne on posters of Mao Zedong and chants of "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh," or any of the other cliché images of young protesters disconnected from reality and blind to the authoritarian realities of Third World nationalist movements. It made its appearance in person, in the form of dictators such as Tshombe and the democracy-minded foreign students who made up an active Third World presence in the metropole.¹⁸

¹² The leftist magazine *Konkret*, for example, featured the face of the murdered Lumumba on its cover on the occasion of his death in 1961. Gruesome photos of the fighting in the Congo—with emphasis on the activity of German mercenaries—appeared in the mainstream magazine *Stern* in November–December 1964.

¹³ See Quinn Slobodian, "Dissident Guests: Afro-Asian Students and Transnational Activism in the West German Protest Movement," in Wendy Pojmann, ed., *Migration and Activism in European History since 1945* (New York, 2008); see also Niels Siebert, "Der Schlafenden Flughafenpolizei krachten die Scheiben um die Ohren: Ausländergesetz, Arbeitsmigration, Afroamerikaner: Der Kampf gegen Rassismus in der Agit 883," in rotaprint 25, eds., *agit 883: Bewegung Revolte Underground in Westberlin 1969–1972* (Berlin, 2006).

¹⁴ "Der Beginn unserer Kulturrevolution': Vor 40 Jahren: Studentischer Protest gegen den Kongolesischen Staatspräsident Moise Tschombe," *So oder So!* 14 (Fall 2004): 15.

¹⁵ See the photo of the mixed group of demonstrating African and German students in Landesarchiv Berlin, F Rep. 290, 120232. The Latin American Student League and the African Student League were co-organizers of the protests, along with the SDS, the Argument-Klub, and the Liberal Student League (LSD).

¹⁶ Rudi Dutschke, *Jeder hat sein Leben ganz zu leben: Die Tagebücher 1963–1979*, ed. Gretchen Dutschke (Cologne, 2003), 23. See "Flughafen Tempelhof—Platz der Luftbrücke, Freitag 10.00 Uhr, Schweigedemonstration," reprinted in Böckelmann and Nagel, *Subversive Aktion*, 279.

¹⁷ "With the anti-Tshombe demonstration," wrote Dutschke, "we have for the first time seized the political initiative in this city. We can see it as the beginning of our cultural revolution, in which . . . all prior values and norms are called into question"; Uwe Bergmann, Rudi Dutschke, Wolfgang Lefevre, and Bernd Rabehl, *Rebellion der Studenten oder die neue Opposition* (Hamburg, 1968), 63.

¹⁸ In this connection, the recent contention of Tony Judt that "if Western youth looked beyond their borders at all, it was to exotic lands whose image floated free of the irritating constraints of familiarity



FIGURE 1: Protest against Moise Tshombe, West Berlin, December 18, 1964. The central placard reads "No Berlin Embrace for Tshombe." Landesarchiv Berlin.

A second major action featuring the alliance of German and African students was the protest in August 1966 against the West Berlin premier of the film *Africa Addio*. Directed by the Italian Gualtiero Jacopetti, *Africa Addio* was an exploitation film masquerading as a documentary. Employing footage shot in the Congo in 1964, shortly before Tshombe's visit to Berlin, it depicted gruesome scenes of mob violence, animal sacrifice, and execution.¹⁹ The all too obvious message, as the SDS and the African Student League put it, was that "the people of the African continent lack the ability to build civilization."²⁰ The inherent racism of this depiction of Africans was underlined by the appearance in the film of the well-known German mercenary Siegfried "Kongo" Müller, a former member of Hitler's *Wehrmacht* who was shown executing a black prisoner. The film thus presented a golden opportunity to protest against racism, against the persistence of colonial exploitation, and against the continuing presence of fascism. The protest began when Dieter Kunzelmann and Ad-ekunle Ajala (head of the African Student League in West Berlin) pulled the curtains closed over the stage of the theater, precipitating several days of disturbances be-

or information" seems overstated at best; Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945* (New York, 2005), 421.

¹⁹ See Quinn Slobodian, "Corpse Polemics: The Third World and the Politics of Gore in 1960s West Germany," in Brown and Anton, *Between the Avant-Garde and the Everyday*.

²⁰ Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund, Afrikanischer Studentenbund, "Sehr geehrter Herr Kinobesitzer," undated, Archiv des Hamburger Instituts für Sozialforschung [hereafter HIS], 110,01.

tween police and protesters.²¹ These disturbances were important in foreshadowing the mass protests of 1967–1969, but they also highlight the importance of educational exchange networks that brought foreign students such as Ajala—an exchange scholar with the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service)—to West Germany.²²

Parallel with the concrete intrusion of the Third World into the politics of the Federal Republic came a growing interest in the Third World as a source of theoretical solutions to the revolutionary problems of the metropole. Several months before the *Africa Addio* protest, frustrated by the inactivity of SDS in another field of anti-colonial struggle—Vietnam—Dutschke and others had decided to take matters into their own hands. Over the night of February 3–4, 1966, they distributed a flyer condemning the West German government for its support of the U.S. war in Vietnam. This action—which had an incendiary effect in a West Berlin in which the overwhelming majority of the population as well as the authorities viewed the Americans as friends and protectors—reflects the key importance of the Vietnam War in internationalizing the student movements of "1968" worldwide; but it also illustrates the unique role played by the war in the West German setting: because of the United States' constitutive role in the formation of the West German state, U.S. actions anywhere else in the world reflected automatically back into West German society. The war also had a special meaning in the light of the National Socialist past, a fact reflected in Dutschke's use of the term "genocide" in reference to Vietnam.²³

Dutschke's right to undertake actions on behalf of the SDS did not go unchallenged; called to justify himself for the way in which he and his circle had gone it alone, he did so—tellingly—by citing the example of the Third World. Che Guevara had shown in Cuba, argued Dutschke, that a small, determined group could make a revolution. Influenced by the German-American philosopher Herbert Marcuse, Dutschke argued that the industrial proletariat was no longer the motor force of history. The mass base of the revolution was now to be, in his words, the "underprivileged of the world."²⁴ The Third World thus supplied a new revolutionary subject for the German New Left; but still open was the question of the role of the revolutionary in the metropole. How was the student movement to fit into this new global scheme?²⁵

²¹ "'Africa addio' am Kurfürstendamm abgesetzt," *Die Welt* 181 (August 6, 1966): 9. See also Jan-Frederik Bandel, "Das Malheur: Kongo-Müller und die Proteste gegen 'Africa Addio,'" *iz3w* 287 (2005): 37–41.

²² The DAAD weighed in on Ajala's behalf in the criminal proceedings brought against him as a result of the protest; Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, "An den Polizeipräsidenten von Berlin . . . Betr.: Herrn Adekunle Ajala, July 4, 1967," HIS, 110.01. The DAAD sponsored some 2,379 foreign students in West Germany in 1968, including 472 from so-called developing nations; *DAAD Jahresbericht 1968*, 92, cited in Björn Pätzoldt, *Ausländerstudium in der BRD: Ein Beitrag zur Imperialismuskritik* (Cologne, 1972), 103. Ajala was later the author of a book on Pan-Africanism: *Pan-Africanism: Evolution, Progress and Prospects* (New York, 1973). On Siegfried Müller, see Christian Bunnenberg, "'Kongo-Müller': Eine deutsche Söldnerkarriere," in Bernhard Chiari and Dieter H. Kollmer, eds., *Wegweiser zur Geschichte Demokratische Republik Kongo* (Paderborn, 2006), 36–38. See also Otto Köhler, *Kongo-Müller oder die Freiheit, die wir verteidigen* (Frankfurt am Main, 1966).

²³ Internationale Befreiungsfront, "Erhard und die Bonner Parteien unterstützen Mord," February 1966, in Kommune I, *Quellen zur Kommuneforschung*, photocopied brochure (Berlin, 1968), Archiv APO und soziale Bewegungen [hereafter APO Archiv], Ordner K I.

²⁴ Rudi Dutschke, "Die geschichtlichen Bedingungen für den internationalen Emanzipationskampf," in Rudolf Sievers, ed., *1968: Eine Enzyklopädie* (Frankfurt am Main, 2004), 252.

²⁵ For Dutschke on Che, see Bergmann et al., *Rebellion der Studenten*, 69. Dutschke and Chilean

The answer, characteristically, was borne on the winds of international pop culture. Sometime during the month of February 1966, Dutschke, Kunzelmann, and others went to see the film *Viva Maria!* directed by Louis Malle.²⁶ It starred Brigitte Bardot and Jean Moreau as two women, both named Maria, who used their cover as performers in a traveling circus to fight in the Mexican Revolution in the 1910s. This lighthearted revolutionary sex romp was imbued by its young viewers with deep significance. For Dutschke, the Marxist former East German, the two main characters personified two important revolutionary streams: Moreau's character embodied a theoretical but passive Marxism; Bardot represented anarchism, full of passion but lacking in theory. Dutschke's inspiration was to combine the two. "Marxist theory," as his close collaborator Rabehl put it, "would make fruitful anarchism's will to revolt, its spontaneity, fantasy, and passion."²⁷ The response to *Viva Maria!* underlines both the importance of popular culture in the formation of radical political identities in the 1960s and the necessity for the historian of using an active model of cultural reception; Dutschke and Kunzelmann saw in the movie what they wanted to see, taking from it what was useful in their particular situation.²⁸

The most important idea crystallized by the film was the necessity not just of supporting the struggles of the Third World, or of using its theory, but of bringing those struggles home to the First World.²⁹ This insight underlay the subsequent founding of the "Viva Maria Group." Meant to function as a vanguard within the SDS, the group helped to effect a theoretical reorientation for the West German student movement and served to channel further transnational connections. Through his American wife, Gretchen, Dutschke made contact with Black Nationalists in New York, familiarizing himself with the writings of Malcolm X, and even visiting the ghettos of New York and Chicago during a trip to the United States in September 1966. Those experiences inspired him to bring into the Viva Maria Group the idea that "colonial" populations in the U.S. were also part of the world struggle, and indeed, that their situation in U.S. cities mirrored that of students in German cities. This position resonated strongly with the thought of Marcuse, which was highly influential for Dutschke, with its emphasis on the revolutionary importance of marginal social groups.³⁰

fellow radical Gaston Salvatore worked together on a new German translation of Che's *Der Partisanenkrieg* (Berlin, 1962), which was published in 1968 as Horst Kurnitzky, ed., *Guerilla: Theorie und Methode. Sämtliche Schriften zur Guerillamethode, zur revolutionären Strategie und zur Figur des Guerilleros* (Berlin, 1968).

²⁶ The group also included Dorothea Ridder and Ulrich Enzensberger, both later of Kommune I, and Hans-Joachim Hameister, the Vietnam specialist from SDS; Alexander Holmig, "'Wenn's der Wahrheits(er)findung dient . . . ' Wirken und Wirkung der Kommune I (1967–1969)" (Magisterarbeit, Humboldt University, Berlin, August 2004), 32.

²⁷ Bernd Rabehl, "Die Provokationselite: Aufbruch und Scheitern der subversiven Rebellion in den sechziger Jahren," in Siegfried Lönnendonker, Bernd Rabehl, and Jochen Staadt, *Die antiautoritäre Revolte: Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund nach der Trennung von der SPD*, vol. 1: 1960–1967 (Opladen, 2002), 425. See also Rabehl, "Viva Maria und die Verknüpfung von Anarchismus und Marxismus innerhalb der neuen Linken," *Kino* 1 (1965).

²⁸ On active reception, see Timothy S. Brown, "Subcultures, Pop Music and Politics: Skinheads and Nazi Rock in England and Germany," *Journal of Social History* 38, no. 1 (Fall 2004): 157–178.

²⁹ Wolfgang Dreßen, Dieter Kunzelmann, and Eckhard Siepmann, *Nilpferd des höllischen Urwalds: Situationisten, Gruppe Spur, Kommune I—Spuren in eine unbekannte Stadt* (Gießen, 1991), 194.

³⁰ Rudolf Sievers, "Vorwort," in Sievers, 1968, 15–16. Especially influential for Dutschke was Her-

For Kunzelmann, the film's vision of the revolutionary group as traveling circus reinforced a longstanding conviction: "Revolution must be fun."³¹ This formula became central to the major project that was to arise out of the Viva Maria Group's search for an effective revolutionary praxis: the founding of a revolutionary urban commune. This commune would create the basis for a two-pronged assault: on the one hand, a revolution of lifestyle that would destroy bourgeois rule at its source, in the relationships and conditions of everyday life; on the other, the transplantation of the Third World liberation struggle into the metropole.³² This vision—prepared by intense discussions in the summer of 1966—was realized in January 1967 with the founding of the Kommune I. Famous for its association with sexual liberation—a natural accompaniment to its emphasis on politicizing the personal that nevertheless drew more on myth than on fact—the Kommune I played a crucial role in radicalizing the politics of SDS.³³

From the (pre-Kommune) "strolling demonstration" of December 1966, in which protesters mingled with shoppers in West Berlin's premier commercial district, to the thwarted April 1967 pudding-bomb assault on the motorcade of visiting U.S. vice-president Hubert Humphrey, the communards introduced to the West German student scene a situationist-inspired politics of provocation. This turn was not welcomed by the leadership of the SDS, for whom the iconoclastic voluntarism of the Kommune I's actions seemed to subvert the democratic process. "Smoke bombs, eggs, and pudding," argued the SDS in clear reference to the sort of individualist actions pioneered by the commune, "are the means of an impotent rebellion."³⁴ The expulsion of the Kommune I in May 1967 came too late to halt its effect. In the glare of the media, the communards—who spent their mornings scanning the daily newspapers to see what had been written about them in order to find inspiration for fresh outrages—became rebel icons. A voluminous amount of fan mail, directed primarily toward the media stars Rainer Langhans and Fritz Teufel, illustrated the growing

bert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston, 1964).

³¹ Dieter Kunzelmann, *Leisten Sie keinen Widerstand! Bilder aus meinem Leben* (Berlin, 1998), 51.

³² Kommune 2, "Versuch der Revolutionierung des bürgerlichen Individualismus," in Sievers, 1968, 365.

³³ On the Kommune I, see Timothy S. Brown, "A Tale of Two Communes: The Private and the Political in Divided Berlin, 1967–1973," in Martin Klimke, Jacco Pekelder, and Joachim Scharloth, eds., *Between the Prague Spring and the French May 1968: Transnational Exchange and National Recontextualization of Protest Cultures* (forthcoming from Berghahn Books); Ulrich Enzensberger, *Die Jahre der Kommune I: Berlin 1967–1969* (Cologne, 2004); Gerd Koenen, *Das rote Jahrzehnt: Unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution 1967–1977* (Cologne, 2001), 149–182. On the sexual politics of the Kommune I, see Dagmar Herzog, *Sex after Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Princeton, N.J., 2005), chap. 4. The sex theme, recalls Rainer Langhans, was one that "was virtually offered to us by the media." In this sense, in contrast to the rationalist politics of the SDS, it represented, in Langhans's words, an attempt to make politics out of "the energies presented to us"; Langhans, interview with author, Munich, September 16, 2006.

³⁴ "Niederlage oder Erfolg der Protestaktion: Erklärung des SDS," HIS, FU Berlin, Flugblätter Diverses, 1966ff. "We threw Kunzelmann and his 'Kommune I' out of the SDS in 1967," SDS leader Tilmann Fichter recalled, "because he was always distributing leaflets that argued the opposite position to the SDS, on the grounds that he and the commune were anti-authoritarian. And he refused to abide by any resolutions, although the resolutions were arrived at in plenary meetings and were therefore relatively democratic"; Fichter, interview in *Die Tageszeitung*, October 25, 2005.



FIGURE 2: Rainer Langhans of the Kommune I, arrested at a demonstration in West Berlin, October 8, 1967. Note the bombed-out Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church in the background, an ever-present reminder of the Nazi past. Landesarchiv Berlin.

status of the commune as a site on which were projected the anti-authoritarian fantasies of young people from around West Germany and beyond.³⁵

In effecting a shift in emphasis away from the serious Marxism of the student movement, the Kommune I pointed the way toward a lifestyle radicalism increasingly

³⁵ Collected in *Korrespondenz der Kommune I, 1967–1968*, HIS, SAK 130.03.

expressed in terms drawn from international pop culture. In a scandalous series of satirical flyers produced in response to the tragic accidental fire in the Belgian department store L'Innovation in May 1967, the Kommune I offered its own take on the Third World national liberation. Styling the fire as "a new demonstration method" designed to introduce "American methods" to a European audience—a pointed reference to the use of napalm in Vietnam—they spoofed the overblown prose style of American advertising copy while drawing a connection between the worlds of consumer capitalism and colonial warfare. The comical malapropism of flyer #8, "Burn, warehouse, burn" (the German for "department store" is *Warenhaus*), added a further layer of association, recalling the "Burn, baby, burn" of the American ghetto riots.³⁶ In a telling example of life imitating art, the ominous rhetorical question—"When will the Berlin department stores burn?"—was cited by real-life arsonists Andreas Baader and Gudrun Enslin in justification for their attack on a Frankfurt department store in April 1968.³⁷ Increasingly, the communards' prankster style of activism created a space in which the distinction between rhetorical violence and real violence became increasingly blurred, helping to set the stage for a group of revolutionary desperadoes to begin living out the myth of the urban guerilla first inspired by *Viva Maria!*

This development unfolded in response to a real and growing conflict with the authorities, which marked a fateful milestone on June 2, 1967. On that day, a visit to West Berlin by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran provoked protests that fundamentally changed the course of the West German student movement. Like the earlier actions against Tshombe and *Africa Addio*, this protest arose out of the interaction of West German and foreign students. The Iranian expatriate author Bahman Nirumand played a central role. Forced into exile in West Berlin—where he had studied as a teenager—Nirumand was a leader in the Confederation of Iranian Students, National Union (CISNU), an organization with a particularly strong presence in West Germany.³⁸ His book about conditions in Iran, published in March 1967, had sold 40,000 copies by the time of the shah's visit.³⁹ The city administration's attempt to force the Free University to cancel an appearance by Nirumand scheduled for June 1—the day before the shah was to arrive in West Berlin—set off a fateful chain reaction of events.

Nirumand approached SDS about organizing a protest against the shah, but was initially rebuffed by SDS leaders Christian Semler and Rudi Dutschke, who worried that it would be a distraction from the issue of Vietnam.⁴⁰ The members of the

³⁶ See Wilfried Mausbach, "'Burn, ware-house, burn!' Modernity, Counterculture, and the Vietnam War in West Germany," in Schildt and Siegfried, *Between Marx and Coca-Cola*, 175–202.

³⁷ The subsequent trial of Rainer Langhans and Fritz Teufel for incitement to arson—they were acquitted on the basis of expert testimony emphasizing the satirical nature of the flyers—provided further opportunity to mock the pretensions of authority; see Nick Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany: A Social History of Dissent and Democracy* (New York, 2003), 104.

³⁸ When the shah's visit to West Germany began on May 27, CISNU had already distributed 10,000 flyers around the country; Afshin Matin-Asgari, *Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah* (Costa Mesa, Calif., 2001), 97.

³⁹ Bahman Nirumand, *Persien: Modell eines Entwicklungslandes oder die Diktatur der freien Welt* (Reinbeck, 1967). Subsequently published in English as *Iran: The New Imperialism in Action*, the book became a best-seller and had an important influence on the New Left internationally.

⁴⁰ The communards satirized the careful approach of the SDS in their flyer #12: "three podium discussions, the announcement of a demonstration (tactical maneuver), solidarity telegram to the Viet-



FIGURE 3: Bahman Nirumand speaking at the Free University in Berlin, June 1, 1967. Note the Farah Diba mask, fashioned from a grocery bag, inverted beside the podium. Landesarchiv Berlin.

Kommune I, by contrast, were keen to participate. It was they who created the signature prop of the protest: paper masks of the shah and his queen, Farah Diba, part absurdist humor, part protection for Iranian students from the shah's secret police.⁴¹ The SDS joined in on preparations for the protest, and the General Student Committee of the Free University produced materials contrasting the democratic pretensions of the shah ("We Persians are of the opinion that no price is too high to achieve the human values contained in a democracy") with the grim reality of a dictatorship that tortured and murdered its own citizens.⁴² Dutschke's anti-authoritarian faction produced a "wanted poster" for the shah, which cited specific instances of human rights abuses ("The Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi is wanted for the torture and murder of the journalist Karimpour Shirazi") and called attention to the culpability of the West German government ("last seen in the company of the Federal president, Heinrich Lübke").⁴³ That President Lübke, like Federal chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, was a former active member of the Nazi Party was lost on no one who read the flyer.

cong, establishment of a subcommittee for the creation of Vietcong flags, paperwork. The shah will be amazed!" Kommune I, Flugblatt no. 12, n.d., APO Archiv, Ordner K I.

⁴¹ The masks, fashioned out of paper bags stolen from supermarkets, were finished in the SDS headquarters; Antje Krüger (Kommune I), interview with author, Berlin, October 5, 2006.

⁴² "Informationen über Persien und den Shah," HIS, FU Berlin, Flugblätter Diverses, 1966ff.

⁴³ "Mord—Gesucht wird Schah Mohamed Reza Pahlawi," Flugblatt SDS, May 31, 1967, APO Archiv, Ordner K I.

The events of June 2, in which a student named Benno Ohnesorg was shot and killed by an undercover police officer, are well known.⁴⁴ The killing of Ohnesorg played a major role in spreading the radicalism of the West Berlin SDS to the rest of Germany, and radicalized the Berlin scene even further. Characteristically, these events were a product not of *national* developments in any meaningful sense, but of fundamentally *transnational* developments. They arose out of the interaction of two overlapping fields of engagement: West German students protested against the shah as a symbol of neocolonial oppression and Cold War anti-communism; Iranian students protested as members of a diaspora concerned as much with national (Iranian) as with global issues. In both cases, the issues were understood in global/local terms: there could be no democracy in one country without democracy in the other.

The death of Ohnesorg, followed by the attempted assassination of Dutschke less than a year later, launched the student movement on a new and fateful course. With a severely injured Dutschke off the scene, the SDS spent itself in a final, futile series of street battles with the authorities before splitting up into its various constituent parts. Some activists retreated into a private world of drugs and/or New Age spirituality, while others carried forward the banner of personal liberation into the women's, gay, and other liberation movements. Some joined one of the crop of new small Maoist and/or Marxist-Leninist splinter parties, while still others gravitated to the "freak" scene of radicalized dropouts in enclaves such as West Berlin's Kreuzberg district. In the latter, the cultural-political style pioneered by the Kommune I came into its maturity, with popular culture supplying an aesthetic vehicle for the reinvention of lost radical traditions. A vibrant assortment of underground newspapers created a potent collage of guns, dope, sex, and revolution painted against a global canvas. The unlikely blend of hippie lifestyle and revolutionary politics was captured in a coat of arms that appeared in the pages of *FIZZ*, featuring a Kalashnikov assault rifle and an ornate hash pipe crossed over a red star.⁴⁵

Such imagery was not ephemeral, but marked the importance of popular culture as a site for imagined linkages between the global and the local. These linkages expressed serious content, moreover, for among these radicalized freaks were a number of those who would become involved in an exacerbated form of protest: armed struggle against the state. Yet in broader terms, this radical scene is but one more example of the transnational in the West German "1968." Like so many other features of the West German "1968"—the importation of radical traditions such as French situationism; the adoption of protest repertoires drawn from the American civil rights movement and the Provo scene in the Netherlands; visits by foreign dictators drawn to the Federal Republic for the Cold War *raison d'état*; the presence of diasporic student communities facilitated by educational exchange networks; the rapid spread of cultural products such as music, films, and books; the influence of

⁴⁴ See the detailed account of the incident and its aftermath in Thomas, *Protest Movements in 1960s West Germany*, 107–126. Documents on the events and the ensuing controversy are collected in Knut Nevermann, ed., *Der 2. Juni 1967: Studenten zwischen Notstand und Demokratie. Dokumente zu den Ereignissen anlässlich des Shah-Besuchs* (Cologne, 1967).

⁴⁵ See the cover of *FIZZ Reprint 1–10* (Berlin, 1989). See also the complete set of issues of 883, the leading organ of the West German underground press, collected in rotaprint 25, *agit 883*. The classic description of the blues scene (to be read with caution) is found in Bommi Baumann, *How It All Began: The Personal Account of a West German Urban Guerrilla* (Vancouver, 2002).

international media (important in both disseminating information to radicals and disseminating the actions of radicals to the wider world); the spread and local adoption of the fashion and mores of the international counterculture—it illustrates how transnational connections intersected across the physical and cultural terrain of the Federal Republic, producing an explosion with critical repercussions for the development of West German democracy.

MANY OF THE SAME LINES OF INFLUENCE fell across the German Democratic Republic, but although they often produced similar effects, the results differed dramatically. If the extra-parliamentary opposition in the Federal Republic can be seen as a delayed response to the problem of German authoritarianism—"1968" as the "second founding" of the West German Republic—the problem of democracy in the German Democratic Republic was of an entirely different order. From 1946, with the founding of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), when the Social Democrats were more or less forced into a fusion with the Communist Party under Soviet auspices, the possibility of pursuing an independent democratic politics in East Germany was hindered at best. Historians have traced a change in the nature of opposition in the GDR from "fundamental" in the late 1940s and 1950s to "reformist" in the 1970s and 1980s—that is, from a total rejection of the SED's claim to rule, to a hope that the system of socialism could be subject to democratic reform.⁴⁶ Notable figures of this reform movement, including the protest singer Wolf Biermann and the dissident scientist Robert Havemann—elder statesmen of the East German "1968"—steadfastly refused to condemn out of hand the socialist experiment in the GDR.⁴⁷

This stubborn commitment to the promise of the GDR was characteristic of the East German "68ers," a group that famously included Havemann's sons Frank and Florian. Unlike their counterparts in the West, and in contrast to the dissident intelligentsia in other Eastern Bloc countries, the GDR 68ers believed that theirs was the superior system, one capable of producing real socialism.⁴⁸ They also experienced the contradiction between the state's humanitarian claims and the reality of lived repression. The key event in the East German 1968—the crushing of the democratic socialist experiment in neighboring Czechoslovakia—was important precisely because it exposed this contradiction in striking fashion. The response to the invasion opens a window onto the actions of a small group of dissenters around the Havemann siblings, a group that protested the invasion, suffered the consequences, and later attempted to elaborate an emancipatory youth politics within the confines of a totalizing communist society. Some went on to found an East Berlin commune in imitation of the Kommune I, an experiment that displayed important similarities with, but also differences from, its western model.

According to an informed estimate, the East German "68ers" were a small group,

⁴⁶ See Karl Wilhelm Fricke, "Dimensionen von Opposition und Widerstand in der DDR," in Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Peter Steinbach, and Johannes Tüchel, eds., *Widerstand und Opposition in der DDR* (Cologne, 1999), 21–43, 24.

⁴⁷ See Martin Jander, "Der Protest gegen die Biermann-Ausbürgerung—Stimulans der Opposition," *ibid.*, 281–294.

⁴⁸ Annette Simon, "Vor den Vätern sterben die Söhne?" in Annette Simon and Jan Faktor, *Fremd im eigenen Land?* (Gießen, 2000), 7–26, 15.

numbering only some 200–300 persons (as opposed to several thousand in West Germany).⁴⁹ Their protest against the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia was limited; indeed, the Havemann siblings and their friends are well known in part because they were among the few out of their larger circle to protest openly. Because their actions received scrutiny at the time, and because a number of them have since recorded their reflections, members of this group make up an important collective source for the East German "1968." In a situation in which, as Annette Simon reminds us, the protagonists enjoyed "no public, no media, and above all no . . . SDS," attention to this small group of *Prominentenkinder* [children of notables] can help us trace the imprint of the "big 1968" on East Germany—that is, to follow the path of transnational influences into East Germany from both East and West, to understand which were important and why, and, crucially, to understand how they became significant in the only instance in the GDR "1968" in which someone tried to use them to be politically effective.⁵⁰

Yet it was young workers, not students, who channeled the most important transnational connection of the 1960s. "Beat music" (the music of English groups such as the Beatles and the Rolling Stones) transmitted a new life feeling that flowed across the borders of nations and blocs, carrying with it a sometimes inchoate but always powerful anti-authoritarian impulse that was much more fundamental than any specific political position of the global sixties.⁵¹ Enthusiasm for the new music shaped the outlook, mores, appearance, and behavior of the young generation of the 1960s in the GDR. Music and fashion became a badge of identity, a totem of disengagement from the dull conformity of daily life. The importance of personal style as a political statement is captured strikingly in the term of self-identification employed in the reminiscences of members of the East Berlin underground scene collected in 2004 by Thomas P. Funk: "longhairs."⁵² It is no surprise that not only music but hair became a primary point of attack in the state's counteroffensive against youth identification with "Western decadence."

The "international feeling" that allowed young people to imagine themselves into a wider world beyond the grim reality of daily life in the GDR was transmitted through a number of concrete routes.⁵³ Before the wall was built, Berlin acted as a zone of exchange between east and west; American cultural products—movies, music, publications—were freely available in the western half of the city, and many young people from the east routinely came to take advantage of them.⁵⁴ This cultural exchange did not simply cease after the construction of the wall. Young people could hang around the Friedrichstraße crossing point between the two halves of the city—as some of Funk's informants did—in hopes of befriending visitors from the west, or they could establish contact with the American soldiers on patrol with pop-

⁴⁹ Florian Havemann, interview with author, Berlin, April 12, 2005.

⁵⁰ Simon, "Vor den Vätern sterben die Söhne?" 8.

⁵¹ See Michael Rauhut, *Beat in der Grauzone: DDR-Rock 1964 bis 1972. Politik und Alltag* (Berlin, 1993); see also Rauhut, "Am Fenster: Rockmusik und Jugendkultur in der DDR," in *Rock! Jugend und Musik in Deutschland* (Berlin, 1995), 70–77.

⁵² Thomas P. Funk, "Unterm Asphalt: Die Kunden vom Lichtenberger Tunnel," in Michael Rauhut and Thomas Kochan, eds., *Bye Bye, Lübben City: Bluesfreaks, Tramps und Hippies in der DDR* (Berlin, 2004), 94–106.

⁵³ "Speiche," in Funk, "Unterm Asphalt," 98.

⁵⁴ Michael Baumann, interview with author, Berlin, October 5, 2006.

ular hits blaring from their jeep radios. Western records and books, brought in through illegal channels, helped fuel disaffection from the East German regime and influenced the sense of personal identity.⁵⁵

The most dangerous Western import—popular music—became an obsession of the regime.⁵⁶ Unable to make up its mind about how to handle the threat, it pursued a zigzag course. After the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, an unofficial period of relaxation ensued, in which expressions of cultural opening in general, and opening to the West in particular, were tacitly tolerated, even encouraged.⁵⁷ Attempting to create a homegrown version of what young people had previously obtained from the West, the regime created youth clubs and sponsored the formation of beat groups.⁵⁸ These developments were interrupted by the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party in December 1965. Attacking notable critics of the regime such as Havemann and Biermann, and cracking down on beat music by forcing groups with English names to change them to German equivalents and banning some groups outright, the Eleventh Plenum struck a heavy blow against the trend toward cultural liberalization.⁵⁹

In response, young music fans engaged in the largest protests since the workers' uprising of July 1953. The protests in Leipzig in October 1965 were brutally repressed by police with water cannons, truncheons, and attack dogs. This assault established a pattern in the state's relationship with nonconformist youth culture that would persist, with occasional breaks, through the 1970s.⁶⁰ The regime launched periodic campaigns against so-called "Gammer"—a term that can be translated approximately as "do-nothing" or "lay-about," with attendant connotations of dirtiness and laziness—and young "longhairs" were "hunted" by police and sometimes administered forced haircuts.⁶¹ Young people fought back against this offensive with any means at their disposal. On more than one occasion, for example, they shouted "Long Live Congo Müller!" in reference to the West German mercenary who had been the subject of a widely shown documentary film aimed at embarrassing the Federal Republic.⁶² If this bit of youthful rebellion helped fuel the fantasies of a state security apparatus obsessed with the danger of resurgent fascism, its real content

⁵⁵ Funk, "Unterm Asphalt," 98.

⁵⁶ See Detlef Siegfried, "Unsere Woodstocks: Jugendkultur, Rockmusik und gesellschaftlicher Wandel um 1968," in *Rock!* 52–61.

⁵⁷ Kaspar Maase, "Körper, Konsum, Genuss," in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (B 45/2003); Uta G. Poiger, "Amerikanisierung oder Internationalisierung? Populärkultur in beiden deutschen Staaten," *ibid.*

⁵⁸ Bernd Lindner, "Steine des Anstoßes—Kunst und Jugendkultur in der DDR," in *Zeitgeschichtliches Forum Leipzig*, ed., *Einsichten: Diktatur und Widerstand in der DDR* (Leipzig, 2001), 146–159, 146.

⁵⁹ Armin Mitter and Stefan Wölle, *Untergang auf Raten: Unbekannte Kapitel der DDR-Geschichte* (Munich, 1993), 377; Wolf Biermann was prohibited from performing publicly in the GDR. See also Wolfgang Kraushaar, 1968: *Das Jahr das alles verändert hat* (Munich, 1998), 225; Günter Agde, *Kahlschlag: Das 11. Plenum des ZK der SED 1965: Studien und Dokumente* (Berlin, 1991); Michael Rauhut, "Ohr an Masse—Rockmusik im Fadenkreuz der Stasi," in Peter Wicke and Lothar Müller, eds., *Rockmusik und Politik: Analysen, Interviews und Dokumente* (Berlin, 1996), 28–47.

⁶⁰ See Dorothee Wierling, "Der Staat, die Jugend und der Westen: Texte zu Konflikten der 1960er Jahre," in Alf Lüdtke and Peter Becker, eds., *Akten, Eingaben, Schaufenster: Die DDR und ihre Texte. Erkundungen zu Herrschaft und Alltag* (Berlin, 1997), 223–240, 223; see also Wierling, "Beat heißt schlagen: Die Leipziger Beatdemonstration in Oktober 1965 und die Jugendpolitik der SED," in Rolf Gericke, ed., *Unsere Medien, Unsere Republik 2: 1965: Warten auf den Frühling*, Heft 4 (Marl, 1993).

⁶¹ Simon, "Vor den Vätern sterben die Söhne?" 10.

⁶² The incident mentioned by Mitter and Wölle took place in Potsdam in 1966; *Untergang auf Raten*,



FIGURE 4: Banned by the party: "The Butlers" (1965). Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft.

comes out in another slogan that often accompanied the name of Congo Müller: "Long live the Rolling Stones!"⁶³

The violence of the regime's measures against youthful nonconformists arguably did as much to harm its reputation as its support for the crushing of the Prague Spring. The writer Brigitte Reimann was shocked by the brutality of the government's dealings with beat fans and hippies, observing: "There were demonstrations; the police used water cannons, arrested people; there was prison and work camps. The laughter in us disappeared."⁶⁴ The singer-songwriter Bettina Wegner, a co-founder of the Hootenanny Club and one of those who distributed flyers against the invasion of Czechoslovakia, expressed this feeling in a poem about the protest against the demolition of the church at the University of Leipzig in May 1968.⁶⁵ Titled "Victory over the Gammler," it read in part: "Twenty years ago in Auschwitz, we found hair in masses, well, raise your glasses, Karl Marx as barber, an army's on the move . . . armed with shears, the bloody German hair-collectors, beat the

393. Müller was the subject of a documentary film by the East German journalists Walter Heynowski and Gerhard Scheumann: *Der lachende Mann: Bekenntnisse eines Mörders* (Berlin, 1966).

⁶³ Both slogans were shouted by a friend of the 68er Thomas Brasch on the Karl-Marx-Allee on October 7, 1967 (the friend was subsequently arrested and tried); see Brasch, diary entry for October 27, 1969, Tagebuch 23.10.1969–6.4.1970, Akademie der Künste, Berlin, Thomas-Brasch-Archiv, no. 1192.

⁶⁴ Brigitte Reimann, quoted in Ute Kätzel, "Kommune I/Ost," *Freitag*, December 20, 2002.

⁶⁵ Established by the Canadian folk musician Perry Friedman in February 1966 under the auspices of the FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend) East Berlin, the Hootenanny Club brought the American-style folk sing-along to East Berlin. Known from 1967 as the Oktoberklub, it became the centerpiece of the officially sponsored "Singing Movement" (Sing-Bewegung) in the GDR; see Rauhut, *Beat in der Grauzone*, 204–208.

Gammler! Hurrah, the Gammler!”⁶⁶ The protest over the destruction of the church prefigured and helped fuel a Christian revival that made the Protestant church a main site of opposition to the state in the 1970s and 1980s.⁶⁷

The line between “Gammler” and “68ers” was in any case never so clear, although the former were often slightly younger and, as the “Congo Müller” slogan suggests, were not always in possession of a well-articulated politics.⁶⁸ The two groups tended to embrace the same fashions and music. “The 68ers of the GDR,” writes Annette Simon, “were, exactly like their sisters and brothers in the west, stamped by the music of this time and the life feeling that it transported.”⁶⁹ Florian Havemann writes: “Bob Dylan and Jimi Hendrix were at least as important [as the Western student movement], if not even more important. This music established a connection that reached all the way into the provinces, to a far bigger group, to the so-called beat fans, who at that time were persecuted by the state.”⁷⁰ These beat fans, Havemann writes, belonged to what was “probably the only truly functioning illegal organization there was: the record club.”⁷¹ Havemann himself belonged to such an operation in East Berlin. He and five other people obtained smuggled Western records, taping them and circulating them to others. He did the same with books, along with his friend Thomas Brasch. “We really didn’t know our history,” he says, “and we wanted to find it out.”⁷²

There were other means of contact between East and West. Annette Simon, several years younger than the main protagonists, remembers seeing Dutschke’s interview with Günther Gauss on West German television in real time, and how impressed she was with his “anti-authoritarian brashness.”⁷³ Franziska Groszer, a member of the Kommune I-Ost, saw the interview as well. “We were transfixed,” she recalls, “by the images of the world that flickered . . . at us from [West German] television . . . student unrest, Paris, Berlin, the Vietnam War, an interview with Dutschke . . . We were determined in no case simply to accept something just because it was expected of us, just because it was considered normal.”⁷⁴ News of the West German student movement and attempts to import Western popular culture along the lines of the Hootenanny Club were, according to Frank Havemann, co-founder of the Kommune I-Ost, “things that awakened hopes. 1967 was for me the Hippie Year. But also important were the first reports about the extra-parliamentary opposition, the anti-shah demonstration, and the Vietnam demonstrations.”⁷⁵ “You

⁶⁶ Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft, Archiv Heiko Leitz, HL 160/2.

⁶⁷ See Ohse, *Jugend nach dem Mauerbau*, chap. 4.

⁶⁸ Indeed, one of the “longhairs” interviewed by Thomas Funk eventually moved closer to student circles and spent some time in the Havemann commune; see Funk, “Unterm Asphalt,” 106.

⁶⁹ Simon, “Vor den Vätern sterben die Söhne?” 9.

⁷⁰ Florian Havemann, “68er Ost,” *UTOPIE kreativ* 164 (June 2004): 544–556.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² There was another such club in Dresden; Florian Havemann, interview with author, April 12, 2005.

⁷³ Simon, “Vor den Vätern sterben die Söhne?” 9.

⁷⁴ Franziska Groszer, quoted in Kätzel, “Kommune I/Ost.”

⁷⁵ Frank Havemann, quoted in Rainer Land and Ralf Possekel, *Fremde Welten: Die gegensätzliche Deutung der DDR durch SED-Reformer und Bürgerbewegung in den 80er Jahren* (Berlin, 1998), 220.

felt one with them," remembers his girlfriend at the time, Erika Berthold, "even if you had never seen each other."⁷⁶

The "imaginary infiltration" of the West, writes Jan Faktor, a Czech contemporary with firsthand knowledge of the East Berlin scene, was also very much a matter of personal contacts. "Whether in television interviews that one excitedly followed, or in direct conversations with friends from the west who came to visit . . . here was no matter of dry theories. Through this direct reporting . . . one could . . . tell that the posture of these young western intellectuals was not a put-on and not artificial."⁷⁷ At the salon presided over by the sculptress Ingeborg Hunzinger in 1967–1968, visits from West German radicals such as Rainer Langhans and Fritz Teufel of Kommune I were not uncommon.⁷⁸ The relationship thus established was by no means one of master and pupil; on the contrary, as Florian Havemann said, "we felt ourselves very much their equals."⁷⁹ Burkhard Kleinert, one of those who distributed flyers against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, gave voice to a similar confidence: "At that time we believed, under the impression of the political struggles in the West, with which we were directly connected through friends, that we were taking part in a Europe-wide, if not worldwide, breakthrough to a purified and modernized socialism."⁸⁰

The emancipatory potential of the Prague Spring supplied the GDR 68ers with an alternative source of inspiration as important as, if not more so than, the Western student movement. "The political orientation point for us in the east," writes Annette Simon, "was above all the attempt to democratize socialism in the CSSR."⁸¹ "At that time we took a strong interest in the developments in the CSSR," remembers Erika Berthold. "Democratic socialism was something that appealed to us."⁸² This interest, like that in the extra-parliamentary opposition in the west, was driven by intensive contacts. The publication in Czechoslovakia of Ludvik Vaculik's "2,000 Words," a manifesto of democratic socialist rebirth, evoked a keen interest in the GDR. "The '2,000 Words,'" writes Marc-Dietrich Ohse, "ignited in Czechoslovakia itself, but also in the GDR, an intensive discussion about goals, opportunities, and problems of the Communist attempt at reform. Already in the early phase of the Prague Spring, after the publication of the action program of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, a naive euphoria had taken hold of many East Germans."⁸³ Frank Havemann recalled the great interest in his group in the course of the Prague Spring:

⁷⁶ Ute Kätzel, "Erika Berthold und die Kommune I/Ost," in Kätzel, *Die 68erinnen: Porträt einer rebellischen Frauengeneration* (Berlin, 2002), 231.

⁷⁷ Jan Faktor, "Die DDR-Linken und die tschechische Opposition," in Simon and Faktor, *Fremd im eigenen Land?* 37–47, 39.

⁷⁸ Paul Kaiser, "Kommune 'K1—Ost,' Ostberlin," unpublished radio broadcast manuscript for Deutschlandfunk-Radio, copy in possession of author, 28; Havemann, "68er Ost," 546. See also the interview with Dieter Kunzelmann in Kunzelmann, Dreßen, and Siepmann, *Nilpferd des höllischen Urwalds*, 197.

⁷⁹ Florian Havemann, interview with author, April 12, 2005.

⁸⁰ Burkhard Kleinert, quoted in Wolfgang Engler, "Die dritte Generation," in Engler, ed., *Die Ost-deutschen: Kunde von einem verlorenen Land* (Berlin, 2005), 303–340, 311.

⁸¹ Simon, "Vor den Vätern sterben die Söhne?" 11.

⁸² Kätzel, "Erika Berthold und die Kommune I/Ost," 223.

⁸³ Marc-Dietrich Ohse, *Jugend nach dem Mauerbau: Anpassung, Protest und Eigensinn (DDR 1961–1974)* (Berlin, 2003), 191.



FIGURE 5: Young East Germans demonstrate their support for the Prague Spring, May Day celebration, East Berlin, May 1, 1968. The banner reads: "A Model for Everyone: CSSR [Czechoslovak Socialist Republic]." Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft.

"I always made sure to get hold of the '*Prager Volksstimme*.' We went to all possible events, films, above all in the Czech Cultural Center in the Friedrichstraße."⁸⁴

Belief in the emancipatory potential of the experiment in Czechoslovakia fueled the aspirations of those who, like Frank Havemann, hoped for a democratization of East German socialism from within. "I read in 1968 an essay by Dutschke," recalls Havemann. "But it was what was happening in the East in 1968 that awakened the greatest hopes, the student unrest in Warsaw, but above all the Prague Spring. The anti-authoritarian provocations directed in the 1960s against the western state and the prevailing culture seemed to us to spring from the best motives and intentions." Fundamentally, however, protests in East and West were understood to be part of the same phenomenon. As Havemann put it: "The protest forms of the 68ers and their models for an alternative way of life made a great impression. Everything about them seemed to us modern and exciting, and they embodied the hope of a human socialism in the West. For us, the Paris May and the Prague Spring were two sides of the same coin—the necessary prerequisite for the end of the [Cold War] bloc confrontation."⁸⁵

The Warsaw Pact invasion of August 1968 produced the supreme moment of cognitive dissonance for those who believed that Eastern Bloc socialism could de-

⁸⁴ Ibid., 194. The *Prager Volksstimme* was readily available at the Czech Cultural Center; see Kätzel, "Erika Berthold und die Kommune I/Ost," 224–225.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

velop a "human face." Protest did not spring exclusively or even primarily from the GDR 68ers, however, but was widely rooted in the population.⁸⁶ As early as the morning of August 21—the day of the invasion—flyers criticizing the invasion and graffiti bearing slogans such as "Russians out of the CSSR" appeared throughout East Germany.⁸⁷ Open public demonstrations were rare, but official reports record many cases of refusal to go along with the officially prescribed position on the invasion.⁸⁸ Files of the state security, the Stasi, record nearly two thousand acts of protest—mostly involving the distribution of flyers and the painting on walls of slogans such as "Long Live Dubček!"—stretching into the early September months.⁸⁹

The dilemma posed by the invasion was particularly poignant for the GDR 68ers. "In the moment of the invasion it was clear," writes Florian Havemann, "that here something decisive had happened, that here a chance for socialism had been destroyed."⁹⁰ Bettina Wegner recalled: "I saw on [West German] television how everything was smashed, how the people cried, how they bled . . . We had to do something about it, so we distributed flyers: Long Live Red Prague. Up with Dubček."⁹¹ Thomas Brasch, Sandra Weigl, and Rosita Hunzinger, on a summer trip to the Baltic seashore on the day of the invasion, were suspicious when they suddenly found themselves unable to buy a newspaper. They found out what was happening by listening to West German radio, then hurried back to Berlin. There, in Weigl's apartment, with the help of Erika Berthold, they produced a set of flyers bearing slogans such as "Hands Off Red Prague," "A Dubček to Berlin," "Ho-Chi-Minh—Dubček," and—tellingly—"No Second Vietnam."⁹² Florian hung a Czechoslovakian flag from the balcony of his apartment on the Straußberger Platz.⁹³

The protagonists were arrested in short order. Tried in October 1968, they received sentences ranging from fifteen to twenty-seven months.⁹⁴ Most were released

⁸⁶ The protests, as Stefan Wolle has shown, ran the gamut from intellectuals and artists to the industrial working class; see Wolle, "Die DDR-Bevölkerung und der Prager Frühling," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Beilage zur Wochenzeitung das Parlament* B36/92 (August 28, 1992): 35–45.

⁸⁷ Rüdiger Wenzke, *Die NVA und der Prager Frühling 1968: Die Rolle Ulbrichts und der DDR-Streitkräfte bei der Niederschlagung der tschechoslowakischen Reformbewegung* (Berlin, 1995), 161–162. In the following days, notes Wenzke, "written and oral expressions of sympathy from GDR citizens [were] noticeable in almost all the large cities"; *ibid.*, 167.

⁸⁸ The methods of these protests, as varied as the protesters, included "slogans, graffiti, anonymous telephone calls threatening leading functionaries, demands for sympathy strikes or at least a downing of tools for *Gedenkminuten* (a minute's silence), and attempted escapes from the GDR"; Mary Fulbrook, *Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949–1989* (New York, 1995), 197.

⁸⁹ Wenzke, *Die NVA und der Prager Frühling 1968*, 167. On the various slogans employed in the graffiti, see Engler, "Die dritte Generation," 307.

⁹⁰ Havemann, "68er Ost."

⁹¹ Bettina Wegner, quoted in Wenzke, *Die NVA und der Prager Frühling 1968*, 168–169.

⁹² About 500 flyers were produced. Brasch and Sandra Weigl distributed 250 of them, with the help of a few others; the remainder were distributed by Hunzinger and Berthold. It is likely that this action was just the tip of the iceberg. A number of other flyers were collected by the Stasi, bearing slogans such as "Freedom for the CSSR," "Don't Let Yourself Be Blindfolded," and "Hands Off—Stalin Lives—Red Prague." The Stasi collected a total of 411 of the flyers containing 33 different slogans. Akademie der Künste, Berlin, Thomas-Brasch-Archiv, no. 1234, aus: MfS AU 339/90.

⁹³ Kaiser, "Kommune 'K1—Ost,' Ostberlin," 25.

⁹⁴ Erika Berthold was the eighteen-year-old daughter of the *Stellvertretende Direktor des Instituts für Marxismus-Leninismus beim ZK der SED*. Thomas Brasch was the twenty-three-year-old son of the *Stellvertretende Kulturminister*. Rosita Hunzinger was the daughter of the sculptress Ingeborg Hunzinger. Also arrested were Sandra Weigl and Hans-Jürgen Uzkoreit. Kätzel, "Kommune I/Ost." These were 7 of some 313 arrests made between August and December 1968; see Wenzke, *Die NVA und der Prager Frühling 1968*, 171. Bettina Wegner distributed flyers a few days later and was arrested on August 24;

after a short time and had their sentences reduced to probation.⁹⁵ In his post-arrest comments to Stasi interrogators, Brasch sought to clarify the group's actions. He had welcomed the initiatives of the Czechoslovakian party, he explained, above all its attempt "to actualize the control of the party through the people, to create more ample sources of information, and in so doing, to create more favorable conditions for a democratized socialism."⁹⁶ His protest against the invasion was not a protest against Eastern Bloc socialism as such, but against the use of violence to settle disputes: "Differences of opinion should in my opinion be cleared up through negotiations. I take the measures [against Czechoslovakia] to be typical of the era of Stalinism."⁹⁷ In the end, the actions of Brasch and the others were aimed at opening the free flow of information and ideas. "My goal," Brasch told his interrogators, "was that it be discussed in public."⁹⁸

This is precisely what was not to be allowed. The effect of the crushing of the Prague Spring within East Germany underlines a key difference between "1968" in the two halves of divided Germany, for it demonstrates the impossibility for the GDR 68ers of realizing any part of an emancipatory political program in the public sphere. Yet the subsequent attempts of the protagonists to pursue their aims within the realm of the private sphere illustrate other, less immediately obvious differences between the two German "1968s." The centerpiece of their effort was the founding of a commune—dubbed informally by its founders, after their West Berlin model, "Kommune I-Ost"—which existed with revolving personnel, in several different apartments, from roughly 1969 to 1973.⁹⁹ The similarities between the eastern and western communes are striking. In Paul Kaiser's words, the communards and would-be communards of east and west shared "similar interests in psychedelic theories and anti-authoritarian child-rearing, [an obsessive focus on] self-discovery, and Far Eastern philosophy."¹⁰⁰ They also found common ground, writes Kaiser, in their dedication to "overcoming the illusory opposition between private/public, leisure/work."¹⁰¹

Yet the similarities between the communards in east and west concealed important differences. Adopting a countercultural lifestyle while supporting official East German demands for "peace," the eastern communards attempted to walk a line between resistance and accommodation, staging a simulacrum of "68er" politics in the narrow space where their political goals overlapped rhetorically with those of

Ilko-Sascha Kowalczyk, "'Wer sich nicht in Gefahr begibt . . .': Protestaktionen gegen die Intervention in Prag 1968 und die Folgen von 1968 für die DDR-Opposition," in Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Peter Steinbach, and Johannes Tuchel, eds., *Widerstand und Opposition in der DDR* (Cologne, 1999), 257–274, 266. See the video interview with Wegner at <http://www.jugendopposition.de>.

⁹⁵ Other sanctions, including the loss of educational privileges, were subsequently enforced; see Franziska Groszer, "Aufbruch und andere Brüche: Die Kommune I Ost," in Helke Sander, Margit Püttmann, and Marlene Streeruwitz, eds., *Wie weit flog die Tomate? Eine 68erinnen-Gala der Reflexion* (Berlin, 1999).

⁹⁶ Akademie der Künste, Berlin, Thomas-Brasch-Archiv, no. 1234, aus: MfS AU 339/90.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Kaiser, "Kommune 'K1—Ost,' Ostberlin," 21. See the personal account of the founding by Erika Berthold in Kätzel, "Erika Berthold und die Kommune I/Ost," 228. See also Kätzel, "Kommune I/Ost."

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Anja Seeliger quoted in Kaiser, "Kommune 'K1—Ost,' Ostberlin."




FIGURE 6: An "LSD Cave," photographed by the East German State Security, date unknown. Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft.

the regime.¹⁰² But carrying a banner reading "We Agree with Dutschke" in a party-organized procession—to cite a particularly apposite moment recounted by Frank Havemann—hardly represented meaningful opposition against the total claims of party and state.¹⁰³ Indeed, in the GDR, support for Third World guerrillas fighting against American imperialism carried little oppositional content; the Third World struggle was not one that could be "brought home" with any effect when the government itself nominally supported that struggle.¹⁰⁴ True, the Third World did reflect back into East Germany, but not in a way that empowered the 68ers; the declaration by their hero Fidel Castro in a speech on August 23, 1968, that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was justified led to a crisis in the Havemann commune.¹⁰⁵ The support of Frank Havemann and some others for Castro's statement precipitated a split in the group, which led to both Wolf Biermann and Havemann's father Robert being banned from the premises, and the departure of a number of members, many of whom later fled to the west.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Florian Havemann, interview with author, April 12, 2005.

¹⁰³ Frank Havemann, in Land and Possek, *Fremde Welten*, 218–223.

¹⁰⁴ See the comments by Erika Berthold in Kätzel, "Erika Berthold und die Kommune I/Ost," 231.

¹⁰⁵ Paul Kaiser and Claudia Petzold, "Perlen vor die Säue: Eine Boheme im Niemandsland," in Kaiser and Petzold, *Boheme und Diktatur in der DDR: Gruppen, Konflikte, Quartiere, 1970–1989* (Berlin, 1997), 13–41, 33.

¹⁰⁶ Florian Havemann, interview with author, April 12, 2005. Those who emigrated were Rosita Hunzinger, Hans-Georg Utzkoreit, Sandra Weigl, Florian Havemann, and Thomas Brasch; Kaiser and Petzold, "Perlen vor die Säue," 33. Frank Havemann distanced himself from his father, Robert, because

One of those who went to the west was Florian Havemann, younger brother of Frank. Tellingly, Florian was criticized privately (in correspondence) by his father—a man who had suffered many indignities at the hands of the regime—and publicly by Wolf Biermann, who had been banned from performing in the GDR since 1965 and who had had to burn his papers and go into hiding on the night of the Czechoslovakian invasion.¹⁰⁷ Biermann wrote a song about Havemann, “Enfant Perdu,” in which he expressed deep hurt at what he saw as a personal and political betrayal; yet the psychic pressures acting on the GDR 68ers such as Florian Havemann could be crushing. Thomas Brasch wrote in his diary of a chance encounter between the two in early 1970, about a year before Havemann left for the west. Havemann reproached Brasch for his “isolation” and criticized his “relationship to society. He did this spouting strange revolutionary claptrap, lots of quotations, but his face betrayed him.”¹⁰⁸

Those who chose to remain and work within the party for change faced a difficult course. Frank Havemann and Erika Berthold met with distrust both from the party and from the “longhairs,” rejected by the latter for their attempts to cooperate with the former.¹⁰⁹ Ultimately, a number of the communards went on to become unofficial co-workers of the Stasi, an act that some of them had revealingly come to see as their only chance to be politically effective.¹¹⁰ This development underlines, again, what is possibly the biggest difference between the communards of east and west. In the latter, the Kommune I functioned not merely as a space in which to revolutionize daily life, fusing the private and the political, but as a strongpoint from which to carry out raids into the public sphere. It was precisely in the interplay between the mainstream media and the Kommune I—whether in the media’s scandalized attention to the commune’s (largely mythological) sexual freedom or in the effect of its spectacular public actions—that the radical effect of the Kommune I lay. Nothing of the sort could be contemplated in the east, where, as the aftermath of August 1968 proved, the boundaries of the private sphere delimited the possibilities of action. Thus, in the end, rather than expose the vistas of possibility in the East German “1968,” the Kommune I-Ost experiment illustrated its limits.

What of the larger youth cultural wave represented by beat music? Prevented from fusing with the “small 1968” rendered stillborn when the Prague Spring was crushed, the youth cultural aspects of the “big 1968” became merely another site of dropout identity in the GDR. International youth culture did provide the raw stuff for the expression of nonconformist identities, but these identities did not supply the

the latter gave an illegal interview to a West German magazine in the commune’s apartment; Kaiser, “Kommune ‘K1—Ost,’ Ostberlin,” 35. “It was interesting,” remembers Erika Berthold. “Either the people of our group took themselves back into the structures of the GDR and said, we want to change something here, or they gave these ideas up and went to the west. There wasn’t actually anything in between.” Kätzel, “Erika Berthold und die Kommune I/Ost,” 229.

¹⁰⁷ See the letters of January 6 and February 10, 1972, from Robert Havemann to Florian Havemann; Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft, *Nachlaß Robert Havemann*, RH 001 Bd. 003.

¹⁰⁸ “He agitated a lot for the commune,” wrote Brasch, and “had already prepared an essay that covered everything from Communist communal relations to group sex”; Brasch, entry for February 23, 1970, *Tagebuch* 23.10.1969–6.4.1970.

¹⁰⁹ Kätzel, “Erika Berthold und die Kommune I/Ost,” 234–235; Kaiser, “Kommune ‘K1—Ost,’ Ostberlin,” 34–35.

¹¹⁰ Kaiser, “Kommune ‘K1—Ost,’ Ostberlin,” 39.



FIGURE 7: Flower Power East German style. Robert-Havemann-Gesellschaft.

basis for the elaboration of a spectacular radical democratic politics as in the West; and if they could imagine themselves into community with young rebels from the other Germany and from around the world—becoming a part of a globalizing “discourse community,” to use the term suggested by Ute Kätzel—they were largely unable to marry discourse to deeds.¹¹¹ In contrast, the “big 1968” in West Germany could blossom out through a myriad of channels, from the countercultural urban guerrilla groups to the various permutations of the “new social movements.”¹¹² The total effect was to broaden the possibilities for popular action from below, pushing back the boundaries of the permissible and creating democratic space in the political and cultural landscape of the Federal Republic.¹¹³ No matter how important these events were for West Germany, however, they were by no means simply West German events. They were a product both of the local reception of transnational influences and of the creation of global imagined communities. The latter were derived from the Cold War (the “free world”), from left-wing theory (Dutschke’s “underprivileged of the world”), or from networks of consumption (the “international counterculture”). At the same time, they arose out of overlapping fields of engagement with the potential to synergize each other (e.g., the relationship between West German students and the Third World student diaspora), and the tendency for events

¹¹¹ On the idea of a “discourse community,” see Kätzel, “Kommune I/Ost.”

¹¹² See Sabine von Dirke, “All Power to the Imagination!” *The West German Counterculture from the Student Movement to the Greens* (Lincoln, Nebr., 1997).

¹¹³ See Ingo Cornils, “Successful Failure? The Impact of the German Student Movement on the Federal Republic of Germany,” in Stuart Taberner and Frank Finlay, eds., *Recasting German Identity: Culture, Politics, and Literature in the Berlin Republic* (Rochester, N.Y., 2002), 107–126.

in one spatial location—the Vietnam War, for example—to reflect back onto another (the Federal Republic).

This sort of “reflecting back” occurred in the east as well, as the example of the crushing of the Prague Spring and Castro’s comments about it indicate, but with very different effects. The lack of political space for an emancipatory youth politics in East Germany meant that, in a certain sense, there had been no “1968” in the GDR. In the Federal Republic, the traumatic events of 1967 only slowly came to be transformed into “1968,” a process that was not complete until the 1980s. In the GDR, the local “small 1968” disappeared, as it were, into the memory hole. It was only with the *Wende* (the “change”) of 1989 and its aftermath in German reunification that the search for an East German “1968” as a democratic tradition and sign of resistance against the “second German dictatorship” really began.¹¹⁴ In other words, “1968” is very much a construction of social memory, a fact that is increasingly becoming the object of scholarly investigation.¹¹⁵ Yet the term “1968” maintains a heuristic usefulness, for as a temporal designation for a spatial event, it suggests the key importance of connectedness in the global emancipatory moment of the late 1960s.

¹¹⁴ See Christoph Kleßmann, “Rethinking the Second German Dictatorship,” in Konrad H. Jarausch and Eve Duffy, eds., *Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR* (New York, 1999), 363–372; see also A. James McAdams, *Judging the Past in Unified Germany* (Cambridge, 2001).

¹¹⁵ For example, at the recent conference “Memories of 1968: International Perspectives,” University of Leeds, UK, April 17–18, 2008.

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Japan 1968: The Performance of Violence and the
Theater of Protest

WILLIAM MAROTTI

Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a place's destination. It makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise.

Jacques Rancière, *Disagreement*

THE ICONIC YEAR 1968 marks the 1960s as a global moment. People took to the streets in nation after nation, their demonstrations recorded and distributed worldwide through a variety of broadcast media in a montage of popular activism (or disorder, depending on one's perspective). For participants and sympathizers, the spectacle of mass protest made visible the international, shared nature of the political imperatives of the moment, and promoted the possibilities of direct action.

This backdrop of ubiquitous activism also reinforced one of the era's key political characteristics: the blurring of conventional sociological categories and identifications as the basis for political transformation and reengagement.¹ The porous divide between political protesters and the larger, supposedly apolitical populace proved

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¹ To take the case of France, Kristin Ross analyzes 1968 as "above all else a massive refusal on the part of thousands, even millions, of people to see in the social what we usually see: nothing more than the narrowest of sociological categories." Kristin Ross, *May '68 and Its Afterlives* (Chicago, 2002), 7. Thus, "what has come to be called 'the events of May' consisted mainly in students ceasing to function as students, workers as workers, and farmers as farmers: May was a crisis in functionalism. The movement took the form of political experiments in *declassification*, in disrupting the natural 'givenness' of places; it consisted of displacements that took students outside of the university, meetings that brought farmers and workers together, or students to the countryside—trajectories outside of the Latin Quarter, to workers' housing and popular neighborhoods . . . The logic of the police worked throughout this period to separate students from workers, to prevent contact, to isolate students in the Latin Quarter, to prevent student-worker interaction . . . May '68 had less to do with the identity or interests of 'students' per se, than with a disjuncture or fissure created within that identity" (25; emphasis in the original). Ross discusses in turn the consequent depoliticizing results of applying conventional sociological or biographical modes of analysis to these events—"confiscations" that reduce the very form of its politicality back to normative categories (4). In the course of several years of teaching classes on "The Global 1960s," while developing research on phenomena in 1960s Japan, I have become convinced of the cogency of this approach in addressing the central comparative dimensions of this global moment.

to be a major source of anxiety for various authorities, who discovered that the former could be only incompletely described as “activists,” or in fact as any conventionally recognized social group. In case after case, the researcher of the 1960s encounters people who, although self-identified as “nonpolitical,” were drawn into committed activism, frequently through some key incident or encounter, in the process often examining and transforming their own social practices and identifications. But instead of a switch from apoliticality to activism, such transformations challenged this very division, and enabled additional possibilities for social agency and radical social change.

In Japan, the term *nonpori* (a phoneticized abbreviation of the English word “nonpolitical”) spoke to both this self-identification and its potential instability. The term denoted an individual’s status outside standard political classifications. It thus reflected a common view of the “political” as an overly narrow domain of government action, party politics, or hierarchical protest networks marked by firm ideological commitments. During the 1960s, however, *nonpori* came increasingly to designate individuals who were likely to self-mobilize spontaneously. They occupied a kind of “not-yet” position that was of great concern to both committed activists and the state. Rather than a contradiction in terms, however, the possibility of political engagement by the *nonpori* reflected an expansion of the field of the political itself as it came to encompass a much wider range of potential issues, actors, and possibilities. The apparent paradox of *nonpori* politics should actually alert us to an expansion of politics in practice that simply outpaced the conventional definitions of the term “political.”

In the context of the campus mobilizations, the “ordinary student” [*ippangakusei*] similarly came to denote the potentially mobilizable target of a variety of appeals by both campus activists and authorities. Likewise, during street battles, the witnesses and, occasionally, participants or casualties were typically identified as “citizens” [*shimin*], a term associated with new urban living patterns since the late 1950s, particularly the lives of those living in the new *danchi* housing complexes.² “Citizen” thus indicated a certain newness and an association with bourgeois comfort and complacency—but could also potentially denote the equally new “citizens’ movements” that originated during the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (Anpo) protests of 1960.³ According to Takabatake Michitoshi, “The term ‘citizens’ movement’ was itself derived from the nature of its membership—normally apolitical people demonstrating in the streets on a part-time basis.”⁴ “Citizens” could therefore, depending

² *Danchi* refers to clustered apartment buildings, and particularly to the high-rise residential complexes sponsored by the Japan Housing Corporation after its creation in 1955. In the 1960s, the *danchi* were increasingly located on urban peripheries, leading to extended commute times. Although the *danchi* were initially emblematic of a promised lifestyle of modern comfort and convenience, residents found the realities falling far short of such expectations.

³ Somewhat confusingly, “Anpo” conventionally refers both to the Security Treaty and to the protests against it, typically identified by the renewal year (e.g., Anpo 1960, Anpo 1970). The formal name of the 1960 treaty is the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan; the previous treaty, signed in 1951 with ratifications exchanged on the day of its commencement, April 28, 1952, was the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, a much less “mutual” affair.

⁴ Takabatake Michitoshi, “Citizens’ Movements: Organizing the Spontaneous,” in J. Victor Koschmann, ed., *Authority and the Individual in Japan: Citizen Protest in Historical Perspective* (Tokyo, 1978), 192. For an additional discussion of the ambiguous signification of “citizen” [*shimin*] and its consequent

on the occasion, refer to anything from a sort of Nixonian “silent majority,” to observers of events, and finally to active participants and victims.⁵

“Nonpolitical,” “ordinary student,” “citizen”: Jacques Rancière and Kristin Ross alert us to see in these and other conceptual and sociological ambiguities the very sign of an expansive and revolutionary politics.⁶ Categories that previously demarcated some degree of distance from political engagement come instead to identify potentially subversive social agents. It is for this reason that such unexpected and emergent political identifications tend to be read as “spontaneous.” If the contemporaneous use of the term “politics” lags behind this expansion and revision of political boundaries, that too should come as no surprise. The unsettling of the “political” as commonly understood and practiced is for Rancière the sign and essence of politics. But if politics is, as Rancière would have it, a struggle for visibility and voice out of noise, a shifting of places and designations, then one must look for its signs in a confluence of perceptual and practical transformations.

In Japan in 1968, as in so many other countries that year, the eruption of such a politics was conditioned by the question of “violence” as illegitimate action and force. The shifts in practice and perception that reveal and constitute this new politics were all hard-won—not only in the face of state opposition, but also against conventional assumptions that such transformations were improper.⁷ This expansive political practice that enabled the formation of new actors, practices, and possibil-

political effectiveness, see Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, *Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu, 2001), 31–34, 177–178. The artist Akasegawa Genpei began his play with the ambivalent figure of the *yajiuma* [gawker or onlooker] during 1969 in manga works such as “Gendai yajiumako” [Contemporary Gawker Mentality], published in the monthly popular journal *Gendai no me* [Contemporary Eye]; in elliptical prose and drawings conflating helmets, heads, and rocks, he asserted a continuum of violence between apoliticality, government force, and activism. For Akasegawa, the roles performed by people in their daily lives were scripted via the violence of the bureaucratic order, and thus were imminently connected to violence and suppression. Violent activism thus represented an engagement with this situation at some fundamental level. At the time, Akasegawa was facing state authority himself, in the midst of a final appeal to the Supreme Court of his 1967 conviction for currency “imitation.”

⁵ In 1960, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke identified a similar putative majority of silent supporters of the status quo as the “voiceless voices”—prompting the organization of the protest group Society of the Voiceless Voices [Koe naki koe no kai] to contest his presumption. See George Packard III, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton, N.J., 1966), 245–247, 274–276; Sasaki-Uemura, *Organizing the Spontaneous*, 155–162. For both Kishi and, later, Nixon, “silence” was the converse of reducing protest voices to inconsequential noise, and necessarily “spoke” for the status quo.

⁶ Jacques Rancière, *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy* (Minneapolis, 1999), 28–30, 58–60; Ross, *May '68 and Its Afterlives*, 20–27, 56–61.

⁷ For the classic statement on the modern state as a relation of dominance inseparable from legitimated violence, see Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York, 1958), 77–128. In a lecture in October 1958 serialized in the *Mainichi Shinbun* in January 1959 (and revised for book publication in 1961), the prominent University of Tokyo political scientist Maruyama Masao linked the tendency for protest to be described as “violence” directly to the narrowing professionalization of the political realm and to an ossification of social roles. Maruyama disclaimed the tendency for “political activities to become considered as the exclusive province of the ‘political realm,’ the groups of professional politicians, and thus be restricted *only* to [activities] within the Diet. Thus political activities in the broader society performed by those other than politicians come to be regarded either as acts transgressing one’s social role or as ‘violence.’” Maruyama Masao, “‘De aru’ koto to ‘suru’ koto,” reprinted in Maruyama, *Nihon no shisō* (Tokyo, 1961), 172, 181–182. Sasaki-Uemura discusses this work and its context within the author’s contemporaneous texts, and within developing citizen protest movements in advance of 1960 Anpo; *Organizing the Spontaneous*, 187–192, 259 n. 126. While noting the piece’s fundamental anti-authoritarian perspective, Sasaki-Uemura critiques Maruyama’s exclusively state-centered conception

ities in 1968 in Japan emerged from a fitful negotiation by which—for a time—the charge of “violence” was redirected away from activists, and onto the state.

IN JAPAN, THE YEAR 1968 SIGNALLED a diversity of temporal references. Viewed as a decade, the 1960s had opened with mass protests and strikes against the renewal and revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and with the treaty set for automatic renewal in 1970, the events of 1968 were read by interested observers forward and backward, both in comparison with this previous high-water mark for postwar mass activism and as portents of a possibly larger convulsion at the close of the decade—particularly in the context of an intensifying security relationship with an America again at war in Asia. By the midpoint of the decade, 1965, there had been a massive escalation of U.S. troop strength in Vietnam, the “Rolling Thunder” bombing campaign of the North had commenced, and Japan had finally concluded a normalization treaty with the South Korean regime—a process interrupted by protests in both countries.⁸ America’s war on behalf of a U.S.-sponsored client government in a partitioned nation had brought together a confluence of troubling associations, including the Korean War, in which the United States’ actions had triggered direct military conflict with China, massively enriched the Japanese economy, and enabled the perpetuation of repressive regimes in two former colonies of Japan: Korea (in the south) and Taiwan (due to the interposing of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait).

The year 1968 also marked the one-hundredth anniversary of the Meiji Restoration, the “return” of governance from the Tokugawa shogunate, which inaugurated a modern, centralized state and located a supposedly primordial institutional authority in a “restored” imperial rule. The Occupation of Japan after World War II saw the passage of a revised constitution that deprived the emperor of direct authority—and accountability—for state actions, but nonetheless retained the imperial institution (and Hirohito himself) as the “symbol of the state and of the unity of the people.”⁹ Both the Occupation and the revised constitution exploited the emperor’s potent symbolic authority—formalized under the Meiji Constitution of 1889, and

of “citizen,” and his identification of the tendency to narrow political professionalization as “nonmodern.”

⁸ In Japan, this marked the first post-1960 resurgence of mass protest; in Korea, protest commencing in 1964 had been so extensive that martial law was declared. This treaty entailed the recognition of the South Korean regime’s legitimacy (endorsing it both as *the* rightful government in Korea and in the form of its government—Park Chung-hee’s repressive regime) and effectively constituted a peace treaty with the southern half of Japan’s former colony. During the latter negotiations, Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer cautioned against a proposed tripartite meeting for its potential effects in Japan, as “creating impression US ‘intervening’ directly in negotiations, which we still feel is most unwise”—such a revelation would energize the left and hamper the government’s maneuvers. Telegram 641 from Tokyo, August 20, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md., Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, Central File 1964–1966 [hereafter CF 1964–1966], POL JAPAN-KOR S, quoted in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968* [hereafter *FRUS, 1964–1968*], vol. XXIX, pt. 1: *Korea* (Washington, D.C., 2000), doc. 347 n. 4. The colonial past was especially hard to shake in 1965: thanks to the conventions of the sexagenary cycle, the year name for 1965 coincided with that of 1905, when Japan first established its Korean protectorate.

⁹ The Constitution of Japan, chap. 1, art. 1, <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c01.html> (accessed December 10, 2008), based on the English text furnished by the Government Printing Bureau.

reinforced through decades of emperor-centered cultural practices—to facilitate their implementation and limit political realignments.¹⁰ At once a national centennial and a link to an archaic (even allegedly eternal) national order, this anniversary marked 1968 with yet another ambivalent relationship to a complex and troubling past. While the state hoped to build upon its celebration of national progress since the war in the 1964 Olympics—in anticipation, too, of Expo 1970 in Osaka—the invocation of Meiji also brought to mind the specters of both political absolutism at home and imperialist expansion into Asia.¹¹ The fixing of the official inaugural date for the year's observance on October 23—the date in 1868 when the era name was officially changed to Meiji in honor of the new monarch—directly invoked the temporality of imperial time.¹² Its ambivalent prehistory in Commodore Perry's forcible “opening” of the country received a contemporary echo in the continuing American role in shaping the form and policies of a postwar Japanese state bound tightly to the United States' cold and hot wars in Asia and the world.¹³ As it happened, however, October 23 was overshadowed by other pressing events.

IN THE FALL OF 1967, A CHANGE OF TACTICS by a subgroup of student activists transformed the purpose and effectiveness of protests. Late the previous year, a coalition within Zengakuren, the All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Government Associ-

¹⁰ Popular sovereignty, for example, was short-circuited by the inclusion of the emperor within the sovereign “people” (*kokumin*, itself a problematic term enabling the disenfranchisement of former citizens of the Japanese Empire after the war). See Koseki Shōichi, *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution*, ed. and trans. Ray A. Moore (Boulder, Colo., 1997), 122, 179–181; in the Diet debates on the Constitution, see, for example, Ray A. Moore and Donald L. Robinson, eds., *The Japanese Constitution: A Documentary History of Its Framing and Adoption, 1945–1947*, CD-ROM, version 1.0 (Princeton, N.J., 1998), RM322.AMPM.SP10.P2, RM325.PM.SP35.P1-3, RM329.AM.SP26-8, and RM329.AM.SP39.P2. (The “RM id” reference system for this exceedingly convenient and easily obtained electronic document collection is explained by Keith Handley in “Referring to These Documents,” *ibid.*) I discuss the return of imperial authority and the complex use of the emperor for post–World War II state legitimacy within a larger study, *Money, Trains, and Guillotines: Art and Revolution in 1960s Japan* (forthcoming from Duke University Press).

¹¹ In his March 1968 presidential address at the Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, John Whitney Hall discussed these differing interpretations of the centennial (including accusations by Japanese historians of fascism, political manipulation, and historical distortion) in relation to the American practice of Japan scholarship. Responding both to the divergence between American and Japanese historical interpretations and in part to contemporary criticisms of “political bias” in Asian studies (then dominated by modernization theory), Hall noted the shift from prior critical readings of the Meiji era to “the current rash of essentially optimistic interpretations of Japan's modern history,” and questioned whether “the ‘success story’ scenario is the natural, the objective, outcome of adopting a ‘value free’ method.” Hall, “Reflections on a Centennial,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 27, no. 4 (August 1968): 718.

¹² The October 23, 1868, designation of the “Meiji” era also began the practice of fixing a single era name for the entire reign of a monarch. Previously, different eras might be proclaimed during the life of an emperor, echoing the other cyclical temporal reckoning systems then in use. See Stefan Tanaka, *New Times in Modern Japan* (Princeton, N.J., 2006), 11. Thus 1968 was also Showa 43 by the convention of imperial era dating, connecting it both to Hirohito's uninterrupted reign since 1926—and attendant fraught history—and to a differently periodized decade, the Showa 40s, which commenced in 1965 with resurgent activism energized by normalization with South Korea and America's escalation in Vietnam.

¹³ Conversely, the prior commemoration of the Perry Centennial in 1953, according to Chizuru Saeki, managed to celebrate the close relationship and the return of sovereignty following the Occupation without invoking the specter of the Cold War for most participants—this despite the ongoing Korean War. See Saeki, “The Perry Centennial Celebration: A Case Study in U.S.-Japanese Cultural Diplomacy,” *International Social Science Review* 80, no. 3–4 (Fall–Winter 2005): 147.

ations, united three groups in opposition to the quiescence of the majority Zengakuren group, Minsei, an affiliate of the equally quiescent Japan Communist Party (JCP).¹⁴ On October 8, 1967, activists in this Three-Faction Alliance, Sanpa Zengakuren, attempted to forcibly prevent Prime Minister Satō Eisaku's departure from Haneda Airport for Saigon, part of his second tour of Southeast Asia.¹⁵ Helmeted Sanpa members armed with lengths of timber and rocks fought riot police [*kidōtai*], who were outfitted with their standard meter-long truncheons, duralumin shields, visored helmets, tear gas guns, water cannons, and armored vehicles. On the three bridges that provided access to the airport, both sides also made aggressive use of the security forces' bus-sized vehicles.¹⁶ During the fighting on Bentenbashi Bridge, where most of the members of the Nucleus Faction, Chūkaku-ha, were initially concentrated, a Kyoto University student named Yamazaki Hiroaki was killed by one of these vehicles, said to have been driven by a fellow student.¹⁷ In the end, the prime minister departed for Saigon as planned; official figures indicated some 600 police and 100 student injuries, and some 50 arrests.¹⁸

While Sanpa had been preparing for direct activism against the prime minister's fall trips since that summer, the decision to employ timber staves appears to have

¹⁴ Zengakuren is an abbreviation for Zen-nihon gakusei jichikai sōrengo. It is a federation of the self-government associations [*jichikai*] at the various universities, and provides resources therefore controlled by the groups that have succeeded on their campuses in gaining control over their local *jichikai*. The three factions represented within Sanpa in 1967 were Chūkaku (the Nucleus Faction, part of the Marxist Student League), Shagakudō (the Socialist Student League), and Shaseidō (the Socialist Youth League; originally associated with the Japan Socialist Party, the breakaway, radical Kaihō faction was the one represented in Sanpa). This membership has shifted since the original formation of Sanpa in the early 1960s, which included Furonto [Front] and an unfragmented Shaseidō without Chūkaku. Sanpa is also frequently rendered as Sanpa rengōkei or Sanpa-kei zengakuren. As the decade progressed, the factions within Zengakuren proliferated, confounding many outside observers—and prompting the publishing of identification guides detailing favored helmet colors, slogans, and clothing. Minsei is short for Nihon minshū seinen dōmei, the Japan Democratic Youth League. Allegedly it was a federation of campus groups, although its JCP connection was a matter of common knowledge.

¹⁵ The trip to Saigon followed Nguyen Van Thieu's September ascent to the presidency of South Vietnam, a move initially greeted with qualified acclaim in the Japanese press as an emergence of popularly supported government, a view "immediately followed by pessimistic afterthoughts that the military was still in power, the U.S. had helped bring forth the form of democratic government without the content, and deep divisions in the populace remained as before." Memorandum, Leonard H. Marks to Walt Rostow, November 13, 1967, National Security File, Country File: Japan, vol. VII, Box 252, Johnson Library, Austin, Tex., 2, Secret. In addition to demonstrating support for the Thieu regime, Satō was under pressure from the United States to step up economic aid to Southeast Asia, both to support the American military commitment and to promote "stability" in the face of a perceived broadly active Chinese threat to the region. For example, Satō blamed Mao for the present violence in Burma. Memorandum of Conversation, Satō's Visit to Southeast Asia (Part III of IV), November 21, 1967, CF 1967-1969, Pol 7 Japan, 2, Secret. The trip was cut short by the death of former prime minister and Liberal Democratic Party powerbroker Yoshida Shigeru, which caused Satō to be recalled to Japan prior to planned meetings with the American ambassador and General Westmoreland.

¹⁶ Kakumaru members also fought on one of the bridges; by contrast, the majority Minsei groups sent only a handful of observers. Participants came from campuses throughout Tokyo and beyond, with many gathering the night before at Chuo University before moving en masse to the airport. Kakumaru developed separately out of another Mainstream group that had worked together with the Bund during the Anpo struggles; its adoption of the title Kakumaru Zengakuren reflects its self-understanding as the proper ideological inheritor of the Mainstream tradition. Kakumaru was often criticized for insufficient activist vigor and alleged bad faith; its violent conflicts with Chūkaku are near-legendary—culminating in a series of murders beginning in 1969.

¹⁷ Activists overran and captured several of these vehicles at one point during the struggle.

¹⁸ Telegram 02361, Ambassador Johnson to Department of State, October 9, 1967, Pol 23-8 Japan, Limited Official Use, in *Confidential U.S. State Department Central Files: Japan 1967-1969* [hereafter *Confidential Files: Japan*], reel 10, 0226-0230.



FIGURE 1: Sanpa Zengakuren members battle riot police on the Suzugamori Expressway ramp near Haneda Airport, October 8, 1967. Photo courtesy of the *Yomiuri Shimbun*.

been made at the last minute.¹⁹ The front page of the July 31 issue of Chūkaku's official organ, *Zenshin* [Advance], featured a long statement by Akiyama Katsuyuki, the committee chairman of Sanpa, declaring that the struggle against the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was already under way. According to Akiyama, Zengakuren would treat the upcoming confrontations as the year's most important "test cases" [*shikinseki*]: Would they prevent the trips or not? While Akiyama speaks of their commitment to this struggle, and of their "combat units" [*sentō butai*], he does not directly indicate the means that would be employed.²⁰

¹⁹ According to activist Fukawa Mitsuo's recollections, the weapons used at Haneda were laid in store as a direct result of violent sectarian conflicts in the immediately preceding week. Bound stacks of timber had been readied for use as staves by groups in conflict with Chūkaku-ha, after a rescue of three members from them at Hōsei University the previous day. Chūkaku-ha members also brought staves to Haneda; Fukawa suspects that these, too, had been on hand for the ongoing inter-sect conflict. The night of October 7, at the Bund [Bundo] meeting at Chuo University, it was resolved to bring the staves to the site, but not specifically to use them on riot police. Fukawa relates hearing that the groups set out for Haneda from Chuo the next day without the staves, but were brought them by latecomers catching up to the main group. He also suggests that Kansai students (those from the south-central region of the largest Japanese island, which includes the cities of Kyoto, Kobe, and Osaka) may have played a key role, having been fired up by a speech the night before by Shiomi Tayaka—of later fame as a founder of the Sekigun-ha [Red Army Faction] of the Kansai Bund; he served nineteen years in prison for his key role in the hijacking of a Japan Airlines airliner to North Korea from Haneda in 1970. Fukawa Mitsuo, *Za • 1968* (Tokyo, 2006), 309–310. The original Bund was the largest of the "mainstream" anti-JCP groups opposing the Anpo treaty in 1960; after the defeat, it fragmented into a variety of smaller groups. The tendency of subgroups subsequently to claim the name "Bund" marks both an assertion of preeminence among the Mainstream factions and perhaps a latent desire for a return to greater unity—much like the various appropriations of "Zengakuren" in group names.

²⁰ Akiyama Katsuyuki, "Zengakuren no hata sara ni takaku," *Zenshin*, July 31, 1967, 1.




FIGURE 2: Students are blasted by police fire hoses off of Bentenbashi Bridge into the river, October 8, 1967. Photo courtesy of the *Yomiuri Shinbun*.

In a flurry of editorials and articles, newspapers roundly condemned the violent tactics of the students, with some quoting Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura Toshio's statement that Yamazaki's death was the result of student groups' rehearsal for violent revolution.²¹ The lead editorial in the daily *Asahi Shinbun* on October 9 accused them of attempting to deliver a "‘revolutionary’ appeal" through violent shock tactics, and thus "taking advantage of society's beneficence toward students and abusing the right of free expression" in their attempt to gather attention. A sensational two-page illustrated spread proclaimed a "Deadly Clash, Outrageous Conflagration," declaring that the violent action was premeditated (following a September 26 national appeal by Sanpa), and that female students had gathered stones

²¹ Ibid.

for the stone-throwers.²² The daily *Yomiuri Shinbun* printed excoriations of the students under headlines labeling them “mere yakuza” and “thoughtless violent gangs,” asking, “is this really a student movement?” Reducing the student voices to noise, as a collection of screamed, empty insults, the paper reported the incident as the appearance of a “new violent gang rioting on the basis of a-theoretical, special rights due to their freedom and youth,” “with faces like crazed wild animals, and smirking.”²³

The newspaper *Mainichi Shinbun* pointed out that the violent tactics had originated in the factional disputes within the student movement, and in a journalist roundtable, it asserted that such violence would garner zero support from the populace.²⁴ A week later, *Mainichi* depicted a mini-drama on the streets of Osaka when a pamphleteering Chūkaku student was spontaneously surrounded by critics. Passing out handbills in front of a sign proclaiming Yamazaki’s “slaughter by the police,” the student was confronted by a thirty-something businessman; their argument soon attracted “some seventy to eighty” scornful passersby. The accompanying photo perfectly dramatizes the article’s depiction of the student’s abjection in the face of a hostile public: overwhelmed by the throng, with his hand pressed to the side of his jaw and his mouth open, the student submissively continues his explanations before the stern face and crossed arms of an obviously unreceptive man in a suit.²⁵

Writing in *Zenshin*, Honda Nobuyoshi, the leader of the Chūkaku sect, lambasted the double standard on violence behind journalists’ condemnations of their actions:²⁶

The organs of the bourgeois press and their official critics . . . obscured [our] focus—“oppose the Vietnam war, obstruct the visit”—with the so-called problem of violence, castigating the Zengakuren struggle as a “violent demonstration” and “armed demonstration,” while simultaneously maneuvering to conceal and defend the fundamental problem of state violence . . . On October 8, Zengakuren had its right to demonstrate stripped from it: wasn’t it police headquarters and the public safety commission whose suppression through outrageous violence ensured that Zengakuren would be unable to exercise its right even to a one-meter-long march without forcibly breaking through the riot police’s obstructing line? And isn’t it

²² *Asahi Shinbun*, October 9, 1967, morning ed., 2, 14–15. (Per current practice, *shinbun*—newspaper—is Romanized in this article with an “n,” although the credit lines in the illustration captions use the established older conventional form *shimbun* to honor the terms of the publication agreements with the newspapers.) Reflecting both the composition of the activist groups and contemporary assumptions about them, the reported presence of women in a demonstration typically functioned as a marker for its nonviolence (see the *Asahi Journal*’s comments on the October 21, 1967, demonstration below). Thus, women’s participation in violence—even in an indirect role—prompted comment. Both aspects were complexly negotiated in the figure of Kanba Michiko, the casualty of a police/activist clash on June 15, 1960, during the Anpo protests (see below).

²³ *Yomiuri Shinbun*, October 9, 1967, 15.

²⁴ *Mainichi Shinbun*, October 9, 1967, morning ed., 5; *ibid.*, evening ed., 10.

²⁵ *Mainichi Shinbun*, October 15, 1967, morning ed., 15. Visible in the background, beyond the hostile crowd, is a scrawled message proclaiming Yamazaki’s slaughter. The student’s expression appears retouched in the photo.

²⁶ Their official name is Nihon kakumeiteki kyōsanshugisha dōmei zenkoku iinkai kakumeiteki marukusushugiha, the Japan Revolutionary Communist League, Revolutionary Marxist Faction. Honda was killed in his apartment in 1975 by rival Kakumaru sect members, a casualty of a multi-year bloody campaign of retaliatory sectarian warfare and murder. It was in fact in the course of sectarian warfare that students first introduced helmets and staves (and face concealment with towels), during the invasion of a Kakumaru meeting in 1964 by rival sect members from Chūkaku, Shagakudō, Shaseidō, and Furonto. Donald Frederick Wheeler, “The Japanese Student Movement: Value Politics, Student Politics and the Tokyo University Struggle” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1974), 219.

police headquarters and the public safety commission that for seven years since Anpo have mobilized the well-armed riot police against Zengakuren's unarmed demonstrations, inflicting bloody oppression by blows, kicks, and arrests, causing near-fatal injuries for dozens?²⁷ For one, the right to be armed and to strike, kick, and arrest; for the other, in order to declare an anti-war intent, the right to be struck, kicked, and arrested—only this is permitted. If this isn't state violence, what is? But on October 8, police headquarters and the public safety commission usurped the right even to be hit, kicked, and arrested.²⁸

While foregrounding the issue of state violence and the systematic obstruction of protest, Honda's argument simultaneously demanded that the press recognize student actions as purposeful and serious rather than as incoherent or irrational rioting. Sounding a similar note, Akiyama Katsuyuki denounced what he saw as efforts to slander and suppress such actions through demagoguery over "a small group of students run riot," or "students killing students."²⁹ Both Honda and Akiyama wrote from underground, however; in hiding from the police, they were hampered in their attempts to counter criticism.

Violence in itself was not new to post-World War II activism in Japan. Past protests had frequently turned into physical confrontations with security forces, most memorably in the May Day protests of 1952, when, a mere three days after the end of the Occupation, 5,000 Japanese police fought 6,000 workers attempting to occupy a newly forbidden site for public protest, the "People's Plaza" outside the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. According to Takemae Eiji's account, two workers were shot, 2,300 were injured, and more than 1,000 were arrested—a record for mass arrests that would stand until 1968.³⁰ "Nonviolent" protests subsequent to the mass actions of 1960 also frequently resulted in injured demonstrators. Contemporary sectarian clashes between student groups often took the form of violent, even armed, conflict—a condition that Donald Wheeler argues was promoted by the very structure of Zengakuren, which fostered competition over local *jichikai* [self-government associations] with no mechanism for limiting conflicts.³¹ What was new at Haneda, then, was the use of violence as a means to prevent the exercise of declared state policy—and consequently, the foregrounding of force itself in the confrontations between protesters and the state.

Some reflection in the weeks following the incident included a bit more nuance than in the initial press commentaries. The *Asahi Journal* issued a special section on the "Haneda bloodshed" on October 22; the lead article, by Takahashi Tōru, proclaimed the necessity of "both considering the situation surrounding the [students] and penetrating to their innermost thoughts." Although critical, the section recog-

²⁷ Literally "demonstrations of spirit and flesh alone."

²⁸ Honda Nobuyoshi, "Haneda tōsō no igi to tatakai no tenbō," *Zenshin* 337 (October 30, 1967), reprinted in Honda, *Honda Nobuyoshi Chosakusen I* (Tokyo, 1975), 341–342.

²⁹ Akiyama Katsuyuki, "Zennihon • zensekai no tatakau gakusei • rōdōsha jinmin e," *Zenshin*, October 17, 1967, reprinted in Takazawa Kōji and Kurata Kazunari, eds., *Shinsayoku riron zenshi, 1957–1975* (Tokyo, 1984), 353.

³⁰ Takemae Eiji, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (New York, 2003), 494–495. Police records list 693 arrests, and 832 injuries among the police, of which 71 were serious and 8 life-threatening. *Kaisō: Sengo shuyō sayoku jiken* (Tokyo, 1968), 134. In banning the protest, the newly independent Japanese government was determined to continue the policy set by the Occupation in 1951 of forbidding May Day demonstrators from using the plaza.

³¹ Wheeler, "The Japanese Student Movement," 222–224.

nized intent and significance in student actions that called for engagement and reasoned consideration, rather than sheer dismissal of what they were doing as animalistic violence. Takahashi acknowledged that the students had three central goals: first, to forcibly oppose, out of an ethic of anti-imperialism, a trip connected to invasion and colonial domination in Southeast Asia; second, to protest the defeatism and lukewarm response of the Old Left (the article notes that the JCP was busy hosting a “picnic” on October 8); and third, to attempt through Sanpa to secure hegemony over the student movement with a shift in tactics.³² The novelist Ōe Kenzaburō and six others considered the meaning of the student’s death, the purpose and effects of the violent protest, and their relation to discourse and public opinion.

Mori Kyoō’s lead editorial, however, depicted the incident as a “nuisance . . . harshly condemned in public opinion. Disconnected from the people, talk of shock therapy, or of touching off a revolution, is meaningless . . . The response from abroad was larger than depicted here: the student activists were likely well-satisfied. Yet within Japan it will become another factor in a rightward shift in politics.”³³ The editors’ joint report on the First Haneda Incident in the next week’s issue stated that the event had failed to attract the interest not only of “average students” [*ippangakusei*], but also of student groups that were typically quick to respond, such as the student bodies at the universities that served as the home bases for the Sanpa and Kakumaru [Revolutionary Marxist Faction] sects, and the College of General Education at Tokyo University.³⁴ The report asserted that students were already turned off by sectarian violence, and thus the Haneda events merely confirmed them in their rejection of the activists. One student stated, “I see what they do every day [here], so it’s no surprise, really.”³⁵ On the other hand, the editors identified how the intertwined interests of purportedly opposed established political entities conspired to prevent more troubling consequences. They noted the odd “duet” between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the JCP: both parties together “denounced running riot” [*bōsō hinan*] and refused to consider the broader background to the incident.³⁶ The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan General Council of Trade

³² Takahashi Tōru, “Haikai no ronri to shinjō,” *Asahi Jānaru* 9, no. 44 (October 22, 1967): 3. The JCP’s decision to hold an alternative October 8 protest event, the “Red Flag Festival,” by Lake Tama—some thirty-five miles from the confrontation at Haneda Airport—became for many a paradigmatic instance of the party’s complacency and unwillingness to confront the state. It generated a possibly apocryphal, though often repeated, tale: a young JCP member (likely part of Minsei) is challenged at the picnic, “Aren’t you going to Haneda?” The JCP youth responds with satisfaction by pointing up in the sky to where a red balloon dangles a streamer declaring “We Oppose Prime Minister Sato’s Visit to South Vietnam.” Airgram A-11, Ambassador Johnson to Department of State, January 14, 1969, CF 1967–1969, box labeled “Politics and Defense: Pol 12-3 Japan to Pol 15-1 Japan,” folder Pol 13 Japan 1/1/67, 3, Limited Official Use. The JCP’s newspaper, *Akahata* [Red Flag], subsequently claimed that some 1,000 JCP demonstrators were at Haneda protesting on October 8, but the JSP’s Bureau of Citizen Movements corrected this figure to “thirty at best.” See “Haneda no hamon wa naze chīsai,” *Asahi Jānaru* 9, no. 45 (October 29, 1967): 15. The JCP called the students’ actions at Haneda a “clash of reactionary and ultra-left counterrevolutionary Trotskyite forces,” and counterproductive to the group’s fight versus “American imperialist aggression in Vietnam.” Quoted in Telegram 02361, 2.

³³ Literally “politics’ right wheel,” a military marching term. Mori Kyoō, “Fūsokuhei [Wind Gauge],” *Asahi Jānaru* 9, no. 44 (October 22, 1967): 3. Mori was chief editor of the parent *Asahi Shinbun*; his commentaries appeared on the third page of the journal well into the 1970s.

³⁴ “Haneda no hamon wa naze chīsai,” *Asahi Jānaru* 9, no. 45 (October 29, 1967): 13.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ This duet echoed a previous instance of bad faith on the part of the JCP during Anpo 1960, variously observed by Yoshimoto Takaaki, Ōshima Nagisa, and others.

Unions, Sōhyō, were similarly blamed for conservative tendencies contributing to the “stagnation of reform” that the editors identified as a major cause.³⁷

It took another demonstration at the airport—the “Second Haneda Incident” of November 12, 1967—before press coverage sporadically began to consider a broader “violence” through the figure of innocent “victims” from the vicinity, distinguished from the students, who remained targets for journalistic vitriol. Once again the protesters’ immediate declared goal was to stop the departure of Prime Minister Satō, who this time was flying to the United States to meet with President Lyndon B. Johnson. The protesters again hoped that the confrontation would ignite the underlying and potentially explosive political issues occasioning the trip. Despite popular reactions to the First Haneda Incident, the November trip seemed potentially promising: public expectations and concerns about the visit were high, anticipating discussions in Washington, D.C., concerning the return of Okinawa from post-1945 American control.

By November, the central question addressed in the national debate in Japan was whether Okinawa post-reversion would accord with the declared state policy forbidding the “introduction” of nuclear weapons, or if such weapons would be permitted at the U.S. military bases.³⁸ In other words, both the Okinawa question and Satō’s perceived pliancy toward American demands were linked to a larger debate over Japan’s involvement in the United States’ cold and hot wars, including the potential for Japan to be drawn into a nuclear conflict.³⁹ That summer, Japanese had received a frightening and direct reminder of this peril in the form of newspaper warnings in mid-June advising the use of umbrellas to protect against expected “hot rain” contaminated with radioactivity as a result of China’s June 17 atmospheric detonation of a hydrogen bomb—a mere three years after the first Chinese atomic detonation in 1964.⁴⁰

Anticipating a repeat of October’s events, press editorials admonished the students against further violence; meanwhile, the authorities readied themselves. Met by a vast deployment of police—5,000 in the immediate vicinity of Haneda alone—the Sanpa students were beaten back with often indiscriminate force. *Asahi* reported the next day that “average citizens” [*ippanshimin*] were caught up in the melee between students and police and, “mistaken for students,” were subjected to concerted police beatings.⁴¹ The presumption that such acts were “mistakes” would, with subsequent demonstrations, become increasingly untenable. The press attention to cit-

³⁷ “Haneda no hamon wa naze chīsai,” 15–16.

³⁸ Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr describe Okinawa as “chock-a-block full of nuclear weapons of all types until 1972.” Norris, Arkin, and Burr, “Where They Were: How Much Did Japan Know?” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 56, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 79.

³⁹ Prior to February 1968, Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa was in selective use as a weather refuge for B-52 flights; this sporadic use nevertheless had generated 82 sorties to Southeast Asia from the base. Bombing strikes directly from Kadena began on February 15, 1968, and averaged 350 a month, with daily flights. “Fact Sheet: B-52 Basing in Okinawa,” March 7, 1969, 1, Secret, in “Japan and the U.S., 1960–1976,” Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com> [hereafter DNSA], doc. JU01051.

⁴⁰ Telegram 015852, “SSN Visit to Yokosuka—Siterep One,” Embassy to Department of State, June 19, 1967, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 2, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 019–020.

⁴¹ *Asahi Shinbun*, November 13, 1967, morning ed., 15. The paper’s term for this is *fukurodataki*, which is typically associated with gang beatings.



FIGURE 3: Police lead beaten, bleeding demonstrators away to waiting wagons, November 12, 1967 (Second Haneda Incident). Photo by Ishiguro Kenji.

izen victims of the state continued with an article in *Yomiuri* on November 14 criticizing the chilly response to citizens' claims for damages inflicted by the police.⁴²

This more careful scrutiny of state force perhaps had something to do with the presence of groups other than the Sanpa activists—far more than during the October 8 action. In the vicinity of the airport, the actions of these groups included a sit-in by the Anti-War Youth Committee, Hansen seinen inkai, composed of young workers.⁴³ Although themselves nonviolent, the members of Hansen proclaimed that Yamazaki's death was nonetheless "evidence of oppression directed at us." Several hundred JCP and JSP protesters were also in the vicinity; some 350 JCP-affiliated Zengakuren students held an energetic snake dance, with rank upon rank of participants linking arms and quick-marching in a zigzag pattern, causing a middle-aged JSP activist to murmur: "Haven't seen one of them in a long time."⁴⁴ One report speculated on the presence there of former participants in the "Red Flag Festival" (the JCP's own ineffectual "protest" on October 8, held some thirty-five miles from

⁴² *Yomiuri Shinbun*, November 14, 1967, morning ed., 13.

⁴³ The group originated in 1965; organized by the JSP and Sōhyō, it had developed its own dynamics by this time. See Takami Keishi, *Hansen seinen inkai* (Tokyo, 1968).

⁴⁴ The snake dance tactic was famously employed during the 1960 Anpo demonstrations. The linked arms of the protesters, their erratic and quick movement, and the tendency for the front ranks to curl back against the rearward ones make it difficult for police to disperse the protest or seize individual members.

Haneda Airport at Lake Tama), noting a riot police official's observation that "from their docility, they're probably Minsei."⁴⁵ While none of these other groups were in the end directly assaulted by riot police, the palpable possibility brought to mind past incidents in which nonviolence had offered no protection from state force.

In the November 26 issue, the *Asahi Journal* issued its own report on the Second Haneda Incident. While renewing their objections to student violence, the editors broadened their criticism to consider the rationale and justifications for their tactical shift:

And yet, students are private individuals. Riot police are public servants. Was there not a private, personal element in the exercise of public authority by the police? . . . If we recall, during Anpo, students wore no helmets and bore no staves. Why, then, have these students taken up weapons and brutally intensified their actions like this? There can be no doubt that a major factor was the expansion of the riot police subsequent to Anpo. If we consider the escalation from October 8 to November 12, does it really reflect an improvement in policing in the long run? This is the question.⁴⁶

The editors reflected back on a scene during the International Anti-War Day Joint Action on October 21, when 2,500 unarmed (and unhelmeted) demonstrators from some forty citizen, student, and cultural groups were assaulted by riot police. According to the editors, half of those protesters were female students in skirts. After a lawyers' group arrived on the scene to object to the assault and arrests of lawful demonstrators, the police released their arrestees and apologized—but left in their wake a road scattered with injured protesters. The group had wished to show that Satō's trip to America was not opposed only by Sanpa; readers were left to ponder the possibilities for such protests in the face of this level of state response.⁴⁷ Implicit in such considerations, too, was the equivalence between "violent" and "nonviolent" protesters confronted by state violence: both the helmeted Sanpa member and the "nonviolent" civic group would equally face club-wielding riot police.

The mood of the press had perhaps also been altered by the dramatic self-immolation of seventy-three-year-old Yui Chūnoshin in front of the prime minister's residence on November 11, the night before the second incident. He died in the hospital the next day, around the time the prime minister's plane was departing Haneda. Yui, who addressed Satō as "Your Excellency" [*kakka*] in his suicide note, declared his intent to oppose with his death Satō's commitment to a violence in Vietnam that recalled for Yui Japan's prior violence in China. Proficient in Esperanto and its longtime advocate, Yui had connections to the peace movement reaching back to the interwar period.⁴⁸ He had recently taken to visiting the offices of the "Peace in Vietnam!" Citizens' Federation, Beheiren [*Betonamu ni heiwa o! shimin*

⁴⁵ "Satō hōbei soshi • sono hi no Haneda," *Asahi Jānaru* 9, no. 49 (November 26, 1967): 14–15. The LDP even managed to mobilize some 1,600 from its youth organization to demonstrate in favor of the prime minister. On the JCP's "Red Flag Festival," see note 32.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 11. *Esukarēto* is a phoneticization from the English. The parallel to Johnson's Vietnam escalation is intentional and is marked by the use of the loan word.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴⁸ Yui's Esperanto proficiency and age suggest a possible connection to the interwar leftist politics and internationalism with which Esperanto had previously been associated.

rengō], to discuss peace issues with young people and lead Esperanto practice groups, according to Tsurumi Shunsuke in the *Asahi Journal*.⁴⁹

In the December issue of the journal *Gendai no riron* [Contemporary Theory], Nakajima Makoto put the Haneda events into a context that further legitimated the activists. He reported a recent subtle shift in public opinion about Yamazaki's death in response to increasing foreign demonstrations against the war. "While still including criticism calling this a small group of students run riot, those who are in solidarity with the goals of peace and national opposition to war have gradually begun to consider the meaning of meeting state authority with physical force." In contrast, he cited the *Asahi Journal*'s characterization of the LDP and JCP conservative "duet" as evidence of a lack of conventional political options. Nakajima noted that while some people distinguished the death of Yamazaki from that of Kanba Michiko during the 1960 demonstrations, he did not: in Kanba's case, too, the state had strongly asserted that the direct cause of death was her fellow students, thus obscuring the actuality of the confrontation with state force.⁵⁰

Since his death on October 8, Yamazaki had in many ways stood in for the ambiguous political significance of the students' actions themselves. While *Mainichi*'s editors had felt sufficiently assured to frame a street drama in Osaka around the angry reactions of passersby to claims of his martyrdom, others were less confident in this image of a uniformly unreceptive public. Two days after *Mainichi*'s article, in a report to Washington on October 17, the American embassy predicted that the "Left [would be] unlikely [to be] able [to] use this death as martyrdom symbol as it did death of girl student in 1960."⁵¹ Despite this, the embassy warned that "in any event incident will heighten emotional pitch of dispute over GOJ [Government of Japan] policies in coming months. Following close on suicide of JDA [Japan Defense Agency] official involved [in] Nike Hawk talks [EMBTel 2355], student death in effort [to] prevent Sato South Vietnam visit appears likely [to] create mood of emotional uncertainty concerning Sato handling of issues closely related to US-Japan relations, regardless of tenuous nature of connections between these tragedies and substance of issues."⁵² The embassy anticipated continuing, unpredictable, and ir-

⁴⁹ "Daijin no minshūshugi to Yui Chūnoshin: Shōshin de uttaeru to iu koto," *Asahi Jānaru* 9, no. 49 (November 26, 1967): 17–19. Tsurumi also appended to his report a personal observation on the First Haneda Incident: he had been present at Bentenbashi, and had even seen the vehicle in question moving along the bridge—although he had not witnessed Yamazaki being pulled beneath it. He wondered not only how an eighteen-year-old youth could fail to avoid such a slow-moving vehicle, but also how—unlike himself, a direct witness to the scene—the riot police could be so certain of the exact cause of Yamazaki's death. *Ibid.*, 19.

⁵⁰ Nakajima Makoto, "Haneda tōsō de no masu • komi to kokumin kanjō," *Gendai no riron* 4, no. 12 (December 1967): 21–22.

⁵¹ The diminutive "girl" here is telling. Kanba's status as one of the movement's few women, as well as her position as a Tokyo University student, contributed to her effectiveness as a symbol of martyrdom against state force for years after Anpo. The immediate cause of her death also provoked a gendered response, as even the official autopsy noted signs of pressure to her mouth, nose, and neck, indicating a possibility of choking—while a JSP Diet member's medical examination of the body strongly implied strangulation at the hands of the riot police. Kanba herself had allegedly joined the head of the Diet incursion with the male students in an assertion of her duties as a Zengakuren officer, bringing her into direct contact with the riot police. See Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, 296 n. 109; Sasaki-Uemura, *Organizing the Spontaneous*, 49. As Sasaki-Uemura has noted, rightist attacks on Anpo demonstrators (with clubs and wooden swords) were observed to particularly target women marchers; *ibid.*, 39.

⁵² Telegram 02361, 3–4.

rational consequences manifested in a “mood of emotional uncertainty,” but had no umbrellas to recommend against this public fallout.

THE ARRIVAL IN JAPAN OF THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER USS *Enterprise* had been publicly anticipated since at least early 1966, when the topic was raised during several Diet sessions. On February 2 of that year, Prime Minister Satō was directly questioned by JSP Upper House member Tsubaki Shigeo over the likelihood of ongoing government preparations for a port call in Japan by the *Enterprise*, or by any of the other nuclear-powered surface ships (NPSS) newly assigned to the Seventh Fleet.⁵³ Tsubaki characterized the already ongoing—and increasingly routinized—visits to Sasebo by nuclear-powered “fast attack submarines” (SSNs) as one part of Japan’s increasing indirect aid to an aggressive and hazardous American strategy of preemptive war in Asia.⁵⁴ He also directly raised the likelihood that the *Enterprise* would “introduce” [*dōnyū*] nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. In response, Satō reiterated the government’s “three nuclear principles”—neither to manufacture, nor to possess, nor to permit the introduction [*mochikomi*] of nuclear weapons.⁵⁵ These high-minded principles, which were part of the reason why Satō was chosen to share the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974, were actually an exercise in dissimulation, and perhaps willful misunderstanding, that even today is incompletely detailed within the declassified archival record. By way of secret agreements to the Anpo treaty in 1960, Japan explicitly permitted such transits.⁵⁶ These arrangements, and the specific language for equivocating about them, had been further clarified in a discussion between Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer and Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi in April 1963.⁵⁷ Coupled with standard American statements—a refusal to discuss the

⁵³ Tsubaki was well-informed: government consultations with the United States over a visit by the *Enterprise* had been ongoing since at least January. See Memorandum for the President, Undersecretary of State Katzenbach to President Johnson, January 24, 1968, 2, Secret, Declassified Documents Reference System, doc. 1088.

⁵⁴ “The gravest threat to Asian peace is at base the self-righteous fervor of America’s tactics in menacing China with its military might by arbitrarily proclaiming that the Beijing government schemes to advance militarily through Asia, and adopting a posture of preemptive war.” House of Councillors, Plenary Session, *Kokkaikaigiroku*, 51-san-honkaigi-9 gō, February 2, 1966. Tsubaki began his comments by questioning incidents demonstrating linkages between the ruling party and violent right-wing gangs, and the use of anti-democratic tactics.

⁵⁵ Ibid. *Mochikomi* is a nominalized form of the verb *mochikomu*, “to introduce.”

⁵⁶ Satō’s commitment to these three principles was cited by both the presenter and Satō himself during his receipt of half of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1974. See Aase Lionaes, “Presentation Speech,” Nobel Peace Prize 1974, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1974/press.html, and Satō Eisaku, “Nobel Lecture: The Pursuit of Peace and Japan in the Nuclear Age,” http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1974/sato-lecture.html (both accessed December 10, 2008). As detailed in a declassified 1969 top secret paper on Japan policy, in a discussion of Okinawa reversion, “Japan now acquiesces in transit by naval vessels armed with nuclear weapons. This right would extend automatically to Okinawa. (This is sensitive and closely held information.)” East Asia Interdepartmental Group, NSSM 5: Japan Policy, undated, 25, attachment to Jeanne W. Davis, NSC Memorandum, April 28, 1969, Top Secret, DNSA, doc. JU01061. See also the authoritative discussion of this topic, and remaining gaps in the declassified record, in Robert A. Wampler, “Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security, and Economic Relations, 1960–1976: Essay,” DNSA, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/collections/content/JU/essay.jsp> (accessed December 10, 2008).

⁵⁷ As Reischauer’s memorandum reports, “I explained that our treaty made Japan a somewhat special case, and we had accordingly modified our standing position to extent of being willing say no rpt no nuclear weapons had been ‘introduced’ in Japan or would be without prior consultation. I took occasion to make clear significances of our sticking to word ‘introduce’ as implying placing or installing

possible nuclear armament of any surface vessel (“neither confirm nor deny”) and promises to “faithfully observe treaty commitments to Japan”—Satō’s three principles were in effect a doctrine of implausible deniability, sufficing nonetheless to deflect direct accusations of violation from the arrival of any particular ship—even a fully provisioned aircraft carrier heading for a combat station in proximity to Vietnam.⁵⁸

Such careful parsing of words was capable of backfiring spectacularly, particularly when challenged. With the imminent arrival of the *Enterprise*, opposition parties in the Diet questioned the government closely; in response, Foreign Minister Miki Takeo flatly denied that the *Enterprise* was equipped with nuclear weapons—much to the concern of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Walt Rostow.⁵⁹ The embassy recognized the gravity of the situation and issued secret instructions to Rear Admiral Horace Epes, Jr., and Captain Kent Lee of the *Enterprise* on how to handle the upcoming arrival press conference with “the utmost care”—to expect loaded questions that might make the standard “neither confirm nor deny” response damaging, and to instruct sailors, if pressed, to state, “I don’t know anything about nuclear weapons.”⁶⁰ The ambassador would fly to the *Enterprise* immediately before its arrival in port to elaborate these instructions and to coordinate the on-ship conference that day with members of the Japanese press and Diet; press would be managed through a Command Information Bureau established at the naval base Fleet Activities Sasebo on January 16.⁶¹

on Japanese soil, and our previous assumption that Japanese had been intending [to] achieve same effect by their use of word ‘*mochikomu*.’ Ohira then remarked that under this interpretation ‘introduce’ would not rpt would not apply to hypothetical case of nuclears [*sic*] on vessel in Japanese waters or port, and I agreed. He then said that while Japanese had not rpt not in past used *mochikomu* with consciousness of this restricted sense, they would do so in future . . . he agreed that henceforth he and others in [the Japanese government] would follow line of asserting that they have full trust in our assurances that we will live up to treaty; they would continue to use word ‘*mochikomu*’ for ‘introduce’ but would henceforth understand by it what we mean when we say ‘introduce.’” Ambassador Reischauer to Secretary of State, Cable 2335, April 4, 1963, Section One of Two, 2, and Section Two of Two, 1, Secret, Distribution to Secretary of State, Eyes Only, DNSA, doc. JU00223. The document references the (still-)classified record of discussions during the Anpo negotiations on January 6, 1960. See also Telegram 1282 to Tokyo, November 10, 1964, quoted in *FRUS, 1964–1968*, vol. XXIX, pt. 2: *Japan* (Washington, D.C., 2006), 46 n. 5 on standard responses. The need to preserve the secrecy of such arrangements by avoiding a written record or dissemination to all but a few key individuals perhaps explains how easily misunderstandings could occur—whether the one recorded above concerning American assumptions about the Japanese government’s statements on *mochikomu*, or more serious ones such as Miki’s (see below).

⁵⁸ The secret agreements concluded *as part of the treaty* enabled this to be a truthful statement. This practice, too, is explicitly discussed in Ambassador Reischauer to State, Cable 2335.

⁵⁹ House of Representatives, Special Committee on the Okinawan Problem, *Kokkaikaigiroku*, 57-shūgiin-okinawamondai nado ni kansuru tokubetsu iinkai-4 gō, December 22, 1968. Rostow called these affirmative statements “the most serious element in the *Enterprise* visit,” even before he learned that Miki and others were not aware of the Reischauer-Ohira arrangements—and had made even broader categorical statements at odds with actual practice. Memorandum for the President, Visits of Nuclear Ships to Japan, January 26, 1968, Secret, Sanitized, DNSA, doc. JU00882 (the paragraph that likely discusses the reason why such statements are problematic is deleted in the released copy); Telegram 005074, Ambassador Johnson to Secretary of State, January 26, 1968, Top Secret, No Distribution, Sanitized, DNSA, doc. JU00883.

⁶⁰ Ambassador Johnson to Department of State, January 16, 1968, CF 1967–1969, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0310; Telegram 04686, “*Enterprise* Visit: Nuclear Weapons Aspect,” Embassy to USS *Enterprise*, January 16, 1968, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 1–5, Secret, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 019–020.

⁶¹ Command History, 1968, U.S. Fleet Activities, Sasebo, Japan, Annex J: Public Affairs Office, in

In this situation, the embassy was particularly concerned about the possible role of the then-small anti-war Citizens' Federation, Beheiren, which had recently acquired a larger public profile. Its 300-person march on October 7, 1967, had been the first in years permitted by the Tokyo Public Safety Commission to take a route past the American embassy. Beheiren was granted such permission "because [the] group was small and had a history of orderly demonstrations," although Chairman Oda Makoto had to threaten suit to compel this action. In the intensified atmosphere surrounding the First Haneda Incident, the march attracted "more than usual publicity."⁶² In the context of the upcoming *Enterprise* visit, publicity about Beheiren's announcement the following month of the spectacular defection of four sailors from the aircraft carrier USS *Intrepid* caused real concern at the embassy over the possibility of a "fluke." "If even one American navy 'defector' fell into clutches of Beheiren (anti-Viet peace group) [*sic*] and started sounding off about presence [of] nuclear weapons on *Enterprise*, a situation would be created that, depending on its exploitation by opposition, could do considerable harm."⁶³ Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson reported that Prime Minister Satō shared these concerns.⁶⁴ In the absence of a "fluke," however, both expected the visit to be a success—violence by "a very small handful of extremist students who enjoy no substantial support" would be deplored in the press, while the visit itself would deepen and strengthen U.S.-Japanese relations.⁶⁵ Nonetheless, thousands of riot police were mobilized from all over Japan, while police closely surveilled the specific actions and movements of student leaders and notable members of Beheiren as they converged upon Sasebo.⁶⁶

folder Sasebo, Japan Fleet Activities CH. 1968, Box 1558, U.S. Navy Operational Archives, Washington, D.C., Confidential, unpaginated. The ambassador was accompanied by a delegation of some twenty members of the Foreign Office, Diet, LDP, and Defense Agency, in a show of trust and welcome. USS *Enterprise* Narrative Command History 1968, 1, and Historical Diary Information Chronology of Events 1968, 1, both enclosures to CO USS *Enterprise* to Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV Report 5750-1, July 1, 1969, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.; Telegram 191926Z, USNIS Sasebo to USNIS Japan, January 19, 1968, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 2, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0362–0365.

⁶² Telegram 02379, "Demonstration in Front of Chancery October 7," October 9, 1967, CF 1967–1969, Pol 23-8 Japan, Unclassified, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 10, 0230–0231. Attention may also have been drawn to the demonstration thanks to the August 31 torching of several cars in the embassy compound when a Molotov cocktail was thrown by an unknown young attacker.

⁶³ Telegram 4763, "Enterprise Visit to Sasebo," January 17, 1968, 3, Secret, DNSA, doc. JU00876. The other "fluke" possibility mentioned was the generation of a "martyr," especially in a fight involving Americans"; *ibid.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 1, 4.

⁶⁶ For example, details of movements, plans for force and for a "Third Haneda Incident," numbers of activists by university, and key leaders were communicated to navy investigators by the Japanese government, as reported in Telegram 020939Z, U.S. Naval Investigative Service Sasebo, January 1, 1968, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 2–3, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0272–0274. Police and the U.S. Naval Investigative Service (USNIS) also monitored the movements of alleged Chinese and Soviet agents to the area, without finding any direct connections to protest. Oda Makoto and Yoshikawa Yūichi of Beheiren and Iwanami Publishing's Yamaguchi Kazunobu (connected to reports on the desertions) are among those named specifically in surveillance of activists arriving in Sasebo. According to USNIS, two police sergeants from the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Board "were assigned to Sasebo specifically to work on Beheiren and related defector activities"; USNIS maintained close contact with them. USNIS took particular note of suspected Beheiren members' participation in Sanpa and JCP events, and their connections with journalists. Their pamphlets, which encouraged all levels of resistance from letter-writing and token walkouts to desertion and filing for conscientious objector status, were read closely. Telegram 191744Z, USNIS Sasebo to USNIS Japan, January 19, 1968, CF 1967–1969, Def 7

The visit of the *Enterprise* had originally been intended to alleviate, rather than exacerbate, tensions over such visits. Japan's perceived "nuclear allergy"—the curious aversion to nuclear weapons of the sole country ever to experience a wartime nuclear attack—had been the subject of longstanding debate in official and popular circles in both the United States and Japan. The two governments had together embarked on an attempt at regularized therapy through the introduction of nuclear-powered vessels, beginning with a series of SSN visits that commenced in 1964.⁶⁷ True to the therapeutic plan, protests had declined markedly in intensity since then, with the most recent—the June 1967 visit of the nuclear submarine USS *Barb* to Yokosuka Naval Base—producing the smallest protest to date.⁶⁸ According to an embassy report, "Opposition was able to mount only two significant demonstrations—2000 [participants] June 20 and approximately 5000 on June 25. Both demos orderly and with significant decline in student participation . . . Although we have not reached point where Yokosuka visits can be considered 'routine' emb[assy] believes significant progress was made in lessening public concern in SSN's."⁶⁹ Even the typically most radical of the activist groups, the anti-JCP Zengakuren students, seemed to be losing steam. The U.S. Naval Investigative Service report commented on the subdued nature and "relative ineffectiveness" of some 720 "Mainstream" or anti-JCP Zengakuren demonstrators against the USS *Barb*'s visit: "During previous anti-SSN demonstrations, 720 of these youths could create far more public mayhem than they did during this protest." Here, however, they merely "staged snake dancing tactics" for some thirty minutes, then headed for the main gate, at which point Japanese police split them into small and easily managed groups "without difficulty"—and without attracting notable media interest.⁷⁰

Anticipating that the return of Okinawa would require continued nuclear basing

Japan-US, 3, Secret, NoFORN [No Release to Foreign Nationals], in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0353–0355; Telegrams 201523Z and 201552Z, USNIS Sasebo to USNIS Japan, "Defector Siterep Five," CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 1–5, Secret, NoFORN, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0366–0372.

⁶⁷ Visits to Okinawa were already in progress, and in fact the first of these SSNs, the USS *Seadragon*, arrived from Naha.

⁶⁸ The Yokosuka Naval Base was located in Tokyo Bay, south of Yokohama, in Kanagawa Prefecture. Although visits to Yokosuka by SSNs were not yet completely casual affairs, the U.S. embassy had reported declining participation and media interest in rallies during the three prior SSN visits (the USS *Snook* in May–June 1966, the USS *Seadragon* in September 1966, and the USS *Sculpin* in March 1967), and coupled with "little, if any, nation-wide interest" in the events, had thus anticipated "no political problems in connection with visit." Telegram 10948, Ambassador Johnson to Department of State, July 13, 1967, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, Secret, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0005; the report of "little, if any, nation-wide interest" addressed the March visit of the *Sculpin*, a Skipjack class submarine like the USS *Scorpion*, which, when lost in May 1968, sank with two nuclear torpedoes in its armament. Telegram 5790, USNIS to Secretary of State, March 6, 1967, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 2, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0097–0098. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force took advantage of the atmosphere to hold a forty-three-ship fleet review in Ise Bay on November 5, 1967, the largest since World War II; the press dubbed it a "success," although some observers complained that the ships were small by comparison with those of the wartime navy. Airgram, American Counsel Nagoya to Department of State, "Maritime Self-Defense Force Holds Fleet Review in Ise Bay," November 13, 1967, 1, Limited Official Use, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 2, 0284–0285.

⁶⁹ Telegram 025536, Ambassador Johnson to Department of State, June 29, 1967, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0008.

⁷⁰ Telegram 211112, USNIS Japan, "SSN Visit Yokosuka—Siterep Three," June 25, 1967, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 2, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0012–0013. This account perhaps underplays the vigor with which police routinely managed protests of this sort.

rights, American and Japanese officials hoped that the visit of the *Enterprise* to Sasebo—in Nagasaki Prefecture—could capitalize on and even perhaps encourage these positive results in nuclear desensitization therapy, “conditioning the Japanese to military nuclear matters.”⁷¹ Nonetheless, the arrival of the massive and probably nuclear-armed *Enterprise* in the midst of a hotly debated controversy over the possible non-nuclear future of a reverted Okinawa posed a “calculated risk.”⁷² In fact, the government’s determination to host the visit in the face of vigorous opposition energized public speculation about the exact reason for the visit, made all the more curious by official statements on the need for supplies, rest, and recreation for a ship less than two weeks out of port.⁷³ In the context of the simultaneous push by Satō to heighten domestic appreciation for defense issues, many read the visit as an attempt to overcome the “nuclear allergy,” thus throwing the issue into high relief.⁷⁴

The *Enterprise* would arrive at Sasebo from the United States, en route to Yankee Station in the Tonkin Gulf, where it would recommence military operations against North Vietnam—despite public assurances by Foreign Minister Miki in the Diet on December 21 that the carrier would not directly proceed to combat operations (since that would amount to using Japan as a base for its operational activities and infringe upon the prior consultation requirements of the Security Treaty).⁷⁵ Even within this haze of denials, the warship could not avoid being seen as the embodiment of all pressing military issues: a cartoon in the *Nagasaki Shinbun* on January 19, the day of the *Enterprise*’s arrival, featured three “opposition party” members standing atop a tiny Japan holding a “Smash the Anpo System” sign, while the *Enterprise* and its escorts bear down on them, trailing smoke inscribed with the words “Okinawa Problem” and “Anpo Problem.”⁷⁶

⁷¹ Action Memorandum, President’s Question about Visit of Nuclear Carrier *Enterprise* to Sasebo, Japan, Philip J. Farley and Samuel D. Berger to Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, January 22, 1968, 2, Secret, DNSA, doc. JU00877. The *Enterprise*, then the world’s largest aircraft carrier, displaced 75,700 tons and carried 70 to 100 aircraft and a crew of 4,674. The *Enterprise* group would also include a second NPSS, the recently assigned cruiser USS *Truxtun*, of 8,200 tons displacement and with a crew of 496.

⁷² Telegram 4658, “NPSS Visit Sasebo,” Ambassador Johnson to Secretary of State, January 12, 1968, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 2, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0403–0406; Telegram 4763, 3. Satō’s contemporaneous push to increase “defense consciousness” had also contributed to the heightened prominence of the visit. Ibid.

⁷³ *Enterprise* left home port in Alameda on January 3, and Pearl Harbor on January 9. Historical Diary Information Chronology of Events 1968, 1.

⁷⁴ Telegram 4763, 4–5; see, for example, *Nagasaki Shinbun*, January 19, 1968, 4.

⁷⁵ USS *Enterprise* Narrative Command History 1968, 1–2. The *Enterprise* was delayed by the *Pueblo* crisis but would attack Hanoi again on February 23. Although the *Enterprise* had been in operation against North Vietnam in 1967, the visit was specifically arranged by both the American and Japanese governments to catch the ship coming from the United States—instead of the Tonkin Gulf—to minimize connections to the Vietnam War. Action Memorandum, President’s Question about visit of Nuclear Carrier *Enterprise* to Sasebo, Japan, 2–3. The Diet exchange is recorded in House of Representatives, Budget Committee Session, *Kokkaikaigiroku*, 57-shū-yosan iinkai-6 gō, December 21, 1967. Here, too, Miki and Satō both state that the introduction [*mochikomu*] of nuclear weapons would require prior consultation, or else violate the treaty. Miki repeats this the next day; see House of Representatives, Special Committee on the Okinawan Problem, *Kokkaikaigiroku*, 57-shūgin-okinawamondai nado ni kansuru tokubetsu iinkai-4 gō, December 22, 1967.

⁷⁶ *Nagasaki Shinbun*, January 19, 1968, 4. The cartoon appears next to the article “Okinawa and Anpo Entangled, Spurred by ‘Curing the Allergy.’”

FOR THE ACTIVIST STUDENTS, THE *ENTERPRISE* VISIT represented yet another showdown with the state over its attempt to drag Japan further into the Vietnam conflict. Therefore they would oppose it with physical force. Meeting at Hosei University on December 17 and 18, the Mainstream Zengakuren national conference proclaimed the various groups' intent to make the *Enterprise* visit to Sasebo Port in January into "the Third Haneda."⁷⁷ Intense media interest in the events at Sasebo was predicated precisely upon the possibility of a repeat of events at Haneda: retrospectively, the embassy reflected that, despite media disavowals of the students' violent tactics, the "media interest in the possibility of another violent clash at Sasebo led to extraordinarily detailed reporting of the strategies and counter-strategies of both police and students."⁷⁸ Thus, while the student violence fell far short of achieving activists' goal of sparking a general mass insurrection, it brought attention back to what had been a waning issue for both media and other protest groups, creating the conditions for their voices to initiate a public debate over state force and the connections between internal suppression and support for war in Asia.

On January 15, police in Tokyo intercepted and skirmished with a number of Sanpa students on their way from Hosei University to board trains for Sasebo, arresting 131 under the Assembly in Possession of Dangerous Weapons Law [*Kyō-kijunbishūgōzai*], previously employed only against rightist mobsters; another 108 were similarly arrested on January 18 during a march toward the prime minister's office.⁷⁹ This legal tactic was one of several coordinated enhancements of police authority for the *Enterprise* visit, including the possible application of the Anti-Subversive Activities Law [*Hakaikatsudōbōshihō*], a matter under consideration since the First Haneda Incident.⁸⁰ The government's sense of general public disapproval

⁷⁷ "Undissuaded by the first and second Haneda, Japan's ruling class has launched a grand provocation in bringing the *Enterprise*—and thus a portion of the Vietnam War—to this port of call. They are once again attempting to drag the people into the war . . . We shall realize our proclaimed Third Haneda at Sasebo!" *Zenshin*, December 25, 1967, 1. The photo of the meeting shows the speakers below a banner proclaiming the slogan "Make Sasebo into a Third Haneda!" Mainstream Zengakuren is rendered as "Zengakuren shuryū-ha" in their December 18 announcement; *ibid*.

⁷⁸ Airgram A-1098, "The Enterprise Visit," February 23, 1968, 6, Secret, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0318-0334.

⁷⁹ Demonstrations against the visit of the *Enterprise* were not confined to Sasebo, or even Kyushu. In Kansai, the Kobe and Osaka offices of the Consulate General were particularly targeted by demonstrations that ranged across six prefectures; police counted thirty-nine rallies and sixty-one demonstrations (with 18,661 and 18,233 participants respectively) between January 7 and January 23. Airgram A-32, Consul General Stegmaier (Kobe-Osaka) to American Embassy Tokyo, January 26, 1968, CF 1967-1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 1, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0292-0297. Student actions were more frequent, with the Mainstream groups accounting for thirteen of the rallies and twenty-four of the demonstrations. *Ibid.*, Attachment 1, Tabulations of Mass Activities, 1. JCP actions were largely separate from JSP and affiliated union actions. Several other "skirmishes" occurred in Tokyo during the visit, including a confrontation in front of the American embassy on January 20 between riot police and around 100 students, as well as an "embarrassing" surprise occupation of the ground floors of the Japanese Foreign Office by some 80 students (until they were extracted by police). The same day, Hansen held a rally; turnout exceeded 10,000. Airgram A-1098, 4, 8. Their January 17 rally in Hibiya Park had drawn 7,600, according to USNIS; the JSP claimed 12,000. Telegram 182019Z, USNIS Sasebo to USNIS Japan, January 18, 1968, CF 1967-1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 3, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0341-0345; Takami, *Hansen seinen iinkai*, 67.

⁸⁰ Telegram 161507Z, USNIS Sasebo to USNIS Japan, January 16, 1968, CF 1967-1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 4, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0302-0306; Telegram 191926Z, 3; *Asahi Shinbun*, January 17, 1968, 9, notes that such charges were a first in the history of student activism. The second group was also indicted under the Interference with Official Duties Act; as USNIS's report notes, the group included two women. The *Mainichi Shinbun* had declared its approval should authorities apply

of student violence prompted it to grant the police latitude to take an even harsher stance against the students—although what exactly had been green-lighted in Sasebo would in retrospect become a matter of some debate.⁸¹

A wide variety of demonstrators converged upon Sasebo in mid-January, along with thousands of riot police from all over Japan. Pro-Security Treaty and pro-visit demonstrators were mobilized by the ruling LDP, much as at Haneda in November; supporters also included rightists such as Akao Satoshi (a.k.a. Akao Bin) and his Great Japan Patriotic Party [Dai nippon aikokutō], who commenced speechmaking and leafleting on January 15.⁸² Business groups and local politicians also greeted the *Enterprise*, whose visit was expected to bring an additional \$2.2 million to the local economy, which was already closely bound to the U.S. naval base and ship visits. They had been campaigning for the visit for two years, and were engaged in an extensive pro-visit, pro-Security Treaty “propaganda campaign” in an attempt to counter opposition before and during the visit.⁸³

The *Enterprise* had been delayed by a day; in consequence, many protest efforts peaked on January 18, the day before its arrival.⁸⁴ The joint JSP-JCP-Sōhyō Grand Rally for Opposing American Aggression in Vietnam, for Petitioning for the Immediate Return of Okinawa to Japan, and for the Obstruction of Port Calls by NPSS was set for 12:30 P.M. at the Sasebo City Municipal Baseball Stadium, and drew some 27,000 participants—the largest demonstration in the area in half a decade, and four times the size of the largest anti-SSN demonstration in 1964.⁸⁵ Kōmeitō (the Clean Government Party), affiliated with the Buddhist organization Sōka Gakkai, held multiple anti-visit rallies, attended by some 20,000 members; the January 15 pre-visit

the Assembly in Possession of Dangerous Weapons Law to helmeted students brandishing lengths of timber. *Mainichi Shinbun*, January 17, 1968, 5. Calls in the Diet for its application continued with the Second Haneda Incident, but investigations into its application had still not been concluded by the time of the *Enterprise* visit. See House of Representatives Accounts Settlement Committee, Closed Session, *Kokkaikaigiroku*, 56-shū-kessan iinkai-hei 6 gō, November 13, 1967; Cabinet Committee Meeting, *Kokkaikaigiroku*, 56-shū-naikaku iinkai—1 gō, January 18, 1968.

⁸¹ Telegram 4763, 2; Airgram A-1098, 0318–0334.

⁸² Rabidly anti-communist, with a long and notorious history, the party was linked with the assassination of JSP chairman Asanuma Inejirō in 1960 (carried out by a young “ex-member”). Akao had previously led fights against leftist protesters in Sasebo during an SSN visit. Scattered rightist attacks occurred during the *Enterprise* visit as well. See Telegram 171945Z, USNIS Sasebo to USNIS Japan, January 17, 1968, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 3, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0335–0337.

⁸³ Approximately 10 percent of the local economy derived directly from the base and visits; in many ways, the establishment of the base in 1946 continued the previous economic links to the imperial navy, whose base here since the late nineteenth century had come to employ some 60,000 in Sasebo during World War II. In 1966, U.S. military expenditures in Sasebo were \$23.6 million, which exceeded the entire city budget of \$18 million. The Chamber of Commerce, the Sasebo Citizens' Council for Protecting the Security Treaty, and other groups mounted an extensive “propaganda campaign” to promote the visit and to counteract leftist arguments with leaflets, pro-visit demonstrations, a lecture series, and conservative governmental and legislative visits. Airgram A-5, “Sasebo Prepares for the *Enterprise*,” January 11, 1968, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 1–3, 5, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0391–0395. LDP propaganda in the area was coordinated by Diet members Sakamoto Misoji and Satō Fumio. Telegram Fukuoka 30, “Impact of *Enterprise* Visit,” January 22, 1968, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 4, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0395–0398.

⁸⁴ Airgram A-5, 4.

⁸⁵ Airgram A-1098, 7. Nonetheless, this and other demonstrations organized by the JSP, JCP, and Sōhyō fell short of their organizing goals, and were often hampered by police-student clashes (e.g., planned parade routes to the base were interrupted). Telegram Fukuoka 30, 3.

rally by the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and its allied union, Dōmei, mobilized 3,500.⁸⁶ Police estimated some 46,000 total demonstrators in Sasebo.⁸⁷

Despite these impressive turnouts, the hundreds of reporters, photographers, and television crewmembers on hand in Sasebo were there principally to record the expected dramatic student-police clashes, which consequently received the lion's share of the publicity.⁸⁸ Following weeks of anticipatory press and television reporting, the spectacle did not disappoint those expecting high drama and eye-catching news. According to the embassy's report, on January 17,

as hundreds of reporters and cameramen looked on, about 375 plastic-helmeted, stove-carrying and rock-throwing [Sanpa] students charged about four times as many riot policemen at a bridge directly in front of the US naval base. After taking the first student thrust, the police responded with their own billyclub charge, supported by tear gas and water cannons. The peak of the clash coincided perfectly with the noon television news and millions of television viewers were permitted to see the full force of the police counteroffensive by direct television relay.⁸⁹

The police also hurled concussion grenades and spiked the water cannons with eye irritant—but it was their generous use of tear gas, and above all the “liberal use of police clubs,” that most excited commentary.⁹⁰ Again, thanks to the timing, many witnessed the events nearly live, and barely edited, through continuing television coverage.⁹¹

As events unfolded, the neat boundaries between participants and observers soon collapsed in a way that would prompt revisions in the press and popular attitudes. Several correspondents on the scene subsequently testified about state violence after experiencing it firsthand. Five members of the press, including a correspondent from the *Asahi Shinbun*, were vigorously beaten by riot police, with no regard for their press armbands or their cries of protest.⁹² The report in the evening edition of the

⁸⁶ Telegram 171945Z, 2. The presence of Kōmeitō in the protests occasioned commentary (e.g., *Asahi Shinbun*, January 17, 1968, evening ed., 1) and governmental concern, although there appeared to be some overlap between their protests and standard election rallies already planned for the area.

⁸⁷ Airgram A-1098, 7. The math on the protesters' numbers appears a bit suspect. There were to be 5,500 police on hand to greet the expected 2,000–3,000 students, according to estimates on January 11; this was revised to 5,800 on January 12. Telegram 4596, Ambassador Johnson to CINCPAC, January 11, 1968, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 1, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0389–0390; Telegram 4658, 3.

⁸⁸ Airgram A-1098, 8. JCP, JSP, and Sōhyō protests in Tokyo were similarly ignored, even in the local papers, in favor of coverage of student-police confrontations, despite mounting “what were in fact the most impressive Tokyo demonstrations in some time.” Ibid.

⁸⁹ Airgram A-1098, 6. USNIS Sasebo estimated 720 students. Telegram 171607Z, USNIS Sasebo to USNIS Japan, January 17, 1968, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 2, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0338–0339. Efforts to deny stones to the students by paving the railway roadbed by the base were apparently of limited success. Airgram A-5, 3.

⁹⁰ Telegram Fukuoka 30, 2; Telegram 200311Z, USNIS Sasebo to USNIS Japan, January 19, 1968, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 2, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0356–0358; Telegram 171607Z, 2.

⁹¹ JSP Diet member Ōide Jun raised the matter in the Cabinet Committee meeting the next day. Discussing the out-of-control police, he mentions having watched a televised scene that very morning in which a policeman clubbed a cringing, gassed, unmoving student, all the while ignoring a supervisor's baton taps on his police helmet and shouts to stop. Cabinet Committee Meeting, *Kokkai Kaigiroku*, 56-shū-naikaku iinkai-1 gō, January 18, 1968.

⁹² The *Asahi Shinbun*'s evening edition reported their correspondent's beating as part of their front-page article on the day's events, along with the hospital's statement that he would require two weeks of medical care for his lacerations; his account appears inside (see below). *Asahi Shinbun*, January 17,




FIGURE 4: Students battle massed riot police and water cannons on Hirasebashi Bridge adjacent to U.S. Fleet Activities, Sasebo, January 17, 1968. Photo courtesy of the *Asahi Shinbun*.

Asahi on January 17 presented a firsthand account of a rather one-sided conflict, and marked a real turnaround in the casting of the dramatis personae. Beginning with

1968, evening ed., 1, 9. The figure of five comes from the announced Sasebo police figures; see *Nagasaki Shinbun*, January 18, 1968, 1.




FIGURE 5: Students are hemmed in and assaulted by riot police outside the Sasebo Citizens' Hospital while staff watch from the windows, January 17, 1968. Photo courtesy of the *Asahi Shimbun*.

a front-page photo of a police pincer attack overrunning the grounds of the hospital where the correspondent was beaten, the photographs sympathetically portray victims of police excess. (See Figure 5.) An image of an arrested student, his head bathed in blood, is featured above an image from the Sasebo Citizens' Hospital [Sasebo Shimin Byōin], where an activist student and a journalist sit side by side receiving care from the white-attired young nurses. (See Figure 6.) Other images show the massed protesters on Hirasebashi Bridge under fire from water cannon blasts, and a mass of perhaps nine riot police clubbing a downed student on the hospital grounds.

The paper's narrative of events echoes the photographs with depictions of solidarity, determination, and sympathy. The account begins with the students' evasion of the police at the station via the railway tracks; they make their way to Hirasebashi Bridge to face water cannons and tear gas in an attempt to cross to the base. They shout their determination, urging each other forward against the water blasts and the barricades, in a visual and auditory image of brave struggle. "Citizens" observe the events with contorted faces, crowding the street near the bridge and watching from open windows. Next, in a brief scene inside the nearby Sasebo Citizens' Hospital, a female student receives treatment, while others pass lemons to arriving male students. The stricken students press the lemons to their gassed eyes, then pick up their staves and rejoin the fight—a gendered image of care and heroism.⁹³ Mean-

⁹³ Lemons are typically squeezed into bandanas worn over the face to provide brief protection from tear gas.



FIGURE 6: Nurses at the Sasebo Citizens' Hospital treat students and press afflicted by tear gas exposure, January 17, 1968. Photo courtesy of the *Asahi Shimbun*.

while, the tear gas infiltrates the hospital, and numerous members of the staff and patients soon require treatment—the first point at which “ordinary citizens” become victims of the police action.⁹⁴

As the line of students collapses under the gas assault and retreats from the bridge, a leader attempts to rally them in front of the hospital under a banner proclaiming “Freedom for the People of Vietnam.” With this, the assault by riot police begins. Whereas descriptions of actions at Haneda often reduced the students’ voices to animalistic noises, here it is the riot police who are portrayed either as a silent, implacable menace or as violent attackers screaming meaningless epithets. They fall on the retreating students, who offer no resistance, display white handkerchiefs, and shout “Stop it!” as they are brutally clubbed by bellowing riot police. A citizen’s brave intervention marks the first of many recorded acts of citizen heroism—and in effect, the taking of sides.⁹⁵ As if to highlight the author’s changing perceptions, the next subsection is entitled “You’re Going Too Far! Police Actions Criticized by Citizens.” Witnessing police dragging injured students from the Sasebo Citizens’ Hospital to inflict further group beatings, two “middle-aged gentlemen” step between the students and the pursuing riot police, “shouting ‘No more mayhem and violence [bōryoku]!’ and ‘What on earth are you doing?!’”⁹⁶

⁹⁴ *Asahi Shinbun*, January 17, 1968, evening ed., 9.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*; emphasis added. Literally “No wielding of violence by riot police!” [*kidōtai wa bōryoku o furū na*]. A final note to the article adds that police reports of thirty-two officers injured in a confrontation on January 16 at the Hakata train station in Fukuoka with Sanpa members en route had been revised later that day to four—all minor.

In “No Police Warning; Riot Police Beat Citizens As Well,” the injured *Asahi* correspondent reports how riot police clubbed him and others on the hospital grounds.⁹⁷ “It was completely out of the blue,” he begins, focusing on the failure by police to issue standard warnings of intervention or arrest procedures that might have allowed citizens to retreat to safety. Without these cautions, observers had no idea what was taking place until it was too late. Instead, a black wave of riot police appeared, and citizens, unable to flee the scene, flooded into the hospital:

Those citizens last to run are brought down. Rising to flee, they are battered again. Ordinary citizens [*ippanshimin*] without helmets or lengths of timber, they cringe, shielding their heads with both hands. They are beaten, kicked with boots. With no way to escape, they press against the wall of the hospital; again and again they receive heavy blows. Truncheon blows fall upon even the motionless and cowering. I shouted “I’m an *Asahi* reporter!” Whether or not they heard, the rain of blows did not abate. My protective helmet flew off. At that point, I thought I’d likely die; I recall as many as four or five blows to my scalp. Diving through the legs of a riot policeman, I attempted to escape, but was again beaten and kicked.⁹⁸

Having finally escaped to the hospital, the reporter is treated in what looks like a wartime triage full of injured students. His reporter’s armband and pants drip with blood.⁹⁹

The *Asahi*’s reporting of January 17 not only starkly records state violence, it also portrays student activists sympathetically; meanwhile, it depicts citizen victimization by, and outrage against, the illegitimate violence [*bōryoku*] of the police. Although discussion in the *Asahi Shinbun* during the following days would shift back to a criticism of student violence, it would also note a shift in local public opinion against the police and government.¹⁰⁰ The *Mainichi Shinbun* similarly featured heroic, angry citizens, “bystanders” transformed from spectators into actors: “From among the watching citizens, angry calls of ‘That’s enough, stop it!’ fly. Citizens who until now have been mere gawkers [*yajiuma*] find courage and, unable to bear it any longer, step in among the police, calling out ‘That’s quite enough!’”¹⁰¹ The next day’s report included text and a photo of an injured fifty-eight-year-old postal employee described as having been intentionally beaten by police, next to a report titled “Over-excited Truncheons: Sasebo.”¹⁰² While still decrying student violence, the paper recognized the support and sympathy of “citizens,” commending their interventions between the combatants and decrying instances of their victimization by police.¹⁰³

Accounts of police violence on January 17 in the local *Nagasaki Shinbun* paralleled the shifting perspective of the national newspapers, and included the paper’s

⁹⁷ *Asahi Shinbun*, January 17, 1968, evening ed., 9.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* Reporters wore helmets similar to police helmets—although typically emblazoned with press identifications. The next day, many wore gas masks as well.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* Such echoes of wartime scenes—and of imperial policing—troubled many observers. See Airgram A-309, “The Japanese Student Protest Movement,” American Embassy Tokyo to Department of State, April 10, 1969, 19, Limited Official Use, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 3, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 10, 0248–0278.

¹⁰⁰ See, for example, *Asahi Shinbun*, January 23, 1968, 2, 14.

¹⁰¹ *Mainichi Shinbun*, January 17, 1968, evening ed., 9.

¹⁰² *Mainichi Shinbun*, January 18, 1968, 15.

¹⁰³ *Mainichi Shinbun*, January 22, 1968, 15. See also *ibid.*, January 20, 1968, 2. By contrast, the *Yomiuri Shinbun* remains solidly critical of the students, and silent on both police excesses and the sympathy of onlookers; e.g., January 18, 1968, 15.




FIGURE 7: Massed riot police beat two fallen demonstrators in Sasebo, January 17, 1968. Photo courtesy of the *Asahi Shimbun*.

very first published statements of opposition to the *Enterprise* visit. As in the case of the *Asahi Journal*'s reporting of October 21, police malfeasance was indexed by an attack on female demonstrators. "During the police action against the anti-war demonstration the other day, riot police first took aim at the female students. 'Ladies first' is perhaps fundamental to some other nations' character, but it is an import not to be borne in this form. Student violence is of course hard to excuse. It is equally important to make certain that the government and law enforcement does not similarly run riot."¹⁰⁴ Extensive coverage the following day described mass beatings of downed students with the meter-long truncheons, and of a female student clubbed down with a police duralumin shield. As the police pound the fallen students, an onlooker shouts his astonishment that they continue to beat the unresisting.¹⁰⁵

Even before the JSP addressed police misconduct in session at the Diet, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura Toshio publicly announced an investigation into the "circumstances leading to injuries of news correspondents and bystanders," saying that Sasebo police "had been instructed to pay courtesy calls on citizens who were injured."¹⁰⁶ The mayor of Sasebo issued a public apology to the injured bystanders and gassed hospital patients; he had been a strong advocate for the visit, but was shaken by the unfolding events. Chief of Police Kitaori Atsunobu declared that his forces would subsequently minimize the use of tear gas bombs, and would not beat unresisting students; he had heard reports that dozens of policemen engaged in the latter practice. His comments suggested that the beatings of reporters and prone demonstrators were individual acts of excess, and would be responded to with individual admonishments. If these limited admissions were made in the hopes of deflecting the question of police violence as a systematic and chosen method of dealing with protest, or of detaching such violence from the policies it supported, these hopes proved in vain—at least in the short term.¹⁰⁷

As the protests continued, authorities maintained their concern about Beheiren in the interest of preventing a "fluke." Maritime Safety Bureau vessels kept the group's rented water taxi at a sufficient distance to preclude sailors from reading their placards ("Follow the Intrepid Four," "Stop the Killing," "Love Your Constitution," and "Will Help You. Beheiren").¹⁰⁸ While leafleting and other efforts by

¹⁰⁴ *Nagasaki Shinbun*, January 17, 1968, 1. The paper also reported the JSP's condemnation of police "excesses" [*ikisugi*] and provocations.

¹⁰⁵ *Nagasaki Shinbun*, January 18, 1968, 8. The same page relates the crash of a Lockheed Orion P-3A from Iwakuni Air Force Base; such crashes, and the dangers they posed, would continue to energize anti-Security Treaty and anti-base opposition as they reoccurred throughout 1968. Much of the subsequent reporting of events at Sasebo, like that in the *Asahi*, voiced criticisms of the students' violence, but also continued to include accounts of the numerous citizen voices protesting police excess, and citizens' attempts to protect or aid injured students. See, for example, *Nagasaki Shinbun*, January 18, 1968, 9.

¹⁰⁶ Telegram 182019Z, 2. Some 300 were affected by the tear gas, in addition to those who were directly beaten. Kimura's admissions brought about an angry rebuke by other members of the government, including the transportation minister (and future prime minister), Nakasone Yasuhiro, for the "weak-kneed impression" of his statements that "might even be taken as a change in government policy," occasioning a public reaffirmation of the cabinet's position that NPSS visits would be permitted. Airgram A-1098, 9.

¹⁰⁷ Telegram 182019Z, 2; *Nagasaki Shinbun*, January 18, 1968, 1.

¹⁰⁸ Telegram 21118Z, USNIS Sasebo to Director, USNIS Japan, January 21, 1968, CF 1967-1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 2-3, Secret, Noforn, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0378-0381. Judging from the site reports, USNIS efforts focused principally on Sanpa- and Beheiren-related groups (such as the

Beheiren members failed to yield any deserters, their waterborne tactics garnered rare news coverage, which was otherwise devoted virtually exclusively to confrontations between Sanpa and the police.¹⁰⁹

On January 19, the day of the *Enterprise's* arrival, the *Nagasaki Shinbun* reviewed the nineteen visits to Japan by nuclear-powered ships over the previous three years, noting that the visit of the *Enterprise* had awaited a diminishment of concern over nuclear "introduction" [*mochikomi*]. It characterized the purpose of the visit as a "spur" [*hakusha*] toward "curing the allergy," and one thus entangled with Security Treaty and Okinawa issues. This was the first time the paper had broached the question of nuclear safety in conjunction with the visit.¹¹⁰ The same issue gave a detailed report on the events of January 18 in Sasebo: while describing scenes of police-inflicted violence (an unconscious female student, a male with a split brow smeared in blood), it noted the presence of some 10,000 citizen onlookers who reflected a politically transforming populace. Some were heard not merely objecting to police violence, but shouting encouragement and warnings to Sanpa students.¹¹¹ The next day, as the *Enterprise* arrived, the paper recorded a "trembling young housewife" speculating aloud that "although it hadn't crossed my mind with the submarines, isn't such a large ship likely to be piled with terrifying nuclear weapons?" As the violence continued, increasingly numerous onlookers [*yajiuma*] gave aid and encouragement to the students—evidencing the eroding line separating such individuals from activists.¹¹² A U.S. Naval Investigative Service site report on January 21 declared confidently that as a new tactic, "[Sanpa] students masqueraded as ordinary citizens . . . [and] intermingled with the bystanders and threw stones from among the bystanders thus adding to confusion." It noted, however, that "it was obvious to observers that police were significantly hampered in their efforts to control due to the presence of large numbers of bystanders and their attitude."¹¹³ American officials were in close touch with police, who themselves were well placed to monitor crowd attitudes thanks to the intermingled presence of numerous plainclothes officers.¹¹⁴

In a report to the embassy, the American consulate in Fukuoka took note of the perceptual transformations under way:

media coverage of the dramatic scene of students repeatedly attacking massed police lines and vehicles produced a curious shift of attitude among [the] local citizenry. Initial mood of apprehension and annoyance at invasion of troublemaking students replaced by sympathy and

Fukuoka Tenth Day Demonstration Society), perhaps testifying to their assessment of the manageability and unproblematic nature of other forms of protest.

¹⁰⁹ Telegram 221202Z, USNIS Sasebo to USNIS Japan, January 22, 1968, CF 1967-1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 2, Secret, Noform, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0385-0387.

¹¹⁰ *Nagasaki Shinbun*, January 19, 1968, 4.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 6-7. The report also discusses actions in Tokyo.

¹¹² *Nagasaki Shinbun*, January 20, 1968, 5.

¹¹³ Telegram 211747Z, USNIS Sasebo to USNIS Japan, January 21, 1968, CF 1967-1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 3, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0375-0377. The *Asahi Shinbun* reported a few days later that bystanders had themselves engaged in throwing rocks at the police; January 24, 1968, 14.

¹¹⁴ Such officers enabled the arrest of one of the Sanpa leaders. See *Nagasaki Shinbun*, January 19, 1968, 6.



FIGURE 8: Citizens object to riot police tactics in Sasebo, January 21, 1968. Photo courtesy of Kyodo News.

even grudging admiration. [Sanpa] students' fundraising campaign among townspeople reported surprisingly successful in collecting sympathy as well as money.¹¹⁵

This "curious shift," inexplicable within the governing assumptions by which U.S. and Japanese officials viewed these events, required explanation. Conservative Japanese observers advising American officials helpfully supplied one in the form of a patronizing culturalism: the shift was due merely to the "sentimentality of the average Japanese who tends to sympathize with [the] underdog without regard for objective right or wrong." The embassy repeated this conclusion to the equally curious State Department, adding that Japanese had a propensity to indulge students.¹¹⁶ While wishfully attributing these popular changes of heart to native romantic emotionality, the American consul in Fukuoka nonetheless concluded that the "main effect of week's developments [is] likely to be [the] sharpening of public

¹¹⁵ Telegram Fukuoka 30, 3. The students and the riot police were largely not from Sasebo, so both groups were potentially recognizable as outside invaders. Interestingly, an article in the *Nagasaki Shinbun*, "Battery of Fallen Students," notes that the riot police were "an elite chosen from Fukuoka, Yamaguchi, Osaka etc."—immediately before describing how five or six were clubbing and kicking a fallen student in the head and stomach in front of the hospital. *Nagasaki Shinbun*, January 18, 1968, 8.

¹¹⁶ Telegram Fukuoka 30, 3; Airgram A-1098, 6–7. This sentimentalism contrasted with the assessment (by Ambassador Reischauer) in the wake of the first SSN visit to Sasebo in November 1964: the "increasingly mature and sophisticated Japanese public is no longer willing [to] respond willy-nilly to leftist and extremist alarmism and demands for show of mass force and even violence in demonstrating opposition . . . [the] Japanese public simply refused to support such action." Telegram 1724, Ambassador Reischauer to Secretary of State, November 14, 1964, 1, Secret, Sanitized, in *FRUS, 1964–1968*, vol. XXIX, pt. 2: *Japan*, 44–46. Compliance with American wishes (and the wishes of their Japanese clients) signifying maturity, dissent indicating thoughtless sentimentality: a perfect illustration of the conflation of developmentalist social analysis and American strategic objectives.

debate on national defense and Security Treaty issues”—an impression confirmed by a *Nishi Nippon Shinbun* poll of Sasebo residents conducted February 10–12.¹¹⁷ The embassy noted that similar attitude shifts appeared to have taken place not just in Sasebo, but nationwide.¹¹⁸

IN *FIRE ACROSS THE SEA*, AN EVOCATIVE and detailed account of Japanese protest against the Vietnam War, Thomas R. H. Havens argues that “the rumpus at Sasebo brought the demonstrators much sympathy and helped to restore the peaceful image of the antiwar movement. People all over Japan watched the daily coverage on television and were aghast at the ruthlessness of the police against the defenseless protestors . . . This support ebbed when student radicals *began carrying staves* on campus later in 1968, but the antiwar movement itself stayed free of violence for the most part until the early 1970s.”¹¹⁹ Such narratives of promise and declension through subsequent violence are common enough in histories of the 1960s, and Havens’s conclusions here match their typical level of distortion and reductivism. Yet violence during this pivotal period played a much more ambiguous role, in many ways becoming the means of disclosing the incorporation of state violence in official policy, and in so doing, closing the distance between “ordinary citizens” (and “ordinary students”) and political activists.¹²⁰ The heightened attention to the issues highlighted by activist confrontations in turn created the conditions for “nonviolent”

¹¹⁷ Telegram Fukuoka 30, 3; on the newspaper poll, see Airgram A-11, “Nishi Nippon Shimbun’s Survey of Sasebo’s Reaction to Enterprise Visit,” American Consulate Fukuoka to Department of State, March 12, 1968, Limited Official Use, CF 1967–1969, Def 7 Japan-US, 3, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 3, 0276–0301. Reviewing the poll results, the consulate again called the locals “relatively unsophisticated and sentimental.” Despite overwhelming disapproval of student violence (83.5 percent), many had been won over by the students’ “pure feelings” of sincerity; their actions, the embassy nonetheless noted, had “jolted many Sasebo citizens out of their apathy and indifference and sensitized them to the security issue.” The *Nishi Nippon Shinbun* survey revealed other alarming opinion shifts, such as that 70.7 percent of respondents now favored removing the base even if it meant Sasebo’s decline, and 72.9 percent opposed the visits of warships, viewing them as a Japanese contribution to the war in Vietnam; 83.1 percent indicated that reporting on the events “had opened [their] eyes” and prompted them to “pay more attention hereafter to questions of war, peace, domestic and foreign situation.” The *Nishi Nippon Shinbun* editors speculated that the *Enterprise* visit had “transformed the people of Sasebo from mere residents into ‘thinking citizens,’” “moving in the direction” of “complete rejection of the Security Treaty” (1–3).

¹¹⁸ Airgram A-11, 6.

¹¹⁹ Thomas R. H. Havens, *Fire across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan, 1965–1975* (Princeton, N.J., 1987), 149–150; emphasis added. Versions of this declension narrative repeat elsewhere in the work. His assertion that the students were unarmed on January 17 is belied by many accounts, as well as by his own photographic illustration of the conflict on Hirasebashi Bridge, in which staves are clearly visible (149). Some participating groups did, however, attempt unarmed combat, a matter occasioning debate among the students. See the accounts by Kaihō faction members excoriating Chūkaku’s January 19 weaponless combat—but also Chūkaku’s opportunistic last-minute stave-waving on January 21: *Zen-shin*, February 1, 1968, 2.

¹²⁰ For criticisms of reductive declension arguments elsewhere, see, for example, Robert Cohen (on the invidious comparisons between the earlier Berkeley Free Speech Movement and Columbia University in 1968), “The Many Meanings of the FSM,” in Robert Cohen and Reginald E. Zelnik, eds., *The Free Speech Movement: Reflections on Berkeley in the 1960s* (Berkeley, Calif., 2002), 38–39, 52–53 n. 87. For perhaps the most famous contemporary defense of armed “self-defense” (in the context of the 1961 nonviolent “Freedom Riders” actions) as a means to compel proper state law enforcement against violence by the Ku Klux Klan and to prevent bloodshed—and against an unacknowledged, omnipresent institutionalized violence in the racist social system—see Robert F. Williams, *Negroes with Guns* (Detroit, Mich., 1998), 3–5, 76.




FIGURE 9: Students battle riot police in Sasebo, January 21, 1968. Photo courtesy of Kyodo News.

protest to become effective. To put it crudely, “nonviolence” was enabled by violence, that is, by a violent display whose results revealed and delegitimated massive state violence, while reenergizing and broadening political possibilities.

In an odd way, Honda was right: it *had* been the demonstrators’ role “to be struck, kicked, and arrested—only this is permitted.”¹²¹ Now, as a result of their shift in tactics, the script for protests had been transformed. While there had been an escalation in the police response following Haneda, subsequent public disapproval and sensitization to protest issues brought about an entirely different situation, one that both constrained police action and focused public attention—a combination of circumstances that now made effective nonviolent protest possible. Whereas before such approaches had generated little interest, and had occasionally been dealt with summarily by authorities, now the imminent possibility of dramatic student involvement brought eager media attention.¹²² With attention and legitimacy conferred upon protest issues, a much broader group of “ordinary” people were motivated to commence activism, expanding the boundaries and possibilities of the political.

For the moment, too, police had retreated from their post-Haneda “aggressive posture,” thanks to reactions against their overt brutality at Sasebo and the ever-present danger that an incident would spark a much wider conflagration.¹²³ An anal-

¹²¹ Honda, *Honda Nobuyoshi Chosakusen I*, 342.

¹²² Other factors in the wake of Sasebo included a reenergized JSP, newly focused and with greatly reduced “internal strife.” See Airgram A-1098, 9.

¹²³ Airgram A-309, 19. This chosen defensive posture was opposed by hawks within the LDP, who

ysis of the student protest movement by Columbia University's James W. Morley in April 1969 reflected that police overreach at Sasebo had "raised the spectre of pre-war police brutality and so offended the public mores, which have been traditionally permissive toward students, that *for many months thereafter the police felt it wisest to fall back on the defense, hoping thereby that a public backlash would develop, enabling them to move out again forcibly later.*"¹²⁴

The beneficiaries of these new political possibilities frequently proved to be the nonsectarian groups, from Beheiren (whose numbers increased dramatically) to the All-Campus Joint Struggle Committees [Zenkyōtō], that, emerging mid-1968 from the developing Tokyo University and Nihon University conflicts, proliferated across hundreds of university campuses to create more than 67 campus seizures or lockouts by year's end (and 127 in 1969)—their ranks swollen with participants from the now-activist *nonpori*.¹²⁵ Widening public concern and disapproval of the Vietnam War and Security Treaty relationships created an atmosphere in which increasing numbers of "ordinary" people found the desire and the means for political engagement.¹²⁶ The Japanese government took careful notice of this development, with the Foreign Ministry, for example, observing in an internal report that during anti-U.S. base demonstrations following the *Enterprise* incident, "the local people in the vicinity of the military bases concerned and *ordinary students* with no particular ideological leanings have come to be involved."¹²⁷

in March 1968 began to push for outlawing Sanpa under the previously unapplied Anti-Subversive Activities Law of 1952—an approach rejected as likely to engender protracted litigation without immediate success, all the while inflaming protest. As a compromise, the LDP executive board decided in September 1968 to apply the anti-riot provisions of the criminal code, setting the stage for events in October. See Airgram A-309, 19–20. In many ways this restraint resembles that of the period between December 1945 and May 1946 when the still largely intact Japanese police forces limited their own responses to activism out of uncertainty over the possible Allied Occupation response—a self-restraint that crucially contributed to creating an atmosphere in which union organizing, "production control" incidents (where workers seized their places of employment, running them without owners or management), and protests could flourish. Repression speedily recommenced, with Occupation approval, following the speech by General Douglas MacArthur on May 20, 1946, excoriating protesters' "mass violence"—green-lighting suppression with language akin to the imperial state's "peace preservation" laws. See Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary* (New York, 1948), 231–240; John Dower, *Embracing Defeat* (New York, 1999), 254–273.

¹²⁴ Airgram A-309, 19; emphasis added. Morley was on hiatus as director of the East Asia Institute at Columbia University for a two-year assignment at the Tokyo embassy, serving as Ambassador Johnson's personal assistant "on a principal mission of liaison with the Japanese intellectual community." On Morley's assignment in the Tokyo embassy to continue former Ambassador Reischauer's "gains," see U. Alexis Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1984), 455, and "Interview with Professor James Morley," March 21, 2005, <http://www.japanconsidered.com/Interviews/050321MorleyJames/050321MorleyJamesInterviewMain.htm> (accessed December 10, 2008). Like many of the documents considered here, Morley's confident account of police and LDP internal decision-making and attitudes in Airgram A-309 testifies to the degree to which he (and the embassy) maintained intimate contacts with Japanese officialdom.

¹²⁵ The figure is based on the Japanese academic year. Zenkyōtō had sprung up previously during struggles at Keio and Waseda University, but it was only with the 1968 conflicts that students came to recognize it as a distinctive and potentially powerful form of activism. See Wheeler, "The Japanese Student Movement," 131–132.

¹²⁶ While it is true that many of the campus eruptions were triggered by local issues—including massive misappropriation of funds by a repressive administration at Nichidai, and exploitative conditions imposed upon medical students at Todai, for example—such particular stories cannot account either for the rapid spread of campus eruptions across Japan or for the commonalities in the form and content of activism.

¹²⁷ Translated as "U.S. Military Bases in Japan," enclosure no. 1, Airgram A-2080, Ambassador

By year's end, *Asahi* chief editor Mori was even willing to entertain the claim that students' use of force might constitute anti-violence. In his column "The Ethics of 'Gewalt Staves,'" he considered the cogency of the activists' language: "what newspapers write of as lengths of timber [*kakuzai*] are called Gewalt Staves [*geba-bō*] by the students. At base is their sense that their acts of Gewalt are not violence but rather anti-violence."¹²⁸ Mori recognized that the choice of the German *Gewalt*—meaning variously force, violence, and power—involved a reconceptualization of the scope and purpose of force, and an attempt to distinguish it from the violence [*bōryoku*] that students associated with the state. "The thinking of the Sanpa-faction Zengakuren appears to be to break the law as a declaration of their intent to resist, and to thereby put their case before the general public. However, rather than being prepared [to accept] punishment, they view [the state's] right of punishment itself as violence, and repudiate it. According to them, Gewalt is neither terror, nor coup d'état, nor guerrilla warfare. *It is seen as a political means.* They strongly reject the stereotypical view that violence is the enemy of democracy, and is in contradiction with peace."¹²⁹ Force remained a complex component in all of these struggles. Students from Nihon University, for example, earned heroic acclaim and a reputation for toughness through their savage combats with police and rightist groups.¹³⁰ Meanwhile, anxious American officials worried that activists would provoke the involvement of U.S. military police or martyrdoms during Okinawan demonstrations, fearing that a nationwide conflagration might result.¹³¹

Certainly the possibility of such a conflagration was always imminent. Events such as the eruption of the Tet offensive at the end of January (including the brief occupation of the U.S. embassy in Saigon) and President Johnson's March 31 address suspending the bombing of North Vietnam and renouncing his reelection bid continued to raise doubts about the war and about Satō's notable support for American policy.¹³² The seizure by North Korea of the USS *Pueblo* during its surveillance op-

Johnson to Department of State, October 1, 1968, 3, Confidential (encl.) / Secret (Airgram), DNSA, doc. JU01001.

¹²⁸ *Asahi Jānaru*, December 15, 1968, 3.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*; emphasis added. Even if he ultimately remained concerned about the possibility of violence becoming an end in itself, Mori's engagement with activist claims marks a notable broadening of public acceptance of such claims.

¹³⁰ This was a tactic largely thrust upon them by necessity: the Nihon University students faced violent opposition for attempting to protest at a university that prided itself on the mass production of graduates free from political activism. The notorious president of the Board of Trustees, Furuta Jūjiro, had in fact boasted to the American embassy in September 1960, in his capacity as chairman of the Private Universities Deliberation Council, that Nihon University students had not taken part in Anpo demonstrations. He suggested that the U.S. lend support to such private institutions as a bulwark against political activism (which he said ought to be banned outright at all schools). He also urgently recommended revision of the constitution and the police law to allow for martial law in similar circumstances. Memorandum, Jūjiro Furuta to Ambassador MacArthur, "Summary of My Private Opinions," enclosure no. 1 to Dispatch 323, American Embassy Tokyo to Department of State, September 16, 1960, Confidential, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Md., Record Group 59, Box 69, 350 Demonstrations 1960–61 SECRET.

¹³¹ Memorandum, "B-52 Operations," Richard L. Sneider to William P. Bundy, February 17, 1968, Secret, Exdis [exclusive distribution], DNSA, doc. JU00900. "B-52 operations are becoming increasingly publicly visible," noted Sneider, suggesting that flights be reduced to three or four times a week.

¹³² See discussions in telegrams 07136 and 07158, both American Embassy to Department of State, April 4, 1968; and in Memorandum, Rostow to President Johnson, April 5, 1968 (enclosing Memo-



FIGURE 10: Sanpa students—many carrying *geba-bō* timber staves—march along the railway tracks on their way to Hirasebashi Bridge, January 17, 1968. Photo courtesy of Kyodo News.

erations, along with border incursions and an alleged assassination plot against South Korean president Park Chung-hee, for a moment made the sudden advent of a second Korean War conceivable, one that would immediately involve Japan directly.¹³³ Although this disaster never materialized, the events surrounding the seizure of the *Pueblo* demonstrated the degree to which Japan's security commitments and arrangements could bring about sudden participation in American wars, current and future. The ingredients were all there: the *Pueblo* had sailed from Sasebo in early January, as of course had the *Enterprise*, itself diverted en route to its Vietnam station to command the task force responding to the *Pueblo* situation.¹³⁴ Of the planes dispatched to the Western Pacific in response, Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa received fifteen B-52s. Beginning February 15, these Kadena-based B-52s commenced regular bombing runs of North Vietnam, averaging 350 sorties per month.¹³⁵

randum from Under Secretary Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to President Johnson), April 5, 1968, all Secret, Exdis, DNSA, docs. JU00927, JU00928, JU00929, and JU00930.

¹³³ This fear is explicitly discussed in Airgram A-1098, 15.

¹³⁴ A top secret CIA memorandum had anticipated the risk, noting the distinct possibility of North Korean action against the *Pueblo*, "in view of the current hostile attitudes and activities of the North Koreans along the DMZ and against South Korean vessels off its coast." R. J. Smith, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, JRC Monthly Reconnaissance Schedule for January 1968, January 2, 1968, 1, Top Secret, Sanitized, <http://www.foia.cia.gov>, doc. 0001458144 (accessed December 10, 2008).

¹³⁵ "Fact Sheet: B-52 Basing in Okinawa," DNSA, doc. JU01051. In June, the Okinawan high commissioner reported that "newspaper articles seeming to confirm officially and for the first time that the

When thousands of students took to the streets by Shinjuku Station in Tokyo the following October, however, police were able to regain some of their lost initiative and reduce the possibility of a wider domestic eruption. On October 8, 1968, the one-year anniversary of Yamazaki's death, some 6,000 to 8,000 students, Hansen members, and their sympathizers again joined in a massive inter-sect attempt to halt transshipments of military jet fuel through this central commuting nexus. The protesters' preparations—achieving a massive turnout, a new high point in inter-sect cooperation, and careful coordination of squads of 150 or so students that brought protesters directly to the tracks—were bested by a centrally coordinated response by the police. Their deployments, water cannons, clubs, and tear gas were enhanced by a concerted attempt to dramatize restraint on their part so as to yield negative press publicity for the protesters.¹³⁶ The success of this performance—most papers (with the exception of the *Asahi*) followed this lead, turning against the students in their portrayals of events—perhaps conditioned the events of October 21, which began with a peaceful Sōhyō protest involving between 35,000 and 55,000 participants, but ended with attacks on Shinjuku Station and wide-ranging street battles.¹³⁷ The participants were largely some 6,000 to 7,000 members of Chūkaku and Shagakudō (the Socialist Student League), joined by some 12,000 to 14,000 locals. The latter, however, were characterized not as “citizens” but rather as a disreputable crowd of opportunists and hoodlums from Shinjuku, and their violence returned to the criminalized, illegitimate category of *bōryoku*. The police response included the first invocation of the anti-riot law since the confrontations of May 1952, a move that met with virtually universal press approval. In contrast, the press rejected activist rationales about the station's involvement in jet fuel shipments destined for attacks on Vietnam.¹³⁸

planes stationed at Kadena were used to bomb North Vietnam further inflamed opposition.” In *FRUS, 1964–1968*, vol. XXIX, pt. 2: *Japan*, 287 n. 8, citing Telegram HC-LN 816605 from the High Commissioner, June 14, 1968. Such events added to the potential volatility of the political situation: the airstrikes against North Vietnam were not announced but were “patently known”; their increasing public visibility could provoke protests that might finally overwhelm the limited Okinawan police forces and bring about battles with American military police, or even a martyrdom—something that authorities feared as a potential political “trigger” for Japan as a whole. Memorandum, INR-Thomas L. Hughes to Acting Secretary, “Conservative Control of Okinawan Government in Jeopardy,” April 12, 1968, 3, Secret, Noform, DNSA, doc. JU00934; Sneider to Bundy, “B-52 Operations.” The other risk was of a general strike in Okinawa: even if short-lived, it would “prove in public what the US, the [government of Japan] and the Okinawans have known all along: that regardless of treaty rights, the US cannot have ‘free use’ of its Okinawa bases if the population is hostile.” It might also provide material for successfully depicting Okinawa as a military occupation. Memorandum, INR-Thomas L. Hughes to Secretary of State, “Brinkmanship in the Okinawan Reversion Movement,” February 3, 1969, 1–2, Confidential, Noform, DNSA, doc. JU01044.

¹³⁶ Telegram 12817, Ambassador Johnson to Secretary of State, October 9, 1968, 1–2, CF 1967–1969, Pol 23-8 Japan, Confidential, in *Confidential Files: Japan*, reel 10, 0316–0317. Police made 819 arrests, although only 42 were indicted, and of those, only 7 were charged under Article 106's anti-riot provisions—a measure of restraint that Morley attributes to lingering caution on the part of police and prosecutors. Airgram A-309, 20. By this point police were implementing a policy of long-term preventive detention, particularly against identified leaders of the activists. This, too, was enhanced by the achieved shift in public opinion: as Morley notes in his analysis, “as the public temper has risen, the courts have been willing to extend the period of detention of suspects in jail and have warranted police searches more freely”; *ibid.*

¹³⁷ Smaller groups also made forays against the Diet and the Defense Agency.

¹³⁸ Telegram 13148, Ambassador Johnson to Secretary of State, October 22, 1968, 1–3, CF 1967–



FIGURE 11: Photographers capture rough arrest of demonstrator by riot police near Haneda Airport, November 12, 1967 (Second Haneda Incident). Photo by Ishiguro Kenji.

The events in Shinjuku established a new equilibrium between state violence and public opinion, restoring legitimacy to police suppression, and threatening to once again reduce activists' voices to mere noise. Morley's extensive analysis of the student movement in April 1969—an analysis that anticipated the approaching Security Treaty struggles of 1970—concluded that “repeated incidents of student violence, crescendoing to the riot at Shinjuku on October 21, *have produced the backlash the police had hoped for.*”¹³⁹ New confidence by police and courts in public support against “protester violence” enabled escalated measures, including mass arrests, extended pretrial detentions, searches—even on university campuses without the acquiescence of their presidents—and finally, full-scale assaults against barricaded campuses.¹⁴⁰ Without another transformation of public perception, the decision by

1969, Pol 23-8 Japan, reel 10, 0305–0307. Again, police and prosecutors had been planning to apply the anti-riot law since September and were awaiting an opportunity; see Airgram A-309, 19–20.

¹³⁹ Airgram A-309, 20; emphasis added.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. As Morley's embassy report notes, assaults on seized campuses followed soon after the Shinjuku events (Sophia University in December 1968 and Tokyo University in January 1969)—and the general public acceptance of these measures encouraged other university administrations to seek such assistance. While it is not the case that every subsequent act of police or judicial repression met with acclaim in the subsequent years of struggle, the police were never again put on the defensive by the level of overwhelming nationwide disapproval that followed the *Enterprise* visit, and that had enabled 1968's long interlude from the usual “law and order” perspective. This ultimately provided an outer limit, even a level of containment, for subsequent political confrontations—one visible only in retrospect. The specter of this prior public backlash—in part, as a harbinger for a nationwide “conflagration”—nonetheless

some opposition groups to meet this force with force could only play into the hands of the police, hardening the categories through which such opposition was dismissed, and collapsing the possibilities for other forms of protest and political engagement—possibilities that had first been enabled, nonetheless, through the unpredictable results of transformative violence.¹⁴¹ For the brief period during 1968 in which the press widely portrayed student actions as heroic resistance (or at least as the political acts of rational people), dramatizing “citizen” outrage and intervention against an omnipresent and indiscriminant police repression, the borders of the political radically expanded to open up a wealth of unforeseen possibilities and actors.

continued to haunt American and Japanese governmental assessments both of continuing military arrangements and of possible countermeasures against this insurgent politics.

¹⁴¹ To take an iconic, even overdetermined, case, Yoshikuni Igarashi discusses the origins of the United Red Army in the declining effectiveness of performative violence in “Dead Bodies and Living Guns: The United Red Army and Its Deadly Pursuit of Revolution, 1971–1972,” *Japanese Studies* 27, no. 2 (September 2007): 122–128. On their embrace of weaponry and illegality—and the interesting repetition of corporate organizational forms—see also Patricia G. Steinhoff, “Hijackers, Bombers, and Bank Robbers: Managerial Style in the Japanese Red Army,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 48, no. 4 (November 1989): 724–740. On the spectacular standoff at Asama Cottage in 1974, the record-breaking marathon televising of the event (and equally record-breaking 98.2 percent television viewership), and its transformation of viewers of activist films, see Abé Marcus Nornes, *Forest of Pressure: Ogawa Shinsuke and Postwar Japanese Documentary* (Minneapolis, 2007), 150. This latter work provides a broad consideration of the role of contemporary activist filmmaking in representing, critiquing, shaping, and promoting political action in a counterpoint to the mass media. On the police use of selective Anti-Subversive Activities Law prosecutions against group leaders to tar entire organizations as criminal and deviant, see, for example, Patricia G. Steinhoff, “Student Conflict,” in Ellis Krauss, Thomas P. Rohlen, and Patricia G. Steinhoff, eds., *Conflict in Japan* (Honolulu, 1984), 194–195. Steinhoff’s discussion here of the application and acceptance of “labeling” might be profitably reconsidered within the Ross/Rancière problematic of the centrality to 1960s politics of the escape from determinative sociological categories.

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Featured Reviews

KAREL VAN DER TOORN, *Scribal Culture and the Making of the Hebrew Bible*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2007. Pp. x, 401. \$35.00.

Karel van der Toorn's book is a major signpost of the increasing focus in contemporary Biblical scholarship on the social conditions for the production of Hebrew scripture. For years, the most one could find in standard discussions of the Hebrew Bible were theories about the general historical and class setting of various books, the social setting of the oral traditions behind those books, and possibly some brief comments on the mechanics of manuscript production—pens, ink, papyrus, marking of columns, etc. The difference marked by van der Toorn's book and others is the increased focus on the dynamics of the production of texts within the limited literate elites of ancient Israel and Judah: how and why these groups wrote texts, how these texts came to be regarded as divine revelations, and what particular factors led to the creation of an authoritative, closed collection of books that would later be termed a canon.

The book opens with several chapters that detail major differences between writing in the ancient world and writing and publishing today. Building on a wealth of scholarship by others, van der Toorn outlines the distinctive way in which texts and authors were conceived in the ancient Near East. He rightly asserts that literacy was highly limited in ancient cultures, including alphabetic cultures such as that of Israel. Indeed, the reading and writing of texts such as the Hebrew Bible were the province of a limited scholarly elite, the "scribes." Except in special cases, individual authorship of texts was not important. Most literary theological works, such as the Mesopotamian epics or biblical narratives, originally were anonymous. Scholar-scribes composed such works largely in their minds, setting them down on tablets or scrolls. Nevertheless, such media were difficult to consult. It could take a long time to find a specific passage on a scroll or a tablet inscribed with tiny signs. For daily use, scribes mostly used their memories to recite, refer to, and reflect on holy writings.

These general reflections lead to two chapters about scribal institutions, one focused on the major cultures of the Near East—Egypt and, especially, Mesopotamia—and one focused on evidence for scribes in an-

cient Israel. These chapters synthesize a lot of information about scribes that was previously available only to specialists. Nevertheless, they also advocate a strong and generally unprecedented claim: that the temple was the main social context where writing and education took place in the cultures of the ancient Near East. For example, van der Toorn claims that "From the end of the Kassite period onward, scribal education took place in temple schools" (p. 56), and he makes similar claims about ancient Israel as well. These claims contrast with the broader consensus of scholars that the temple was a primary context for writing and education in the ancient Near East alongside other elite institutions such as non-cultic portions of the royal administration or the army. To support his strong claim for the temple as the main site of ancient scribal culture van der Toorn cites some labels on Mesopotamian texts that emphasize the secrecy of the texts they designate, and he mentions two letters that emphasize the importance of not teaching priestly literature (p. 56). Nevertheless, these data only show an emphasis among priestly groups on the importance of protecting the secrecy of priestly lore. Surveys of textual archives in the ancient Near East have found that only a minority of such archives, even in the first millennium, were located in temples.

The balance of the book focuses on the production of books amid this temple scribal culture. Van der Toorn summarizes rich evidence for scribal production and revision of earlier documents from both the Hebrew Bible and the larger cultures of the Near East. He then attempts to show how scribal dynamics are evident in the formation of the books of Deuteronomy and Jeremiah. At times, this leads him to theories that will surprise and probably not convince his scholarly peers, such as his idea that the book of Deuteronomy was created through four major stages, one every forty years (620, 580, 540, and 500 B.C.E.), with each new form of Deuteronomy created after the papyrus of the older version had worn out. In response, one should note that papyrus scrolls did not wear out every forty years like clockwork, and the past two hundred years of work on

Deuteronomy has shown that its composition was far more complex than van der Toorn hypothesizes. Nevertheless, van der Toorn is more convincing, at least to this reviewer, on other points. For example, he outlines several ways in which the "confessions" of Jeremiah, often supposed to be autobiographical statements about his suffering, are actually formed of a tissue of memorized quotes and allusions to earlier literature (pp. 189, 193).

Van der Toorn concludes his book with chapters on how texts like Deuteronomy or Jeremiah came to be viewed as divinely inspired and included in a closed scriptural corpus. Here van der Toorn's arguments about divine inspiration are particularly intriguing. He argues that the claim of divine inspiration first arose in both Mesopotamia and Israel around the time of a crucial shift from oral to written authority. In earlier times, tradition in both cultures was preserved by authoritative people such as scholars or priests—using a combination of texts and memory. These people were viewed as divinely inspired. Nevertheless, when authority began to be separated from such authoritative personnel and instead be located in texts, both Mesopotamian and Israelite scribes claimed that the texts themselves were "divinely inspired."

This argument about divine inspiration is one of the most interesting and far reaching in the book, but there are a couple of potential problems with it. First, in addition to the examples that van der Toorn cites, there are assertions of divine inspiration in at least two Old Babylonian texts that probably predate his posited shift in Mesopotamia from oral to written authority: the Atrahasis epic and a hymn to Ishtar. Second, van der Toorn's concept of a general shift from oral to written authority lacks nuance. Though there does seem to be a meaningful shift in textual authority in ancient Judah that is marked in part by an increasing focus on a textual law in accounts of Josiah's reform, there is continued evidence for the importance of orality in subsequent traditions, including the importance of authoritative oral interpretation of written traditions by properly qualified individuals. Van der Toorn shows in his early chapters that he is well aware of the pitfalls of past ideas of a major divide between orality and textuality, but some parts of his discussion of divine inspiration could be misunderstood as perpetuating an idea that Israel moved at some time from the one to the other, from orality to textuality.

Van der Toorn well realizes that claims for divine inspiration are not the same as the formation of a closed scriptural corpus, a canon. The final chapter of his book explores the particular conditions under which the Hebrew Bible became a closed collection of books to which new ones could not be added. He argues that this took

place in two main stages: the authorization of the Mosaic Torah under Persian rule in the fourth century B.C.E. and the creation of a closed collection of "prophets" sometime prior to the time of Ben Sira (early second century B.C.E.). This latter move involved the creation of an idea of a "canonical era" of prophecy, an era which came to an end in the Persian period. He argues that various Jewish groups of the time came to share this idea of a "canonical era," even as they disagreed on which texts should be included in it. Some, for example, believed works such as Jubilees or Enoch to be authoritative works from before the "end of prophecy," while others, such as the tradition of rabbinic Judaism, excluded such books from their scriptural corpus.

Van der Toorn's peers may quibble with parts of this picture, but the basics are sound. To be sure, many would disagree on whether Ben Sira already knew a clearly defined and closed collection of prophets, and there appears to be more diversity in early Jewish ideas about scripture than van der Toorn allows. Nevertheless, his basic idea of the creation of scripture in two steps, Torah and Prophets, well fits the evidence that has emerged over recent years from the Dead Sea Scrolls and re-examination of other data. Moreover, the idea of an "end of prophecy" does seem to have been a major new development toward the outset of the second century B.C.E., increasingly defining the debate about which texts should and should not be considered authoritative.

Overall, this book presents quite a mix for the non-specialist, trade audience toward which it appears to be directed. As discussed above, the book contains a number of bold and interesting proposals, and it does an excellent job of describing major ways in which ancient texts were produced in an environment and manner quite different from the way contemporary texts are produced. At the same time, the book also contains a wealth of specific ideas about exactly how the Bible and other ancient texts were produced, some of which are not well supported by the brief arguments that van der Toorn offers. This presents a challenge for someone outside of van der Toorn's primary areas, Assyriology or biblical studies, who may have trouble distinguishing the better- and worse-grounded hypotheses from one another. Nevertheless, amid the variety of ideas one can find here, the basic focus of the book on the scribal context for the formation of the Hebrew Bible is important, and it contains a rich array of ideas worth fuller discussion.

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LILLIAN M. LI. *Fighting Famine in North China: State, Market, and Environmental Decline, 1690s–1990s*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2007. Pp. xix, 520. \$75.00.

KATHRYN EDGERTON-TARPLEY. *Tears from Iron: Cultural Responses to Famine in Nineteenth-Century China*. Foreword by CORMAC Ó GRÁDA. (Asia: Local Studies/Global Themes, number 15.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2008. Pp. xxiii, 332. \$39.95.

The appearance of two works on famine in China at a time when China's longstanding reputation as the "land of famine" has all but disappeared needs some explanation. Both Lillian M. Li and Kathryn Edgerton-Tarpley are prompted by a strong comparativist impulse to situate China within the larger world history of famine. Edgerton-Tarpley has been influenced by, among others, Cormac Ó Gráda's *Black '47 and Beyond: The Great Irish Famine in History, Economy, and Memory* (1999), and Ó Gráda provides a short preface to her book. Li began her study as a co-convenor, with Thomas G. Rawski, of a working group to encourage the application of quantitative analysis to Chinese economic history that produced the pioneering volume of essays, *Chinese History in Economic Perspective* (1992). China provides an important case for those focused on modern famine, and both authors address Amartya Sen's entitlement thesis and its critics among contemporary historians. However, famine also has a particular significance for students of China. The Chinese state, according to its own standards, was judged by its ability to deal with famine and what we would now call food security. At the same time that Adam Smith was warning British politicians away from state regulation of grain markets and British society was debating the worthiness of recipients of relief, the legitimacy of the Chinese state was being measured in large part by its capacity to stabilize grain prices and provide relief to all subjects without differentiation. These criteria of self-assessment account for the great lengths to which Chinese governments went to develop systems of state grain storage and distribution, price stabilization, and water management. It was no accident that the statistics-gathering function of the state, while only imprecisely tracking population, was notable for its accurate collection of rainfall, grain price, and harvest data.

There are, however, more contemporary reasons for this interest in China's history of food security management. Evidence that rural areas in China today are benefiting far less than urban areas from economic reform has focused sharp attention on the problems of China's agricultural population. The current monumental project to move water from western China to the north may also be better understood against the detailed history of north China water management that Li so skillfully provides. In addition, the Great Leap Famine of 1959–1961 has now joined the Irish Potato Fam-

ine of the 1840s and the Bengali Famine of 1943–1944 as classic comparative cases for students of global food security. Both Li's and Edgerton-Tarpley's works are inspired by a desire to understand better what many have called the greatest famine in human history, a task made somewhat easier in recent years by the opening of the history of the People's Republic of China to greater scrutiny by foreign and Chinese historians alike.

Although both books look at famine, they take very different approaches to their subject. Li's examination of the economic and political history of famines in north China exemplifies the possibilities for quantitative and economic histories of China's last dynasty. Edgerton-Tarpley, following in the footsteps of Henrietta Harrison, Paul A. Cohen, and others, has mined the rich store of Chinese visual, print, and oral records to explore the cultural meaning of one particular famine, the "incredible Famine" of 1876–1879 as it affected Shanxi province. While these studies share important concerns, particularly the relationship between state and society, they also make individual contributions.

The title of Li's masterful new book is deceptive and revealing. Famine relief is only part of the story. Arguably more important than the dramatic efforts of the state to deal with famine when it occurred was the state's commitment to preventing famine through the maintenance of granaries, intervention in the grain market (price stabilization), and the creation of a large and costly bureaucracy devoted to river conservancy for both transportation and flood control. It is Li's treatment of all of these aspects of food security that distinguishes her study from previous works on China's granary system by Pierre-Etienne Will and R. Bin Wong (1991) and on China's river conservancy administration by Randall Dodgen (2001) and Jane Kate Leonard (1996). It also allows her to arrive at some surprising conclusions that a focus on famine alone would preclude: most notably that, for all its efforts to save lives, the main goal of famine relief was to ensure the rapid restoration of agricultural production.

The main focus of Li's study is the capital region of north China, the Zhili-Hebei region, where issues of state security and food security almost completely overlapped. The importance of river conservancy and food supply to the mission of the highly paternalistic imperial Chinese state both explains and is revealed in the abundance of documentary material on these subjects

left behind by the last dynasty. Li has made use of routine grain price, rainfall, and state-of-the-harvest reports to provide the most ambitious econometric analysis of China's northern agrarian economy. At the same time, she has contextualized her findings by exhausting the written record in the form of local histories (gazetteers), official correspondence, agricultural manuals, treatises on famine relief and water control, newspaper reporting, and the reports of foreign observers.

Some of Li's most important findings, and there are far too many to include in one review article, raise doubts about the trajectory of the north China economy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Li argues against the claims of Dwight Perkins and Ramon H. Myers that food supply grew along with the long-documented increase in China's late imperial population. Looking only at Zhili, she argues that a reasonable living standard was rarely met and examines the role that various grains played in the diet of the Hai River Basin population. Relying largely on the qualitative accounts in local gazetteers and widely accepted evidence that there were no breakthroughs in agricultural technology and that there was a steady deterioration in water and soil conditions, Li concludes that life was insecure even in the best of times. Even the claim that peasants could maintain their living standards by eating down the food chain is challenged by quantitative evidence that prices for different qualities of grain were well correlated within local markets.

Li also joins the debate over the commercialization of north China. It is here that her statistical analysis of Chinese harvest and grain price data is put to its greatest effect. In chapter seven, Li subjects the abundant monthly price reports for various grains submitted by each of Zhili's seventeen prefectures for the years 1738–1911 to statistical analysis to test the theory (argued qualitatively by G. William Skinner, William T. Rowe, and Rhoads Murphey) that China experienced *interregional* integration but did not develop well integrated *intra-regional* market networks. Li comes to the surprising finding that, while modest price integration across Zhili prefectures had taken place during the eighteenth century, there was a marked decrease in integration in the nineteenth century. She attributes this to declining state maintenance of granaries and transportation infrastructure. Li also found that only the major treaty port of Tianjin experienced decreasing grain price sensitivity to local harvests, a direct effect of its easy access to seaborne grain shipments from Shandong and Fengtian (present-day southern Manchuria) and, by the late nineteenth century, from south and central China as well.

Poorly functioning markets may explain the extraordinary commitment of state resources to food security and the ideological commitment of Chinese states, from imperial times to the People's Republic, to grain self-sufficiency. But debates over how to carry out famine relief—the degree to which cash should replace grain and merchants replace the state in relief delivery and the gradual abandonment of the state granary sys-

tem, which Li superbly documents—raise questions about how the market appeared to the court and officials in the north. Indeed, Li herself, at times calling on the excellent work of Helen Dunstan, acknowledges an increasing confidence placed in merchants and the market by the Qing court. I would add that the state's almost single-minded attention to food security and river conservancy created a wide open space for unregulated economic activity in almost every area except the grain trade. An analysis of this phenomenon and its impact on economic thinking is beyond the scope of Li's study. However, new work by Margherita Zanasi and others should help provide the link between dynastic policy and the development of modern Chinese economic thinking in the early twentieth century.

Li's findings provide an important addition to the debate over the development of the market economy in China during the last dynasty. By combining the analysis of market development and famine relief, Li has come to the conclusion that the Qing displayed considerable capacity for intervention in the economy, but that this intervention was oriented not toward growth but toward stability. At least until the nineteenth century, the government was effective in north China at price stabilization, grain storage, and famine relief. At the same time, population growth and hundreds of years of skillful river engineering created new challenges to China's food supply. Li demonstrates that the enormous expenditure in human and fiscal resources dedicated to river conservancy reflected the belief of early Qing rulers that a comprehensive program of water engineering could both end cycles of floods and increase the food supply. The idea that there could be a final solution to these twin problems appears to have been abandoned by the late eighteenth century, around the same time that the state began to depend on the private sector in other areas as well. However, as the last chapters of Li's book, which cover post-dynastic China, document, the unintended consequences of centuries of water micromanagement, particularly the channeling of rivers into the Grand Canal to facilitate south-north movement of rice, were severe silting, waterlogging, and salination of the soil across Zhili and adjacent regions of north China.

One of the tragic consequences of this environmental decline was the North China Famine of 1876–1879. Li devotes only a few pages to this famine, but her entire study provides context for understanding the devastating impact it had on the subsequent attitudes and realities that made China in the twentieth century the "land of famine." Edgerton-Tarpley's study draws our attention to the local-level response to this famine in its hardest hit region, Shanxi province, exploring the competing famine narratives located in gentry poetry and memoirs, folktales, stone inscriptions, and missionary and newspaper reports, as well as policy debates of the kind examined by Li. While none of these sources exists in great abundance, their mutually enforcing depictions of mass starvation, human trafficking, and even cannibalism, which Li superbly documents—raise questions about how the market appeared to the court and officials in the north. Indeed, Li herself, at times calling on the excellent work of Helen Dunstan, acknowledges an increasing confidence placed in merchants and the market by the Qing court. I would add that the state's almost single-minded attention to food security and river conservancy created a wide open space for unregulated economic activity in almost every area except the grain trade. An analysis of this phenomenon and its impact on economic thinking is beyond the scope of Li's study. However, new work by Margherita Zanasi and others should help provide the link between dynastic policy and the development of modern Chinese economic thinking in the early twentieth century.

balism make them useful as evidence of both the perception and the reality of this terrible disaster.

One of the most important questions addressed by Edgerton-Tarpley is why. Although Li's study shows that the administration of famine relief was declining, nothing in the past performance of the Qing state prepares us for the mass starvation experienced in the late 1870s. Li provides one clue by reminding us that the drought that caused this famine came on the heels of a major flood that denuded large areas of north China of trees and vegetation, destroyed irrigation ditches, and altered the course of rivers. In addition, the spread of the drought from Shandong and Zhili to Henan, Shanxi, and Shaanxi left many areas unable to rely on traditional sources of relief grain supply. Edgerton-Tarpley also points to China's international situation and to policy debates over the appropriate allocation of scarce resources between famine relief and so-called self-strengthening projects such as coastal defense and arms manufacture. Neither study provides clear evidence of the relative weight to be given to factors such as poor road conditions, the corruption of village headmen and elites, the unexpected length of the drought, and the ability or inability of the market and private philanthropy to respond to the crisis in the absence of adequate government relief. As a result, the argument made by both Li and Edgerton-Tarpley that this famine was the result of real dearth and not a case of what Amartya Sen has called a failure of entitlement has yet to be proven.

Nonetheless, Edgerton-Tarpley has made a convincing case for the reality of the perception that this was a crisis of unimaginable proportions. Poetry, memoirs, and accounts in local histories describe a situation of social and economic breakdown. Businesses were closed, workers had no salaries, farmers had no crops, and, as the drought continued, those with a surplus soon found themselves with no more to eat than those who had not managed to lay anything aside. Indeed, Edgerton-Tarpley suggests that some of the worst off may have had a better chance of survival because, when the famine first hit, they fled the famine region. Families could not carry out the usual religious and clan rites that gave their lives meaning, and, as the drought wore on, even the wealthy began to sell their houses and possessions piece by piece. But there was no food to buy. Edgerton-Tarpley describes the consumption of famine foods by a desperate population: pets, bark, leaves, roots, white clay, and eventually other people.

No one caught in this cycle of despair, nor many who observed it from the outside, appears to have blamed the state for what was happening. While gazetteers evince fatalism about famine, they also reflect a common belief that the state would take care of its victims. When famine struck Shanxi in the late 1870s, Edgerton-Tarpley tells us, local people prayed for rain and blamed their own vices—eating meat, smoking opium, lack of filiality, and female immorality—for their woes. The foreign missionary community, which played an important role in famine relief by this period, likewise blamed

popular depravity, to wit, Chinese "idol worship." For scholars engaged in the study of famine in Ireland and the British colonial world, it is interesting to note that the foreign business and diplomatic community, mostly British, took the famine to be a confirmation of the need for free market solutions and the application of science and engineering to China's problems.

Edgerton-Tarpley ends her study with what she calls the "semiotics of famine," an exploration of "the diverse meanings that key famine images took on during and after the disaster" (p. 11). This is both the most original and the most disturbing part of the book. One of sources for this section gives its name to the study as a whole, *Henan qihuang tieleitu* [The Incredible Famine in Henan: Pictures to draw tears from iron], a collection of twelve woodblock prints accompanied by short poetic descriptions of the agonies faced by those who remained in the famine precincts (in this case neighboring Henan province): to starve, to sell their women and children, and, in extremis, to eat first the already dead and then the not yet dead. (A sign of the global reach of China's situation was the appearance of an English version of this pamphlet in London, translated by the most famous of Chinese translators, James Legge, and published by an arm of the China Inland Mission.) Edgerton-Tarpley finds it hard to credit the worst of these images, particularly those in which people devour their own kin. The metaphoric sacrifice of children for their parents was a common trope in Chinese pedagogical literature on filial devotion. However, the accounts that Edgerton-Tarpley relates, including a horrific stone inscription that has survived in one Shanxi village, document a reversal in which men ate their wives, children ate their parents, and younger and elder brothers ate each other. Edgerton-Tarpley sees these accounts, and those more numerous accounts of the sale of wives, daughters, and children, as containing equal parts reality and harsh representation of a feeling that the social order was being destroyed by unimaginable catastrophe.

Probably the most important conclusion we can draw from these analyses of the late Qing famines was that they caused lasting damage to the regions in which they occurred. Edgerton-Tarpley reminds us that Shanxi before the turn of the century had a thriving commercial sector and was home to some of the most influential merchants in the Chinese long distance trade. Their demise was not merely the result of innovations in banking. It also had roots in the devastation of their home counties. Li reminds us that the severity of the damage inflicted on the north helps to explain why in every decade of the first half of the twentieth century there were famines in China. Some were cruelly man-made, like the floods created in 1938 when the Nationalist army bombed the Yellow River dikes to block the advance of the Japanese military; others reflected diminished state capacity, particularly as China's political institutions fragmented during what historians call the Warlord Era. Li devotes considerable space to the most famous of these, the Great Leap Famine of 1959–1961, which

all analysts now agree was man-made. As a coda to her study, Edgerton-Tarpley shows how official efforts to contain the historiography of the Great Leap Famine have clearly failed. However, the state's quest to document that earlier famine in order to show that the Communist Party did a better job of caring for the masses than did the Qing dynasty was a boon to his-

torians. It also reminds us that, for governments in China, the paternalistic state is not the property of any one regime but permeates the popular understanding of the role of government and cannot be escaped even by states fixed on creating a market-based economy.

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CATRIONA KELLY. *Children's World: Growing Up in Russia, 1890–1991*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2007. Pp. xxii, 714. \$45.00.

The title of Catriona Kelly's book suggests that childhood is not just a phase of life that adults leave behind; it is another planet with its own norms, rituals, insults, joys, stories, and songs. For those familiar with Russia, "children's world" also calls to mind the Soviet-era department store chain of the same name (*Detskii mir*), whose Moscow flagship still operates from a grand building on Lubyanka Square. The square itself is better known as the former headquarters of the Soviet political police (KGB). The juxtaposition of the KGB prison and the child consumer's paradise "dramatically confronted children with the alternatives to which the two extremes of behavior—obedience and delinquency—might lead" (p. 144). On Lubyanka Square, the world of children is both a wonderland and firmly embedded in adult ideologies and institutions.

This work thus confronts the conundrum that faces all histories of children and childhood: how to give due attention to the history of adult ideas about children without losing sight of "mentality on the ground" (p. 13). Kelly's solution is to organize the book into parallel narratives of childhood and children in the years 1890–1991. The first section, "Imagining Childhood," traces the "history of representation of children" (p. 13) in a dizzying array of fields, including the visual arts, child psychology, pedagogy, law, journalism, and literature for both children and adults. Having quarantined "discourse analysis and institutional history," which, she asserts, "do not get one very far in understanding childhood" (p. 13), she focuses the bulk of the book on exploring the real worlds in which children lived.

In order to allow us to see the world "through children's eyes" (p. 11), Kelly relies on interviews—with adults raised in working-class, intelligentsia, and peasant households and in children's institutions—as well as examples of children's school work, drawings, letters, and diaries. This wide-ranging and ambitious book offers a comprehensive guide to the changing children's world or, better, worlds, as it surveys the lives of the poor and the privileged, of children in orphanages, on the streets, and in prisons, and schools and families. It aims to provide a submersion experience, a virtual Russian childhood.

One of the book's strengths is its insistence on both the multiplicity of adult ideas about children and the

variety of children's experiences—even at the most repressive moments in Soviet history. The four chapters that explore shifting adult representations of children trace the tensions between progressive, child-centered approaches on the one hand and policies aimed at shaping children into responsible adults on the other. Sharing "a conviction that [children] deserved at least a degree of freedom and autonomy from adult interference" (p. 57), prerevolutionary reformers in the fields of education, child psychology, and law advocated both "free upbringing" that allowed children to develop their imaginations and legislation that protected children from abusive parents and exploitive labor. Yet such liberationist visions coexisted with a strong sense that schools and nurseries, even the most avowedly child-centered, should mold children into rational members of society.

After 1917, the uniquely happy lives of Soviet children became a prominent propaganda theme, and much of the prerevolutionary reformers' emphasis on the need to emancipate children won state support. Early Soviet legislation set up special juvenile courts and provided for the rehabilitation of youthful offenders. Early Soviet schools and nurseries emphasized "self-government," collaborative work, and child-centered pedagogy. Yet such ideals always competed with the view that only (professional) adult intervention could prepare children to build the future society, conceptualized as at once modern and socialist: "a rational, politically literate, hygienically aware, 'cultured' collective" (p. 67).

In the 1920s, the balance began to shift toward a vision of children as in need of discipline and political education. By the mid-1920s, the Commissariat of Enlightenment had centralized control of curricula and teaching methods. However, Kelly views 1935 as the real turning point, the moment when, in the aftermath of the disruptions of collectivization and crash industrialization, the obedient, docile, often female child superseded the usually male child activist—anti-bourgeois and often anti-adult—as the "governing image of 'Soviet childhood'" (p. 76). Stalinist schools demanded discipline and good grades, a clear repudiation of progressive experiments in education. Yet the mid-1930s cult of happy Soviet childhood also saw the "rehabili-

tation . . . of children's literature as a genre concerned primarily with fantasy and wonder" (p. 98) and continued injunctions against corporal punishment. Such remnants of progressivism worked to construct "a sentimental idea of childhood as a space—perhaps the only space in Soviet culture—that lay beyond politics" (p. 112).

Kelly considers Joseph Stalin's death in 1953 a less dramatic turning point in Soviet conceptions of children and childhood. The view of the child as an innate creator and activist that had been quashed by Stalinism reemerged, and "the tension between 'disciplinary' and 'indulgent' models of childhood became still more pronounced" (p. 142). The myth of the happy Soviet childhood persisted into the 1980s, when the cheery, subordinate child became an emblem of all that was wrong with the Soviet political system, and exposés of conditions in children's institutions refuted seventy years of propaganda.

This history of images of childhood provides a frame for the discussion of real childhoods. Conceptualizing adult representations of children and adult control of children's spaces as the "boxes" or "envelopes" in which childhood was lived" (p. 13), Kelly presents oral history as offering a window into children's experiences within such "boxes." To document children's everyday lives, she draws on over 150 interviews conducted in small towns, villages, and big cities throughout post-Soviet Russia and among Russian émigrés in the United Kingdom. (Information about interviewers and informants as well as questionnaires and transcripts of several interviews are available at the book's website, <http://www.mod-langs.ox.ac.uk/russian/childhood/>.)

Kelly recognizes that the pervasive myth of happy childhood "was readily absorbed by children themselves" (p. 423) and that the myth could shape adults' narratives of their childhoods. However, the interaction of post-Soviet adults' memories with the "envelopes" that delimited their Soviet childhoods receives little attention. Rather, Kelly's interest is in mining the interviews for "precious material" (p. 15) on everything from baby-minding practices to the day-to-day life of children's institutions and in imaginatively reconstructing, in dense and often fascinating detail, children's lives in all sorts of settings over the course of a century.

Some of the sources analyzed as "discourse" in the first section reappear in the remaining sections as rich veins of data on childhood. Thus, for example, Kelly initially treats the published mother's or father's diary, which charted the child's development in meticulous but highly selective detail, as offering insight into adult expectations and models of childhood. Later she reads such diaries alongside oral history as straightforward indicators of the degree to which parents implemented the Soviet state's childcare prescriptions. She implicitly challenges what might be termed postmodern approaches to childhood as exemplified in works such as Ping-chen Hsiung's *A Tender Voyage: Children and Childhood in Late Imperial China* (2005). Whereas the structure of Kelly's book attempts to separate the his-

tory of "imagining childhood" from the historical reconstruction of children's experiences, Hsiung deems the reconstruction of children's experiences a "simultaneously alluring and unattainable task" (p. 258) and argues that the traces of children's lives visible in sources such as medical case studies and memoirs always remain part of the discourse of childhood.

No brief summary can do justice to the breadth of Kelly's work of reconstruction. Four chapters sketch the lives of children on the streets and in children's institutions— orphanages, reformatories, and boarding schools—from 1890–1991. The frequent failure of good intentions to affect actual care constitutes a key theme. In the tsarist period, children's institutions relied on charitable organizations that were often obstructed by a state suspicious of private initiative. After 1917, the Soviet state made public care for homeless, abandoned, and delinquent children a high priority, at least in its propaganda. However, very often "on-the-ground practice deviated from pious ideals" (p. 214). The picture that emerges of Soviet institutions is one of chronic underfunding, unsanitary conditions, an overworked and under-trained staff, sometimes harsh discipline (even beatings), and the occasional idealistic, innovative, and dedicated teacher or director who overcame the obstacles and made a positive difference in children's lives.

As in her history of representations of childhood, Kelly sets 1935 as a watershed in Soviet care for waifs and orphans. The "Stalinist obsession with discipline" (p. 221) meant that juvenile offenders were increasingly tried and punished as adults. Reversing an earlier emphasis on "open door" children's homes—and a tendency to romanticize street children as plucky and self-reliant—homeless children were forced into still-underfunded and often poorly administered institutions. The book includes many photographs of life within children's institutions, the most moving of which may be the mug shots of twenty sad, scared, uncomprehending, and undernourished children imprisoned as "family members of traitors to the motherland" (p. 235). Here the contrast between the real and the imagined—the poster reproduced on the cover of grateful boys and girls thanking "dear Comrade Stalin" for their happy childhood—is at its sharpest.

The four chapters in the book's longest section (almost 300 pages) and the conclusion trace the experiences of children in families. Kelly focuses on Russian children, with some attention to Jewish and Tatar children. Eschewing overarching generalizations, she presents the modernization and medicalization of Russian childhood as an uneven, but ultimately far-reaching, process. The Soviet state never realized early dreams of free, universal, professional daycare. The countryside was rarely well served. Nonetheless, postnatal clinics and home visits successfully trained mothers in the norms of "modern" childcare, and infant mortality rates fell substantially over the course of the twentieth century.

While educated, urban parents often followed "rational" guidelines for hygiene, dress, and breastfeeding,

they might resist other childcare advice. Parents often ignored shifting messages regarding gender socialization—continuing, for example, to favor unisex clothing into the 1930s, when experts began encouraging greater gender differentiation. Likewise, not all parents heeded Stalinist propaganda's injunctions against spoiling children. In the 1960s and 1970s, the expanded availability of children's goods—from rubber pacifiers to stuffed elephants—facilitated hygienic practices and encouraged “an ethos of ‘everything for the children’” (p. 393), if not uniformly permissive childrearing.

Chapters on leisure and school suggest the limits of adults' ability to regulate children's lives. Kelly emphasizes the continuities in children's games across the century—even as children adapted play to crowded urban conditions—as well children's evasion of adult efforts to rationalize recreation. Drawing on oral histories and memoirs, she engagingly documents children's ability to get their hands on the “wrong” books—especially romances and adventure stories—or to read the “right” books in unexpected ways. In the case of schools, Kelly stresses that, as in other children's institutions, individual teachers and directors often determined the nature of children's experiences. As the secondary school program became more demanding in the 1930s, teachers

could mitigate state-mandated regimentation and political education. At the same time, the playground—a site of teasing, bullying, and fights—often remained beyond the teachers' control.

Kelly concludes with a discussion of the experiences that marked childhood's end. In Soviet Russia, the break came at age fourteen or fifteen, when children started jobs or went on to more serious academic or political activities. Through the 1970s, adults taught children to value romantic love, but provided little sex education. This situation could make adolescence “agonising.” However, Kelly cautions with typical evenhandedness, this “should not be exaggerated” (p. 589).

Exploring an encyclopedic range of subjects, including even the notoriously filthy toilets in Soviet schools, this book establishes itself as the necessary starting point for students and scholars interested in the lives of Russian children or in comparative studies of childhood, schooling, and families. The book resists “grand statements about ‘Russian’ or ‘Soviet’ upbringing” (p. 598) and magnificently fulfills its goal of giving the details of childhood their due.

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JAMES J. SHEEHAN. *Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 2008. Pp. xx, 284. \$26.00.

In the vestibule of the Johanniskirche in the posh Berlin suburb of Schlachtensee a stark memorial encapsulates the bitter lesson of the world wars. “Lord, you have chastised us [in] 1914 [and] 1939,” proclaim black metal letters on a grey granite surface. The epitaph goes on to enumerate a curious blend of victims such as those who “died in combat, were killed by bombs, were extinguished as unworthy to live, sacrificed in resistance,” as well as “murdered Jews” and “witnesses of faith—all their blood cries out to you.” In sharp contrast to glorifications of national sacrifice that were seen during the Wilhelmine Empire, the prayer concludes: “Lord have mercy upon our suffering and guilt, make us messengers of your peace!” How did sentiment in the German capital turn from justifying war to calling for peace within the span of a single century? That is the subject of James J. Sheehan's new book, an impressive reflection on one of the grand themes of twentieth-century European history.

The author is a well-known historian of nineteenth-century Germany with special interests in the development of liberalism, “socialism of the chair,” and art museums. The text consists of an extended essay, based on secondary literature, which probes the bloody transformation of continental political culture from a widespread militarism around 1900 to an equally prevalent pacifism in 2000. Enthusiastically endorsed by Niall

Ferguson, Fritz Stern, Josef Joffe, and Charles S. Maier, the book has been highly lauded in its early reviews.

In fact, Sheehan's book presents a double argument: “First, the obsolescence of war is not a global phenomenon but a European one,” a result of its catastrophic history during the first half of the twentieth century, and “second, the disappearance of war after 1945 created both a dramatically new international system within Europe and a new kind of European state” (p. xvii). To substantiate this bold assertion Sheehan traces a three-stage development: In the late nineteenth century European states were highly militarized, being primarily devoted to making war; in the first half of the twentieth century they engaged in two bloody world wars, killing about ten and over fifty million people respectively, almost destroying themselves in the process; and in the final half of the last century they gradually transformed into civilian states, organized around providing social welfare and increasing the prosperity for their citizens. In the process, traditional continental disunity and repeated attempts to gain hegemony have given way to cooperation and integration. The story is implicitly focused on Germany as the largest and most troublesome European power, treating it not as an exception but rather as the central element of this remarkable transformation.

Especially for the general reader, there are many things to like in this book. The writing style is smooth and directed toward a broad audience, in places almost assuming the quality of a spoken lecture. The focus on one major theme helps structure the narrative, but repeated evaluatory passages create space for reflection. The tone of the exposition is generally judicious, the argument well supported and the judgment balanced. An unusual attention to the emergence of pacifism includes nice portraits of Ivan Bloch and Norman Angell, for instance (pp. 28–34). There are impressive insights, such as the claim that Great Britain was “by far the most persistently bellicose of the European powers” in the nineteenth century (p. 47). The comparative approach ranges from the center of the continent to the peripheries in East and West. There are also graphic descriptions of World War I fighting, such as the reference to the *voie sacrée* at Verdun and telling quotations from lesser-known authors (p. 75). Beyond the expected presentation of great power politics, the author touches on neglected topics such as the democratic transformation of the Mediterranean in the 1970s. Finally, his political comments are largely on the mark. Although he approves of European integration, Sheehan makes a strong case for Europe’s inability to become a superpower, and he points to the often forgotten problems of the ill-defined Eurasian frontier as a danger for the future (p. 227).

Specialists will, nonetheless, be vexed by some of the problems of this account. The author’s perspective is somewhat Olympian, focusing more on statesmen and high intellectuals than on the common people. Due to its broad temporal coverage, the treatment, though even-handed, remains somewhat superficial concerning controversial issues such as the outbreak of World War I. During that conflict, essential aspects of the escalation toward total war such as the race for allies and transformation of weapons are left out. With World War II the command of scholarship gets thinner, there are fewer telling quotations, and the presentation drifts from analysis into a narrative of chief events. For instance, the coalition nature of World War II is not explored, and, though Adolf Hitler’s “racial imperialism” is treated at some length, the term “Holocaust” is avoided in discussing Nazi crimes. Since the comparatively brief presentation of the postwar period (one quarter of the book covering about half of the period under discussion) focuses on high politics, it merely asserts that “military values and institutions, like the conscript army itself, faded away so gradually that few people noticed that they were no longer there” (p. 179). Complex events like the generational rebellion of 1968 or the collapse of communism of 1989 are simplified so much that some assertions border on the misleading. The generalization that the European Union “is not the product of war, but of peace” is a bit of an overstatement—without the double trauma of the world wars, Europeans would not have come together (p. 223).

Telling an extraordinary story in a grand fashion, Sheehan offers some important elements of an expla-

nation of how Europe transformed. “Set against these memories, indeed, set against any other period in European history, the creation of the civilian state seems like something to be cherished, celebrated and preserved” (p. 224). As negative causes for the incapacity of further fighting on the old continent he offers the nuclear stalemate of the Cold War, the Soviet-American condominium over Europe, and the process of decolonization. The eclipse of European power no doubt was one significant precondition for the continent’s enforced pacification. As for positive reasons for a psychological distancing from warfare, Sheehan mentions a growing abhorrence of nationalism and the spread of affluence which made civilian life more attractive. This concurrent shift of psychological priorities no doubt helped to ease the transformation as well. But whether the loss of power or the dawning of insight were more important and how they precisely they interacted in decision making remains somewhat in the dark, because the text does not address this question sufficiently, preferring to focus on the sequence of major events.

From a methodological perspective, this is a somewhat old-fashioned book that does not quite go far enough in probing militarism as a social practice and cultural attitude. Sheehan’s focus on leading statesmen and intellectuals keeps him from examining the militarization of the social fabric and the entire culture in sufficient detail. For instance, the gendered nature of military culture as a form of masculinity is barely touched upon. How did the “militarists and their followers” take “control of powerful institutions”, mobilize “enormous resources,” and demand “discipline and sacrifice” before 1914 (p. 41)? Why did the nineteenth-century states not disintegrate sooner during World War I but rather succeed in organizing mass slaughter for half a decade (p. 90)? For what reason did the violent movements of fascism and communism win out over pacifism in the interwar period and manage to start another bloody conflict in 1939? Which motives made Germans follow Hitler’s racist utopia and keep fighting “long after every chance of victory was extinguished” (p. 127)? The book raises numerous interesting questions, but in many instances the brevity of the text allows only the most tentative of answers.

In order to understand the repudiation of war after 1945 better, a more comprehensive analysis of the complex process of demilitarization is necessary. This effort might begin by tracing the voluntary demobilization among the winners and the imposed demilitarization among the losers that reversed the military dominance in society. It should go on to explore the psychological consequences of mass killing and dying after World II by looking at the collective mourning practices through which millions of families tried to cope with the loss of loved ones. Such an investigation would also need to engage the cultural turn toward civilian values in film and literature, which increasingly portrayed war as meaningless slaughter, robbing it of its heroic nimbus. Finally, it ought to address the spread of conscientious objection and alternate service as well as the rise of

large peace movements, directed against nuclear weapons and the stationing of intermediate range missiles. In short, the erosion of military budgets, manpower, and institutions, that the author discusses was propelled by a grass-roots distancing from militarism and embracing of civilian values among Europeans—a collective learning process that has barely begun to be explored.

By raising such interesting issues, Sheehan has made a major contribution to modern European history. As a bird's eye view of the twentieth century, this book is stimulating reading for the general public, which needs to be better informed about the reasons for the fundamental difference between European and American views on war. Forcing them to reexamine something they have taken for granted, the book is also a challenge for the specialists who might have gone somewhat stale

from lecturing about the same topic time and again. The endless mire of the insurgency in Iraq has somewhat toned down neoconservative deprecations of European softness as being "from Venus" in contrast to assertions of American strength as being "from Mars." This chastening of unilateralism has opened the door for a broader appreciation of the civilizing accomplishment of "soft power" in Europe, which prefers persuasion and incentive to resorting to military force. In discussing the Balkan debacle of the European Union, Sheehan is realistic enough to avoid "civilianism" as a panacea. But might the "eclipse of violence" in Europe (p. xx) that he so effectively describes not also contain some peaceful lessons for a new American leadership?

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GERARD J. DEGROOT. *The Sixties Unplugged: A Kaleidoscopic History of a Disorderly Decade*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2008. Pp. xi, 508. \$29.95.

This is a very comfortable book. It is well written; it covers much of the basics of 1960s lore within the Anglo-Saxon universe; and it occasionally even offers some welcome surprises. The book consists of sixty-seven snapshots of individual issues and particular scenes occurring in the calendar decade of the 1960s. It is likely to become a modest commercial success; a reader in the English-speaking world, who chose randomly to glance at a book purporting to provide a survey of that mythical decade, would find most of his or her prejudices confirmed. There are probably few, if any, factual mistakes within the narrative. The problem lies instead with its premise and the interpretive patterns which pervade the text. What does the author mean to say?

Perhaps the most obvious point Gerard J. DeGroot attempts (successfully) to get across to his readers is his view of the 1960s to be little else but a powerful myth occluding far more than it may possibly serve to explain. In his introduction, the author provides a straightforward preview of attractions filling the succeeding 450 pages of his text: "For too long, the Sixties has been a sacred zone. The spotlight has been shone upon those people or events we would like to believe were important. But cast aside the rose-tinted spectacles and we see mindless mayhem, shallow commercialism, and unbridled cruelty" (p. 2). The message of the last sentence of this quotation is then relentlessly pursued. In a peculiar type of "counter-history" of the 1960s, DeGroot leaves few stones unturned, few "heroes" unassailed, few "worthy causes" untainted with his depiction of this decade as a period when hypocrisy and egocentrism supposedly ruled supreme or, at the very least, ran amok.

To give a flavor of the tone and the peculiar interpretive bent of the author's "insights," a good place

to start is his view of the Vietnamese Revolution, the cause and consequence of the single most important transnational, mobilizing mechanism of the turbulent decade worldwide, the Vietnam War. "The revolution was, from the beginning, a brutal, sadistic monster" (p. 72). While the precise choice of words in this passage is perhaps subject to questioning, few objective observers of North and South Vietnamese communism since World War II would likely quibble with the essence of this statement. A constituent part of the Stalinist universe, Vietnamese communism did not differ from its homologues elsewhere in its disdain of dissidence and its brutal methods of suppressing dissent. The immediately succeeding sentence in DeGroot's text leaves quite a bit more to be desired: "Its distinguishing feature was not moral purity but naked terror" (p. 72). Was this really what the struggles of the National Liberation Front were all about? But it gets worse. Apparently in all seriousness, the author asserts that "the revolution depended upon ignorance" (p. 72). "Honest officials were most at risk" from the exactions of Stalinist terror in Vietnamese disguise and, as a literary frosting on this amalgam, he ends his one-paragraph-long assessment of the nature of the Vietnamese Revolution in a summary which warrants no response: "Crooks, on the other hand, were kept alive to keep the peasants suffering" (p. 72). Full stop.

Casual readers of this review may wonder whether this reviewer may have torn those quotations out of their proper context or whether this passage may not be an uncharacteristically shallow one in an otherwise more meaningful text. Two additional snapshots of DeGroot's single-minded denigration of key constituent parts of the spirit of the 1960s demonstrate that his exceedingly polemical and wholly one-sided assessment

of the Vietnamese revolt is by no means an exceptional mishap in an otherwise serious text.

The Port Huron Statement (1962) was the founding document of the quintessential organization of the American New Left, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). There have been plenty of measured discussions of the origins and the nature of this document in historical and social scientific studies. DeGroot, by contrast, manages to ridicule and marginalize not only the statement itself but the SDS as well—and all this in one sentence containing no more than fourteen words: “The decade produced few documents more boring, but SDS activists, being dull, loved it” (p. 94). Inexplicably, given that DeGroot later relishes the story of the self-destruction of the SDS due to heavy doses of infighting between its constituent factions, the author invokes a non-existing ideological monolithism, and his “analysis” continues: “SDS was a religion, and the Port Huron Statement its Scripture” (p. 94).

If it seems difficult to trump this caricature of a major document and a major player in 1960s politics, the author proves the jaded reader wrong once again. There are few accounts of a major event in the turbulent 1960s that are as meaningless and absurd as DeGroot’s comments on May 1968 in France. “Screen out the rosy glow of burning barricades, however, and the picture that emerges is one of anarchy, egotism, and emptiness” (p. 346). “Most French revolutionaries were nothing more than hippies able to quote from Mao’s Little Red Book” (p. 352). “Cut through the verbiage and one found a basically antidemocratic, elitist movement dominated by the desire for orgasms on demand” (p. 352).

DeGroot’s appraisal of individual icons of the various movements he purports to study is no more balanced than his assessment of key moments and events. Most leaders of the various respective student and societal revolts are depicted as egomaniac, self-serving, media-hungry fakes. After reporting on accusations of plagiarism during Martin Luther King, Jr.’s student days, for instance, DeGroot asserts the following: “In addition to being a cheat, he was also a sex addict” (p. 308)—although, apparently in a generous mood, DeGroot concedes: “In the end, King should be judged on his talents and his achievements,” which “render him a great deal more admirable than many other Sixties heroes who also had feet of clay” (p. 309). What usually saves the reputation of the few key players not depicted in an unabashedly negative light was an early death. But even then the author rarely wastes an opportunity to proclaim that, had the person in question continued to live, they would have turned out to behave like all the others. Note, for instance, his “appreciation” of Patrice Lumumba: “If some see him as a democrat, that is only because he died when Congo’s experiment with democracy was in its infancy” (p. 38).

In short, 1960s’ activist players were ludicrous, overbearing, violence-prone, elitist, anti-democratic, and, with few notable exceptions (including the inventor of the mini-skirt, Mary Quant!), superficial. Consider the author’s view of the British Mods: “There was no body

politic underneath the sharp clothes. Yet they were perhaps the most honest of Sixties subcultures: they were superficial and proud of it. All they wanted was some fun and an occasional bit of aggro. They saw no need to complicate their style with ersatz substance” (pp. 175–176).

The study under review is thus no serious work of scholarship. Nonetheless, there is more to this book than its tiring litany of the weaknesses, foibles, and dangers supposedly lurking within most individuals and most movements associated with the 1960s. Indeed, there are individual chapters that are beyond reproach, such as DeGroot’s comments on why the 1968 U.S. presidential elections sent Richard Nixon to the White House, or his pages on the massacre of up to one million Indonesians by the combined tender loving care of American and British secret services propping up the murderous Indonesian officer caste. The trouble with this book is that such gems and the generally positive assessment of the social and cultural changes associated with the 1960s are embedded within an overall framework of unremitting hostility toward any fundamental challenges to the social, political, and cultural paradigms then operating in the Western world. What may explain this debilitating flaw in a work purporting to chronicle a turbulent decade?

One answer is provided by the author’s glowing comments on Berkeley’s Free Speech Movement in the first half of the 1960s: “[Mario] Savio and his friends became heroes other students enthusiastically emulated. Unfortunately, those who imitate produce imitation: second-rate, often exaggerated versions of the real thing. That is why the student movement produced only one Savio and why the golden moment of revolt came at its very beginning.” And here comes the crucial reference to the 1960s’ original sin: “The essentially liberal nature of the movement would seem old-fashioned in just a few short years. Before long, students would direct their anger at liberalism itself. Instead of seeking to improve the system, they would try to demolish it” (p. 189). In other words, change and protest is all to the good, as long as it is wholly compatible with established liberal values. Once social movements go beyond the comfort zone of the liberal elite, they must be opposed.

Two further comments should not be omitted. First, an observation regarding a notable contradiction between certain central claims made by the author and the content of this book. DeGroot never tires of pointing out that most people experiencing the 1960s either lived or wanted to live a quiet life: “Riots and demonstrations make interesting reading,” DeGroot avers, but “protesters were a tiny minority of an otherwise apathetic student body” (p. 355). Rather than to mindless and destructive student radicalism, attention should be devoted to much more fundamental underlying sociocultural and political changes underway at that time. “The most successful political revolution of the 1960s was not conducted by students, nor was it left-wing. It was instead a populist revolution from the Right, which had Ronald Reagan as its standard bearer” (p. 406). Or, “In

fact, the most profound revolution that occurred was the emergence of a consumer society" (p. 395). Given DeGroot's sarcastic denigration of subsequent observers' fascination with supposedly ineffectual and counterproductive student and other radicalism, why does he himself replicate this presumed tunnel vision? And why does he focus with relentless efficacy on precisely the most outlandish and flamboyant groupings and individuals from the large array of protest movements operating in this colorful decade? Why, to limit my observations on this point to just one milieu, are there so many pages on the Yippies (Youth International Party) and virtually nothing on the vast coalitions responsible for mobilizing millions of Americans in the streets? Could it be that, rather than to counter what the author regards as myths, he is most concerned with capitalizing on the image and reality of what he persistently denigrates as an idle myth?

My second comment pertains to a puzzling statement in the author's introduction: "While this is not an international history of the decade, it is certainly more global than any book previously produced" (p. 4). By any stretch of the imagination, this is indeed a most

outlandish claim. Most of the book's sixty-seven mini-chapters are concerned with U.S. or, secondarily, British society and politics. And much of the rest is seen through the lens of an (oftentimes rather superficial) Anglo-Saxon observer. And how could it be any different, given that the author, apart from a handful of Dutch-language sources translated by others, uses not a single source in any language other than English.

A few years ago Richard Vinen, writing in the *Times Literary Supplement* (June 4, 2004), made the apt comment that Mark Kurlansky, in his popular *1968: The Year That Rocked the World* (2003), "often writes not so much about what happened in 1968 as about what Americans saw on their television screens that year." Given DeGroot's propensity to focus almost single-mindedly on the most outlandish and colorful variants of the protest culture of the Anglo-Saxon 1960s, this reviewer is inclined to suggest that DeGroot, in the publication under review, relays events through the eyes of an American viewer of CNN's Headline News.

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Reviews of Books

METHODS/THEORY

IAN BAUCOM. *Specters of the Atlantic: Finance Capital, Slavery, and the Philosophy of History*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 387. \$23.95.

On September 6, 1781, the *Zong*, a British merchant vessel loaded with slaves, weighed anchor and sailed from the coast of Africa bound for Jamaica. By late November disease had ravaged both the crew and the ship's human cargo, and Captain Luke Collingwood, despite passing in sight of Jamaica, commanded the *Zong* back out to sea, whereupon he ordered his crew to begin throwing the sickest slaves overboard. Over the course of three days, over one hundred and thirty slaves, many of them handcuffed, were flung into the churning seas. Upon the ship's return to England, its owners filed an insurance claim for lost "cargo," and in the process exposed in the most pitiless fashion the triumph of finance capital over the human heart. They also, not incidentally, provided the abolition movement with its most moving and powerful indictment of a mercileless trade.

Ian Baucom explores the *Zong* tragedy as a signal event in a melancholic version of modernity, and in the process quite literally sounds the depths of the event-structure of historical meaning. But Baucom's study is far more than the history of a dreadful episode in the catalogue of middle passage horrors. Proceeding with an almost Benjaminian diligence and industry, Baucom longs to read "the total event" of the *Zong* incident; or, in other words, to imagine how the drowning of one hundred and thirty three slaves "bears on the inauguration of a long twentieth century underwritten by the development of an Atlantic cycle of capital accumulation" and speculative epistemologies (p. 167). Ever sensitive to the tropes of liquidity and speculation that haunt both the *Zong* case and the financial revolution more broadly, this work strives to situate the *Zong* and its victims as they flicker between what Baucom calls "romantic historicism" and "actuarial historicism," the competing conditions of possibility that shape the accounting of the event (p. 42). The *Zong*'s insurance contract, and the trials surrounding its efficacy, thus emerge as allegories for a speculative, and spectral, capitalism.

It is difficult to do justice to the theoretical scope and

bravura of Baucom's project. The *Zong* tragedy and the ensuing legal and actuarial disputations are situated in an "elongated contemporaneity" that extends from the early modern rise of chartered, joint-stock companies to Nike's twenty-first-century micro-loan program in Vietnam. Where the first half of Baucom's book tracks the structures of credit and credibility that bring early theories of fiction and finance into common purpose, the second half offers an extended and powerful meditation on ethical witnessing. Central to this meditation is the place of sympathy, melancholy and the language of "humanity" in the interpretation of the law: in particular, Baucom looks at Granville Sharp's legal dispatch regarding the *Zong*, as well as a brief of appeal from the trial, and their recourse to "humane language . . . of remonstrance and expostulation" that crept into what was ostensibly and coldly a matter of contract (p. 197). As a counter-narrative to contractual relations, the recourse to humanity and sympathy opens up a space for a form of "melancholy witnessing"—interested, partial, and grieving the singularity of what is lost—distinct from the disinterested liberal spectator. Baucom considers how figures such as Sharp, Walter Scott, J. M. W. Turner, and, much later, Derek Walcott and Edouard Glissant staged the contest between "imaginative sympathy" and "imagined value," "aggrieved sentiment" and "disinterested propriety" in the service of what Baucom calls "romantic liberalism." Thus Turner's canvas entitled *Slavers Throwing Overboard the Dead and Dying* (1840) renders visible not simply the specific massacre but "the very mind of romantic liberalism, contemplating such things" (p. 288).

Some will surely find that these are not wholly new ideas, but Baucom's ability to move between the singularity of the event, its juridical and speculative afterlife, and the philosophies of history that shape how we bear our own historical witness is at times exhilarating, even moving. Make no mistake, this is a densely theoretical work of cultural history, and its philosophical range is truly formidable: indeed, Baucom's argument for a nonsynchronous contemporaneity allows him to discover a host of curious genealogies that link, for instance, Edmund Burke, J. G. A. Pocock, and Slavoj Žižek around the universalization of the subject of global finance capital (pp. 57–59); or Immanuel Kant, Walter Benjamin, and Alain Badiou on the the-

ory of the event “as apparition and reappearance” (p. 123). Despite the almost vertiginous referentiality of Baucom’s method, one is never allowed to forget the centrality of the *Zong* tragedy to the story of our modernity. In asking whether this murderous act was singular or exemplary, Baucom returns us to one of the central questions regarding all historical reckoning and insists that we carefully deliberate over the ethical consequences before answering.

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W. JAMES BOOTH. *Communities of Memory: On Witness, Identity, and Justice*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2006. Pp. xv, 247. \$42.50.

In our times the subject of memory has become both a scholarly and public issue. Driven by massive political debates that erupted in Europe over the legacy of World War II and the rise of cultural diversity, political communities everywhere have discovered the provisional nature of their “histories” and the breathtaking array of silences that have marked their collective memories. It is not that citizens never argued in earlier times over how their past was to be represented in the present. They did, and the history of those debates has proven to be a rich field of scholarship. It is that now both the public debates over what the past should be and the scholarly ones over how it has been constructed in various times and places are more widespread and more interrelated. This explosion of interest and argument has, therefore, created a demand for more sophisticated and theoretical ways to think about what memory is and what it should be.

In this book, W. James Booth provides one of the very best and most sophisticated discussions of what memory debates are about and why they are central to the politics of any political community. He makes the well-established point that remembrances of the past are essential to the very identity of a nation. Obviously the way a political community sees its past forms a substantial part of how it sees itself and presents itself to others. Booth extends this idea considerably, however, by explaining that the idea of collective memory must be about much more than identity and include what he calls an “ethical dimension.” Beyond surface reminders of what the past was about—such as monuments, museums, or archives (which often seek to end debates over the past)—Booth calls attention to the need to root out the “moral truth” of a community’s past. Memory for him is central not only to identity but to an ideal of justice.

Moral truths in collective memory, however, are contingent upon the reconstruction of a past that is complete in both its positive and negative dimensions. For memory to be ethical it must account for both a society’s noble achievements and sordid misdeeds. Thus, if Americans want to take pride in World War II, they must also be willing to discuss slavery. To remember past crimes and betrayals, however, is difficult work and

does not come naturally. Booth is incisive as he explains how both the inevitable passage of time and the tendency to forget misdeeds means that present generations need to work hard to preserve traces of such information. In a sense, as he argues, such work constitutes an act of resistance not only to the forces of time but to the inevitability of silences. He admits that some would resist the notion of responsibility for past crimes committed by ancestors. But Booth does not say that they should feel guilt for deeds they did not commit but only that they accept a more general sense of “shame” that keeps alive enough of the notion of accountability to sustain an ethic of justice in the community over time. And no commemorative action can serve the cause of fashioning an ethical memory more than the act of “bearing witness.” The witness, of course, can be someone capable of relating firsthand accounts. But Booth provocatively argues that witnessing is broader than the idea of the eyewitness and can also include the statements and actions of those in the present who have received firsthand accounts from others. Thus, patriotic citizens who grieve for the dead from a war fought before their time still “transform themselves into living reminders” that a state elected to take lives.

He also explains how difficult it is to rely on accounts of the past to promote an ethic of justice in the present in societies that are liberal and democratic. In such communities conceptions of justice tend to be advanced not by references to the past but by ideas of individual rights. He correctly points out that liberal democracy tends to distrust the role of memory in settling issues of justice, because those communities associate memory with tradition and an old order—something such nations have sought to escape.

This is a powerful and elegantly written book that should be read and considered by anyone interested in the role and importance of collective memory. Perhaps Booth could have examined a bit more forms of remembrance—such as the wide use of myth—that work so powerfully to blunt the formation of an ethical memory, but still his work is indispensable for understanding what nations remember and what they tend to forget.

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ZOE VANIA WAXMAN. *Writing the Holocaust: Identity, Testimony, Representation*. (Oxford Historical Monographs.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. viii, 227. \$45.00.

This book is a bit of an intellectual roller-coaster that leaves its readers full of anticipation during the first chapters and then delivers a number of important insights that rush by all too quickly.

Right at the start, Zoe Vania Waxman criticizes Holocaust scholars who have tried to derive universal lessons from the history of the “Final Solution” and, in the process, homogenized and dehistoricized the written

testimonies of the victims and survivors of Nazi genocide. Waxman does not identify the scholars she has in mind but promises to recover the diversity of Holocaust testimony and demonstrate that "bearing witness is inextricably entwined with the social and historical conditions in which it is done" (p. 2). In her first chapter, dealing with the writing of testimony in the Warsaw ghetto, Waxman disagrees with critics like Lawrence Langer who categorically reject the rhetoric of heroism as linguistically and factually incompatible with survivor memory. Waxman explains that at least in some instances the preference for heroic emplotments of Jewish responses to Nazi persecution already began in the ghettos. Moreover, in her assessment, all diary writing functioned "both as an assertion of individual identity and as a more collective continuation of cultural life as a form of resistance" (p. 37).

Already in chapter one Waxman occasionally loses sight of the testimonies and their authors and instead constructs from her sources a sequence of well-known Holocaust themes about misery in the ghettos. That tendency is even more pronounced in chapter two and for good reasons. The terrible conditions in the camps prevented all but a very few inmates from keeping notes. Consequently, in her analysis of concentration camp testimonies, Waxman dedicates a few pages to the discussion of the famous Auschwitz scrolls written by members of the *Sonderkommando* but otherwise limits herself to summarizing the various stages of life in the camps on the basis of postwar writings. Unfortunately the slippage between representation and history, between the analysis of testimony and the surprisingly extensive discussion of the conditions under which these testimonies were written, leaves the reader with few concrete insights into the language, narrative structure, and philosophical-ideological orientation of the wartime writings of victims of Nazi persecution.

In chapter three Waxman begins the discussion of the dialectical relationship between survivor memoirs and the postwar politics of memory that is the main topic of her book. After 1945, the survivors faced the daunting task of having to rebuild their lives, although many still found the energy to write about their experiences. This first wave of testimonies received little attention outside the community of survivors. Even in countries that had welcomed victims of Nazism, "little time was given to understanding, or even listening to, the experiences of the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust" (p. 95). Public interest in the "Final Solution" only increased significantly in the wake of the Adolf Eichmann trial and the television series *Holocaust* (1978). Both events prepared the ground for two more waves of survivor memoirs published in the late 1960s/early 1970s and the 1990s, respectively.

The new identities of witness and survivor helped many Jewish victims recover a vital sense of self. But by assuming the role of Holocaust survivor the victims also entered a relatively rigidly structured discursive environment that compelled them to talk and write about their past in the form of commonly appreciated stories.

As Waxman puts it succinctly, "the concept of the Holocaust acts as an organizer of memory" that facilitates remembrance but also "conceals the diversity of experiences it seeks to represent" (p. 152). The process of homogenization is particularly noticeable in testimonies of female survivors, because the Holocaust paradigm presents women as unproblematic, accessible victims and structures their experiences in such a way that they confirm preconceived gender roles. Waxman mentions two particularly compelling examples: selfish mothers and brutal female Kapos have no place in the redemptive narrative world of Holocaust memory, not even in feminist-inspired works of history that document the important differences in the wartime experiences of men and women.

In the context of her astute remarks on the gender politics of Holocaust remembrance Waxman develops a number of other sound judgments on a range of topics, including contemporary trauma discourse and Benjamin Wilkomirski's fake Holocaust memoir. All of Waxman's critical remarks, sometimes delivered in passing, make one wish that she had focused her book more specifically on the role of testimonies in the postwar politics of memory and presented a more extensive and more precise critique of the sexist structure of contemporary Holocaust culture. That way Waxman also would have been able to extend her analysis beyond the range of readily available postwar English-language publications that represent the primary focus of the book and introduce the reader to less familiar testimonies that deserve our attention precisely because they transcend the ideological confines of contemporary Holocaust remembrance.

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COMPARATIVE/WORLD

DAVID BIALE. *Blood and Belief: The Circulation of a Symbol between Jews and Christians*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 299. \$39.95.

When it comes to blood, Judaism and Christianity appear to be at odds. Judaism prohibits consumption of the bodily fluid; Christianity mandates its ingestion as the blood of Christ. Despite these apparent contradictions, David Biale's new panoramic study demonstrates that the two religions share more with one another than might be imagined.

In this ambitious book, Biale deftly reveals that generations of Jews and Christians have participated in a common discourse about blood even if they offered disparate interpretations of it. Blood, according to Biale, lies at the center of the divide between Judaism and Christianity while simultaneously encouraging the two religions to develop in close interaction with one another. Generations of Jews and Christians have wrestled over the "control" of this bodily fluid whose power

rests partly in the fact that it "can be filled with a host of meanings, some of them even contradictory" (p. 4).

Biale first locates the association between blood and power in the Hebrew Bible, whose discourses on blood helped both to create a priestly monopoly on sacrifice and to reinforce the bodily fluid's connection to atonement, initiation, and salvation. He then moves to an analysis of the period following the destruction of the Second Temple (70 C.E.), when Christians and Jews searched to replace the sacrifices that had been conducted there. During the first four centuries of the Common Era, Christians substituted for sacrifices the symbolic blood of the Eucharist and the blood of the martyrs. Jews, who were prohibited from ingesting blood, centered on the blood of circumcision and their specific traditions of martyrdom. Both Jews and Christians invoked the spiritual and physical meanings of blood and both positioned themselves as having the authoritative "covenant of blood" with God. This contest intensified in the medieval period when God's anatomy, particularly God's blood, served as a theme over which Jews and Christians debated their difference. Looking to circumcision and the tales of the martyrs, Jews envisioned a powerful connection between the blood of God and the blood of Jews. Christians simultaneously promoted the Eucharistic sacrament, routinely celebrated Corpus Christi, and invoked the charge of blood libel.

Blood libel accusations reemerged centuries later, this time taking on the character and themes of the modern era. Particularly interested in the blood libel's place in Nazi ideology, Biale unpacks the different strands of blood discourses that emerged in the twentieth century. In the modern era, antisemites not only charged that Jews wished to suck out the blood of non-Jews, but they also envisioned that Jews wished to inject non-Jewish blood into Jewish bodies through miscegenation. Jews responded to these charges against them by envisioning a Jewish nationalism that was inexorably linked to blood and by charging that the blood libel could be harmful for the Christian community as well as for the Jews.

Biale's study of the meanings of blood within Jewish and Christian culture bridges diverse regions and spans thousands of years. Moreover, it examines the fluid in dozens of guises and incarnations: as symbol and substance, as belief and practice, as visible and invisible fluids, and as contradictory representations of life and death, purity and impurity. Seemingly cognizant of the problems such a broad scope engenders, Biale marshals a stunningly wide array of sources and theoretical frameworks to identify the continuities and discontinuities that took place over time and space. His combined attention to historical research, biblical studies, rabbinics, and literary theory reflects the complexity of the history of blood and makes for a robust, nuanced, and highly interdisciplinary narrative. The book's panoramic nature sometimes poses certain challenges. Biale does not always return to the theoretical frameworks he introduces. His introduction's focus on post-

colonial theory, for example, was illuminating but infrequently used as the book progressed. In addition, while Biale offers a rich, nuanced reading of blood in Jewish and Christian culture, his book includes no visual illustrations of the many images his study invokes.

These few concerns aside, Biale's work is an important new addition to religious theoretical and historical scholarship. Beautifully written and probing, it illuminates the ways in which blood served as an index of power and helped to shape Jewish and Christian identity and culture.

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DOUGLAS J. HAMILTON. *Scotland, the Caribbean and the Atlantic World, 1750–1820*. (Studies in Imperialism.) New York: Manchester University Press. 2005. Pp. xv, 249. \$84.95.

Douglas J. Hamilton's recent study examines the activities of Scottish settlers and itinerants in the West Indies between 1750 and 1820. Thoroughly researched and cleanly written, it greatly expands and enhances our understanding of both Scots abroad and Caribbean society and economy in the Age of Democratic Revolution.

The monograph argues that the period was one of changes in Scotland's hitherto rural society: the shift toward a more urban and industrial landscape, geographic mobility, expanding population, increased levels of education, and the infusion of Scots into Great Britain's government. Challenge and stress within Britain pushed Scots outward to the peripheries of the empire. This book examines one such periphery—Britain's Caribbean colonies—considering its economies, divisions (largely along racial but to a lesser degree national lines), imbalances, and rebellions (particularly racial). Throughout, Hamilton deftly synthesizes much recent scholarship. He examines in detail the personalities, connections, and activities of four key professional groups: planters, merchants, doctors, and politicians. In careful cohort reconstructions, Hamilton shows how they expanded their networks within an island and connected them across the Caribbean Sea. In reconstituting "the breadth of mercantile connections," he discovers "the existence of a transnational Atlantic world, where national boundaries, even between rival powers, did not prevent the transfer of goods or finance" (pp. 106–107). Considerable space is given to the Scots' political activities, both resolving internal conflicts within an island and fighting external foes: Londoners, North Americans, and non-Britons. Here Hamilton is at his best, weaving the social and economic strands he previously laid bare into a complex political tapestry. Faced with the easing of restrictions on Catholics, the independence of the Thirteen Colonies, and the 1790s slave insurrections, Scots "demonstrated their very 'Britishness'"—a surprising outcome given the alienation from Whitehall that most Scots colonists in North America experienced. Hamilton asserts—in the most

intriguing and probably debatable claim of his book—that “the transient nature of the white population in the islands ensured that the ‘home’ country remained central to their consciousness” and that the prominence of Scots in official positions “had profound implications for the legislatures’ responses, and for fostering both integration and continuity” in the Atlantic world (p. 141).

Hamilton expands historians’ view of the role and importance of the West Indies in shaping the late early modern and modern Atlantic world. He successfully focuses on a wide range of islands. Previous Caribbean historians, most notably Richard B. Sheridan and Alan L. Karras, have studied Scots’ contribution to eighteenth-century Antiguan and Jamaican society. Hamilton cast a wider net, catching all islands in the British West Indies where Scots worked and settled. Particularly prominent in the narrative are the Scots who went to Barbados, the Leeward Islands, and, after peace was declared in 1763, the Ceded Islands. It was the new infusion of Scots after the Seven Years’ War that supplied so much of the empire’s entrepreneurial energy.

Hamilton also focuses on networks, joining a host of other historians in the past two decades who have identified their importance to economic and social life. Scots “employed networks based on ties of kinship, local association or profession to raise capital, facilitate communication and recruit employees across a range of functional areas, most notably in business” (p. 6). Hamilton’s construction of networks is less wooden, and so more believable, than those uncovered by other Caribbeanists. His networks succeeded—and sometimes failed. They “were by no means exclusive”: Scots worked with other Britons.

The only surprising omission in this excellent study is the lack of some comparison to other ethnic networks. To eschew the reigning anglocentric frame is laudable. But we still want to know how distinctive the Scots were. Did the English, Irish, Welsh, or even North Americans behave differently in the West Indies and leave a different legacy? Ethnicity is an important bond in most communities. Its importance becomes clearer if we know how other groups used it. Were Scottish networks different from non-Scottish networks in their formation, organization, and utility? Were Scots connected in ways that explain (if only in part) certain outcomes in heavily populated Scots colonies? If Scottish-Caribbean connections “were among the key bonds forging transnational maritime world of exchange” (p. 7)—a claim I wholeheartedly suspect to be correct—did others’ bonds do so too, and with what differences? Put another way: did the islands rely upon Scots more than other groups? Did medically educated Scots form a disproportionate share of doctors? Did Scots politicians have a larger influence than other ethnic networkers? Hamilton believes “networks were critical to the success of Scots in the islands” (p. 6); what effect did this form of economic and social organization have on the evolution of the islands? We still need more explana-

tion if we are to appreciate in full “the way in which the Atlantic world was created” (p. 6).

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YAACOV SHAVIT and MORDECHAI ERAN. *The Hebrew Bible Reborn: From Holy Scripture to the Book of Books; A History of Biblical Culture and the Battles over the Bible in Modern Judaism*. Translated by CHAYA NAOR. (Studia Judaica, number 38.) New York: Walter de Gruyter. 2007. Pp. x, 566. €119.63.

Until the nineteenth century, the Talmud and its commentaries, not the Hebrew Bible, were the principal foundation of Jewish religious culture. It was only with the integration of Jews into Western societies, which also claimed the Bible but not the rabbinic literature, and with the establishment of the Zionist movement, which regarded the Bible as its historical warrant, that the biblical text came to displace the talmudic as the formative document of Jewish identity. The shift required both reinterpretation of the Bible and its defense against scholarly and popular attacks that sought to undermine the Bible’s theological status, moral value, and originality.

This book, an expansion and rewriting of Yaacov Shavit and Mordechai Eran’s earlier Hebrew volume, traces this revaluation and defense of the Hebrew Bible as they transpired especially in Germany and also in the Land of Israel both before and after the establishment of the Israeli state. Although numerous studies have dealt with various aspects of this subject, no work can match this one for its comprehensiveness, detail, and broad erudition. Following a discussion of the reassessment of the Bible by modernizing Jews, the authors deal with the first significant challenge to its authority: the higher criticism popularized especially by Julius Wellhausen. The documentary hypothesis that he espoused with regard to the Pentateuch undermined the orthodox Jewish concept of revelation and forced even liberal Jews to redefine their relationship to the text. Less challenging was the new science of archaeology, which, unlike the clearly problematic division of the text into various sources, could be seen in a positive light as undermining the documentary hypothesis. Its discoveries could even be used to prop up the historicity of the Bible.

More than a quarter of the volume is devoted to the controversy created in German society, and especially in its Jewish community, by the highly publicized series of lectures given in Berlin by the famed Assyriologist Friedrich Delitzsch beginning in 1902. In the opening lecture, delivered under the patronage of the Kaiser, Delitzsch argued that the Bible was derivative from Assyrian-Babylonian civilization and hence lacked originality and unique value. Specifically, he maintained that the names for God in the Bible had earlier parallels in Babylon, that the Sabbath was invented by the Babylonians, that the biblical flood story was not original,

and that the Mosaic code had a superior predecessor in the Code of Hammurabi. This assault, popularly known by the title of the first lecture as "Babel und Bibel," was perceived as undermining the entire spectrum of German Judaism. The authors outline the contents of the lectures and examine the variety of responses, by both Jews and Christians, detailing and citing from the numerous attempts to refute Delitzsch's assertions.

The last portion of the book deals chiefly with the role of the Bible in the Jewish society of Mandatory Palestine and in the state of Israel. Here there emerged an internal dispute between traditional religious Jews who insisted on the Bible as the revealed word of God and secular Zionists who sought to remake the Bible into a historical document that justified resettlement in the land of their ancestors. The extended controversy centered on the role of the Bible in high school education and on the introduction of biblical criticism at the newly established Hebrew University in Jerusalem. As in Europe, the Orthodox here too struggled to assert the revelatory status of the Bible, but they were unable to prevent the secularization and historicization that were requirements for the Bible's transformation from a religious document into the formative text of a secular national identity. For decades the Bible served as the principal historical source for the Zionist enterprise and its canon for literary and artistic culture. However, as the authors point out, by the last decade of the twentieth century, the rising individualism and cosmopolitanism of the dominant secular element in Israeli society had driven the Bible out of its position of centrality in education and culture and was leading to its repossession by the religious sector.

This is a large and very expensive volume. With little loss Shavit and Eran might have foregone summarizing so many fundamentally similar arguments on the various issues with which it deals. Had they embodied a more consistent diachronic structure, avoiding the frequent reappearance of individuals and similar arguments in various polemical contexts, the book would have been more readable and probably more affordable. However, it must also be said that its scope and depth make this thoroughly researched study on a highly consequential subject an invaluable source for Jewish and German religious and intellectual history.

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MARTIN THOMAS. *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2008. Pp. xii, 428. \$49.95.

Martin Thomas has written a valuable, if dense, study of the role played by the intelligence and security services in the British and French-controlled territories of the Middle East after 1914. The interwar years marked the apogee of those empires, for Britain and France not

only tightened control over their North African colonies and protectorates but also held most of the former Ottoman Middle East through the new mandates system of the League of Nations. Yet that control was inherently unstable, not only because both powers were militarily and financially overstretched, but also because their rule was, Thomas argues, always considered alien and racially based by the subject populations. Aware of their vulnerability, yet unwilling to govern these territories simply as "police states," European powers perforce sought to construct what Thomas terms "intelligence states": regimes with the capacity to gauge the loyalties of local populations and dissipate threats from hostile quarters. Intelligence networks could not render these regimes legitimate, but, sensitively deployed, they might—or so their architects hoped—at least make the use of overwhelming force unnecessary.

Thomas opens his book with two chapters explaining the structure and prevailing assumptions of the security services in these two imperial arenas. He stresses the degree to which military, intelligence, and police apparatuses tended to blur together (especially during times of crisis), and tracks how administrative precedents (in, for example, the Sudan or Algeria) and prevailing cultural assumptions about Islam and the East shaped policies and institutions. These chapters are full of information, but because Thomas has carved this book out of the rock-face of archival research and keeps many factors in play, they do not really advance a parsimonious thesis. Yet, what might be a drawback of these early sections is a strength in the further seven chapters, which describe in rich detail the workings of the intelligence and security services in different regions and at different moments. There are chapters on French responses to perceived Islamic and Communist threats across the Levant; on both states' efforts to contain nationalist movements in Iraq, Syria, and Morocco in the 1920s; on their parallel efforts to "sedentarize" the Bedouin populations of Iraq, Syria, and Transjordan (a particularly illuminating piece of work); on the close relationship between French policing of immigrant communities in the metropole and the empire; and on both states' responses to unrest and revolts in the late 1930s. These individual studies are well documented, sometimes vivid, and will be of great interest to regional specialists and students of late-imperial policing and security alike.

Although each case is distinctive, themes recur and arguments emerge. Worth noting, to begin with, is Thomas's judicious parsing of the various factors, ideological and practical, that shaped the intelligence services' "official mind." Intelligence officers and colonial administrators often held rigid or racist views about "Islam" and "the orient," Thomas argues, and those biases could and sometimes did compromise their ability to gather information and to understand what they found. Yet, since the survival of these regimes—and, indeed, often intelligence officers' own lives—depended on their ability to assess threats accurately, they sought to

foster pragmatic collaboration wherever they could. Nor was cultural chauvinism the only impediment: parsimony, competing metropolitan priorities, or a simple undersupply of trained personnel could compromise information as well. "Air control" in Iraq and to a degree later in Transjordan might have saved the British Treasury money, for example, but it could not provide the kind of reliable intelligence gathered by agents and informants in villages and towns. France's obsession with the threat of communist subversion was, Thomas shows, equally short-sighted, leading authorities to miss more serious signs of disaffection.

Equally illuminating are the author's insights into the two states' rather different practices and styles. Thomas is at pains not to overstress such distinctions, insisting that they were more alike than different, but contrasts nevertheless emerge. French security policies in North Africa and the Middle East were adapted from systems developed during the Third Republic to control immigrants in the metropole itself, for example, while British practices tended to be based on other imperial precedents. Likewise, shifts in domestic French politics (notably the advent of the Popular Front) had far greater repercussions in the French empire than domestic political changes had on British imperial policy. In a sense, then, Thomas's book lends support to Miles Kahler's old argument about the British political system's greater capacity to insulate domestic and imperial politics from one another.

Finally, Thomas's account underscores the force of Franco-British rivalry, even in a situation of shared vulnerability. There was security collaboration of course, but when one empire got seriously into trouble, the other showed more *Schadenfreude* than solidarity. Britain, thus, refused to force Abdullah to close Transjordan to rebels escaping French retaliation during the Great Revolt in Syria in 1925–1926; at this point and others, the need to sustain the Hashemite alliance limited a willingness to assist France. And France, for its part, would not jeopardize its fragile concordat with Syrian notables to help Britain cope with the Arab rising in Palestine, which it viewed as the consequence of a Zionist alliance it had always considered misguided.

The British and French "intelligence states" of the Middle East and North Africa emerge in this book as inherently fragile, able to hang on only through clientelism, surveillance, and the threat of force. Their main advantage, Thomas implies, was the simple fact that since these territories were imperial creations, their populations—possessed of other loyalties and often divided by class, community, religion and region—understandably had difficulty reimagining themselves as citizens of such patently fabricated "nations." Against their own intentions, the surveillance and security apparatuses Thomas outlines did much to provoke that nationalist identification.

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ASIA

LEONARD BLUSSÉ. *Visible Cities: Canton, Nagasaki, and Batavia and the Coming of the Americans*. (The Edwin O. Reischauer Lectures.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2008. Pp. xi, 133. \$25.95.

This volume explores the economic, political, and social positions of three Asian port cities as they faced crucial historical shifts at the end of the eighteenth century. Leonard Blussé, perhaps the leading Dutch scholar of the United Dutch East Asia Company (De Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC) and its dealings in Japan and China, brings his considerable expertise to bear on the historical legacies of Batavia (now Jakarta), Canton, and Nagasaki.

By the 1790s, each of these cities had served for over a century and a half as the major "window" of foreign trade for its political master. Nagasaki was the only Japanese port open to foreign trade under the closed country policy of the Tokugawa. Canton was likewise the only port open to foreigners coming to trade with Manchu-ruled China. Batavia was the main trading hub for the VOC in Asia and was therefore, in a sense, Europe's window on Asia.

Blussé explores the historical role of each of these port cities in the economic life of its respective maritime sphere (the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Java Sea) during the years when they were the preeminent ports of Asia. He also attempts to expand our understanding of China's and Japan's traditional relationships with the maritime sphere and the implications of these relations for the modern era, as both countries now resume their earlier presence in that world.

Overall, Blussé provides a different approach to Asian maritime history than that to which most of the anglophone audience is accustomed. While he makes ample use of Chinese and Japanese sources, he looks at the region from a Dutch point of view and is primarily concerned with the object of his greatest familiarity, Batavia and the VOC. This strategy makes good sense, however, since the Dutch were the dominant European force in Asia during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.

There is not much the specialist of each of these towns might learn about his or her particular area, but the coverage and comparisons of the three is an exercise that throws new light on the region as a whole. For example, Blussé compares Chinese and Japanese intelligence about the West. After the 1630s, Japanese subjects were forbidden to travel, but Japanese authorities maintained a lively interest in the outside world, relying on the Dutch to import books and translating them. They also carefully interviewed foreigners and Japanese who had travelled abroad. These reports and translations did not circulate widely, but there was always an element of the Japanese elite that had a reasonable awareness of things Western. Chinese authorities, in contrast, were mainly interested in the activities of their own subjects abroad and cared little about for-

eigners as such. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Chinese elite were totally ignorant about the overseas world. They even failed to grasp the extent and importance of the Chinese junk trade to Southeast Asia, because the agents of the central state did not collect and analyze the data in their own provincial records.

The portion of the book's subtitle "the Coming of the Americans" initially struck me as extraneous, but it provided an interesting perspective. The late 1780s saw a veritable explosion of American trade with Asia. This development came at a time when the economic and political arrangements which had sustained the three port cities were rapidly eroding. Great Britain's star was rising in the East on the back of the opium trade and that of the European continental powers was declining. The Napoleonic conquest of Holland would have been a total disaster for Dutch trade if it had not been for the Americans, whose ships were ready to carry cargos from Batavia in those years. Blussé reports that in 1804 the Javanese port was visited by seventy-four American ships (p. 64). Americans were even commissioned to carry Dutch cargos in their privileged trade to Nagasaki.

Blussé criticizes the British for exporting "ever greater quantities [of opium] to Southeast Asia and China, ultimately throwing entire societies out of balance" (p. 65). This is true, but Blussé fails to note the Dutch role in laying the foundation of the opium trade during Batavia's heyday, nor does he mention the Dutch role in spreading the habit of smoking the drug to Taiwan in the seventeenth century.

Despite a few quirks, the book is a useful one. It is engaging, well-written, and accessible. It should be good for undergraduate reading in an Asian studies course.

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VINCENT GOOSSAERT. *The Taoists of Peking, 1800–1949: A Social History of Urban Clerics*. (Harvard East Asian Monographs, number 284.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2007. Pp. xi, 395. \$49.95.

The field of Chinese urban history has long been bedeviled by undue dependence on post-Enlightenment dichotomies such as "religion" and "society," resulting in social historical research on Chinese cities that largely overlooks the role of religion. Susan Naquin's magnum opus, *Peking: Temples and City Life, 1400–1900* (2000), took an important first step toward remedying the situation, but subsequent scholarship has tended to stress the importance of the state and commercial elites in shaping urban religious traditions. Vincent Goossaert's book signifies a major breakthrough by directing our attention to the humble professionals who worked at temples on behalf of urban residents ranging in status from officials to maids, giving advice on personal issues while also performing rituals and providing instruction in self-cultivation tech-

niques. This book reflects years of painstaking research involving a wide variety of sources, including stele inscriptions, palace and municipal archives, local histories and works of folklore, writings by Taoists and other religious practitioners (as well as spirit-writing texts), and ethnographies by Japanese scholars. It is also closely related to the author's ongoing research on the history of religion in modern China, in that Goossaert draws on his knowledge of these trends to elucidate the ways in which Taoist specialists responded to rapidly changing developments while continuing to shape Peking's social life and religious economy.

The work is divided into three main sections. Part one examines the historical development of modern Taoist clerical lineages, as well as Taoism's place in the formation and maintenance of Peking's diverse social structures (including various ritual and pilgrimage associations). There is also a thorough consideration of the relationship between Taoism and the state, especially in light of religious policies enacted between 1898 and 1949. Part two is based on Goossaert's five-part typology of Taoist clerics, including monks from the renowned White Cloud Monastery, court Taoists, eunuch monks, temple Taoists, and mendicants. Goossaert presents detailed information on their backgrounds, particularly the prevalence of military men and artisans who chose to become Taoist specialists. He also examines aspects of their careers such as training and ordination, and his methodology bridges the gap between social and economic history by uncovering a wealth of previously unexplored data on patterns of temple management and the rights and responsibilities of temple Taoists. Part three treats the services that Taoist clerics provided, which included healing and divination but especially the performance of mortuary rites and other liturgies. Goossaert also offers an innovative analysis of the complex interaction and competition among Taoism, spirit-writing groups, and redemptive societies, which adds immensely to our understanding of both the extensive diffusion of Taoist beliefs and practices in modern China and the ways in which a wide range of religious groups chose to define themselves as "Taoist."

Among this book's many contributions is its challenge to latent anticlerical prejudices that have influenced the field of Chinese religious studies, which should prompt scholars to expand the scope of their research from highly literate clerical elites (especially court Taoists, whose impact may have been overstated) to ordinary religious specialists who struggled to make a living managing temples or staging rituals. In addition, Goossaert overturns the conventional wisdom that Taoism entered a period of decline during the modern era. His data clearly show that this religion helped preserve key aspects of Chinese religious culture through its symbolic and liturgical resources. It also proved able to adapt in the face of numerous challenges, one noteworthy example being the use of modern publishing techniques to transmit Taoist doctrines and self-cultivation practices, such as the edition of the Taoist Canon that scholars use today. The book also demonstrates

that, because Taoist elites did not enjoy temporal or doctrinal authority, charisma became an essential means of attaining leadership and prestige. At the same time, Goossaert examines more controversial aspects of modern Taoism centering on issues of celibacy and sexuality (including homosexuality and adultery); he presents moving accounts of the eunuchs who converted to Taoism and a dramatic description of a schism centering on the controversial cleric An Shilin that led to his being burned alive in November 1946. Perhaps most importantly, this book puts forward a holistic view of religious life in urban China by portraying Taoist clerics as integral components of a triangular network of power featuring officials (who represent the state and attempt to carry out its policies), elites (who control the social and economic affairs of their communities), and religious specialists (who are in charge of the ritual aspects of communal life). The book is also graced with numerous high-quality maps, figures, and tables. It should be a most welcome addition to courses on Chinese religions.

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TOMOKO SHIROYAMA. *China during the Great Depression: Market, State, and the World Economy, 1929–1937*. (Harvard East Asian Monographs, number 294.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center. 2008. Pp. xvi, 325. \$45.00.

Tomoko Shiroyama's book is a welcome addition to the recent historiographical effort to place modern Chinese economic history within a wider, global historical context. By focusing on the effects of the Great Depression in China, the author is able to bring to light the complex networks that connected domestic economic and financial practices with international fluctuations in the price of silver and to illustrate how this international crisis affected state-market dynamics.

Some of the effects on China's economy of the silver crisis generated by the Great Depression—the rise in the price of silver, the resulting drain of silver out of China, and the deflationary trends it triggered—have been the focus of earlier studies. Shiroyama, however, makes the case that its impact was deeper than previously thought, upsetting the very foundations of the silk and cotton industries of the Lower Yangzi Delta, her two case studies.

According to Shiroyama, important characteristics of China's financial and industrial systems made the national economy particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in the price of silver. The Chinese government, in fact, was unable to control its own currency since its value "was not guaranteed by the state but with silver" (p. 23). Because silver "was a mere commodity" in other countries, "its market price was influenced by supply and demand factors, irrespective of China's economy" (pp. 27, 36). While this situation did not pose a problem in the early twentieth century, when silver remained

cheap, it became a serious threat during the Great Depression (p. 36). The rising value of silver and plummeting commodity prices not only generated a credit crisis in rural areas but also paralyzed the emerging industrial economy of the Lower Yangzi Delta. Silk and cotton manufacturers financed their operations completely through bank loans, using as collateral assets raw materials, industrial equipment, and real estate. As the price of commodities fell, the value of this kind of collateral plummeted, making it impossible for manufacturers to obtain credit and to keep operations going.

Shiroyama argues that the crisis created a consensus among government officials and urban entrepreneurs that some form of government intervention was needed to lead China out of its economic troubles. The government began to lend money to banks and to expand its role in the economy. In 1935, it also launched a currency reform that ended China's dependency on silver and reorganized the credit and banking systems (pp. 183–185). Shiroyama argues that these policies marked a new relationship between state and market. The effects of the Great Depression in China and "the process of economic recovery and monetary change politicized the entire Chinese economy" (p. 2) and transformed "the industrial map of the Lower Yangzi . . . as the government came to play a larger role in the economy" (p. 226).

This claim, however, reveals a limitation of this otherwise carefully argued book. Being narrowly focused on silver and the Depression years, Shiroyama loses sight of wider political and economic trends. Inspired by nation-building goals and anti-imperialist sentiments—as well as by new economic-dirigisme policies in post-World War I Europe and by the success of Japan's state-led industrialization effort—trends toward strong government intervention in the economy had already emerged before the effects of the Great Depression began to be felt in China. In this context, the Great Depression provided the Chinese government with both a validation of its statist vision and with an opportunity to realize more fully the economic policies it was already beginning to implement. While it is true that the Great Depression brought about an expanded role of the state in the economy worldwide (p. 235)—and its impact on economic thought should not be underestimated—it is also true that the extent and modes of state intervention varied in each country and were predicated upon wider political considerations. In the United States, for example, New Deal policies were inspired by Keynesian economics, while the Chinese government mostly followed a corporatist model. In addition, the long-term persistence in China, in comparison with other countries, of state-controlled models of development points to the importance of wider and more complex factors.

In spite of these oversimplifications in the discussion of state-market relations, Shiroyama's book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the Chinese economy in the 1930s. This book not only places familiar, but generally unconnected, aspects of

this economic crisis into a unified narrative; it also demonstrates the importance of recasting the discussion of imperialism within the wider framework of globalization (although unfortunately Shiroyama does not expand on this important point). The economic relations of China with both Japan and the Western powers emerge as influenced not just by unequal power relationships—although they certainly hindered the Chinese government's ability to deal with the crisis—but also by global market forces that complicated imperialist bilateral dynamics.

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LAIKWAN PANG. *The Distorting Mirror: Visual Modernity in China*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 2007. Pp. viii, 280. \$55.00.

Laikwan Pang's study is an exploration of two aspects of Chinese popular culture, the pictorial and the theatrical, from the perspective of visual modernity. The author seeks to understand "how urban Chinese 'saw' the new modern culture that evolved between the 1880s and 1930s—a period characterized by drastic ruptures in almost all cultural domains in the country" (p. 1) and by an influx of Western ideas and technology into Chinese urban areas.

Chapter one focuses on the famous Shanghai lithographed pictorial *Dianshizhai huabao* (1884–1898). Here Pang discusses depictions of hot-air balloons to illustrate how the Chinese accepted wonderful Western inventions and depictions of torture in Chinese culture to demonstrate how Westerners reacted to a traditional Chinese practice.

Chapters two and three address photography and its impact on the urban population, as well as the role of female images in advertising. Courtesans often used their photographs to further their careers. Photographs of courtesans clad as men and of Mei Lanfang (1894–1961), the Peking opera actor who played female roles, reveal incidents of cross-dressing. Also of interest is the photograph of Dowager Empress Cixi (1835–1908) dressed as Guanyin, the Buddhist bodhisattva of compassion. The author probes the meanings and impact of this image but fails to note that Cixi's predecessor, Emperor Qianlong (r. 1736–1795) sat for portraits of himself dressed as the bodhisattva of wisdom. In chapter three, Pang unravels a host of connotations behind a poster for medicine for children, which depicts a calm Buddhist monk seated amid a bevy of provocative beauties. Does the monk's face indicate religious enlightenment or sexual gratification? Can the consumer identify with the monk or with the sexy woman, with the seduced or the seducer?

Peking opera is the subject of chapter four. Pang reveals that by 1907 Peking opera successfully competed with early Chinese movies, partly because of the development of the so-called Shanghai style of Peking opera that incorporated elements of Western stage productions. Chapter five shifts to the cinema and,

interestingly, describes how spaces initially selected for showing films helped to establish a new spectatorship in a new form of garden: the amusement park. Chapter six expands on the themes of theater and performance by defining various types of magic shows and explores connections between scientific technology as a means of solving practical problems and magic as "the technique of spiritual order" (p. 184).

While Pang's strength lies in decoding modernist messages, the book is marred by two weaknesses: the author's tendency to make sweeping, misleading statements and her incomplete knowledge of traditional Chinese culture. For example, she claims that "the Gregorian calendar gradually replaced the Chinese lunar calendar" (p. 33). While this is true on the official level, Chinese New Year as celebrated today is calculated according to the lunar calendar. Regarding the representation of women in China, Pang asserts that "the few human figures depicted in [traditional Chinese painting] were usually male" (p. 123). In reality, there are hundreds of paintings in traditional Chinese art depicting the human figure and among these are numerous representations of women.

The author discusses a well-known lithograph from the nineteenth-century pictorial publication *Feiyingge huace*, which shows two women having their photograph taken in a photographer's studio. Pang translates the title of the lithograph, *Wo jian youlian*, as "I see and pity," which, according to Pang, "could have multiple meanings" (p. 72). The title of the picture is a near quote from a story found in a famous fifth-century collection of anecdotes, *Shishuo xinyu* ("A New Account of Tales of the World"), wherein a jealous wife visits her husband's new concubine in the concubine's chamber, intending to kill her. Upon seeing the lovely and lonely girl, however, the wife embraces her, saying, "even I feel affection for you as I see you; how much more must that old rascal" (*Shih-shuo Hsin-yü* [1976], p. 353). Recognition of the lithograph title's origin would have affected any interpretation of its use in a modern context. In the history of print culture, this is a pivotal picture. Yet Pang misses the irony that a hand-drawn lithograph representing a photographer's studio depicts exactly that mechanical method of picture-making destined to replace lithography as the pictorial technique of choice.

Despite such drawbacks, readers attuned to modernist theory and rhetoric will find much to appreciate in this book.

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LAURA NENZI. *Excursions in Identity: Travel and the Intersection of Place, Gender, and Status in Edo Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 2008. Pp. xi, 260. \$57.00.

Perhaps most scholars of early modern Japan have come across references to journeys and trips in documents from the period, especially journals and letters. Many of us view the importance and meaning of these

references to travel as self-evident; travel to us means more or less what it meant to people in early modern Japan. Laura Nenzi seeks to delve into the topic of travel more deeply and demonstrate why contemporary scholars cannot and should not take the subject of travel for granted. She argues that agents during the Edo period undertook journeys for "re-creational" purposes; travel was a respite from one's daily routine, but it also represented an opportunity to escape temporarily the rigid rules of class and status that otherwise dominated the lives of people in the Edo era.

Although the book's emphasis is on travel, Nenzi is interested in the much broader theme of "the cartography of self-assertion" as it is manifested in "travel, space, gender, status, literacy, the economy, and the body" (p. 2). Thus, the play at work in the production of identity was not limited to journeys as such, and Nenzi analyzes other practices that performed similar functions, including the buying of souvenirs, the consumption of regional delicacies, the frequenting of public baths, and the solicitation of prostitutes. Nenzi argues that these new "bodily engagements with the sites of travel" (p. 185) coexisted with or even displaced more intellectual and literary modes of connection, such as versification and the composition of diaries, which were customs that had developed in the centuries preceding the Edo period. Nenzi also notes that these bodily practices were related to commercial and market developments: "'I buy, therefore, I am' was the new mantra of nineteenth-century recreational travelers" (p. 5).

The author asserts that the potential for play in the practice of identity that travel presented (in other words, "excursions in identity") was especially important for women during the Edo period (p. 4). In some ways, the role of travel in the lives of early modern women represented a kind of continuity with earlier eras, chiefly the Heian period. In fact, Nenzi observes that women of the Edo period created "an implicit identification between the Heian period and female agency" (p. 99). While women sought to invoke the spirits of their Heian forebears during the Edo period, men connected to travel in quite different ways, such as seeking the companionship of prostitutes, mainly in exotic locales like Nagasaki (p. 171). Nenzi's analysis of travel through the lens of gender is a novel approach and represents an important contribution to gender studies of the early modern period.

Nenzi's argument concerning the significance of Heian Japan for women during the Edo period is reminiscent of Motoori Norinaga's (1730–1801) work during the latter half of the eighteenth century. Norinaga also identified Japan as an essentially feminine culture, as opposed to the masculine culture of China, and poetry (*waka* in Japan and *kanshi* in China) revealed this difference. A discussion of Norinaga's work in this context would have been interesting. A general discussion of travel and its related practices is also noticeably absent from the book. Although Nenzi cautions the reader against assuming too much about travel during the Edo

period, a similar caveat applies to the interpretation of travel in our own context. Edo people were able to recreate their identities partially or completely when they undertook a journey (p. 92). Are we, therefore, any more or less aware of our own agency when we travel than the people of Edo Japan were? Nenzi's argument is a bit subtle on this point, perhaps by design.

Nenzi's analysis of the ways in which people during the Edo period were able to forge new identities, even if only temporarily, adds to an already existing body of literature, particularly Eiko Ikegami's recent book, *Bonds of Civility: Aesthetic Networks and the Political Origins of Japanese Culture* (2005), that deals with the same topic. While Nenzi emphasizes the difference between male and female excursions, Ikegami's analysis of tea and poetry gatherings applies equally to men and women. Yet rather than see these works in opposition to one another, one could argue that the two elucidate different facets of the same phenomenon.

Nenzi's book is an important contribution to the field of Tokugawa studies. Its linking of travel and gender is especially noteworthy. The book itself is very well written, even beautifully so. This is an appropriate text for undergraduates and graduate students alike and is overall a delightful read.

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TADASHI KARUBE. *Maruyama Masao and the Fate of Liberalism in Twentieth-Century Japan*. Translated by DAVID NOBLE. (LTCB International Library Selection, number 23.) Tokyo: International House of Japan. 2008. Pp. ix, 212.

Maruyama Masao (1914–1996) is probably postwar Japan's single most famous intellectual, and his ideas remain highly influential today. A political philosopher, he tried to define the nature of Japanese society, focusing on both the legacies of the premodern past and contemporary political practice. Like most Japanese of his era, he strove to understand why Japan had initiated World War II in Asia and how to prevent such criminal idiocy from happening again. He framed the problem both as one of fascism—a pathology of all modern mass societies—and of the "emperor system," Japan's own particular deviance, by which he meant an ethical framework in which no one was accountable for his or her actions.

Tadashi Karube introduces Maruyama's theories to readers unfamiliar with his work, and, for those who know Maruyama's ideas, shows how they developed in the context of his life. This effort is particularly useful for English-language readers, since the main translation of Maruyama's work on modern societies, *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics* (1969), is a collection of essays originally published in Japanese over a twenty-year span, making it hard to see how his ideas evolved.

Karube demonstrates the influence of Maruyama's

personal experiences on the development of his political philosophy. For example, Maruyama turned to the study of neo-Confucian Japanese thinkers such as Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728) in 1940, when he produced a brilliant alternative history to counter the celebrations of “the timeless Japanese national spirit” then dominant in Japan. Maruyama’s analysis of Ogyū focused attention on the ethical underpinnings of political thought as well as the diversity of the Japanese intellectual tradition. I had always assumed that Maruyama turned to this topic because it was safer than modern ones, a tactic deployed by many other scholars at the time. On the contrary, as Karube explains, his research was not safe at all. Maruyama wrote this history as the main text for a new college course, approved by the Ministry of Education in 1939, that was supposed to indoctrinate students in “national polity studies” (*kokutaigaku*). His professor, Nanbara Shigeru, hired Maruyama both to develop the curriculum and to teach the course, but Maruyama was actually the second person to be offered this opportunity. The first, Tsuda Sōkichi, who had focused on ancient Chinese and Japanese thought as a visiting scholar in 1939, was relentlessly attacked as unpatriotic and the following year lost his job at Waseda University, had four of his books banned, and was prosecuted for violating publishing laws.

In the summer of 1944, at the age of thirty, Maruyama, unlike nearly all of his colleagues, was drafted, probably as punishment for his views. In addition, he was inducted as a private, not an officer. Maruyama probably could have volunteered for officer’s training but was too stubborn. He paid dearly for this gesture. Japanese Imperial Army officers were notorious for the harsh treatment they meted out to enlisted men—especially highly educated ones—and Maruyama was beaten and starved to the point where he collapsed from beriberi, a vitamin deficiency caused by malnutrition. Maruyama’s ill-treatment took place while he was in basic training in Japan, not at the battlefield, and, ironically, probably saved his life by keeping him in the hospital when his regiment departed for Korea (p. 87). Karube provides a new explanation for the intensity of Maruyama’s interest in the question of why individuals accepted fascism.

In the early 1950s, Maruyama began focusing less on the ways in which groups of citizens could reshape political institutions and more on the uniqueness of individual experience, rather than a common national or modern identity. Karube argues that this shift was occasioned in part by Maruyama’s lengthy sojourn of over two years (in two stints) in a Tokyo hospital for tuberculosis sufferers. That experience, argues Karube, “deepened his understanding” that people tended to act on the basis of “their images of the world and to have difficulty communicating with people holding different world views,” and, more importantly, that this difficulty was “not limited to political conflict, but frequently occurs in the midst of everyday life” (p. 138). Maruyama’s last decades were a bit sad: as Karube explains, Maruyama’s ideas had made enormous sense to

other Japanese until about 1970, but from then on younger people found him frustratingly old-fashioned, and Maruyama withdrew from public life, writing less and less. Maruyama’s own image of the world was deeply rooted in his personal experiences, which corresponded to that of many others of his generation. Young people, unfamiliar with either wartime oppression or the grinding poverty that had accompanied it, saw public life in different ways.

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PRASHANT KIDAMBI. *The Making of an Indian Metropolis: Colonial Governance and Public Culture in Bombay, 1890–1920*. (Historical Urban Studies.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2007. Pp. xix, 268. \$99.95.

South Asian urban history has enjoyed a vigorous development during recent decades; not only are more scholarly studies appearing, but their contributions are marked by a broad diversity and sophistication of approach. Prashant Kidambi’s book, reflecting this urban turn in Indian history, offers a thoughtful exploration of how colonial and indigenous powers and peoples confronted complex problems that threatened to overwhelm the city around the turn of the twentieth century. Based on a recent doctoral dissertation—some markers of which remain—this is a closely researched and thickly documented examination of relationships and responses between government and society in the context of urban growth and crisis.

Kidambi opens with a brief introduction to issues of urban history, followed by a description of the “Rise of Bombay,” the transformation of a colonial port city into an urban industrial center, which is based on a careful reading of earlier studies by Jim Masselos, Meera Kosambi, Mariam Dossal, and the late Raj Chandavarkar. Although there had been occasional efforts by the colonial authorities to direct and limit urban developmental spread, the “on the ground” products of new docks, railways, and textile mills meant that Bombay was largely a congested and insanitary “unintended city” (p. 10). This imperfect development reflected structural and intellectual barriers (both British and Indian) to recognition of the need for urban amenities. Neither capitalist political economy nor the class interests of dominant local political forces led naturally to a proactive approach to solving the tribulations of the city’s ordinary people. The arrival of bubonic plague in 1896 suddenly altered this equation.

At the time of its onset, the microbial causes of the plague were unknown. Initial responses were based on what Kidambi terms “localist” etiologies in which disease was connected to place—to the filth and congestion of the city’s slums. If plague first appeared in slums, then slums needed cleansing and slum dwellers required quarantine. In fact, thousands of Bombay residents fled the city, creating an economic disruption

while transmitting the disease to other parts of the country.

Something had to be done: a European port embargo had been threatened, and the Indian export economy and the well-being of Bombay's elites were at risk. Borrowing a metropolitan model from Glasgow, the government created the Bombay Improvement Trust, an agency that would allow officials to "reorder the city" without the encumbrances of locally elected politicians. Commissioned to overcome the sanitary disorder of the city, the Trust drew up schemes for clearing slums, building hygienic housing for workers, and opening broad new avenues through the congested city—to allow for "cleansing breezes" and to ease the policing of urban unrest. Middle-class "suburbs" were promoted in the north of the city to encourage decongestion and earn revenues to pay for the improving assault upon the slums. The fact that the Indian and provincial governments required the Trust to pay for the land was good economics but crippled the positive impact of the scheme. In the event, the clearing process was more efficient than the rebuilding, and, as in so many urban renewal plans, many of the problems simply were shifted. Ultimately, the Trust was deemed a failure, although its legacies still stand in contemporary Mumbai as shabby monuments to an earlier age of activism.

The period under study was also a time of significant religious and political unrest in the city, arising from Hindu-Muslim confrontation or from popular resistance to anti-plague measures. One chapter examines reforms in policing the city and the impact of the 1902 Police Act. Of particular interest here is Kidambi's examination of the extension of police authority into attempts to regulate space, by controlling hawkers and other elements of the street economy. However, a growing police influence over a wider range of city life was paralleled by the growth of a "civil society," to which the author devotes a detailed chapter documenting a "growing density and diversity of associational activity" (p. 201), including caste clubs, voluntary associations, cricket teams, and public service societies. Civic activism grew apace from these roots as a growing educated middle class subscribed to the ideal of "social service" for the "uplift" of the urban poor. Kidambi suggests that here lay the roots of "disinterested selflessness" that colored the "moral capital" of the Indian nationalist movement under Mohandas K. Gandhi after 1920 (p. 233). The work ends with a brief conclusion which, noting parallel problems in the larger, more congested, modern Mumbai, suggests that the middle-class and elite anxieties that informed Bombay in the period under study still dominate the city's civic discourse. Whether or not this suggestion is compelling depends on the outlook of the reader; nonetheless, Kidambi has offered here important insights into the dilemmas of Bombay during the high noon of empire.

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OCEANIA AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

MARTIN CROTTY and DAVID ANDREW ROBERTS, editors.
The Great Mistakes of Australian History. Sydney: University of New South Wales. 2006. Pp. ix, 244. \$34.95.

Martin Crotty and David Andrew Roberts's edited collection has emerged from a heated and highly politicized debate over the history of Australia that raged in the decade following the advent of John Howard as prime minister in 1996. Conservative politicians, backed by journalists in the right-wing press and a few like-minded historians, led an assault dubbed "the history wars" aimed at reversing open recognition of the conflicts and injustices in Australia's past. The conservative revisionists affirmed, by contrast, an older familiar and comfortable story of Australia's progressive path to an equitable and stable democracy, studded with the exploits of a sturdy, sometimes heroic manhood. Academic historians struggled to refute the concomitant denigration of serious scholarship in a similarly populist style. Crotty and Roberts's response was to invite twelve Australian historians to join them in a book aimed at a wide readership within which contributors could develop their scholarship in their own terms. The chapters are very diverse, but contributors all focus on mistakes as their entry point to developing a critical historical narrative.

Several chapters consider Australia's colonial legacy and its resulting racism as settlers, so distant from the mother country, continued to assert Australia as a new white society despite their fragile hold on the vast island continent with its populous Asian northern neighbors. For the nineteenth century, Roberts covers the initial great mistake that inevitably led to massive Aboriginal dispossession: the British assessed the country as *terra nullius*, having no owners. Thus they did not offer the hunter-gatherer Aborigines any treaties, opening the way for invasion of their land with the resulting marginalization and impoverishment. Peter Read in turn considers how humanitarian sympathies that drove the establishment of the Parramatta Native Institution also gave rise to the policy of separating children from their parents as the swiftest means of Christianizing, teaching, and "civilizing" Aborigines. This mistake was the forerunner, he suggests, of the subsequent widespread ruthless separation of children from their families that up until the 1960s caused incalculable pain. Marion Diamond explores the mistake of no fewer than three abandoned government attempts to establish ports on the northern coastline. Such ports, she speculates, would have facilitated Australia's trade with Asia, lessening the country's alienation from the region and the resultant racist exclusion of migrants of color under the White Australia policy.

Further chapters on the twentieth century reveal how Australia's unthinking attachment to the British connection compromised its national interests in the region and its own governance. This is treated well in Crotty's chapter on the tragedies that ensued from Australia's decision to enter World War I to support Britain, and

in David Day's contribution on the Australian government's miscalculation of Britain's capacity to hold Singapore against the Japanese in 1942. Two other historians tease out mistakes grounded in racism and chauvinism: Ilma O'Brien unpacks successive governments' abrogation of the rights of Australian citizens of Japanese, German, and Italian descent in the crisis of two world wars, and in another fine chapter Klaus Neumann exposes callous decisions to repatriate spouses of non-European origin after World War II. Clive Moore and Wayne Reynolds track mistakes that followed the Commonwealth Constitution Britain approved in 1901; Reynolds shows the intricacy of decisions that led to the governor general's extraordinary dismissal of the prime minister in 1967.

Crossing both centuries are further chapters by Alan Atkinson, Richard Waterhouse, Manda Page and Greg Baxter, and Paul Ashton that canvass mistakes in exploration, land use, and planning for economic development and urban infrastructure. The outcomes were environmental disasters: land degradation, water depletion, the unleashing of pests that cannot be eradicated, and ugly constructions that mar cityscapes. Each writer concentrates on the figures and precise occasions of bad decisions but also places the events in wider contexts of colonial and national histories. One omission is surprising: no one discusses mistakes that particularly affected women or family lives.

Overall this is an informative, engaging, and stimulating history. Some will quibble with the extent to which the contributors explicitly highlight how their chosen historical issues reverberate, albeit in differing guises, in contemporary Australia. For this reader, it was an appropriate and ultimately fruitful decision. The "history wars" exposed the paralysis of many historians in the face of a coordinated political effort to stifle knowledge of the less commendable facets of the national past. The government has changed, but the problems that flow from these mistakes remain. If the volume's challenge to complacency serves to endorse a timely consideration of social justice and human rights in Australia, the contributors will have put their admirable historical knowledge to constructive use.

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CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

COLLEEN GRAY. *The Congrégation de Notre-Dame, Superiors, and the Paradox of Power, 1693–1796*. (McGill-Queen's Studies in the History of Religion, Series Two, number 48.) Ithaca, N.Y.: McGill-Queen's University Press. 2007. Pp. xvi, 250. \$75.00.

In 142 pages of text Colleen Gray has produced a compact yet rich volume about French Canadian nuns in the eighteenth century, drawing from an unusually comprehensive set of Canadian and French archival materials for the Congregation of Notre Dame, an uncloistered community in Montreal. Canadian religious history is

usually invoked in the United States only to acknowledge a few persons and places, notably the French Canadian mystic, Marie de l'Incarnation, and the Hotel Dieu convent, adjacent to the Notre Dame property in Montreal, the notorious site of the nineteenth-century anti-Catholic exposé written by Protestants about the sordid life of a fictive nun called Maria Monk. Thanks to Gray's meticulous research, however, we can add to that list by following the foundation and growth of a new congregation of Catholic secular sisters who were established in Montreal by Marguerite Bourgeoys in 1657. As "filles seculières," the women were governed by a community rule but were able to work outside the cloister, in this case as teachers of the children of New France's settlers. (Initial plans to instruct Native Americans were abandoned.) A Catholic school, boarding school, workshop, and numerous missions soon followed up and down the St. Lawrence River. In 1698 the bishop imposed a stricter formal constitution upon the women, drawing to a close this earlier "golden age." His imposition of dowry requirements meant that only women whose families could support this cost could hope to enter the congregation. Gray finds, however, that the bishop's constitution did not necessarily restrict the spiritual potential of these zealous sisters (p. 28). Lists of professed members from 1693–1796 supplied by the author in an appendix suggest that at least some nuns came from fairly humble origins, daughters of bakers, carpenters, farmers, and locksmiths.

Gray opts for an institutional history in the first three chapters followed by biographical portraits of three distinguished superiors of Notre Dame—Marie Raizenne, Marie-Josèphe Maugue-Garreau, and Marie Barbier, the last taking control of the congregation in 1693 following the administration of Bourgeoys, the foundress. As expected, the sisters grappled with the transatlantic effects of Catholic conflicts in Old France in the context of harsh colonial conditions, including debates on how to best promote the agenda of the Catholic Reformation and how strictly to enforce cloister rules for women religious. However the Jansenist controversy that had split the church in France, had less impact in Montreal, where Sulpicians and Jesuits worked together to keep colonial affairs running smoothly. Gray concludes that at Notre Dame, talent was rewarded in the selection of its superiors and administrators, rather than the social status and patronage networks that usually privileged elite women in the *ancien régime*.

The author pays close attention to the smallest details of convent life, such as the daily ritual of locking the doors and the superior's routine correspondence with the local bishop, which allows her to reconstruct a convincing and empathetic portrait of daily existence by nuns and their leadership. Obligated to support themselves financially, the sisters engaged in numerous economic activities in addition to their teaching vocation, including acquiring real estate, building schools, hiring temporary laborers, baking communion wafers, and laundering church linens. They did whatever they could to keep solvent and out of debt. The sisters emphasized

a self-mortifying spirituality that, over time, became outmoded as an expression of faith. During the eighteenth century monastics began to be dismissive of the mystical style that had reached a zenith in France in the seventeenth century, suggesting that Sister Marie Barbier's self-flagellations may have represented the last gasp of a sterner Catholicism that survived on the periphery of the empire.

As a community of women, the Congregation of Notre Dame was subject to the usual power struggles between the sisters and the male clergy who had absolute power over them as bishops, priests, and confessors, although there was certainly variation in how men chose to enforce that power, if at all. Gray emphasizes repeatedly that the agency of women religious, though often remarkable given the cultural context, was always perilously dependent upon the cooperation of the clergy and hierarchy. Despite patriarchal control, the sisters became efficient managers of a fairly large set of properties, schools, and missions, none of which survive today.

In the final chapter appears an analysis of the complicated relationship between the Notre Dame Superior, Marie Barbier, and her confessor, Charles de Glandelet, who also later became her biographer. Barbier, a mystic, clearly relished her suffering as necessary to her experience of God, yet also used it to help her purvey "the moral message of the Catholic Reformation" to a wider audience (p. 134). Theoretical works are introduced briefly here to address historiographical debates relevant to the constant factor of power in the lives of religious women: were they agents or victims, empowered or oppressed? For the leaders of the Congregation of Notre Dame Gray concludes that power was at once a privilege and a heavy burden on the way to heaven.

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LISA DILLON. *The Shady Side of Fifty: Age and Old Age in Late Victorian Canada and the United States*. Ithaca, N.Y.: McGill-Queen's University Press. 2008. Pp. xiv, 338. \$75.00.

In this book Lisa Dillon cooks a remarkable statistical menu, squeezing, dicing, processing, and combining Canadian and American censuses and flavoring them with supplemental material to create offerings that fill a scholar's appetite for social history. Starting with the premise that age is an overlooked historical category, she sets out to explore old age as "both as a concept and as a lived experience, highlighting the evolution of old age phases" (p. 5). She then organizes her analysis around an intensive comparative examination of the Canadian population censuses of 1871 and 1901 and parallel U.S. censuses of 1870 and 1900. Her analytical tools include not only statistical methods—basic ones such as cross-tabulation and more sophisticated refinements such as logistic regression—but also discourse analysis of the ways in which census directors and others

have categorized age, and especially old age. She also integrates qualitative evidence for various trends and observations from diaries and other literary sources. Making sense from these data and sources, Dillon rightly claims, was "a hell of a job" (p. 29), but the payoff is worthwhile.

A focused examination of old age from all of these data does not really occur until halfway through the book. Before then, Dillon presents a fascinating history of how the Canadian and American governments—namely, those in charge of taking the census—created age categories and then instructed their enumerators how to record age information. These decisions and instructions reflected social and political purposes, and enumerators had to make choices that embodied official priorities. Moreover, other choices had to be made in the ways that the collected information on age was aggregated in, or omitted from, tables that included other variables such as occupation, place of birth, and relation to family. The 1870–1871 censuses of the U.S. and Canada resembled each other in their collection of age data—both of which were more detailed than in previous censuses—but differed in that the U.S. government seemed more interested in using age data to understand social and economic changes resulting from immigration and labor-force composition while Canadian officials seemed more focused on personal-level demographics such as marital status, causes of death, and health problems. By 1900–1901, the United States was collecting more elaborate age data than Canada, but neither country gathered information in a way that reflected interest in family composition or the status of different age groups within the family.

Dillon follows this examination with a somewhat protracted investigation of age misreporting: the tendency of people to lie about their actual age and the tendency of census enumerators and aggregators to "heap" individual ages into rounded categories of age groupings that ended in 0 and 5. These practices, she notes, are important for understanding consciousness of age. In general, Dillon concludes that most people reported their age truthfully to census enumerators, but she also hypothesizes from this analysis that age awareness and heaping into a younger age increased in middle and old age and that age heaping was more common among racial minorities.

In the subsequent chapters that focus more directly on old age, Dillon unsurprisingly discovers diversity in the lives and statuses of the elderly, and her multivariate analyses mostly confirm what cross-tabulations and other simpler statistics suggest. Still, the appeal is in the details. Generally, Dillon finds that the status of older women depended on their economic resources, their children, their marital status, race, ethnicity, fertility, and urban living. The most revealing change from 1870–1871 to 1900–1901 among these women was that in the later period fewer lived with family members than in the earlier period, a pattern that Dillon asserts was a "harbinger of more significant shifts toward nonfamily living arrangements during the twentieth century"

(p. 178). Patterns among men, she shows, suggest different thresholds for old age, depending on a number of socioeconomic and family characteristics, most particularly presence or absence of a spouse. Also, men more than women seemed to fall into categories of late middle age, young-old age, and old-old age. Dillon concludes by using her microdata to examine the existence and consequences of grandparenthood, showing that three-generation households tended to be more common among U.S. whites, for economic reasons, than among blacks, Amerindians, Asian Americans, and Canadians.

The book does not make for a riveting read, and it should be of interest chiefly to scholars in fields of history, demography, and sociology. Yet Dillon presents her microdata and painstaking parsing of qualitative information in a way that is far from dull. Except perhaps for the dry, somewhat repetitive review of scholarly literature in the long introduction, her analysis makes quantitative history much more engaging than one would expect.

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WOODY HOLTON. *Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution*. New York: Hill and Wang. 2007. Pp. xi, 370. \$27.00.

Woody Holton's book represents a sophisticated modern attempt to resuscitate the thesis of Charles Beard's famous Progressive-era classic, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (1913). In that work, Beard argued that the U.S. Constitution represented the victory of a small group of wealthy elites, particularly creditors who owned bonds and other securities, over the interests of the mass of small farmers and debtholders. A strong centralized government supposedly benefited the few at the expense of the many. Since the publication of Beard's work, generations of scholars have challenged, refuted, or modified his claims. Yet within the past two decades only a handful of historians have pursued the question of economic motives in any rigorous or systematic fashion.

In his study, Holton seeks to redirect the discredited focus on the bondholding patterns among elites and turn to examine the sentiments and interests of more ordinary people, the "thousands of Americans who rejected the Framers' view that the Constitution was the only way out of the economic crisis of the 1780s" (p. 274). Drawing on a rich variety of newspapers, pamphlets, and political tracts, Holton does a fine job of elucidating the conflict between the people's desire to regain their economic footing in the aftermath of war at the same time that Congress, working through the states, attempted to impose new taxes. He shows the various ways in which complex economic problems vexed individuals, states, and the nation. These problems ranged from the difficulties of state governments to compensate bondholders who had loaned them money, to Congress's need to pay off the commutation

certificates of former revolutionary war officers, to competing demands from creditors and debtors over whether paper money should be used to satisfy outstanding taxes and debts.

By recovering the voices of the people within the states, Holton turns the discussion away from abstract ideological issues and moves it toward a focus on the real economic concerns that permeated people's lives, threatened their livelihoods, and undermined their economic futures. What Holton does not prove, however, is that state governments were better equipped than a new national government to deal with these challenges. Even within the states, as Holton himself admits, conflicts did not always reflect obvious economic divisions. "The complex fiscal and monetary debates of the 1780s," he says, "did not simply split the nation into two factions. Actually there were many more, and every broad grouping was split into numerous subgroups. The difficult questions of the 1780s even divided the minds of many individuals" (p. 119). Yet like Beard and other neo-progressive critics of the Constitution, Holton wishes to portray the proposed government as less responsive to popular sentiment, less supportive of the prosperity of ordinary citizens, and less "democratic" than the state governments.

The framers, however, never claimed to support pure democracy; they believed in a "republican" form of government in which the people (meaning, qualified white male voters) would elect representatives to Congress. Individuals would not lose representation at the state level; they gained another form of representation in a body that would govern in the interests of entire nation. Although it is naive to suppose that this form of government did not benefit certain economic elites, it does not follow that a strong central government necessarily failed to serve the economic interests of the majority, who made their living as small farmers. Greater access to credit, greater security in the belief that debts would be repaid, and greater confidence in the financial system would bring more economic advantages to more people throughout the country.

Thus, much as Holton would like to portray the debate over the Constitution as a conflict between creditors and debtors, or haves and have-nots, his own evidence does not support the point. As he acknowledges, although "bond speculators were among the Constitution's most enthusiastic supporters, . . . it is also clear that thousands of Americans . . . supported federal taxation not because they owned bonds—many did not—but for other, more public-spirited reasons" (p. 215). In fact, "Some of the most avid supporters of the Constitution were not creditors but debtors" (p. 230).

In the end, Holton's book fails to take full advantage of the richness of his own sources. Whereas Max M. Edling's *A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of the American State* (2003) transcends the neo-progressive debate over the Constitution by reframing the question as an issue in state formation, Holton's work remains mired in an older paradigm of class conflict. Yet on the face

of his own evidence, Holton has discovered there was far more to it than that.

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JON KUKLA. *Mr. Jefferson's Women*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2007. Pp. xiii, 279. \$26.95.

On the bicentennial of Benjamin Franklin's death in 1990, one wag—reflecting on Franklin's popular image as a womanizer—dubbed him “Our Founding Flirt.” If one were to apply the same logic to Thomas Jefferson and his relationship with women, the Sage of Monticello should perhaps be described as “Our Founding Fake.” At least that is the lasting impression that comes from reading Jon Kukla's book. Indeed, Kukla's story of the five “significant women in Jefferson's life [told] not only through his eyes but also from historical evidence that is completely independent of his perceptions” (p. 5) is both jarring and disturbing, because this particular founding father seems to have had strangely contorted relations with individual women in his life and a draconian notion of the role of women in a republican society.

From the outset Kukla warns us that he will not be painting a pretty picture: “In his personal life, Jefferson was never entirely comfortable with strong and independent women”; and “Jefferson did nothing whatsoever to improve the legal or social condition of women in American society”; and “he was always wary of female influence in government” (p. 4). Kukla tells us that this “is not a book that could be written by a young scholar” (p. 5). Only “the accumulated joys and bruises of life” (p. 5) could arm one to write this complicated tale of woe.

Kukla carries us, fully forewarned, through virtually everything he can tell us about the five important women. Rebecca Burwell was Jefferson's first flame at age twenty, and he became romantically obsessed with her. His inept ability to explain his infatuation directly prevented a connection between them. When she announced her plans to marry another man, Jefferson suffered a “violent head ach” (p. 35) such as one that ensued following the death of his mother and in other moments of severe stress over forty-five years of public life.

Elizabeth Moore Walker came next, around his twenty-fifth year. When her husband, a college chum of Jefferson, headed to the frontier to treat with Native American tribes, he asked Jefferson to handle his business affairs. Jefferson seized the moment to move in on Walker's wife and to pursue what Kukla characterizes as “predatory sexuality” (p. 55).

Martha Wayles Skelton (Jefferson), a widow, married Jefferson in 1772, and the two of them enjoyed what was evidently a fulfilling marriage that lasted ten years. She stayed at home, managed the property, supervised the slaves, and was pregnant 54 of the 128 months of the marriage. With each of her six pregnancies, she became weaker and more sickly until she did

not recover from the sixth childbirth. Two daughters survived. But no letters survived between the proud parents since Jefferson systematically destroyed all records of their marriage.

Maria Cosway was another married woman with whom Jefferson had a brief affair when he was forty-two, a widower, and living in Paris. Cosway proved to be the most cosmopolitan and intellectually challenging female in Jefferson's life. Emotionally overwhelmed by the electricity of her personality, Jefferson beat a quick retreat from her with a tortured twelve-page disengagement essay which he titled “Dialogue Between My Head and My Heart” (1786).

Sally Hemings was one of Jefferson's slave women (and also a half sister of his wife Martha) who probably attracted his sexual interest when she arrived in Paris as a traveling companion to Jefferson's daughter Mary (Polly). While other historians have dissected the Jefferson-Hemings relationship, Kukla focuses on the timing of their affair and their living arrangements at Monticello. He proposes that Hemings helped resolve one of Jefferson's probable fears about the ill-effects of frequent masturbation. Kukla also attaches much significance to Jefferson's realization that his children born of Hemings were legally white; but since they were born of a female slave, they were also by law not free (pp. 133–137).

Kukla completes his survey by brief references to other powerful women known to or observed by Jefferson—Abigail Adams, female leaders in revolutionary France, Ann Willing Bingham (a wealthy Philadelphian), and Elizabeth Leathes Merry (wife of the British minister to the United States). All frightened Jefferson immeasurably, underscoring what Kukla outlines as Jefferson's general principles on the subject of women. Women, to him, were invisible and should remain so. He did not favor the education of women and thought they should have no role in government or society. He ran his White House without a female aide or companion and never invited a woman to sit at one of his legions of private presidential dinners.

Kukla writes this rather depressing story sometimes with engaging narrative but at other times with unyielding detail (i.e., the genealogy and pedigrees of far too many First Families of Virginia). The book cries for some kind of chronology, a list of biographical notes on the large cast of characters, and a map of where all these Virginia folk lived. While the book is published for a general audience, one needs to have Cavalier roots to keep track of the many Virginia names. Many questions about other women in Jefferson's life are hardly touched or glossed over—his mother, his six sisters, and especially his relationship with the daughter who survived him, Martha Jefferson Randolph. While Kukla tells us that Jefferson invited no women to dine with him at the White House and proudly served the meals at table to his male guests, we are left in the dark about whether female servants or slaves might have helped in preparing the food.

If we compare Jefferson's many odd relations with

women to those of his renowned flirtatious mentor—Franklin—there are parallels. Franklin had affairs with “lewd” women when he was young. He was a sexual predator toward the fiancée of his roommate and closest friend. His first son was illegitimate. He lived covertly with his landlady in London while still married. He had an affair similar to Jefferson’s fling with Maria Cosway at almost the same age. But the difference was that Franklin in his *Autobiography* (1791), which he carefully crafted for posterity, characterized his most flagrant sexual exploits as “errata.” One does not get the sense—nor does Kukla give us any indication—that Jefferson ever considered any of his strange behaviors and attitudes toward women—even by the standards of his own time—as either *errata* or anything other than among what he perversely considered to be the basic rights of men.

LARRY E. TISE
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ROBIN MISKOLCZE. *Women and Children First: Nineteenth-Century Sea Narratives and American Identity*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2007. Pp. xxii, 220. \$45.00.

Until the last ten years, the presence of women at sea in the nineteenth century had been unremarked upon in scholarship, or presumed to be negligible in practice. The publication of Joan Druett’s *Hen Frigates: Wives of Merchant Captains under Sail* (1998), Lisa Norling’s *Captain Ahab Had a Wife: New England Women and the Whalefishery, 1720–1870* (2000), and Margaret S. Creighton and Norling’s collection *Iron Men, Wooden Women: Gender and Seafaring in the Atlantic World, 1700–1920* (1996) brought significant and instructive attention to the many roles women played in the U.S. maritime economy and culture in the nineteenth century. Robin Miskolcze’s new book proposes to do for literary criticism what Druett, Norling, and Creighton have done for historical analysis. This is a necessary and important move, especially in terms of the recent swell of scholarly interest in the oceanic studies. Less concerned with the experiences of actual women involved in maritime affairs than with the way women were imagined in nautical literary and cultural productions, Miskolcze invokes a remarkable range of texts in her account. In chapters focused on colonial American narratives of deliverance, female shipwreck victims, the Middle Passage, English female captives, and cross-dressed sailors, Miskolcze argues that the image of women in relation to the sea always reflected the nation. Her aim is to analyze what such representations “say about the hopes, desires, anxieties, and goals of the United States at a volatile time in the nation’s history” (p. xii). Indeed, “anxieties” are a special interest of this book, whether their focus be national, gender-based, or moral. Women, in Miskolcze’s account, exist to teach men lessons, whether how to be men, how to feel, how to act, or how to be citizens.

Throughout the book Miskolcze frequently invokes

the idea of “American exceptionalism,” which, for example, she sees embodied in shipwreck narratives’ attention to the salvation of women and children (their rescue, she argues, was seen as “analogous to saving the exceptionalism of the nation” [p. 26]). She defines American exceptionalism using Wai-chee Dimock’s terms in *Empire for Liberty: Melville and the Poetics of Individualism* (1989), but would have been well served to freshen her list of scholarly sources, as critical attention to the notion of American exceptionalism has been a frequent focus of New Americanist work in recent years. And since American exceptionalism is a curious trope to invoke in terms of maritime history, which is necessarily transatlantic and transnational, the study under review would have been strengthened by more attention to other current scholarly conversations, as well. (I am thinking in particular of the fields of Black Atlantic and Atlantic World studies, which might stand in tension with some of Miskolcze’s claims about the status of the nation in sea literature.) Similarly, her attention to gender might have been further amplified by engagement with recent work on sentiment and sensation in nineteenth-century American literature. Miskolcze’s work is admirably ambitious in engaging with the critical categories of nation and gender, yet a more specific definition of such terms within the parameters of nineteenth-century American sea literature would have strengthened her claims.

In arguing that virtually all textual representations of women at sea reflect the United States in its putatively exceptional status, Miskolcze often makes presumptions—i.e., that the imperiled female body automatically stands in for the national body, or that the English female captivity victim would obviously appear as a source of American ethnic identification—that might strike a reader as unnecessarily broad, if not disputable. One wishes that she might have read some of her examples more playfully, or with more resistance, particularly in the final chapter on women disguised as sailors (in which she makes a compelling and necessary intervention into scholarship on James Fenimore Cooper). For Miskolcze, cross-dressed women’s function is to “teach men how to be men”; when “appearing as men, these women reveal a character that displays the personal and civic qualities necessary for the nation to claim its exceptional nature” (p. 132). She persuasively finds that “anxieties” over gender are at play in the surprisingly large body of sea literature featuring scenes of transvestism but might have reflected more upon the potential for pleasure (or subversion) that such roles would produce, both in the cross-dresser and in his fellow sailors.

While scholarly interest in sea literature and history has traditionally been scant, there is a current surge of new work in the field to which this study will certainly contribute. My desire for further close analysis and critical context is a testament to the promise of the arguments made in Miskolcze’s stimulating book.

HESTER BLUM
Penn State University

JOHN CRAIG HAMMOND. *Slavery, Freedom, and Expansion in the Early American West*. (Jeffersonian America.) Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 2007. Pp. xi, 245. \$35.00.

Thomas Jefferson famously described the Missouri Crisis (1819–1821) as a “firebell in the night,” but as John Craig Hammond suggests, the problem of slavery in the West had been smoldering since the 1780s. His book explores the contest over the status of slavery in the region that became Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Louisiana, and Missouri. Drawing from territorial and federal government records, western newspapers, and the correspondence of government officials and migrants, Hammond argues that the interplay between local and national politics explains why slavery was blocked in the Northwest Territories while it expanded in Louisiana and Missouri.

Key to the contest over slavery in the early national West was Article Six of the Northwest Ordinance, which prohibited slavery in the territory northwest of the Ohio River. Hammond does not dwell on the enactment of Article Six in 1787, which has been thoroughly analyzed by other scholars, but he does trace the struggle to preserve and enforce the prohibition in the territorial and state politics in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois over the next thirty years. Proslavery forces tried to roll back Article Six either through forthright attempts at repeal or, when those attempts met with opposition from Congress or popular resistance at the local level, through the subterfuge of indentured servitude. Among those who championed the proslavery forces was Indiana’s territorial governor William Henry Harrison, who had to do an abrupt about-face when he met with broad popular resistance to slavery.

Hammond shows that northwestern proslavery advocates faced an uphill battle wherever slavery emerged as a popular political issue. Indeed, democratic politics in the Old Northwest served as a crucible for antislavery ideas and feelings, hammered out and refined by ambitious politicians and newspaper editors. The antislavery coalition included evangelical abolitionists who regarded slavery as a sin and migrants from slaveholding states who were fleeing from its evil effects. They decried slavery as an aristocratic cancer on republican society, inimical to free labor and subversive of liberty. Article Six was their guiding star, or as Senator Benjamin Ruggles of Ohio put it, a “cloud by day and pillar of fire by night” (p. 158). Hammond finds surprisingly little racist prejudice in this phase of the northwestern antislavery movement; it seems to have been motivated by a genuine egalitarianism rather than a desire to exclude black people.

The balance of political power was different farther south. Article Six did not apply to the Southwest Territory, which became Tennessee, or to the Mississippi Territory, which became Mississippi and Alabama. After a vigorous debate, Congress allowed slavery with some restrictions in the Orleans Territory, the southernmost portion of the Louisiana Purchase, and essen-

tially punted on the status of slavery in Upper Louisiana so that local law authorizing slavery prevailed. Hammond argues that the decisive element in the failure of Congress to prohibit slavery in the southwestern territories was concern for the fragility of the Union. National policy makers recognized that the federal government was especially weak on the southwestern frontier, and they could not afford to alienate local slave-owning elites in the region.

This argument is a valuable addition to the historiography of early national state formation in the United States, which emphasizes the challenge of nation-building given the constraints of a relatively weak national-state apparatus. However, Hammond could have strengthened his point by offering a more robust analysis of the actual prospects of secessionism or irredentism in the southwestern and Louisiana Purchase territories. He offers no new evidence that slave-owning elites were really prepared to bolt if their concerns were not alleviated. What if an antislavery Congress had called their bluff? Where were they going to go?

The book under review also dovetails with recent scholarship resuscitating the antislavery reputation of the Democratic-Republican tendency in American politics. Challenging historians who emphasize Federalist antislavery, Hammond argues that it was northern Republicans who held the line against the expansion of slavery. In the Northwest, he argues, antislavery Republicans defended Article Six against erosion, and in Congress northern Republicans often took the lead in trying to block slavery’s expansion, as Representative James Tallmadge of New York did in the Missouri Crisis. Hammond’s argument raises the question of how southern Republicans like Jefferson managed to cast antislavery as a crypto-Federalist plot.

Hammond’s careful delineation of the emergent boundary between slavery and freedom in the western United States reminded me of a fragment from a little poem by William Blake that bears witness to the symbolic power of the Ohio River in the transatlantic imagination: “Tho born on the cheating banks of Thames / Tho his waters bathed my infant limbs / The Ohio shall wash his stains from me / I was born a slave but I go to be free.”

ADAM ROTHMAN
Georgetown University

L. DIANE BARNES. *Artisan Workers in the Upper South: Petersburg, Virginia 1820–1865*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 2008. Pp. xi, 253. \$37.50.

In this useful and nicely written monograph, L. Diane Barnes asserts that the Upper South had “a capitalist mentality and a strong and vibrant market economy” (p. 7). Its focus is Petersburg, Virginia, which emerged during the antebellum era as one of the key manufacturing centers in the slave states.

Located at the falls of the Appomattox River, Petersburg shared with nearby Richmond a location that combined both commercial and industrial potential.

The town relied first on tobacco marketing and manufacture. The Appomattox Canal made it the entrepôt for a tobacco-growing region that stretched west across Virginia's Southside. Twisting and flavoring tobacco plugs was a labor-intensive manual process. Access to waterpower then attracted flour and grist mills, which served the growing number of nineteenth-century Virginia farms that switched from tobacco to wheat or corn. Water-driven machinery also made it possible to manufacture cotton textiles, which processed locally grown fiber. By the 1850s Petersburg became an industrial center where steam engines, rail cars, and locomotives were manufactured. Five railroad lines converged there, as historians of the Civil War are well aware.

European immigrants and northern-born migrants contributed technological and entrepreneurial know-how that enabled Petersburg to prosper. But the bulk of its labor force was home grown. Almost half were African American. A majority of Petersburg's black workers were enslaved—often hired from overstocked rural slaveholders. So slavery proved compatible with urban life in this city, at least. But many of its black workers were free. No antebellum southern city had a higher proportion of free blacks than Petersburg. They lacked any political rights and faced legal and social restrictions. But they enjoyed greater economic opportunities than their counterparts in northern cities, who encountered more daunting racial barriers.

Barnes shows that skilled white artisans often adapted to the rapidly changing economic order. Her work joins others in raising questions about the pioneering scholarship of the 1970s and 1980s that depicted the prospects for skilled artisans in bleak terms. She notes too that southern white workers "gained a social equality based on race that was not available to northern mechanics" (p. 203). In exchange, they agreed not to challenge "the established order of slaveholding Virginia society" (p. 112). Barnes pays particular attention to the Petersburg Benevolent Mechanic Association (PMBA), which attracted an upwardly mobile urban middle class. Its members had artisan origins and still gave lip service to a republican producer ideology, but they had moved up to various capitalist endeavors and almost all owned or leased slave laborers. The PMBA functioned as a fraternal order and a source of short-term credit.

This book both builds on and contributes to several scholarly realms. Most previous writing on the rise of industrial capitalism focuses on northern towns and cities. Barnes shows that Petersburg's development paralleled the North in many respects. But she shows too how the South diverged. At the same time she rejects the idea of a southern monolith. Like historians William G. Shade, William W. Freehling, Edward L. Ayers, and Frank Towers, she depicts an Upper South that differed in major ways from the Lower South. In studying the lives of Petersburg's African Americans, Barnes stands on the shoulders of the pioneering black scholar, Luther Porter Jackson, who surmounted all the obsta-

cles to practice his craft in early twentieth-century Jim Crow Virginia.

Yet Barnes might have done more. Melvin Patrick Ely's prize-winning study of free blacks in Petersburg's hinterlands, *Israel on the Appomattox: A Southern Experiment in Black Freedom from the 1790s Through the Civil War* (2004), has a deeper research base. This reviewer also would have expected more on the lives and perspectives of women. After all, Petersburg provided the locale for Suzanne Lebsock's pioneering work in gender studies, *The Free Women of Petersburg: Status and Culture in a Southern Town, 1784–1860* (1984). And Barnes might have probed more deeply into political history.

The book concludes with a chapter on the Civil War, when Petersburg suddenly vaulted to the national spotlight. White Petersburg artisans rallied to the Confederate cause and thereby affirmed their solidarity with a doomed order. The wartime sequel is memorably recounted in A. Wilson Greene, *Civil War Petersburg: Confederate City in the Crucible of War* (2006).

DANIEL W. CROFTS
College of New Jersey

STEWART DAVENPORT. *Friends of the Unrighteous Mammon: Northern Christians and Market Capitalism, 1815–1860*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2008. Pp. x, 269. \$45.00.

Stewart Davenport offers a detailed and engaging intellectual history of the reception, defense, resistance, and adaptation to political economy at the dawn of the market revolution in the United States. With remarkable clarity he explicates the so-called "Adam Smith problem" and what was at stake for highly religious Americans in coming to terms with how self-interest and sympathy for others could be reconciled. Davenport helpfully divides the book into three parts and the mostly clerical thinkers on the moral tenability of capitalism into three types. The "clerical economists" were men like Brown University president Francis Wayland, who brought the dismal science into college curricula and pronounced it righteous. They saw political economy as revealing some of God's laws in an ordered universe, a strategy that also brought early natural science into these same church-sponsored colleges. A second group resisting political economic thought as pernicious and injurious to the soul and, especially, to the poor, Davenport calls "contrarians." His contrarians, Stephen Colwell and the early Orestes Brownson, provide some of the most trenchant insight into the agrarian and paternalist values that industry and commerce threatened in antebellum America. Industrial Britain, in particular, loomed large for the opponents of capitalism as an example of all the forms of human misery the new economic order could bring. Meanwhile, the "pastoral moralists" sought to resolve the problem in small ways and in particular situations by urging their readers and hearers to act virtuously within a system premised on the pursuit of self-interest. In sum, they

sought to adapt faithfulness to the new situation as best as they could imagine.

Davenport's felicity in introducing his writers means that their ideas are presented sympathetically and are rendered highly intelligible 150 to 200 years after their original presentation. Consequently modern readers will note the ways Davenport's three kinds of thinkers strikingly prefigure contemporary free market advocates, anti-globalization protesters, and advocates for the simple life or for keeping one's soul in a soulless system. Davenport's work is important in this sense: that readers are able to see in detail the basic positions adopted on the question of the morality of the market at the moment when it was dawning on Americans that there was a "new fashion" or "the rage," as they called the emerging economic arrangements.

Throughout his book, Davenport strongly asserts that his *characters* (always italicized following Alasdair MacIntyre's conception of the term)—clerical economists, contrarians, and pastoral moralists—embody the ethical traditions of utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue ethics, respectively. While these associations bring light to the arguments, they also create shadows to the extent that the pastoral moralists, for example, often employ the concept of duty in their cited writings. Likewise, the clerical economists would probably reject the label utilitarian (despite obvious affinities) insofar as they understood themselves to stand in the tradition of Scottish common sense moral philosophy. Fortunately Davenport provides ample evidence that his thinkers are more subtle and interesting than (or at least ambivalent with respect to) the boxes his analysis sometime places them in. Another set of heuristic categories proves more analytically successful, however, when Davenport engages faculty psychology, which all the groups employed, to sort out the relation of the morally superior faculty of conscience, the inferior faculty of the passions, and their respective relations to self-interest. Clerical economists associated self-interest with conscience, while contrarians associated it with passions. The pastoral moralists aligned conscience with self-interest but associated its close cousin selfishness with passions and sought to identify a line between rational self-interest and irresponsible selfishness.

This book is an outstanding contribution to American intellectual and religious history, with source notes and bibliography that demonstrate command of the historical materials on its subject. Davenport's determination to show that socio-intellectual concerns were more important to antebellum responses to the rise of market capitalism than were socioeconomic realities is largely supported by the historical record he uncovers. All of his writers spoke more of God, morality, right and wrong, than they did of railroads, banks, and canals. Still one observes that other socioeconomic factors appear to influence which intellectual responses Davenport's individual writers adopted. Is it mere coincidence that most of the clerical economists personally or institutionally benefited from the new economics? Or that the pastoral moralists principally attended to the

cure of souls of people who were trying to live in two worlds at one time? These are questions the reviewer wishes the author had engaged explicitly. Nevertheless, these questions and others can now be probed by historians because Davenport has rendered such an effective history of faith, morality, and political economy in the antebellum North.

JAMES HUDNUT-BEUMLER
Vanderbilt University

WILLIAM C. HARRIS. *Lincoln's Rise to the Presidency*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2007. Pp. xii, 412. \$34.95.

One of the enduring fruits of the bicentennial commemoration of Abraham Lincoln's birth in 2009 will be the new spate of outstanding biographies and monographs supplementing and reassessing what we know about the life and career of the 16th president of the United States and his place in our national history. Most of the new scholarship will address Lincoln's presidency, particularly his management of the Civil War and his leadership in moving the nation toward emancipation. A smaller number will add to our knowledge of Lincoln's pre-presidential life and contributions. William C. Harris's book is a standout in its thorough and meticulous determination to explain precisely how Lincoln rose, in little more than a decade, from virtual obscurity as a one-term, western congressman to head the Republican Party, win the presidency, and assume moral leadership of the nation during the Civil War and beyond.

The strength of Harris's approach is to capture, as Lincoln always strove to do, what is essential in his argument and discard the unnecessary. The result here is a meaty but taut narrative that focuses on the political imperatives that Lincoln confronted and eventually mastered in his quest to lead Illinois, and later the nation, to a principled yet workable opposition to slavery. Lincoln's political base in central Illinois required him to craft a moderate approach to ending slavery that promised eventual success while appealing simultaneously to racially conservative former Whigs and Democrats, nativist and anti-Catholic supporters of the Know Nothings, Protestant immigrants, especially German Americans, and radical proponents of abolitionism. In this training ground of sorts for national contention, Lincoln learned to stake out common ground, hold to it steadfastly, and lead with patience. The compromise position that Lincoln forged denounced slavery as a moral wrong that demanded eventual eradication and proclaimed the essential humanity of African Americans while eschewing any commitment to immediate social and political equality. Lincoln's approach, which Harris labels "progressive conservatism," depended on a commitment to the ideal of equality of opportunity that was grounded in the Founding Fathers' principles of republican government, as espoused most forcefully in the Declaration of Independence. Through his devotion to the nation's founding

ideals of equality, opportunity, and the ultimate extinction of slavery, Lincoln could assume the mantle of conservatism while quietly assembling the pieces of a political coalition that was dedicated to the eventual demise of the institution. The formula that Lincoln worked out and tested in Illinois proved the winning approach across the North and secured him the Republican nomination and election to the presidency in 1860. Harris reiterates that Lincoln's opposition to the extension of slavery contained the seeds of civil war but also credits the political skills Lincoln honed in Illinois during the 1850s with fostering his extraordinary leadership abilities to meet the crisis during his presidency.

In the best tradition of Don E. Fehrenbacher, whose masterful *Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850s* (1962) this book will substantially supplant, Harris keeps his eye fixed on the daunting political context that constrained and helped to shape the development of Lincoln's antislavery philosophy. In rich and authoritative detail, Harris leads the reader step-by-step along the same path that Lincoln took from Illinois's lone Whig congressional district, to Republican dominance of the state, and finally to his dramatic ascendance to leadership of the party and the nation. His analyses of the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lincoln's campaign for the nomination, the election of 1860, and the process of shaping an effective cabinet are particularly insightful. The result is an authentic and compelling portrait of Lincoln the politician working tirelessly to build a coalition against slavery in the only way that was workable in the Illinois, and quite probably the United States, of the 1850s.

In crafting this rich and judicious reassessment of Lincoln's political path to the presidency, Harris has shorn the broader social, cultural, and economic landscapes that Lincoln also navigated during his long personal and public rise, including his family life and legal career. But there is no finer nor fully rounded rendering of Lincoln's single-minded struggle to find, defend, and implement an effective and popular strategy for winning political power and ultimately ending slavery.

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Lincoln

CAROLINE E. JANNEY. *Burying the Dead but Not the Past: Ladies' Memorial Associations and the Lost Cause*. (Civil War America.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2008. Pp. xiii, 290. \$35.00.

In *The Southern Lady: From Pedestal to Politics, 1830-1930* (1970), Anne Firor Scott wrote that the Civil War emancipated not just black people but women as well. Subsequent scholars have questioned Scott's argument, holding that while southern white women did indeed escape the women's sphere during the war, they did so only temporarily and afterward returned to their antebellum roles.

In her study of Ladies' Memorial Associations in five Virginia cities, Caroline E. Janney resurrects Scott's ar-

gument. She finds that the southern white women joining the Ladies' Memorial Associations were intensely political, acting immediately after the war to perpetuate Confederate patriotism in the face of what they saw as Yankee aggression. They were political, she says, because they wielded "influence in their communities, state, or region" (p. 5). They began less than one month after General Robert E. Lee surrendered to General Ulysses S. Grant, when Mary Dunbar Williams and Eleanor Williams Boyd rallied women who had volunteered in the hospitals during the war to form a memorial society to bury the dead. The idea spread and within a year seventy memorial associations had formed. During the war women had sewn battle flags and nursed the Confederate wounded; caring for the dead allowed them to continue to demonstrate their patriotism. They used their work as an instrument of Confederate nationalism, Janney writes, cultivating the notion that southern whites constituted a distinct cultural group within the restored Union.

As evidence that the Ladies were Confederate nationalists and not merely sentimentalists, Janney points out that their male relatives often had not served in the Confederate Army. Upper and middle-class white women joined the Ladies' Memorial Associations not because they had been widowed by the war but to pursue their political agenda. They organized Memorial or Decoration Day celebrations. In some towns thousands gathered to march out to the cemetery where the Ladies decorated the graves. Orators, chosen by the Ladies, gave speeches. In the presence of U.S. Army occupation forces, the Ladies "consciously framed . . . blatant displays of Confederate patriotism within the domestic sphere of women" (p. 64). As women they could openly defy federal occupiers in ways men could not.

Perhaps more significantly, the Ladies formed a kind of surrogate Confederate government, Janney claims. In the absence of actual Confederate government, the Ladies built a bureaucracy that supervised the construction of memorials, recorded and dispensed burial information, and collected and distributed money. Janney never says so directly, but implicit in her argument for a Confederate shadow government is the idea that state and local governments functioned poorly or ineffectively throughout the nineteenth century. Absent from this story, those governments seem irrelevant.

The Ladies first faced serious resistance with the end of Reconstruction in Virginia in 1870. Male Confederate veterans could now openly celebrate their service to the Confederacy, challenging the Ladies for control of memorial activities. Former Confederate general Jubal A. Early proved especially troublesome. Early lit "fires of hostility" that led some to condemn him as a misogynist or a "woman hater" (p. 114). The women battled back and continued to dominate efforts to build Confederate memorials. As Janney points out, the Virginia landscape today would look quite different if not for the women's work.

Although they fended off Early and persisted even as Confederate veterans organized, the Ladies faced con-

tinuing challenges. In the 1870s memorial associations diminished. Janney blames economic hard times, but she acknowledges that women continued their benevolent work in other venues, especially in church associations. In the 1880s they rebounded, adding members. Here readers will pause to consider Janney's argument. In three of her cities, the total membership in Ladies' Memorial Associations during this renaissance totaled just 261 women. Janney also acknowledges that these new members closely resembled the founding generation. Born between the 1830s and the 1850s, they could remember the war themselves. Most had been members of earlier memorial associations. This renaissance was confined to a tiny—and aging—segment of the population; it is likely that most women hardly noticed.

The final challenge came in 1894, when a younger generation of white southern women organized the much larger United Daughters of the Confederacy. Unlike the elitist Ladies, the UDC women set an objective standard for admission: members had to prove they had an ancestor in the Confederate Army. This standard cut across class lines, leading to a different kind of organization than the postwar Ladies' Memorial Associations. The Ladies fought back, as they had when challenged by the men, but ultimately they could not win. Janney concludes by writing that the "devoted and persistent" Ladies "seeded the ground" for the more popular organizations that followed (pp. 198–199). They put in place the celebrations and rituals that persist today and attract increasing controversy.

This excellent and well-written book illuminates the work of an important group in the South's Lost Cause movement.

CHRISTOPHER WALDREP
San Francisco State University

JOAN MARIE JOHNSON. *Southern Women at the Seven Sister Colleges: Feminist Values and Social Activism, 1875–1915*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2008. Pp. 229. \$39.95.

Joan Marie Johnson presents a "collective biography" (p. 2) of unique Reconstruction-era collegians: southern white women who attended northern, single-sex "Seven Sister" colleges. Johnson ably mines school records, surveys, obituaries, diaries, personal letters, and autobiographies of over 1,000 "pioneers" (p. 9). The era of interest lies between 1875, when Smith College and Wellesley College were founded, to the World War I era, when higher education in the United States underwent drastic structural changes. The mix of gender expectations, regional allegiance, and campus climate makes for a lively but nuanced tale of complex identity formation. The women's stories reveal intricacies of (northern) higher education's clash of values with (southern) home training.

Chapters are arranged to follow the women's stories from their upbringing in the South, through the college experience, and then after graduation when most returned to the South. Chapter one, "The Benefits of a

Liberal Arts Education," situates the students in their home environment, and chapter two, "Entrance Requirements, Preparatory Departments and Schools, and Alumnae Networks," locates pipelines of college preparatory schools and feeder clubs. Although the girls are painted as privileged "belles," Johnson argues that those who chose to go north for college were a self-selected set of radical-minded women who sought social adventure, superior mental development, and broadened personal freedoms not available at their local or state institutions.

Chapters three and four, "From Homesick Southerners to Independent Yankees" and "Southern Clubs, Yankee Ways, and African American Classmates," reveal relationships with peers, faculty, staff, and administrators that challenged the newcomers intellectually and socially. They were forced to mature as they worked to overcome stereotypes that southern girls were "lazy" or only attended school to "find a husband" (pp. 84–85). In these two chapters especially, the quotes of women's self-definition and perception of their "damn Yankee" surroundings are priceless (p. 83).

The last chapters of the book, "The Marriage and Career Dilemma" and "The Activist," show the difficulties of re-entry into southern culture for those who had flown the coop. When they went north, most felt like awkward "misfits" (p. 69) who clung to their southern roots and culture, often stubbornly remaining "unreconstructed rebel girls" (p. 78). However, Johnson follows the young women after graduation as they entered into marriage and public life, where they realized how much they had grown beyond southern paradigms. There was a wide range of reactions to both leaving and returning, but overall, major questions loomed about family ties, suitable work, marriage, and motherhood. Johnson ends where she began, making the point that southern women with northern education employed "Yankee" ways of independence and activism in ways that demonstrated their local and regional loyalties to the South. They brought the academic lessons and feminist culture that strained southern restrictions of ladylike behavior to bear on the improvement of their homeland. Professional employment, community service, or organizing clubs like the Southern Association of College Women (SACW) scandalized some families where communities insisted upon adherence to the ideal of "Republican motherhood" (p. 15). Seven Sisters women formed the base of white women's support of women's suffrage (pp. 144–145) and boycotts against racial segregation (pp. 95, 106–107).

This book's major contribution to women's educational history lies in excavating the regional impact on the social development of race and gender. Individual identities, "family claim" (p. 127), and community norms (such as the status of a non-working socialite) had specific strictures for southern white women. Johnson provides detailed statistical representations of each school and from each state, though much weight rests on Kentucky, Tennessee, Maryland, and Texas, the

states that provided the most southern students to the Seven Sisters.

Johnson's argument that a disproportionate number of the southern women who attended northern schools became public leaders at home seems well grounded. Yet one wonders if southern women will not object to the portrayal of feminism in the South as inorganic. Other Reconstruction texts that raise issues of gender identity and public policy in the South might show otherwise and round out the picture drawn here. The thematic, disciplinary, regional, or gender-focused possibilities to connect with this text are limitless.

There are two slight drawbacks to the construction of the book. A brief overview of women's colleges in the introduction to set the stage would have been very helpful. Also, thematic headings only appear in chapter five; inclusion in each chapter would have smoothed the flow of information. Despite this small oversight, the book is a collective story well told.

Those interested in southern history will find much useful in the sources and nuances of historical figures' political interpretation. Those in the history of education can add this to the growing collection of race and gender studies about identity, institution type, and college attendance. Women's studies scholars—especially researchers of the construction of white womanhood—will certainly appreciate the depth of stories and the richness of the quantitative data. Perhaps the most apparent audience for this work is the alumni offices of the Seven Sister colleges. These institutional narratives through the eyes of southern girls and their families offer invaluable insight into the vibrant character of one very important demographic of their alumnae.

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GEORGE B. ELLENBERG. *Mule South to Tractor South: Mules, Machines, and the Transformation of the Cotton South*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 219. \$42.50.

In 1877 Michael Burns, a longshoreman and labor advocate from Galveston, Texas, told an agitated crowd of mostly African American laborers that "this country had been built up by the Irishman, the negro and the mule" (Robert S. Shelton, "'Built by the Irishman, the Negro, and the Mule': Labor Militancy across the Color Line in Post-Reconstruction Texas," *East Texas Historical Journal* 46:2 [2008]: 20–21). Historians, however, have not spent much time debating the mule's influence. George B. Ellenberg steps into this void and in doing so makes a significant contribution to southern history. He documents the lack of respect southerners afforded the mule initially but explains how cotton planters, farm owners, tenants, and sharecroppers alike came to depend on the animal. The dependency slowed mechanical adoption as southerners seemed hesitant to give up their mules in favor of tractors. Finally, during the 1950s the tractor supplanted the mule as the draft

source of choice across the cotton South. Not all saw the shift as positive. Some lamented the loss of traditional values that the mule symbolized and the intimacy between animals and their human handlers that draft animals facilitated.

Ellenberg discusses the ways in which southerners manipulated the mule to suit their needs, and how, in turn, mules helped define southerners' status and power, or lack thereof. He relies on major southern and agricultural journals, government publications, personal papers and reminiscences, literature and agrarian rhetoric to document the symbiotic relationship of mule and southerner. The evidence allows him to convey the contradictory perspectives of southern farmers, laborers, breeders, and boosters who both loved and loathed the ubiquitous mule.

The book begins with a brief overview of the unique nature of the mule as a hybrid, a product of genetic engineering, but it quickly moves to social historical and cultural issues. Ellenberg explains how planters, notably politicians such as George Washington and Henry Clay, experimented with mules and helped establish breeding programs in Virginia and Kentucky. Between the 1810s and the Civil War, mules symbolized planters' attempts to innovate. Tales about a mule's longevity, ability to survive on meager rations, superior intelligence compared to oxen or horses, and adaptability to plantation conditions helped sway many southern farmers to adopt them for cotton production. The Civil War resulted in a loss of as many as forty percent of mules in some states, and meeting the increased postwar demand forced breeders in Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and to some degree Texas to increase production.

A network of breeders and markets had to exist to ensure an adequate supply of the animals because farmers had to purchase new stock to replace their sterile animals. Mule breeding could be complicated, and southerners depended on regional rather than local markets to satisfy their needs. Ellenberg addresses this, but his survey lacks the detail possible in a state-based study. Walton C. Arnold's overview of breeding and mule sales in Texas provides evidence that supports Ellenberg's argument that mule owners depended on markets outside their region. Arnold argues that farmers in the Blackland Prairie preferred big strong animals that could plow central Texas soil, and this led breeders such as Joe Cavitt at Caufield Ranch to develop an animal to meet their needs. In contrast, the U.S. Army needed a more consistent supply of larger numbers of mules, and they depended on the St. Louis Stockyards, and after 1906, the Fort Worth Stockyards, to satisfy their demand. During the early to mid-1930s, however, the Caufield Ranch ceased mule breeding and the Fort Worth Stockyards closed its "Mule Alley" (see Arnold, "The Mule: The Workers that 'Can't Get No Respect,'" *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 92:1 [2008]: 36–50).

The closing of such regional markets prompted what Ellenberg calls the "golden age" of local mule breeding (p. 67). Farmers throughout the South had depended

on regional markets but during the late 1930s and early 1940s local breeding programs had to develop to meet the demand. They flourished due to aggressive publicly funded rural reform initiatives undertaken by agricultural extension agents and 4-H clubs and supported by special interest groups such as the Horse Association of America.

Ellenberg argues that southerners depended on mules to such a degree that they could not envision farms without them. As late as 1955, nearly 1.4 million southern farmers still had no tractors (p. 100). A majority of planters who bought tractors retained their horses, believing that mules could cultivate better than tractors (p. 113). Yet, as farmers in mule-breeding states adopted tractors, regional markets closed and farmers in other parts of the South had to adopt tractors (p. 119). By 1962 mules contributed so little to agricultural production that the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Statistical Reporting Service ceased counting them (p. 126).

In general, Ellenberg makes a major contribution to understanding the mule in social and cultural context. Society constructed the hybrid work animal initially, and the animal in turn influenced southern society. While mules may have symbolized backwardness, Ellenberg explains how mules really drove modernization in the cotton South for nearly 150 years. Ultimately, this book helps us understand the contested nature of modernization and the mixed responses to it.

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ROBERT W. LARSON. *Gall: Lakota War Chief*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 2007. Pp. xvi, 301. \$24.95.

Gall (ca. 1840–1894) was a band chief and prominent warrior of the Hunkpapa tribe of Lakotas (the Teton or Western Sioux). He is remembered primarily for the detailed account of the Battle of the Little Big Horn that he gave in 1886, ten years after that famous event, and for the striking, often-reproduced photographs of him taken by David F. Barry. Written sources on Gall's life are sparse and he is often mentioned only in conjunction with Sitting Bull, the most prominent and best-documented of the Hunkpapa chiefs. This work is not a biography, but a history of the Northern Sioux. Since he was for most of his life closely associated with Sitting Bull, the book covers much the same ground as Robert M. Utley's *The Lance and the Shield: The Life and Times of Sitting Bull* (1993). Characterizing Gall as "the Fighting Cock of the Sioux"—an epithet said to have been bestowed on him by U.S. soldiers—Robert W. Larson focuses on Gall's engagements with the army and with enemy tribes, even though he frequently has to qualify his account as conjecture. The overuse of such words as "probably," "arguably," and "may have" is jarring.

Larson depicts Gall as a fearless warrior and repetitively characterizes Sitting Bull as his "mentor," with Gall serving as the chief's "lieutenant." However, dur-

ing the Hunkpapas' exile in Canada following the Little Big Horn, the two men ultimately disagreed on strategy. Larson interprets Gall as placing the welfare of his band members ahead of his commitment to continuing the buffalo-hunting way of life that depended on the fast-dwindling herds. Pragmatically, in the winter of 1880 he led his people back to the U.S. to surrender to the army at Fort Buford, causing a permanent rift with Sitting Bull. The story of the surrender is told in the book's opening chapter. It was a bungled affair. Gall was apparently undecided as to acceptable terms of surrender, which led to a military attack on his village and the treatment of his people as prisoners of war.

After the Hunkpapas were settled on Standing Rock Reservation in spring 1881, Larson argues that Gall became a "realist," content to cultivate his fields by day and smoke in his cabin at night (p. 188). In 1889 he was appointed a judge of the Court of Indian Offenses. He settled his people near Saint Elizabeth's mission and school, run by the Episcopal Church, sent his children there to be educated, and was himself baptized there in 1892. He died in 1894, suffering ill health from old wounds and the effects of obesity.

Larson has done extensive research for this book, using a vast array of primary and secondary material. Much of the narrative, however, is built on secondary sources. Moreover, the author shows a lack of discrimination in his use of sources. Some on which he depends heavily—for example, Charles Eastman and Josephine Wagoner—require careful assessment and corroboration. As a simple example, Larson (p. 146) quotes from Wagoner the Lakota name for Captain Anson Mills, *Jirug Narya*, "Burns Lodges"; in fact, the name is *Ti rug-nagya*. Somewhere along the way the original handwriting has been misread. Further, the book lacks any systematic way of writing Lakota words.

The narrative is marred by minor errors. It begins with a summary of the usual misconceptions about the Seven Council Fires (p. 18), a claim unsupported by historical data. Lakota women's "quilting" is clearly a mistake for "quilling," that is, decorative work with porcupine quills. Gall was not the "first major Indian participant" to give an account of the Battle of the Little Big Horn (p. 123). The *chanku wakan* "sacred road" is not the road to Canada (p. 155) but is the international boundary. Crazy Horse is fatally shot (p. 160), but his death is later correctly attributed to bayonet wounds (p. 177). Agent James McLaughlin is blamed for banning the Sun Dance at Standing Rock (p. 186), but that ban was in fact imposed by the Office of Indian Affairs.

Larson has missed at least two major opportunities in this book. Although he alludes throughout to Gall's skill as an orator, he does not reproduce any of his speeches or give close readings of them. Yet the records exist and would add an important dimension to understanding Gall as a personality. Moreover, Larson considers Gall as a culture broker, but he minimizes discussion of what must be considered as Gall's most important contribution: establishing the community of Wakpala as a place where his people could make a live-

lihood and learn to transition to reservation life in the years ahead. Documentation of that story is not easy to come by, but it can be found in written records and reconstructed from the stories still told today.

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BARBARA BERGLUND. *Making San Francisco American: Cultural Frontiers in the Urban West, 1846–1906*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2007. Pp. xviii, 294. \$34.95.

Barbara Berglund claims in the preface to this fascinating study that she provides a different kind of history of San Francisco, one that moves beyond familiar stories. On this, she delivers. Although we travel through recognizable terrain—the gold rush, Chinatown, and world's fairs—we are also introduced to new characters and venues that even the scholar of California history may find surprising. This book argues that cultural frontiers are central to the project of nation making and the politics of nationalism. As the author explains, “the ordering processes that occurred on the cultural ground . . . were every bit as far-reaching, profound, and integral to nation-making as the military and political conquest of the 1840s” (p. 15). If we hope to understand how San Franciscans “understood their differences and translated them into social hierarchies” after the gold rush, we must look to restaurants, hotels, boarding-houses and places of amusement, the city's cultural frontiers (p. 2). For those interested in how race, class, and gender are constructed in the West's largest city, these sites are crucial.

From the outset, this study takes on some of the age-old, and now tired, myths that have attached themselves to San Francisco, one of the most problematic being that the male societies created by the gold rush resulted in greater freedom for women. While skewed sex ratios may indeed have disrupted normative gender roles, Berglund is careful to note that “dominant ideologies of white womanhood . . . were in good working order [in San Francisco] and perhaps even intensified under the strain” (p. 29). This point is well-taken. In spite of several important works on gender and post-gold rush California (Susan Lee Johnson's work comes to mind), a simplistic understanding of gender has held sway for too long.

Berglund is especially adept at demonstrating the ways private life spills into the public and commercial realms. San Franciscans, in the second half of the nineteenth century, lived publicly and played publicly, and the author does a superb job of showing the reader what that looks like and why it matters. In fact her chapter on “vicious and virtuous amusement” is probably her most insightful in addition to being an entertaining read. The sex trade on the Barbary Coast is a topic many authors have described in lurid detail, but few have made sense of it. Here, through very creative use of police records and material aimed at tourists, the au-

thor shows the ways this vice district is simultaneously encouraged and contained. The dangers of the Barbary Coast for civic leaders, according to this study, lay in the cross-class and cross-racial alliances (or dalliances) that such a district fostered. But unlike other nineteenth-century cities, San Francisco did little to regulate prostitution, hoping, perhaps, to use the Barbary Coast—like the city's Chinatown—to attract crowds and tourists seeking dangerous pleasures.

San Francisco's Chinatown, like the Barbary Coast, tells us about larger projects of nation making and the significance of racial meanings in that process. While a survey of tourist literature provides a useful lens through which we can experience the tourist gaze, this is a place where the construction of race could be explored further. What do all these visits to Chinese restaurants, theaters, and opium dens add up to? The author is careful to point out that white tourists were often disgusted by, and attracted to, the inhabitants of Chinatown. In fact, she argues that the wariness of white tourists in the district's restaurants “echoed and reinforced the prevailing distaste for incorporating Chinese immigrants into the American fold” (p. 117). But feelings about foodways are different from the class tensions that exacerbated the anti-Chinese movement, and I wonder if a more thorough discussion of the politics of that movement might help illuminate what is the same and what is different about a cultural frontier like Chinatown and a sizable political movement (that was, after all, headquartered in San Francisco).

Some of my favorite parts of this book take us to nineteenth-century sites very few historians—if any—have explored. The Mechanics' Institute Fairs, of which there were thirty-one, show us the pageantry of labor in the service of progress and white supremacy. It is here, and in the discussion of the California Midwinter Exposition of 1894, that the process of making San Francisco American is best articulated. That process necessitated a widespread effort to contain “wild west” elements of the city and harness the language of work, science, and civilization in order to erect the kinds of boundaries and hierarchies that would come to define the city. This study should inspire readers to ask more questions about national identity and how it is shaped in particular places and particular times; and this inspiration is welcome indeed.

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MATTHEW KLINGLE. *Emerald City: An Environmental History of Seattle*. (The Lemar Series in Western History.) New Haven: Yale University Press. 2007. Pp. xix, 344. \$30.00.

If the United States of America is “nature's nation,” then Seattle is a top contender to be “nature's city.” Located on an isthmus between Lake Washington and Puget Sound and lying within the shadow (when the sun breaks through) of Mount Rainier, Seattle has a reputation for being a lifestyle environmentalist's paradise,

an “emerald city”—to invoke one of the city’s marketing slogans—set in a natural region. That perception is both the subject and the foil for Matthew Kingle in his excellent new study. Combining urban and environmental methodologies and questions, Kingle makes two big points about Seattle’s history. First, he emphasizes how constructed the city is: how much bodily and mechanical work has gone into transforming the Seattle landscape over the course of more than a century, as well as how much cultural work went into the city’s modern image. Second, and of more consequence, Kingle argues that all of this work had not only dramatic environmental consequences but profound social ones as well, particularly for Seattle’s most marginal residents.

The book portrays Seattle’s urban history as a palimpsest. After an opening chapter on Native American land use and the disruptions that came with early nineteenth-century settlement, Kingle provides two compelling chapters about landscape transformation and the making of private property. Chapter two focuses on the filling of tidelands along what had been a waterfront commons and the reengineering of the city’s many waterways. Chapter three provides a fascinating discussion of the aggressive regrading of Seattle’s hilly topography and the construction of a modern sanitary infrastructure in the city. In both chapters, Kingle insists that “manipulating nature to create landscapes of property and profit often amplified human social divisions by yielding an unstable and hazardous new environment” (p. 85). Second nature often bit back.

Kingle then turns to the history of Seattle’s urban parks and the subsequent development of the city as a mecca for exurban outdoor recreation. Chapter four looks at the parks system designed for the city by John C. Olmsted and the political and social contests over how these spaces were developed and used, while chapter five moves from urban to regional outdoor recreation and the processes whereby the city’s flanking scenery became both a consumer commodity and a part of the city’s identity. Particularly noteworthy in the latter chapter are discussions of the Mountaineers, Seattle’s variant on the Sierra Club; the Co-operative Campers, a socialist group forged in the crucible of Seattle’s radical post-World War I era that morphed into the consumer cooperative Recreational Equipment Inc. (REI); and the early career of an outing goods retailer named Eddie Bauer. Together, these two chapters suggest just how Seattle got its “metronatural” (another, more recent marketing slogan) reputation, though Kingle is appropriately critical of the ways in which more space for play cut off critical parts of the landscape to those who relied upon them for the work of subsistence. Chapter six adds to that criticism by exploring what Kingle calls the “unnatural ecology of urban poverty” during the Depression era, and particularly the ways in which the poorest urban denizens ended up in the lowest and most hazardous parts of the landscape.

If urban parks and exurban outdoor recreational

spaces defined Seattle’s environmental image in the first half of the twentieth century, the Hoovervilles notwithstanding, then the emergence of Seattle as an environmentalist city defined much of its postwar history. In chapter seven, Kingle examines the development of a movement to curb water pollution in 1950s Seattle. Indeed, he shows that the ecological restoration of Lake Washington was both an important moment in the making of postwar environmentalism and a mixed success. Using the new tools of ecologists and a new form of metropolitan political authority, Seattle’s leaders cleaned up Lake Washington to a remarkable degree, though at the expense of shifting pollution to the Duwamish River and into the backyards of those with the least power to object. Restoration for some became degradation for others. Chapter eight—which begins by invoking Ernest Callenbach’s wooden but instructive vision of the Pacific Northwest as *Ecotopia*—examines the politics of salmon restoration in the late twentieth century and the ways in which urban salmon fetishism, persisting Native American fishery claims, the city’s watershed protection needs, a vocal wilderness protection movement, the desires of sport fishers, and the technological panacea of hatcheries interacted to create heated debates and strange political alliances in the city of Microsoft, Starbucks, and Amazon.com. The city named for Chief Seeathl confronted the fullness of its social and environmental history.

The book under review is an urban environmental history with a commitment to social and environmental justice at its core, but Kingle also does a remarkable job of touching on and incorporating other critical themes in urban environmental historiography, from parks and pollution to the built environment and city-country interconnections. As such, it is a model for future scholars to follow. But Kingle ends an otherwise satisfying book with a risky gambit: in his epilogue, he offers a manifesto on the need for a new ethic of place. To the extent that all history writing is an exercise in ethical clarification, this is an admirably honest move. But Kingle is only partly successful in explaining and defending this new ethic, and that modest success in turn deflects attention from what is otherwise a terrific history of environment and society interwoven in place.

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JOHN C. PUTMAN, *Class and Gender Politics in Progressive-Era Seattle*. (The Urban West Series.) Reno: University of Nevada Press. 2008. Pp. xi, 296. \$39.95.

This book is a welcome addition to the literature on Progressive politics in the American West. John C. Putman makes several important and often overlooked points about the West during this period. First, the romanticized version of the “Wild West” obscures the extent to which the phenomena of industrialization, urbanization, and immigration rapidly transformed the region in the late nineteenth century, leading to many of the same problems that affected the eastern United

States during this time. Second, the labor movement was actively involved in Progressive-era reform, not simply the target of middle-class reformers worried about potential working-class radicalism. Third, working-class women stood at the intersection between the labor and women's movements and were active in reform measures that affected both populations. Putnam's study does a great service in providing a detailed case study of these developments in the city of Seattle, Washington.

The book's five chapters recount the early history of Seattle, working-class political activity, two chapters on gender politics (one focused on the successful woman suffrage campaign of 1910 and the other on the female post-suffrage activism), while the final chapter concentrates on the years just before World War I. Putnam argues that vigorous early political activity by working-class people and women helped define the political environment of the city, but that growing concerns about labor radicalism thwarted many of their initiatives, especially in the final years of the study. His discussion begins with anti-Chinese agitation followed by repeated episodes in which working-class political alliances and parties confronted middle-class "law and order" or "good government" groups who accused their opponents of radical and violent tendencies. These were not simply conservative reactionaries; they were often labor's erstwhile Progressive allies. To a certain degree the Seattle labor movement *was* influenced by radicals, socialists, and the Socialist Labor Party in the late nineteenth century, and by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) after 1905. As Putnam reminds us, the labor movement was not a unified group. There were major differences between a large group of usually unskilled, often transient, and predominantly male workers and more settled skilled craftsmen who tended to be more politically moderate and worried that radicalism could be used to discredit the labor movement as a whole—which it was.

Putnam's exploration of the roles women played in the city's politics, both in alliance and in conflict with the labor movement is thorough, but not particularly original. Progressive women reformers have received much attention generally, and the activities of Seattle working-class women have been analyzed previously by other scholars, including Dana Frank, Maurine Weiner Greenwald, and Dorothy Sue Cobble. Putnam is correct that working-class women were the center of the interaction between labor and gender politics, but just how that worked in practice, and what exactly constituted their "brand of feminism," are not always very clear. It is true that women are not always easy to find in the historical record, but focusing primarily on middle-class women in discussions of gender politics reinscribes the idea that "labor" means men and "women" means middle-class reformers, although the status of working-class women was often the basis for the arguments of both groups.

This problem affects Putnam's account of the 1910 woman suffrage campaign. His main focus is on the ac-

tivities of middle-class suffragists, particularly those allied with the state suffrage association president, Emma Smith DeVoe. The book includes brief descriptions of suffrage activity by working-class women, but mostly the story is about the efforts of middle-class woman to create a cross-class coalition by appealing to labor and other progressive organizations largely dominated by men. Putnam is partial to DeVoe and dismissive of another leader, May Arkwright Hutton of Spokane. This is unfortunate for two reasons. First, Putnam does not challenge allegations made by DeVoe's supporters that Hutton had a past record of "immorality" (i.e., prostitution), although they could provide no evidence. Second, Hutton consistently identified with working-class women, so an important voice for their interests is silenced.

The question of what enfranchised women did with their votes is a very important one, and Putnam correctly notes that achievements on the state level have been neglected by studies that focus on national suffrage. Nevertheless, this account continues to focus on middle-class women. Putnam does address how labor women hoped that suffrage would help them obtain an eight-hour day law—which it did. On this issue women of both classes shared a common cause, but not necessarily for the same reasons. Middle-class women tended to focus on connections between low wages and prostitution, which often offended working-class women who felt that they were being subjected to narrow middle-class prescriptions about female morality. They were particularly upset when vice campaigns left them unemployed. Working women surely registered and voted, but did they support the successful effort of a middle-class coalition of women and Progressive reformers to recall the mayor, Hiram C. Gill, who was accused of being too tolerant of vice? Without a gendered breakdown of the vote, it is impossible to determine.

In summary, this book provides a very useful case study of Progressivism in a major western city. If the analysis is sometimes limited, the author deserves credit for tackling some tough problems, providing a useful synthesis, and demonstrating ways in which additional studies can further illuminate our understanding of this important topic.

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ROBERT W. TUCKER. *Woodrow Wilson and the Great War: Reconsidering America's Neutrality, 1914–1917*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 2007. Pp. xv, 246. \$39.50.

In this fine book, Robert W. Tucker succeeds in examining Woodrow Wilson's pursuit of U.S. neutrality from the beginning of the Great War in 1914 to his recommendation to Congress of a declaration of war against imperial Germany in 1917. Tucker notes the fundamental dilemma facing the president as he sought both to keep the United States out of the European war and to

protect America's neutral rights. On the one hand, protecting its neutral rights might require the United States to resort to war against either the United Kingdom or Germany, which would sacrifice American isolation. Adhering to its nineteenth-century tradition of isolation from Europe might, on the other hand, require the United States to sacrifice its neutral rights. More clearly than other authors—and herein lies the most original aspect of the book—Tucker explores this fundamental dilemma. His deep understanding of traditional international law relating to neutrality enables him to recognize Wilson's selective insistence on U.S. rights on the high seas as he acquiesced in the British blockade but not in German submarine warfare. More than his Secretary of State Robert Lansing and his close adviser Edward M. House, Wilson genuinely wanted to stay out of the European war, believing that the United States had no real interest in the particular conditions of peace in Europe. Even after he allowed House to explore mediation between the Allies and the Central Powers in 1915–1916 and announced his own peace initiative in December 1916, Wilson reaffirmed that the belligerents should negotiate those conditions among themselves. The threat to U.S. neutral rights, especially from German submarines, had led the president to explore these possibilities for ending the war, recognizing, paradoxically, that limited diplomatic intervention might be the best or only way to enable the United States to keep out of the European war and thus maintain its isolation.

Tucker's originality, ironically, comes from his reaffirmation of an older interpretation. Some other scholars have viewed Wilson's diplomacy from 1914 to 1917 from the perspective of the U.S. belligerency in 1917–1918 or the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 or the Wilsonian legacy throughout subsequent decades. Because they know that he later became the champion of the League of Nations—i.e., American internationalism—they have frequently given too little credence to his genuine, if flawed and ambivalent, attempt to isolate the United States from the European war and to protect its neutral rights. This has often distorted their perspectives on Wilson. By avoiding this error and keeping him in the historical context of 1914–1917, Tucker's analysis is a welcome corrective. He writes: "Wilson went to war in defense of neutral rights. The oldest explanation of America's entrance in World War I remains the most satisfactory" (p. 204). This conclusion derives from Tucker's clear focus on the immediate context of 1914–1917.

Throughout the book, Tucker accomplishes his purpose: "My aim in this study is not to provide yet another comprehensive general account of the years of neutrality but rather to examine in depth some key issues and episodes of this period" (p. x). He offers generally persuasive critiques of other scholarship on Wilson and U.S. neutrality, including Arthur S. Link's multivolume biography of the president, Patrick Devlin's *Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality* (1974), and John W. Coogan's *The End of Neutrality: The United States,*

Britain, and Maritime Rights, 1899–1915 (1981). Tucker partially agrees with them but also notes his differences.

Keeping his focus on U.S. neutrality, Tucker recognizes the fundamental shift in Wilson's thinking in 1917 when he called for war against Germany to make the world safe for democracy. "The war message to Congress thus marked the beginning of a new Woodrow Wilson. The old Wilson had seen the war as essentially a conflict to determine who would dominate" (p. 196). In contrast, Tucker writes: "The war address held out a new understanding of the meaning and significance of the great conflict. What had been a struggle for power now became a conflict between democracy and autocracy" (p. 197). Thus, Wilson's wartime crusade for democracy was fundamentally different from his earlier pursuit of U.S. neutrality and isolation from the Old World.

General readers and specialists alike will benefit from Tucker's contribution to the historical literature on U.S. foreign policy during the Great War. This book, which is based on solid research and clearly written, offers a persuasive interpretation of the factors that culminated in President Wilson's decision for war against Germany in 1917, despite his earlier attempts to keep the United States out of the European war and protect its neutral rights.

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CHRISTOPHER CAPOZZOLA. *Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of the Modern American Citizen*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2008. Pp. 334. \$34.95.

When America declared war against Germany in April 1917, the Wilson administration needed quickly to build an army of millions and transport it an ocean away. This daunting challenge justified an unprecedented expansion of federal power, as the government conscripted men and money, ran the railroads, mediated labor disputes, and in countless ways asserted a new authority over American society.

In a nicely written survey of the American home front, Christopher Capozzola explores one dimension of war mobilization: the government's attempt to ensure patriotic support for the war. That task was urgent because public opinion was deeply divided, and many labor radicals, pacifists and immigrants felt no obligation to join the fight. To wage war the state not only made unprecedented demands on Americans but took unprecedented steps to secure their loyalty, including a powerful propaganda campaign and a legal crackdown on dissenters and "slackers."

Capozzola shows us that, in addition to such overt displays of state power, the administration mobilized Americans through their traditional networks of voluntary associations. In 1917 many Americans distrusted federal power and felt more keenly their obligations to their communities. The Wilson administration did not

replace these local centers of authority but used them to rouse and channel enthusiasm for the war, and to threaten those who failed to join in.

Tracing the activities of voluntary organizations, Capozzola paints a rich portrait of America's complex and decentralized political culture, while showing how these groups enhanced the federal government's power to wage war. He surveys the activities of local draft boards and the volunteer spies of the American Protective League, the women's clubs that knitted socks, promoted food conservation, and filled the ranks of the YMCA, and the home guards and vigilance groups that enforced vice laws, punished labor organizers, and kept a watchful eye on immigrants suspected of divided loyalty.

When surveillance, peer pressure and patriotic hoopla failed to inspire neighbors to do their patriotic duty, community vigilance gave way to vigilantism, the dark side of democratic self-government. While the stories of wartime lynchings, assaults, and deportations are familiar, Capozzola helpfully reminds us that these were not just the momentary, irrational acts of a nation gripped by war fever. Rather, they were expressions of a traditional and widely practiced method of social control that the author calls "coercive voluntarism."

While the Wilson administration used voluntary organizations to extend the state's reach, the author suggests that this was a symbiotic relationship. By serving the war effort, those groups working to promote library circulation, quell labor unrest, or battle vice enhanced their own power. And the author shows that this struggle over the new meaning of Americans' citizenship obligations was, in the overused parlance of our own time, "contested." Those fighting for women's suffrage and the rights of workers and minorities had their own voluntary organizations, many formed long before the war, and they entered the wartime debate over the meaning of citizenship eager to advance their causes.

Capozzola makes a convincing case that those who fought to impose loyalty on war dissenters drew on the values of a nineteenth-century political culture more concerned with "obligations" than with individual rights. This emphasis, however, produces a picture of the American home front that is largely devoid of principled political discussion about the nation's war aims. Those brave enough to resist the public demand for loyalty appear to stand on principles, but the ideological commitments of the vast majority of Americans who supported the war are less clearly drawn. Many longed for the comfort of national unity in a time of world crisis, and some lashed out against dissenters with a suspicious and furious passion. But the author's focus on the majority's attempt to impose loyalty leads him to pay less attention to the principles and ideals that animated those who were inspired by Wilson's crusade to remake the world in America's image.

Capozzola argues that the process of war mobilization had lasting effects on the nature of American citizenship, "part of a massive and sometimes contradictory restructuring of the relationship between

Americans and state power." The war enhanced the federal government's authority, even as liberals and radicals learned to better defend the civil liberties of those who chose to defy the state's attempt to coerce individual conscience. The war's effect on the culture's tradition of voluntarism is equally complex. The war gave these groups unprecedented power, but in the end their excesses undermined their legitimacy. The use of mob violence to impose patriotic obligation gave way to new, more centralized and supple forms of political authority: a federal state less dependent on voluntary citizen groups to define obligations and impose order, balanced by an "emerging culture of rights."

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GABRIELA F. ARREDONDO. *Mexican Chicago: Race, Identity, and Nation, 1916–39*. (Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Centennial Series.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2008. Pp. xii, 255. Cloth \$60.00, paper \$25.00.

Situating herself as a recent addition to the second generation of Chicana/o historians who entered the field in the 1980s and 1990s, Gabriela F. Arredondo pursues an autobiographical positioning that informs her study. Her middle-class parents met in Chicago but moved to Mexico before she was born. As a young girl she moved with her family to Texas, where her schoolmates questioned her being Mexican but not her middle-class identity or her gender. When it was time to pursue graduate studies, Arredondo headed to Chicago to discover identities among the first generation of immigrants from Mexico between 1916 and 1939. Focusing on questions of being, she engages theories of ethnicity as applied to European immigrants and theories of race as applied to African Americans and finds both wanting.

Arredondo begins by examining Mexicans' journey northward and finds that their migration experiences, or paths to the city, differed from those of their predecessors, having been more diverse, typically unplanned, and filled with stops along the way. Few people expected to remain permanently given Mexico's proximity, and of those who did almost none became naturalized citizens. Arredondo then looks at the groups with whom Mexicans interacted in the Chicago neighborhoods where they clustered. Because their numbers were insufficient to be predominant in any single setting they lived among European immigrants and African Americans. She then examines adjustment to the city by Mexican immigrants and the expectation that they would assimilate in the manner of their European immigrant neighbors. But their experiences differed, as most came without families and usually held short-term jobs. Furthermore, during interactions with neighbors, co-workers, providers of social services, and the police, Mexican immigrants encountered rising prejudice and discrimination that blocked their attempts to whiten. As a result of their apparent failure to assimilate they

were portrayed as a problem. Arredondo then turns to internal divisions, or striations, among Mexicans, particularly by gender, class, and socialization, to demonstrate that Mexicans were less inclined to unite collectively than European immigrants. She finally looks at how Mexicans resolved their identity crisis, profoundly influenced by their local environment and by the Mexican Revolution, by becoming Mexican rather than American, as did most Europeans, or Mexican American, as did Mexicans in much of the Southwest. At the same time, understanding the implications of the dominant racial binary, they successfully fought against becoming black. The process of becoming Mexican, she concludes, was complicated, contradictory, and uneven.

As the first scholarly book on the history of Mexicans in Chicago, this volume enriches a substantial body of literature in Chicana/o urban history. It derives evidence largely from the same sources as earlier studies of Chicago, particularly the outstanding 1976 dissertation of Louise Año Nuevo Kerr. However, it stands out from other publications by its consciously middle-class focus and concern with identity issues, particularly pertaining to race, nation, and gender. Rather than the systemic and collective issues that preoccupied an earlier generation of scholars, Arredondo's focus, from which many of her conclusions follow, is on individuals and emphasizes division and distinction. At times the interpretations are problematic. In discussing paths of migration, she argues that earlier studies neglect the importance of adventure, rather than more mundane factors like labor recruitment, pressure for survival, or sustenance, as a motivating factor in explaining migration. Even actors who asserted that they were motivated by a desire for adventure were simultaneously influenced by other factors. Mexicans developed an adventurous spirit in significant numbers for only three years during World War I, and then for about five years in the mid-1920s. They were not adventurous again until the 1940s, instead moving in massive numbers out of Chicago between 1920 and 1922 and between 1929 and 1933. A disproportionate number of individuals speaking in the documents, including the most adventurous, identified with the numerically small middle class. Another example comes from conclusions about divisions with other groups in which the author argues that Mexicans had better relations with Italians than any other immigrant group. It does not resonate with testimony by some Mexicans that Italians were the most prejudiced of all, reinforced by later Mexican experiences in the Chicago suburb of Cicero. Still another case in point, Arredondo accepts arguments that Mexicans were not inclined to join unions. This widespread stereotype was used to stir anti-Mexican and anti-African American sentiment among working-class Europeans. The author does not consider that the stereotype served employers well. Furthermore, by the 1940s both African Americans and Mexicans gained reputations as loyal union members who were inclined to collective aspirations. Such examples of conclusions based on small samples or individual statements while neglecting

to read documents against each other detract from an otherwise valuable study.

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DAN STREIBLE. *Fight Pictures: A History of Boxing and Early Cinema*. Foreword by CHARLES MUSSER. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2008. Pp. xix, 396. \$24.95.

Dan Streible's book comes packaged with ringing endorsements from both academia and Hollywood. Film historian Charles Musser describes Streible's "much-awaited work" (p. xiv) as part of "a second wave of scholars working on important aspects of early cinema" (p. xv). Director Martin Scorsese, in his blurb for the back cover, applauds Streible's "definitive account of the complex fascination these first films exerted." Thus framed, the text under review carries a hefty obligation to meet both the rigors of scholarship and the publisher's hope for a wide-reaching book. To these ends, Streible is successful. The author, however, does encounter some historiographical hurdles.

Streible is a fine writer and a generous storyteller. He culls years of archival and film research in order to portray the early motion picture industry's active participation in producing boxing films. He moves easily between chapters (portions of which have been previously published) as he marshals a wealth of information to make the case for the significance of a neglected genre. The lost film is Streible's *succès d'estime* in academia where his "orphan film" project has rescued a cache of material film culture. This book demonstrates in historical form the author's commitment to this endeavor. Its filmography is thus invaluable.

At the outset Streible plots three methodological areas in which he attends his subject: "cinema studies, sports history, and social history" (p. 4). He draws out the "connection between motion pictures and boxing" to establish the way in which "both institutions sought to exploit" and, simultaneously, "shed the other's sometimes tainting influence" (p. 23). For a sporting industry that was at one time illegal in all fifty states, it remained a popular spectacle of huge proportion. And, as the book makes clear, the cinema played no small part in its appeal. Richly illustrated with a relevant selection of sketches, film grabs, and popular advertisements, Streible's institutional history is firmly presented.

The first half of the text guides us through the "precinematic antecedents" of fight films (p. 26), inventor William Kennedy Laurie Dickson's Kinetograph experiments in Thomas Edison's "Black Maria" film production studio, the resurrection of the "cinematic landmark," the film *Corbett-Fitzsimmons Fight* (p. 52), and, fascinatingly, a history of "fake fight films." His detailed recounting directs fresh light on such industry figures as Siegmund Lubin as well as the lesser-known Miles brothers. Two later and substantial chapters explore the African American fighter Jack Johnson. Tracing the boxer's career and the grotesque racism he confronted,

Streible outlines the film industry's commandeering of the black sportsman and the subsequent impact his representation had on white cultural anxieties about race and manhood. As Johnson's career declined and finally fell at the hands of the white boxer Jesse Willard in 1915—duly recorded on film—the press cheered that Willard “restored pugilistic supremacy to the white race” (p. 253). In a deft piece of research, Streible further links Johnson's decline with D. W. Griffith's *The Birth of a Nation* (1915).

It is disappointing, therefore, when Streible hastily glosses over Theodore Roosevelt's relationship to these events. While Roosevelt's actions were racially heinous indeed during the Brownsville affair (1906) and elsewhere, African Americans remained fond of the statesman for a range of reasons (consider the encomiums provided by African American filmmaker Oscar Micheaux in *Within Our Gates* [1920]). When the former president died in 1919, several African American newspapers eulogized “the Colonel” with glowing remembrances. It is a complicated tale. Had Streible more thoroughly researched Roosevelt (by using the biographies penned by Edmund Morris, for example) and not relied on the *Theodore Roosevelt Cyclopedia* (1941) or a handful of articles, his argument might have delivered a more nuanced reading about the dynamics of race in American culture and, particularly, sport.

This leads me to the murky conclusions that Streible sometimes announces and the important historiographical questions such assertions raise. The book illuminates the uneasy methodological positions historians take on when they engage abstract theory to inform materialist issues of gender, race, sexuality, class, and nation. As such, Streible's writing is awkward when it comes to matters of gender and sexuality. For instance, in seeking to problematize boxing and homoeroticism in fight culture, Streible offers little in the way of critical theory. He writes, “the world of boxing was more likely to comport with the traditional patriarchal culture of masculinity than with a gay subculture. Homosexual or bisexual men may have been motivated to watch the sport for the same reason heterosexuals did, but its erotic attractions were tempered” (p. 94). Theoretical buzzwords tell us little. It would have been useful if Streible had turned to queer historians (à la George Chauncey) who point out that nineteenth-century sport facilitated “gay” culture. Or he might have turned to queer theorists who suggest that desire is made manifest in multiple ways. Had his theoretical premise been wider, Streible's conception of the erotic (made available by the display of contact between men in the boxing ring) might have realized a more pliable span of queer pleasures.

Bringing together empirical “fact” with intangible experience is no easy matter. It is a crucial intersection, however, that historians face. Though Streible's book does not succeed in this task, it nevertheless is an important contribution to American film studies.

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DAVID H. PRICE. *Anthropological Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American Anthropology in the Second World War*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2008. Pp. xxii, 370. Cloth \$89.95, paper \$24.95.

David H. Price's book adds substantially to a historical understanding of social scientists' service to government and the military during World War II, and it raises troubling questions about the social and institutional roles of knowledge professionals that transcend the temporal conditions of total war. In this fascinating and important study, Price contends that global military conflict convinced American political and military elites that anthropological insights mattered, and that the profession's central “culture concept”—that each human society possesses its own internal dynamics, logic, values, and integrity—offered the means not only for comprehending the folkways of the world's peoples but also for working with or against them in the furthering of war-related objectives. In meticulous detail, he conveys anthropologists' participation in intensive training of military personnel in over two dozen languages and in cultural education, the protection of U.S. access to raw materials in Latin America (as well as to the cheap indigenous labor necessary for obtaining them), the coordination of counterinsurgency campaigns against Axis occupying forces, the formulation of refugee settlement plans, the management of racial tensions on the home front, the internment of Japanese Americans, the assessment of Japanese morale, and engagement in espionage operations.

Despite this extensive range of wartime roles and their significance for both the war effort and the national profile of anthropology itself, Price finds their results to be at once underwhelming and deeply troubling. U.S. officials commonly utilized anthropological research for the purpose of manipulating populations and securing their cooperation with external managerial priorities, and anthropologists routinely supported them in doing so, especially when their own ideological proclivities tended toward social engineering and the manufacturing of consent. Thus, anthropologists not only failed to challenge openly Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066 authorizing the relocation of Japanese Americans from the West Coast, but many actively facilitated it through field work within the camps, in the course of which the internees' resistance to their plight was pathologized as evidence of “social disorganization” to be neutralized. Astonishingly, anthropologists' planning for the postwar relocation of European refugees envisioned areas of South America, Australia, and Palestine to be “unclaimed or underused” (p. 133), despite the presence of indigenous or historically rooted communities within them.

Moreover, Price reveals that military and intelligence officials routinely ignored anthropological research that conflicted with longstanding stereotypes and assumptions. Caricatures of the Japanese as unwilling to surrender under any circumstances persisted in the face of growing evidence of deteriorating Japanese morale

and of increasing numbers of combatants who surrendered rather than fighting to the death. Similarly, anthropologists working within the Office of War Information, including Ruth Benedict and Morris Opler, failed to convince the executive branch that preserving the status of the Japanese emperor was vital not only to the securing of a Japanese surrender but to the maintenance of productive postwar relations, so that the Allied demand for unconditional surrender persisted and thereby facilitated Truman's ultimate decision to order the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Price identifies in these aspects of wartime anthropological service a fundamental moral and ethical tension between the professional requirements of social science work and the exigencies of the mortal struggle against totalitarianism. In participating in the latter, anthropologists oversimplified or distorted cultures that lay outside their areas of expertise, succumbed to "groupthink" in the environment of secrecy that their activities required, participated in "piecemeal" approaches to knowledge-gathering that rendered them incapable of anticipating or controlling the uses of the information they provided, studied captive populations without their consent, used field work as a cover for espionage activities, and, under the auspices of the Office of Strategic Services, even contributed to the study of how the Japanese might be physiologically or culturally vulnerable to methods of biological warfare.

Price offers but a cursory analysis of why and how anthropologists compromised their professional ethics so readily and unreflectively during the war, emphasizing World War I's precedent for such decisions, and particularly the fact that Nazism's virulent racism and antipathy toward free intellectual inquiry were antithetical to modern anthropology. He identifies a general—and telling—reticence among these scholars regarding how they reconciled their professional ethics with their wartime work (with notable exceptions, including Carleton Coon's often hilarious reminiscences of his North African exploits), although a more extended analysis of the pressures and status insecurities of a young profession seeking to demonstrate its relevance within twentieth-century American society might have further illuminated anthropologists' decision to commit to the wartime functions that they performed. Ultimately, Price notes, anthropological intelligence during World War II facilitated the Cold War-era appropriation of anthropological work for quite different purposes, as "the fight for free markets and client states supplanted the fight for freedom" (p. 280). Today, he warns, the declared emergency of a "war on terrorism" enlists the energies and expertise of the discipline once again, with no formal professional obstacles, in the form of clear ethical standards, to their misuse.

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ANGELA M. LAHR. *Millennial Dreams and Apocalyptic Nightmares: The Cold War Origins of Political Evangel-*

icalism. New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Pp. viii, 281. \$49.95.

Angela M. Lahr makes a compelling case in this book for the Cold War as the crucial venue in the forging of the contemporary U.S. Christian Right. In her well-documented account, Christian anticommunism is the principal means by which the evangelicals negotiated their way out of their decades-long separatism after the Scopes trial and back into the national conversation mainstream. In particular, she emphasizes their success in constructing and disseminating a widely appealing apocalyptic interpretation of the Cold War that was rooted in their premillennialist eschatology yet generic enough to meet the existential questing of many secularists as well. As she cogently summarizes, the atomic bomb provided the "exigency" for the evangelicals' rejoining of the American mainstream, with anticommunism the "tool" and premillennialism the "interpretive framework" (p. 44).

These claims are fleshed out in a series of case studies on evangelical and fundamentalist responses to the atomic bomb, the Cuban missile crisis, the war in Vietnam, and the Cold War tribulations of the state of Israel. In addition, Lahr has written an insightful chapter on religious missions as Cold War agencies and another on the Presidential Prayer Breakfast and the grassroots prayer circles that proliferated in the 1950s. She argues that these prayer circles helped evangelicals to reconnect with and further shape American civil religion. Public prayer and missionary work offered usable templates for the Cold War state's propaganda war against the Soviet Union, with evangelicals becoming "deputized" (p. 16) by the state in the process. The result was an "ultrapatriotic evangelicalism" (p. 16) that remained in creative tension with the valuations of the secular state but often did sacralize the "American Way". Politically inactive and culturally separatist it was no more.

This account of the origins of the New Christian Right seems eminently reasonable and serves as a much-needed correction to the dominant historiographical tendency to narrate political evangelicalism in terms of domestic political controversy only. It should, indeed, be a matter of some wonderment that others have for so long ignored the rich field of inquiry that Lahr has tackled. Many surveys of the anticommunist, fundamentalist, and evangelical movements have anticipated her case, but such a well-documented account as Lahr's simply has not existed until now. Her book begins to fill a major gap in the historiography of both the Cold War and the New Christian Right.

That said, this book does suffer from some serious limitations. It is not, to say the least, elegantly written. Frequently rambling, repetitive and disjointed, it accords an inordinate amount of space to tangential discussions of topics not clearly related to the core thesis. For example, Lahr's chapter-length discussion of the evangelical reaction to the Cuban missile crisis turns out to be a foray into the history of U.S. missionary

activities on the island that fails adequately to address the crisis itself and its very real implications for the gradual dissolution of the Cold War consensus. Lahr is also in the habit of applying derogatory epithets to those with whom she disagrees. For example, she consistently refers to the Reverend Carl McIntire and his associates in the American (and International) Council of Christian Churches as "infamous," "sneaky," "extreme and distasteful," even "objectionable" (pp. 41–43). One looks in vain for similar editorializing on the Soviet leadership or on the liberal theologians whom McIntire opposed.

Lahr's attempt at tracing the origins of an "American apocalyptic tradition" (p. 22) to Native American influences is unconvincing, as is her rather myopic claim that antisemitic conspiracism was "concocted" (p. 45) in the 1930s. More substantively, Lahr's tendency to compartmentalize the Cold War runs the risk of simplifying matters that a longer historical perspective would correct. Thus, when she claims that the events of the late 1940s and the 1950s prompted an unprecedented evangelical interest in foreign policy, she seems to be only dimly aware of the public advocacy by fundamentalist anticommunists that had been ongoing ever since World War I. Lahr is clearly correct in emphasizing the unique new opportunities for popularizing premillennialist anticommunism that the Cold War provided, but the discontinuity between that era and what went on before it should not be overstated. Both the doctrine and the dissemination of premillennialist anticommunism predated the Cold War; what changed after 1945 was the public reception of such ideas.

Its flaws aside, Lahr's book is a significant and persuasive contribution to our understanding of the origins of political evangelicalism in the twentieth century, and it should receive a wide readership. It is to be hoped that this book will contribute to broader interest in investigating and narrating American religion in comprehensive contextual terms that give due recognition to the factors beyond U.S. national borders that also helped to shape it and that it shaped in turn.

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MICHELLE MART. *Eye on Israel: How America Came to View the Jewish State as an Ally*. Albany: State University of New York Press. 2006. Pp. xiv, 242. \$65.00.

U.S. political and military support for Israel is largely taken for granted today. Large-scale support, however, although extremely important in terms of recognition at the time of Israel's founding in 1948, really only began in the 1980s. That is why Michelle Mart's book, which looks at the often-neglected middle period, is of such interest.

Mart takes a broad and creative approach by focusing on the influence of culture and ideas in the process of what was a rather remarkable transformation. After all, during World War II, antisemitic ideas in the State Department had limited Jewish immigration during the

Nazi era, thereby making inevitable the deaths of tens of thousands of people. Hostility to Israel's creation continued within the government bureaucracy well into the decision-making process of 1948, while policy in the 1950s could be described at best as evenhanded.

To explain how so much changed regarding this issue, the author's presentation is organized in six chapters. The first chapter is entitled "The Image of the 'New Jew' in Postwar Culture," though I would suggest a better way to put it would be the new image of the Jew in postwar culture. In the face of social trends at home and reactions against antisemitism—whose consequences were viewed by American soldiers and journalists in the Nazi concentration camps—attitudes toward Jews shifted within the United States. In the author's words, a "transformation of Jews from outsiders to insiders" (p. 22) occurred, though I would add that it was only from being a relatively unpopular to a relatively popular group.

Chapter two, "The United States and the Founding of Israel," adds nothing to the story on the policymaking front but provides new material on the public debate. There are two problems here. First, by focusing on the immediate developments the book does not deal with longer-term themes, such as historic Christian images of the Holy Land. Second, the text understates questions about sympathy for Israel based on the socialist leadership and democratic structures of the pre-state movement, instead putting its emphasis on images arising from the war.

"Views of the New Jewish State," chapter three, discusses the early image of Israel within cultural circles, a sympathy that stood in contrast to very limited "American political commitments" (p. 84). While there are no surprises here, the examples provided are interesting and often hitherto obscure ones.

A more original perspective is provided in chapter four, "The 1950s Religious Revival and 'Christianizing' the Image of Israel and Jews." The argument regards the development of pro-Jewish sentiment in Protestant churches, something best expressed in the subtitle "From Christianity to Judeo-Christianity" (p. 86). While this is extremely interesting, it should also be noted that the detachment of cultural and intellectual history from political-strategic factors can be misleading. For example, while religious factors might have led to a more positive feeling toward Israel, the main issue was the siding of Egypt and other Arab states with the USSR in the Cold War, not to mention the increasing radicalism and anti-Americanism expressed by them well in advance of any increase in U.S.-Israel relations.

If "numerous policymakers" and cultural figures "saw Israelis as religious brothers," after all, the alliance only developed after the country became a major asset following Israel's victory in the 1967 Six-Day War and its role in preventing a Syrian-PLO conquest of Jordan in 1970. Indeed, this is foreshadowed most importantly by an obscure but extraordinarily important State Department memorandum of April 1, 1956, which expressed concern over the effort by President Gamal Ab-

del Nasser's Egypt to overthrow more moderate Middle Eastern regimes friendly to the United States. And even after attempts to conciliate the radical Arab nationalists failed, it still took more than a decade for a pro-Israel U.S. foreign policy to develop.

Chapter five discusses "Jews in 1950s American Culture and Politics." A growing assertiveness and openness contrasted sharply with the fear and hesitation of the prewar period characterized so memorably by Ben Hecht. It was a two-way process, also involving an increased acceptance of Jews by the larger Christian society.

Finally, chapter six, "The Cold War, Suez, and Beyond," analyzes U.S. policy in the 1956 Suez crisis, albeit mainly regarding Israel's relations with American Jews. "Despite American displeasure at Israeli actions during the Suez crisis, with their military victory over Nasser and their partnership with the British and the French, the Israelis had demonstrated their membership in an alliance of Western nations that opposed the danger and disorder of radical nationalism, revolution, and, by extension, the Soviet Union. In the late 1950s, Israelis appeared as more natural (and military adept) potential Cold War partners than did their Arab adversaries."

While generally accurate, the last sentence overstates the case regarding policy makers' perceptions. The main emphasis was still on trying to mobilize support from the remaining non-military regimes in the Arab world. In a real sense, the American policy shift was quite slow and a reluctant one on the part of the State Department bureaucracy. It was eventually brought about by elected and appointed policy makers with a wider strategic vision who were not State Department officials.

Mart's book takes the emphasis away from pro-Israel lobbying efforts, which were minimal even into the 1980s, and places it on evolving attitudes within the political, intellectual, and cultural elite. In so doing it adds to the literature and provides a number of enlightening examples and quotes. Read as a cultural-intellectual—and less as a political-strategic—study of evolving attitudes toward Jews in postwar America, this book supplements our understanding of what emerged as a central issue of U.S. foreign policy in later years.

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MARY C. BRENNAN. *Wives, Mothers, and the Red Menace: Conservative Women and the Crusade against Communism*. Boulder: University Press of Colorado. 2008. Pp. xi, 197. \$34.95.

It was once thought that when women organized politically they did so predictably on behalf of progressive causes. For some time now historians have been dismantling this assumption. We know now that women have organized on the radical Right as well as on the radical Left, for Republicans as well as Democrats, in

support of wars as well as in opposition, against feminism as well as for it.

Mary C. Brennan's exploration of women's anticommunist activism in the post-World War II years contributes to this scholarship. Through an examination of the private papers and public writings of prominent activists, as well as the pamphlets and newsletters of right-wing organizations, she establishes a significant female anticommunist presence. Anticommunist women were mostly white and middle class; some were well connected to powerful men, while others came from more ordinary situations. Brennan argues that anticommunist women played a "significant role in defining the relationship of U.S. foreign policy to the threat of communism" (p. 83). By framing issues of day-to-day concern (such as education) in terms of the struggle against communism and by perpetuating that discussion through newsletters, speeches, and conversation with neighbors, women "shaped the way anticommunism was perceived by the general public" (p. 113). They became the public face of the grass-roots movement.

Brennan presents a sure-handed (although narrowly focused) discussion of the growth of grass-roots women's organizations and the proliferation of anticommunist newsletters. She also provides case studies of women prominent enough to have left records of some kind. While some of these women were able to play with gender expectations to their advantage, others found their contributions and skills overlooked. Her subjects include the well-known Phyllis Schlafly; wives of prominent male anticommunists, such as Jean Kerr McCarthy, Doloris Thauwald Bridges, and Elizabeth Churchill Brown; a former communist turned dedicated anticommunist, Freda Uteley; and—somewhat surprisingly, given her reputation as a moderate Republican who stood up to the anticommunism of Senator Joseph McCarthy—Senator Margaret Chase Smith. Brennan has crafted compelling portraits of these women that help flesh out our understandings of postwar anticommunism. Particularly interesting is her discussion of the role of anticommunist women (including McCarthy's future wife, Jean Kerr) in the defeat of McCarthy's nemesis Millard Tydings in his 1950 reelection bid.

Brennan observes that instead of using "maternalism to argue for pacifism" as other women's organizations had done, anticommunist women used "motherhood to legitimize their more aggressive stance" (p. 64). This is an important point. Here, however, she curiously omits reference to Glen Jeansonne's book *Women of the Far Right: The Mothers' Movement and World War II* (1996), which makes a similar argument. Although Jeansonne covers a slightly earlier period, his approach is not unlike Brennan's, and the isolationist mothers' groups he studied would seem to be likely antecedents to the activists Brennan has uncovered in the postwar period.

Most puzzling is Brennan's recurring surprise at finding women in the 1950s engaged with politics at all. The notion that the 1950s was a period in which women were closeted in their homes has long been dispelled.

Women were politically active through the League of Women Voters, through political clubs, through the civil rights movement, through anti-nuclear groups, and through labor unions. Certainly not all women were interested in or participated in politics. But that a number of them who *were* chose to do so through anticommunist organizations is not in itself surprising. Brennan finds it especially noteworthy that women on the Right were politically active because they “theoretically supported status quo gender roles,” so “advocating women’s political participation contradicted their underlying principles” (p. 9). Elsewhere she notes that “[i]ronically” it was anticommunist women’s “very dedication to home and children” that led them to politics (p. 31). Other students of women’s history may not find this particularly ironic, given that American women—including deeply conservative women—have long used an expanded notion of the domestic to justify political participation.

Brennan, whose earlier book, *Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP* (1995), was on the transformation of the Republican Party, brings an extensive knowledge of party politics and foreign policy to bear on this current project. Her analysis would have benefitted from a longer view of the history of women’s activism. As it is, she offers a snapshot of conservative women activists in one period, a snapshot that at times is rich in fascinating detail. But readers will be left wondering how that story fits into a longer tradition of women’s activism, women’s conservatism, and of grass-roots conservatism in general.

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DAVID BARBER. *A Hard Rain Fell: SDS and Why It Failed*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. 2008. Pp. xi, 286. \$50.00.

With his book title David Barber makes clear for his readers what this text’s purpose is: to explain the failure of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). With forty years to reflect on the history of this organization, Barber has clearly identified the mistakes of the past: a failure on the part of young male activists to comprehend the concept of white skin privilege and a refusal to follow the advice of African American activists, especially those in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Black Panther Party (BPP), who urged them to go back to their white communities and combat racism there. They also failed to acknowledge the intellectual leadership role that blacks had played in the past (W. E. B. Du Bois and Malcolm X) and should rightfully assume in the black liberation movement. Furthermore, men in SDS ignored the contributions of women in the face of a growing feminist movement, thereby driving out some of their most dedicated members. They also did not listen to Vietnam war protesters who urged them to build a broadly based antiwar constituency in the United States. Instead, many leaders in SDS succumbed to a macho, self-indulgent and,

in the end, self-destructive vision of a revolutionary movement centered around white male leadership.

In order to make his argument, Barber presents an extremely detailed analysis of all the permutations of SDS: from its origins in the civil rights movement of the early 1960s, when it developed as an ally of urban poor people and an initial leader in the antiwar movement, to its fractious end with bombings and confusion in the late 1960s. Along the way he explains the break with the more conservative Progressive Labor Party (PL), as well as the differences among the Revolutionary Youth Movement I (the Weathermen) and Revolutionary Youth Movement II factions. He also provides a nuanced account of the origins of the women’s liberation movement that breaks down the divisions between the women who tried to stay within the ranks of the New Left (the “politicos”) and the radical feminists who, after being scorned and booed at SDS meetings, left and formed their own political groups.

The main theme of the author’s criticism here is that the young, white, male activists in SDS did not see that they were continuing the errors of traditional American culture by assuming that, because of their white skin, they were necessarily the leaders of a progressive student movement. He argues that “the New Left failed not because it radically separated itself from America’s mainstream, the claim of a number of important historians of the period. Rather, it failed because it came to mirror that mainstream, and in mirroring . . . American racial attitudes, it ceased to represent a Left” (p. 8). In the end, SDS came to be dominated by the Weatherman and Weatherwoman factions that wanted to “out-macho” the white working class by brawling with the police and blowing up buildings. As a result, when huge numbers of Americans took to the streets to protest the war in 1969 and 1970, SDS was nowhere to be found. They had abdicated leadership in the most important antiwar effort of that decade. In the end, leaders in SDS were guilty of refusing to work at community organizing, building alliances, and resisting imperialism.

What then are we to make of all of this? Barber builds a solid case for the argument that many leaders in SDS were blind to their privileges as white men, and that they did not acknowledge the contributions of both African Americans and women. And yet I wonder if we can so clearly place blame on all those who were part of that time and that culture. I am reminded of Alice Echols’s conclusion in *Scars of Sweet Paradise: The Life and Times of Janis Joplin* (1999): “Nevertheless, mistakes were surely made, not the least being the assumption that personal and cultural transformation could be easily achieved—a matter of breaking off and breaking through. It was an assumption that blinded us to how deeply marked we all were by the conventions and expectations of the mainstream, no matter how ‘counter’ we proclaimed ourselves” (p. 305). The mistakes of activists in SDS were those of the culture that they came from, but those errors—and the ways in which women and African Americans reacted to them—paved the

way for a more inclusive and more pragmatic progressive movement. Calls for revolution have been replaced by continued efforts for international peace and more-equitable distribution of opportunities for people of color and women, and there is obviously much more to be done. However, we do learn from the past, and Barber has served us well in making that point.

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JEREMI SURI. *Henry Kissinger and the American Century*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2007. Pp. ix, 358. \$27.95.

The books on Henry Kissinger keep coming. Leaving aside Thomas Jefferson, Kissinger must hold the record for the most biographical (and autobiographical) accounts of secretaries of state (and national security advisors)—and he has been out of office for only thirty-two years. Confronting the problem of redundancy, especially after Jussi Hanhimäki published his authoritative *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (2004) and Robert Dallek his comprehensive dual biography *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (2007), Jeremi Suri adopted a unique approach to making sense of the good doctor.

Above all, Suri is interested less in what Kissinger did than in why he did it. In order to explain the origins of Kissinger's *weltanschauung*, Suri stresses the significance of his Jewish background not only in Germany but as an immigrant to the United States in the 1930s, his U.S. Army service, the Harvard days, and finally in the Nixon administration in 1969. To make his case, however, the author goes overboard in describing the American Century as a "Jewish century" (p. 10), much as he goes a bit overboard evaluating Kissinger's transcendent brilliance and wizardry.

Suri not only makes good use of recently released documents but also conducted several interviews with Kissinger himself—a rare accomplishment for a professional historian—even though the great man was guarded about his private life and thoughts. Like other biographers who have had to deal with the lacunae in Kissinger's formative years, Suri makes intelligent inferences from the general environment, as well as from interviews with Kissinger's brother and a boyhood friend, to understand what it meant to grow up as a Jew in Fürth under the Nazis and to reach maturity as an unassimilated immigrant on New York's Upper West Side in the late 1930s.

The German experience, in particular, shaped the future world figure in a variety of ways. For one thing, Kissinger was an outsider who lived as a "permanent exile" (p. 43), one perpetually concerned about the mobs in the streets whether they were Brownshirts or antiwar protestors. And although he was Jewish, he was also a German whose understanding of Europe helped influence and solidify the United States' new transatlantic relationships after the war. But this is not the en-

tire story. The author points to Kissinger's "abrasiveness, self-centeredness, and excessive ambition" (p. 65) as also contributing to his insularity and the outsider status that would dominate his relationships. Further, not all German-Jewish émigrés rattled on their colleagues to the FBI as Kissinger did.

At Harvard Kissinger was present at the creation of the new intellectual partnership between the government and the academy. There he was promoted and protected by insider patrons like William Y. Elliott while also building a personal network (like his hero Metternich) that would come in handy when he became national security advisor. Because of their unique sensitivities and experiences, according to Suri, Jewish émigrés were at the center of this nexus, reprising the traditional role of the Court Jew. Here, the author may exaggerate not only the role of Jews in this transformation but also the importance of Kissinger's scholarly work as a public intellectual influencing policy makers in Washington (p. 138).

From his earliest days, Suri asserts, Kissinger admired strong and pragmatic leaders who eschewed Wilsonianism. He found one in Richard Nixon after they began working together in 1969. The author describes the White House as a sort of Mafia with Nixon as a "gangster" in chief (p. 206) who could control his capo in the "dysfunctional" relationship (p. 207) because Kissinger was an outsider who relied upon insider patrons for his power and influence.

Suri devotes a relatively small portion of his study to Kissinger in power, which is just as well since others have gone over the familiar escapades in China, Russia, the Vietnam War, the Middle East, and Chile in greater detail. Moreover, although Suri notes Nixon's clearly dominant role in the relationship earlier in the text, he credits Kissinger in this section with too much policy initiation, as compared to his boss who disappears for pages at a time. And because of the need to condense, the author's narrative can be incomplete as is the case with his omission of the July 1969 ultimatum to Ho Chi Minh as the explanation for the October alert.

But these are minor quibbles. Suri has constructed an engaging, well-written, and sophisticated study of where Henry Kissinger came from and how his experiences influenced his worldview and the worldview of the people he influenced. Here Suri emphasizes the positives over the negatives. Although there are those who decry Kissinger's influence right up to his ardent support for the Iraq War, there is no doubt that he has played a major role in shaping the late twentieth-century world, and for that reason Suri's fascinating book is an essential contribution to the cottage industry that constitutes the vast literature on the former national security advisor and secretary of state.

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GREG GRANDIN. *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*. (The

American Empire Project.) New York: Metropolitan. 2006. Pp. viii, 292. Cloth \$25.00, paper \$16.00.

Greg Grandin's book is a highly readable and deeply unsettling account of how the strategies, tactics, and diplomacy that the United States government developed to deal with the Central American "crisis" of the 1980s became the very policies that resulted in the current U.S. involvement in Iraq. Grandin traces how the "Reagan Doctrine" of the early 1980s—a policy that called for direct intervention in places such as Nicaragua and El Salvador, where progressive or communist efforts threatened U.S. political and economic interests—morphed into the "Bush Doctrine," according to which the "war on terror" demands preemptive intervention to protect those same interests elsewhere in the world. Grandin meticulously traces the evolution of these policies through the careers of individuals—Republican strategists and politicians such as Dick Cheney, Otto Reich, John Poindexter, Elliott Abrams, and many others—who cut their political teeth framing policy during the eight years of the Reagan administration and, although less stridently, during the four years of the first Bush administration. These same Republican theorists reemerged in 2000 to serve the aggressive and turbulent administration of George W. Bush. The basic worldview of this neoconservative nucleus centers around the idea that the United States has a strong moral vision, even a providential destiny—defined by conservative economic and political values and supported by an equally conservative evangelical Christian discourse—that must be protected and advanced, by military power if necessary.

The New Right ideal, Grandin argues, developed around Central America policy during Ronald Reagan's "morning in America"—a vision that rejected the wariness and anti-interventionism that had informed American public life since the Vietnam War era. Central America was an almost perfect location in which to experiment with both the rhetoric and actions of what Grandin terms neoconservative imperialist policy—not because the region was important to U.S. strategic interests but precisely because it was so unimportant. Central America lacked critical strategic resources, the USSR did not want costly new allies in the region, and it was not a place where confrontation ran the risk of provoking nuclear war. In other words, this small and insignificant regional workshop provided a perfect venue for the kind of late Cold War showdown that Reagan hoped to provoke in order to advance U.S. hegemony in places where the stakes were much higher, such as Europe and elsewhere. Or nearly so: as National Security advisor Robert Tucker cautioned at the time, "The eagle that kills the deer in Central America will not frighten the bear in the Middle East."

Grandin points out that if one utilizes the metrics of the New Right—"democratic" elections of one kind or another, the defeat of Leftist armed groups and governments, a docile media, and the unfettered expansion of capitalism—U.S. policy toward Central America in

the 1980s was a rousing success. By ignoring the aspects of that policy that were of little or no importance to the neoconservative agenda, such as respect for national sovereignty, basic concern for human rights, and support for civil society, the policies of the New Right set the stage not only for continuing inequalities in Central America but also for the future catastrophe of the Iraq war.

Although it is almost impossible to condense this rich, dense, and provocative book into a short review, there are a few points that are especially important to historians. The first is that it is not a historical monograph as such; the book rarely employs footnotes, and the author is clearly reaching out to a much wider audience. Although Grandin, who makes no apologies for his own strong political opinions, has written articles for smart popular publications such as *Harpers* and *The Nation*, this book marks his first real foray into the world of public intellectuals. Even so, his training permeates all aspects of this work, as he uses the historian's toolkit to connect together discourses, events, and people that might otherwise seem to be unrelated or coincidental. One of Grandin's proven talents as a scholar is finding things hidden in plain sight—his use of Jorge Luis Borges's example of the camel in the Koran, never mentioned because it is so obvious, suggests that Grandin himself is aware of this particular gift. But just as one of his earlier books, *The Last Colonial Massacre* (2004), was the first work to draw the definitive lines explicitly between the peasant organizations that formed in Guatemala during the Arbenz regime (1950–1954) and the New Left that emerged in Guatemala during the late 1970s, so this one connects the dots between the policies of empire that surfaced in the Reagan years, after forming during the Nixon and Ford administrations, only to evolve to such pernicious effect in the Middle East in the early twenty-first century.

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ELIZABETH D. BLUM. *Love Canal Revisited: Race, Class, and Gender in Environmental Activism*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2008. Pp. xiii, 194. \$34.95.

Elizabeth D. Blum's book is a short, well-written account of one of the emblematic environmental disputes in recent historical memory. She complicates what we think we already know about how Lois Gibbs single-handedly and courageously sought relocation for her family and community away from the chemicals seeping from the old Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation site in Niagara Falls, New York, fighting both big business and government along the way to victory. In widening the narrative from heroic individualism to situating the events in their historical context (both in the 1970s in the wake of social movements and within the history of the region), Blum sheds light on the complex dynamics of race, class, and gender in this conflict.

She begins with a contemporary dispute over what to

do with the Love Canal site, as most current local residents oppose attempts to mark its significance through a museum or even a plaque. For Blum, this refusal comes as no surprise, given the contentiousness of the dispute itself. She focuses on white working-class women, of whom Lois Gibbs was the emblem in her capacity as the leader of the Love Canal Homeowners Association (LCHA). Gibbs was a housewife who linked her son's illness to the chemicals buried by the Hooker Corporation, which had sold the polluted land to the local school board for one dollar. After a long, complex struggle against the local and federal governments, LCHA successfully achieved relocation for its families, and the federal Superfund Act (the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 1980) was passed. In 1988, Hooker's successor organization was found responsible for the contamination and ordered to pay a large settlement. Thus, Love Canal represents many things: an example of local women taking on the power structure and winning; the need for the passage of federal environmental legislation; the political and cultural moment defined by distrust in the wake of Richard Nixon's resignation; and the rise of the anti-toxics and environmental justice movements that flourished in the 1980s.

As Blum argues, the media focus on Gibbs and the concerns of white housewives and mothers was both singular and strategic. She outlines the complexity of the range of white male reaction to Gibbs, ranging from the outright sexism in the Love Canal Revitalization Agency (the main competitor organization to LCHA) to the ways in which some men sought help from their union representatives in the struggle. Although Blum agrees that there was a gendered split in the issues that women and men generally cared about (health for the former and the economy for the latter), she rejects the simplified narrative of Gibbs' story representing those of other white women involved in the dispute. In part, this refusal is tied to Blum's astute reading of the strategic use of gender for Gibbs and the LCHA. Rather than drawing on essentialist notions of motherhood, Blum highlights that the LCHA consciously "chose to emphasize the children because doing so generated the most media attention and best results and empower[ed] them as mothers" (p. 61). Their focus on children may also have been a reaction to their perceptions of feminism—at the same time that they adopted the language of citizenship and rights derived from the feminist and civil rights movements.

In highlighting the intersectional politics of gender, race, and class, Blum uncovers crucial stories marginal to the "standard" narrative of Love Canal, particularly the roles of African American renters and middle-class activists associated with the Ecumenical Task Force. She highlights the tensions between LCHA and how calling the group a "homeowners" association alienated residents of Griffin Manor, a nearby federal housing project. As Blum suggests, the language of citizenship and rights was empowering and exclusionary: some citizens and taxpayers believed that they deserved more

rights than others. At the same time, the black residents did have white allies from the Ecumenical Task Force. Blum's focus on class is broad and devotes attention to the different values and tactics of working-class and middle-class advocates.

One of her main arguments is that "environmental activism reveals much about the importance of race, class, and gender in American society, and it is a lens by which to examine the absorption of larger social movements within the general population and people's views about larger concepts" (p. 150). I would have liked to see Blum make some of these connections more explicit. Many of the broader race, class, and gender conflicts and their points of connection are still relevant to environmental and social justice organizations today, and thus her story complicating the metanarrative of Love Canal has broader implications. I also would have liked more connections made to other recent work in environmental history. For example, Blum's discussion of white male union members could have been situated in comparison to Chad Montrie's recent study on work and environment. But overall, this book is a powerful revisionist account of a historical episode that has traveled into myth—and that needs to be read again as history, by as many people as possible.

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MICKI MCELYA. *Clinging to Mammy: The Faithful Slave in Twentieth-Century America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2007. Pp. 322. \$27.95.

Micki McElya's new book joins the corpus of literature that explores the complexities of mammy and her surrounding myths. There is much more, however, to contemplate in this analysis than simply the images of mammy as a cultural icon. Deconstructing the racial ideologies that permeated the twentieth century, McElya complicates and problematizes this icon of black womanhood, which has been used to uphold myriad hierarchies in the United States. Deftly moving through an impressive array of primary sources—newspaper accounts, private and organizational correspondences, legal records, songs, advertisements, statuary, political cartoons, and other ephemera—McElya maps the ways in which the mammy caricature served a fundamental role in connecting slavery to the consciously propagated myth of the "Lost Cause."

Readers who are already well acquainted with the literature on Nancy Green, the first living trademark with the moniker "Aunt Jemima," may slog through the necessary familiarity of the first chapter. Aware of this, McElya quickly moves into newer territory in the next chapter, "Chicago Mammy Trials," by explaining in detail the case of Marjorie Delbridge, a white child reared by an African American woman, Camilla Jackson. Jackson became a *cause célèbre* when a social worker discovered that Delbridge had been living with the Jackson family for over fourteen years. By virtue of her age and

physical maturity, this adoptive arrangement complicated the boundaries of segregation. Most interesting, perhaps, are the ways in which the press persisted in describing Jackson as "mammy" while young Delbridge referred to her as "mother." McElya proceeds to discuss the legal discourse and wrangling that ensued over the years, all of which was entangled in issues of race. With this discussion the contours of U.S. racial discourses are laid bare and the ending of the story is almost predetermined. Unable to resist prevailing social and cultural limitations, Delbridge eventually renounced Jackson as the mother she had known since infancy, thus bringing a sad end to an emotionally charged tale.

McElya further deconstructs the myth of African American females as obese, large-breasted, asexual, elderly women who happily performed their domestic duties with broad grins and subservient attitudes when she brings Camilla Jackson to life. By emphasizing the weightiness involved in using a term like "mammy" rather than "mother" to define black women's maternal roles, McElya makes ample use of intersectionality theory. In doing so, she elucidates the various ways that socially and culturally constructed categories interact on multiple levels to manifest themselves as inequality in society.

Of particular interest to social and cultural historians may be the chapters "Monumental Power" and "The Violence of Affection." Similar to other work on monuments that employs an intersectional approach, McElya explores the thorny issue of commemoration around the "faithful colored mammies of the South." She grapples with the power of such objects to speak to a number of complex racial paradigms. Equally important in both this and the chapter on affection is the way in which power operates through material icons, thereby revealing instances of violence as much as resistance.

Most provocative is McElya's discussion of white women's minstrelsy and the lengths to which some women went to soothe their anxieties in response to perceptions of declining racial superiority. This chapter comes early in the author's analysis, but the same this line of reasoning resurfaces poignantly in the book's closing chapters, which illustrate the strong connections between the mammy problem and the African American female domestic. By highlighting the efforts of white women to "claim the status of empowered whiteness" by controlling black female laborers, McElya simultaneously draws attention to the ways in which black women resisted. Not only did African American women improve their own lot, they also transformed the master-servant relationship into a relationship on their own terms—employer-employee—that improved the work life of their descendants.

If there is anywhere that McElya could have taken a different approach in the book, it is in her direct use of black women's voices. She employs an astounding number of sources, but few of them reveal the thoughts of African American women. Hearing from those who experienced much of what McElya describes would go far

toward strengthening her thesis that black women consciously resisted their plight.

This observation aside, McElya takes great pains to illustrate not only the enduring legacy of the mammy stereotype but also the ways in which it continues to function as a trope in American imaginations. Readers will be enriched by McElya's pointed observations and assertions, yet troubled by the possibility that they are still "clinging to mammy."

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CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

NOBLE DAVID COOK and ALEXANDRA PARMA COOK. *People of the Volcano: Andean Counterpoint in the Colca Valley of Peru*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2007. Pp. xv, 319. Cloth \$84.95, paper \$23.95.

A research adventure of many years, following many twists and turns, has led to a fine book by the historical team of Noble David Cook and Alexandra Parma Cook. Readers get a glimpse of their adventure that is, if anything, too brief. The book follows the authors' appealingly idiosyncratic microhistory of the life of the Spanish notable Francisco Noguero de Ulloa who settled in the southern Andean city of Arequipa, *Good Faith and Truthful Ignorance* (1991). As such, it is the second, and this time more ethnohistorical, act in a projected Colca Valley trilogy. The Cooks note that a third study will treat the extraordinary and relatively little-known Franciscan evangelizer Luis Jerónimo de Oré (1554–1630). With so much behind and surrounding it, this book reads as one possible foreground in a vast historical tableau that has been painted as the Cooks have followed their lines of data over many years. Indeed, also informing *Good Faith* and this book are Noble David Cook's studies of demography and imperial administration of the Colca region and the Andes more generally, not to mention pioneering spadework on Oré.

A particularly detailed Spanish census and inspection report of the indigenous peoples, places, and economies in the middle Colca Valley in 1591 acted as a kind of genesis, triggering the authors' research in local archives and repositories across Peru and Europe. Drawing on this documentary base, the core of the book is an exploration of the social and cultural transformations experienced by the first three post-conquest generations of indigenous peoples, principally the Collaguas and Cabana, and people of Spanish descent in the jurisdiction known as Collaguas. The authors' knowledge of this early colonial Andean environment contributes depth to the book's core argument about cultural persistence and social and economic continuities in spite of depopulation, agricultural pressures, and undeniable ruptures and change during colonial times. The Cooks fall occasionally into a binary portrayal in which a relentless and calculating Spanish Catholic state faces off against indigenous and other

subjects who are forced to accommodate or be destroyed. These instances are understandable reactions against the extraordinary highhandedness of Spanish proclamations and policies the Cooks know so well, but they are unfortunate mostly because, in following their documentation, the authors themselves suggest a more complex "lived" story as the generations in the Colca region proceed and interact.

The Cooks are at their best when second-guessing the capacity of colonial administrators to execute their own designs. Their gift for specifying colonial-era transformations in the lives of individuals in the region serves up concrete evidence of variations on a tale. In the process of seeing a region thus, the complex workings of an entire early modern Spanish world are revealed. Remarkably careful, universalizing imperial ideals were projected to a number of places, but they tended to settle in new contexts only because they were so unevenly communicated and haphazardly enforced on the ground. Ultimately capable of demanding far less than their multiple agents might coax over generations of local interaction and compromise, ideals accumulate and give way. The colonial presence proves as variable, contracting and expanding wildly even before the mid-seventeenth century. The Cooks' examination of the colonial administration's quintessential period of expansion under the activist Viceroy Francisco de Toledo (1569–1581) is now the most accessible and evocative regional account we have in English of the extraordinary social push and pull, reform and resistance, of this period. And yet the outcome by mid-colonial times was multiple. The Cooks reveal a variety of negotiated settlements on the ground, a colonial system in Collaguas that was still evolving, becoming andeanized.

With human detail and an argumentative sweep at the core, this book will remind many readers of what has been so good about the regional histories that have enlivened the study of colonial Spanish America since the 1970s and 1980s. This is a strength, but it also brings one of the study's few weaknesses. Sometimes it is as if the authors are attempting to touch quickly all manner of knowledge about the colonial Andes, as if acting on a concern that this might be the only book students will ever read on the region and era. To be sure, the Cooks prove steady guides and they may be quite right about a broader readership's needs, yet the rich variety of concrete examples in this regional ethnohistory, the memorable portraits of entire lineages of *kurakas* and *encomenderos*, and the layered descriptions of transforming places such as the early colonial village of Corporaque, create an expectation of the originality and nuance at the core of this contribution. I regretted being led away from the Cooks' compelling main story and through quick and sometimes unrooted treatments of everything from the hypothesis that native Andeans' perception of Spanish conquistadores as divine "*vira-cochas*" was little more than Spanish deception, through a half-characterization of the *Taki Onqoy* as a movement whose proponents intended a pure return to pre-Hispanic religion, to the native practice of con-

structing *apachitas* to protect travelers along perilous roadways.

My wish for more reflection on a long investigative journey, and my reservations about some inconsequential padding and the role of binary understandings challenged by the study's own more dynamic portrayals, are minor, hopefully constructive criticisms of a work I admire. This book is one of the best and most richly documented regional studies of indigenous peoples and Spaniards in the early colonial Andes to appear in some time. We ought keenly to await volume three in this trilogy.

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JONATHAN EASTWOOD. *The Rise of Nationalism in Venezuela*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 2006. Pp. x, 212. \$59.95.

Jonathan Eastwood's disquisition is a most eloquent example of the fact that, since we are not the messianic entelechy, historians must collapse past reality into disciplines addressing a unit of analysis that, even as it constrains the epistemological reach of the analytic model ("my approach also has its limitations" [p. 1]), also approximates a truth that scholars want to know or explain. The analytic model's unit of analysis is "nationalism" in its Venezuelan, Spanish, and Spanish American concretization. The book's introduction concerns itself with theory(ies) of nationalism and their applicability to the reality under scrutiny. We learn that "nationalism is a long-term, macro sociological phenomenon"; that it is of the "sphere of values" and, thus, "ideas"; and that human beings are the political agents who create the nation. Such a definition of nationalism questions the perennialist and structuralist theories while endorsing that of the constructivists.

In defining nationalism, Eastwood asserts that studies of highly localized communities, the particular, must be complemented with macrolevel, general studies. Eastwood then "focuses largely on elite political discourse," while not ignoring studies that emphasize specificity or time-place as contributors to the concretization of that historic phenomenon. He studies the particular role played by the Venezuelan elite. Eastwood scrutinizes the idea of nationalism and its performance in reality for Bourbon Spain in chapter one, for Spanish America in the colonial period in chapter two, and for Venezuela in chapters three and four.

His general conclusion is that nationalism in northern South America, Venezuela included, exhibits specific features that differentiate the region from others. As the data evinces, nationalism "was largely collectivistic"; it had "a built-in tendency" toward authoritarianism; and it was civic in nature, anchored in the rights of citizens, not ethnicities or birth. More importantly, before the wars of independence, there was no notion of a "nation" in the region. Thus, "nationalism, when it emerged in Latin America, was a novel phenomenon in the Hispanic world" (p. 155). The idea of nationalism

was current in nineteenth-century Europe but not in Venezuela or Latin America at that time.

Although Eastwood's conclusion that minorities, the elite, were responsible for the advent of nationalism in Venezuela in one sense is traditional, his epistemological approach is fresh, innovative, and responds to the structure of the data at hand. In more than one aspect, his conclusions are sound and open new avenues of inquiry into the history of Venezuela and northern South America more generally. This book is a landmark for Venezuelan and Latin American history, as well as analytic history, and it has epistemological contours appropriate for graduate students and professionals in the field.

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EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

JONATHAN ELUKIN. *Living Together, Living Apart: Rethinking Jewish-Christian Relations in the Middle Ages*. (Jews, Christians, and Muslims from the Ancient to the Modern World.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2007. Pp. x, 193. \$24.95.

The thesis of this book is an important one and not as obvious as it may appear: that the Jewish experience of the Middle Ages was not one of unrelieved persecution and intolerance. Indeed, Salo Baron, the dean of Jewish historians, long ago decried what he famously termed the "lachrymose conception of Jewish history," and yet many historians have continued to maintain this distorted view. In the well-phrased statement of Jonathan Elukin, "seeing medieval Europe as a persecuting society obscures the complexities of the Middle Ages and reduces the Jewish experience to a one-dimensional narrative of victimization" (p. 4). There are many reasons for such distortion in modern writing, which ought to be a subject for a book in itself. Elukin attempts to rectify the picture through a re-examination of Jewish-Christian relations in medieval Europe (essentially Germany and France, with only occasional references to England, Italy, or Spain).

The first chapter, dealing with the early medieval period (the fifth century onward), is in some respects the weakest, perhaps due to the difficulty of trying to encompass the entire medieval period in fewer than 200 pages. Some scholarship is neglected; for example, although my book *Jews, Visigoths and Muslims in Medieval Spain* (1994) is cited, it obviously was not actually consulted, resulting in some questionable conclusions. The author is on more solid ground when he deals with the Carolingian era and the High Middle Ages. Evidence from many perspectives shows that there was a degree of acculturation by Jews and even a greater toleration of them than is usually understood. Furthermore, there was also some measure of cultural dependence on Christian religious and social ideals. More research is needed on some of these subjects.

Historians who deal with medieval Spain are familiar with the oft-debated notion of *convivencia*, an almost untranslatable term which refers to living in harmony with members of other communities. One need not be guilty of "romanticizing" in acknowledging the undeniable fact that this did exist, not only in Muslim but primarily, in fact, in Christian medieval Spain. However, as cogently recognized by the author, it did not apply only to medieval Spain, for there were many aspects of cooperation and harmony in medieval France or Germany (p. 75). Details are not here fleshed out, and this is something that awaits future study (some of this is discussed in my *Daily Life of the Jews in the Middle Ages* [2005], another book the author could have benefited by consulting).

Important topics such as the conversion of Jews to Christianity or the attacks on Jews in the First Crusade are discussed rather cursorily. For the first, see, for instance, the articles "Conversion by Jews" in Norman Roth, editor, *Medieval Jewish Civilization* (2003), in Elukin's bibliography) and "Conversion to Judaism," an equally significant topic not even mentioned by Elukin. While the analysis of Jewish conversion is well thought out, the important issue of the violence of the Crusade is dealt with simply by summarizing Robert Chazan's well-known *European Jewry and the First Crusade* (1996) without even a mention of dissenting viewpoints. More important, perhaps, what impact did this violence and the consequent martyrdom and conversion of many Jews have on subsequent Jewish identity and attitudes to the Christian majority?

More satisfactory is the author's approach to polemic. Although not mentioning any particular example, nor indeed discussing, however briefly, a single Christian-Jewish disputation, the general statement that "it is not clear whether derogatory language about Jews would have struck people as uniquely hateful" is probably correct (p. 93). Medieval rhetoric was as a rule more harsh and "abusive" than what is today considered acceptable. Yet another important aspect, not mentioned by Elukin, is that very few people, Christians or Jews, were aware of or could even read the polemical writings to which we so easily have access.

The concluding chapters on violence and expulsion adequately summarize the situation in France and Germany but are weak on Spain (important secondary studies are not even mentioned). Surely we move beyond the boundaries of the medieval period when we add a discussion of the creation of ghettos in sixteenth-century Italy. This, too, is summarized from recent scholarly work.

One of the questions posed in the book's introduction is answered, to an extent, in the conclusion: why, or how, did Jews survive in the diaspora? The answer given is that while they could look back on "centuries of remembered persecution and expulsion" they also could reflect on centuries of "residence and attachment to their European homes" (p. 138). True, but is this all? Here the author is too modest, for he has shown us that there was more, that the persecutions have been over-

emphasized in most scholarship and the normalcy of harmonious relations ignored or at least minimized. Also, one might add, Jews survived because they had a will to survive: they *chose* to remain Jewish.

Elukin displays a commendable knowledge of current literature on a variety of topics; if one were to fault anything it might be that few or no studies prior to 1998 are mentioned, and that sources are cited entirely in translations or from secondary studies. However, this is a commendable effort and a welcome contribution to our understanding of medieval Jewish-Christian relations.

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SCOTT G. BRUCE. *Silence and Sign Language in Medieval Monasticism: The Cluniac Tradition c. 900–1200*. (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, fourth series, number 68.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xv, 209. \$95.00.

From early medieval times, monks and nuns were encouraged to keep quiet when not at prayer. Texts like the *Rule* of St. Benedict, the most widely used manual of communal monastic life in medieval Europe, called for zeal in keeping silence. Limiting conversation was an aspect of humility and obedience; it was a means to ward off sinful words and, more positively, a practice that fostered fuller awareness of God's presence. Some large communities had officials to patrol the monastery and report idle conversation to superiors. But even so strict a life could not be carried out entirely without communication. By 1200, a system of silent discourse, a language of signs, was widespread in cloisters across Western Europe.

Scott G. Bruce's model monograph, while resting on a substantial literature on monastic silence, is the first study to focus on the genesis and diffusion of monastic sign language. The matter of silence was taken very seriously at the Burgundian monastery of Cluny, where the brothers saw silence as both a characteristic of angelic conduct and a foretaste of the eternal silence that would follow the Last Judgment. In the tenth century, Cluniacs began to develop a system of hand signals to make possible silent exchange of necessary information. Late eleventh-century customaries, compilations of detailed information about the customs of monastic communities on which Bruce relies heavily, feature a written Cluniac sign lexicon, 118 hand gestures meant to facilitate silent communication. (Bruce provides an accurate and entertaining translation of these signs on pp. 177–182.) Even before it was written down, this system of signs had spread well beyond Burgundy: as Bruce demonstrates, already by 1000 the silent language of Cluny was known and modified for use in western France, southern England, and Bavaria. The brothers of Canterbury wrote an Old English sign lexicon based on the visual vocabulary of Cluny. To the east,

around 1090 a monk of Hirsau transcribed a vocabulary of 359 signs, the most extensive surviving list from the Middle Ages. Bruce argues this was not so much the product of innovation as the recording of signs well known in oral tradition at Cluny but not written down in the Cluniac lexicon, a document designed in large part for the training of novices rather than as an exhaustive list of signs in frequent use. By the early thirteenth century, the practice was so widespread that its abuse, manual loquaciousness, was among the vices attributed to wayward monks. One satirist claimed that dinner with the monks of Canterbury was so rife with silent chatter that he felt himself to be among actors and jesters. Only the most austere monks, the Carthusians who lived as quasi-hermits, rejected the Cluniac-derived system, using only simple signs (*signa rustica*) that precluded frivolous talk.

However, as Bruce stresses, the Cluniac lexicon and its adaptations were never intended to substitute for spoken communication as does American Sign Language (ASL), commonly used by the deaf in modern North America. They constituted, instead, "a silent language of meaning-specific hand signs that allowed [monks] to convey everything necessary without recourse to speech" (p. 55). There was no grammar or syntax associated with what monastic authors called "signs for speaking" (*signa loquendi*). Most signs were everyday nouns: for food (useful in meal preparation, a task shared by all in a monastery), clothing, monastic liturgy, people, and objects. Many sign-forms had visual associations: fruits like pears or apples were signaled by enclosing the thumb within the other fingers, vinegar by rubbing the throat ("because the sharpness of its taste is felt in the throat"), a book by a movement imitating the turning of pages, and the cellarer by pretending to turn a key in a lock. Some signs were more abstract. Religious sign language was, taken as a whole, designed as a relatively simple and practical means to an end: the perpetuation of silence and its associated disciplines and aspirations.

This is a smart and lively book. A brief summary cannot discuss at length its important sub-themes, including the pedagogical and acculturating purposes of the Cluniac lexicon and its variations, the essential unity underlying apparently diverse developments in religious life in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and the deep influence of Cluniac practice across Europe. The author's careful, almost lapidary descriptions of lived experience evoke medieval monastic reality to great effect, and Bruce has a knack for choosing examples both vivid and instructive: monks who talk with their toes (a spoof) or the bear that ate a book of St. Augustine's letters (an actual incident). The book concludes by noting that the first successful European attempt to teach the deaf to speak was by a sixteenth-century Spanish monk who drew on "a distant descendant of the Cluniac sign language" (p. 176), used not for the perpetuation of silence but the teaching of speech. What in Bruce's view began at Cluny over a millennium ago continues today, as researchers work to create a visual dictionary

of signs that can be interpreted and explained by computers.

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ALBRECHT CLASSEN. *The Medieval Chastity Belt: A Myth-Making Process*. (The New Middle Ages.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2007. Pp. x, 222. \$69.95.

Another nail in the coffin of the chastity belt should not be necessary. However, like the *droit de seigneur*, this myth refuses to die. Albrecht Classen's book ought to kill it, but as he points out, people are quite willing to go on believing demonstrably untrue things about contemporary as well as medieval culture.

Classen is most successful at reviewing and rejecting the medieval evidence, especially from literature, that has been adduced for the use of chastity belts. He convincingly argues that literary references to the use of a belt as a marriage gift have nothing to do with a chastity belt (indeed, the common use of this gift in documents of practice supports his argument). References to a man wanting to put his key in a woman's lock are, he rightly claims, most convincing as coded references to sexual intercourse; and references to a man holding the key to a woman's heart need not be directly sexual at all. The belt in Marie de France's *Guigemar* protects the lady's fidelity by providing a means of identification for the lovers, and in this way functions like the girdle of chastity in ancient literature, which was a symbol of virginity only to be removed by the husband but which did not physically prevent intercourse. The phrase *cingulum castitatis* in religious texts refers to a symbol as well (and is connected with men rather than women). Texts that do refer to locked devices that prevent vaginal and anal penetration—particularly Conrad Kyser's *Bellefortis* (1405), Giovanni Sercambi's *Novelle* (ca. 1399–1400), and Hywel o Fualt (sixteenth century)—do not, in Classen's persuasive analysis, describe actual practice but are satirical and ironic. Classen successfully debunks the idea that Francesco II of Carrara, duke of Padua (1389–ca 1406), invented the chastity belt.

Classen's second aim of tracing the development of the myth of the chastity belt from the Middle Ages to today is less successful, not because his argument is wrong but because it is hard to follow. The first chapter of the book begins with late twentieth and early twenty-first-century synthetic and reference works, moves to long sections on nineteenth and early twentieth-century authors, and then shifts to eighteenth and nineteenth-century encyclopedists and nineteenth and twentieth-century reference works. The second chapter contains sections on twentieth-century art history, twentieth-century histories of popular culture, sixteenth and seventeenth-century art, a (quite convincing) argument from silence based on several Renaissance literary works, modern histories of fashion, Enlightenment texts, eighteenth and nineteenth-century reference works, sexology, modern reference works, and the writings of contemporary historians. It is extremely difficult

to discern the principle of organization. Classen is critical of many of these authors' use of medieval evidence, but his own thorough discussion of the medieval evidence does not occur until the latter part of the second chapter; it would be more useful earlier. The discussion is further hampered by extensive references to visual representations, of which no illustrations are provided. The only illustrations are six photographs of four different faux medieval chastity belts from German museums, which appear at apparently random places throughout the text.

Classen's account of the uses of the myth of the chastity belt is at its most interesting when it suggests (although does not elaborate on) ideological motives: the wish to contrast the barbaric and the civilized, whether medieval/modern, Mediterranean/German, or Oriental/Occidental. Ultimately his attempt to make a larger point about the nature and function of historical myths in general is unsatisfying. The first chapter opens with a discussion of the myth that medieval people thought the earth was flat, and the third chapter (a scant eight pages in contrast to the first two rather hefty ones) discusses the *ius primae noctis*. He succeeds in showing that myths about the Middle Ages, particularly about sex, die very hard. His conclusion argues only that the myth of the chastity belt is not true, and the fact that many people believe it does not make it true. These points are hard to disagree with, but one could wish that he had further discussed the meaning, and not only the appearance, of the myth's echoes in early modern and modern (and postmodern?) understandings of the Middle Ages.

The book has not been well proofread; there are a number of typos, including in quotations, and lines are dropped from two of the pages. Some of the translations from French are awkward and un-idiomatic (e.g. "the entire world . . . among us" for "tout le monde . . . chez nous" [p. 33]). The author Reay Tannahill is repeatedly identified as a man surnamed Tanna Hill.

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DAVID ROFFE. *Decoding Domesday*. Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press. 2007. Pp. xx, 374. \$85.00.

Domesday Book has possessed a unique, iconic status for nine hundred years. No document in English history, other than perhaps *Magna Carta*, has been so revered, studied, or has generated such controversy. Interpreted and reinterpreted, the form and function of Domesday survey and book are constantly questioned and reshaped. But just occasionally, once perhaps in every one or two generations, there is a seismic shift. F. W. Maitland in *Domesday Book and Beyond* (1897) and V. H. Galbraith in *The Making of Domesday Book* (1961) challenged old orthodoxies and created new ones. David Roffe stands in their company. First in his *Domesday: The Inquest and the Book* (2000), and now in this explicitly companion work, Roffe's thesis is fundamentally a simple one. All previous interpretations

have been predicated on the indivisibility of inquest and book, the former leading seamlessly to the latter: by decoupling them Roffe argues that there is no connection between the intent(s) of the survey and the intent(s) of the book. The survey was a tax assessment conducted in 1085; the book, a response to the rebellion of 1088, was essentially unrelated, though it did make use of the material gathered in the survey.

Such a hypothesis has by no means been universally accepted. Much of what Roffe said in 2000 and repeats and expands upon here is persuasive, but objections remain and his responses to them are not wholly convincing. *Pace* Roffe there is no firm evidence that, while the inquest had many functions, *none* of them were intended to result in the book. Roffe also claims that, although the book may not have been completed until some years into the reign of William II or even (as he provocatively suggests) as late as the reign of Henry I, it was not conceived and begun in the reign of William the Conqueror.

Roffe argues that the primary aim of the survey was to reassess the geld (the fundamental tax of eleventh-century England) and knight service. This is a convincing analysis, but perhaps not as novel as he would suggest: after all, as early as 1895 J. H. Round pointed to the inquest's relationship to the imposition of knight service. Further, two years later Maitland famously wrote, "Our record is no register of title, it is no feodary, it is no customal, it is no rent roll; it is a tax book, a geld book." Moreover, in arguing both that more recent commentators have ignored the multiplicity of its functions and for "the abandonment of the concept of a single purpose for the Domesday enterprise," Roffe protests too much. It is true that other historians have perhaps prioritized one aspect to the relative neglect of others, but none, not even Maitland, held that there was one motive alone behind the survey.

But if Roffe is right we do need to ask once again, "What was *Domesday Book* for?" The survey was a stupendous bureaucratic achievement in its collection, collation, and presentation of data, carried out a time of heightened military threat and placing heavy demands on both human and financial resources. Repeating the argument he made in *Domesday: The Inquest and the Book*, Roffe claims that the book was originally "a private document compiled for the management of the royal demesne and regalia," probably produced as a response to the tenurial disruption following the baronial rebellion against William II in 1088. If so, there are no hints as to how it was used in this context, and indeed Roffe suggests that *Domesday Book* was little more than an administrative aid for use within the royal treasury, while much more use was made of the records of the inquest. Here Roffe seems to be moving close to the view of those earlier iconoclasts, H. G. Richardson and G. O. Sayles, that *Domesday Book* was a "historical monument, respected but unused."

This book is a major contribution to Domesday literature and to our understanding of the early Anglo-Norman polity. Its arguments are presented with a rare

elegance and fluency. There is no space in this review to do more than mention its impressive scope, which ranges over not only the administrative process but also the late eleventh-century economy, local urban and rural society, and governmental practice at both national and local levels. Its central theses are challenging and powerful; it is too early to judge whether they will become the new orthodoxy.

BRIAN GOLDING

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THEODORE EVERGATES. *The Aristocracy in the County of Champagne, 1100–1300*. (The Middle Ages Series.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2007. Pp. vi, 415. \$95.95.

This immensely informative study seamlessly weaves pithy historiographical debates, statistical analyses, and prosopographical compendia, all while displaying a keen appreciation of the contingency presiding over the circumstances of a twelfth and thirteenth-century lay elite. As the book's title makes clear, this aristocracy was very much shaped by its situation in a very specific polity, the northeastern French county of Champagne. Theodore Evergates approaches all frames of aristocratic life—the county, the fief, the lineage, indeed the individual—in terms of their life cycles. Thus layers of temporality, diachrony, synchrony, and cyclicity diffract the perspective on phenomena that proceeded at different paces, emphasizing the serendipitous nature of their interaction. Of these phenomena, the author particularly singles out three: state building, lordship, and fiefs; familial organization and behavior. His elaborate treatment of these, which obliges a radical reassessment of medieval fiefholding and noble kinship, rests upon a thorough engagement with the relevant literature and a superb command of a large body of archival and manuscript sources, many of which are unpublished. It is unfortunate that the latter are not listed separately; cartularies and registers are integrated in the bibliography of published primary sources while citations of single charters are scattered within the copious endnotes.

Previously a motley assemblage of disparate holdings, the county of Champagne emerged as a coherent principality by the mid-twelfth century and remained, despite a war of succession (1216–1218), a powerful autonomous polity for over a century before entering the French royal domain through the marriage of its heirless, Jeanne of Navarre, to King Philip IV in 1284. The establishment and durability of the county profited from both male rule and female regency, the latter intermittently extending over many years because the comital succession was fixed at age twenty-one. State building relied upon the management of local barons, which involved incorporating their castles within the county's districts, imposing direct comital lordship on all fortifications, and enforcing accountability through a bureaucracy intensely dependent upon the written word. Not only were fiefs central to the regulation of

power and ties between counts and nobles, but fief tenure defined nobleness and constituted a major motif of aristocratic life. Only baronial holdings rated castral lordships; middling and lesser knightly nobility, male and female, held, received, and gave homage for fiefs consisting of land, residences, and revenues. A veritable marketplace of fiefs ensued as they were created, exchanged, gifted, bought, sold, mortgaged, annuitized, and bestowed as dowers or dowries. This convincing presentation of a "culture of the fief" strengthens the argument against those historians who have argued that the concept of the fief is postmedieval.

Evergates's main target, however, is the ensconced patrilineal model of noble kinship and its attendant concepts of primogeniture, patrimony, and the dispossession of women and younger sons, as proposed by Georges Duby half a century ago. Redirecting attention from eldest sons toward wives and children, Evergates argues for the primacy of the conjugal unit as the elementary form of the aristocratic family. Upon marrying, women received a dowry from their natal family and a dower from their husband. The dower, consisting of half the husband's possessions, the marital residence, and half of all the property to be acquired during marriage, established a conjugal economic unit as well as the right of the wife to share in her husband's material possessions after his death. This right of dower thus contributed to women's substantial involvement in fiefholding, especially because they tended to survive their husbands. Children were provided for through the practice of partible inheritance, which did privilege the eldest surviving son but nevertheless partitioned the parental estate equitably among siblings. Given the largely endogamous aristocracy of Champagne, some properties were later rejoined through marriage and collateral inheritance; others disappeared through fragmentation or were absorbed into more powerful estates. There was, accordingly, no simple correlation between lineage and lordship, as further evidenced by the rarity of hereditary family names, whereby heirs adopted the toponym of their most important property. Evergates is careful to expose the diversity of noble lives, and his overall characterization of the aristocratic family is thus compelling, even if perhaps slightly incomplete. There is, for instance, no assessment of the possible impact of the growing sacralization of marriage on the strength of the conjugal unit, nor is there a systematic consideration of the placement of children in clerical offices or monastic institutions. Surprisingly, given the attention granted to sealing practices, seal epigraphy and iconography are not analyzed. A real opportunity exists to correlate seal names and titles with land devolution, heraldic emblems with dynastic awareness; marks of cadency, for instance, introduced in paternal coats of arms to indicate cadet status, appeared early in Champagne, and may shed light on the significance of the absence of hereditary names.

In this monograph, the culmination of years of fruitful research and writing on medieval Champagne, Evergates has established invaluable vantage points from

which to consider the social history of medieval Europe.

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PETER LINEHAN. *Spain, 1157-1300: A Partible Inheritance*. (A History of Spain.) Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. 2008. Pp. xvi, 284. \$100.00.

This volume is one of the last to be completed in the Blackwell History of Spain series, long awaited in that it covers a period of extraordinary importance in the development of medieval Iberia. Peter Linehan's remarkable scholarly productivity richly qualifies him to be the author of such a book. Indeed, his own publications occupy nearly two full pages of the ample bibliography; readers of his books and essays will thus find it unsurprising that the author sharply reinterprets the historiography of the age. Linehan's view, informed by a deep understanding of the complex relationship between monarchy and church in the central medieval period, is prefigured in his *History and the Historians of Medieval Spain* (1993) and his other writings. One can also note his humorous and ironic writing style, which occasionally verges on the satiric. This sometimes appears at the cost of narrative clarity, but his wit is constantly engaging. Linehan informs the audience in his preface that a detailed narrative is not his intention here, which possibly explains the absence of an account of the Sicilian Vespers or of battle narratives in an age full of crucial conflicts. This is not a book for those new to peninsular history; one needs a solid background to fully appreciate what the author has to offer.

A major objective of the volume is to counter the tendency of many narrative historians of Spain to assume that the peninsula naturally moved from a myriad of medieval states to unification by the reign of Fernando and Isabel during the early sixteenth century; hence Linehan's subtitle. Since the period under study witnessed the ostensible unification of Leon and Castile and the creation of the federated Crown of Aragon, Linehan is keen to demonstrate that these political groupings were contingent at best and still quite far from the achievements of the Catholic monarchs. Between 1137 and 1300 the peninsular monarchs were inclined toward the patrimonial tendency of dividing their kingdoms among their sons (if they had more than one), demonstrating little sensitivity to that ultimate unity hovering expectantly at the end of the medieval period. However, Linehan fails to explain in this reckoning why Fernando III (1217-1252) neglected to do this for his several male heirs. That issue aside, Linehan mines the substantial documents of state and regional authorities as well as those of ecclesiastical archives to underpin his thesis. Regarding the role of *convivencia*, the notion initially advanced by Américo Castro that the interaction of Judaic, Islamic, and Christian communities worked toward the creation of a multicultural society, he is skeptical of its impact beyond literary and intellectual circles and any role it was able to play in societal unification. His section on the Jewish and Mus-

lim experiences is quite lucid in this regard, where the subaltern voices implicit in the civic and ecclesiastical documents clearly counter the sensitivity of the literary elite. He is also inclined to downplay the role of religious crusading in unification, seeing monarchical lust for territorial power as the driving force of Christian expansion, wherein religion played only an ancillary role.

Of all the monarchs whose rule this volume covers (eight in Leon-Castile, seven in Aragon), the individual who clearly receives the greatest attention is Alfonso X el Sabio (1252–1284). Linehan readily acknowledges this emphasis. The Learned King engendered the grandest designs of any of the peninsular rulers of the age while simultaneously encountering the grim realities of the ill-fashioned state his ancestors had assembled. His diplomatic initiatives in the Holy Roman Empire, Italy, and even the Near East belied the uncertain stability of his Leonese-Castilian power base, where even the Andalusian conquests indicate the overextension of his territorial control, lacking the population settlement that anchored the earlier acquisitions. Linehan closely examines Alfonso's patronage of the arts and science, which produced evolving and often contradictory concepts of his historical objectives. Alfonso's series of law codes indicated a similar uncertainty regarding the best method of governing his complex realm. By contrasting the histories of the Hispanic monarchies with English administrative consolidation during the same era, Linehan tweaks the title of my own work, *A Society Organized for War* (1988), into the equally descriptive phrase "a society disorganized by war." By this, he argues that the Reconquest of the Iberian peninsula, which made one kind of contribution to the unification of Spain through the conquest of Islamic territories, also caused a serious counterflow in the historical process: it generated an independent population of greedy warrior nobles, higher clergy, and even non-noble settlers who seriously complicated the construction of orderly kingdoms.

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JESÚS ÁNGEL SOLÓRZANO TELECHEA. *Santander en la Edad Media: Patrimonio, parentesco y poder*. Foreword by BEATRIZ ARÍZAGA BOLUMBURU. Santander: Universidad de Cantabria. 2002. Pp. 489. \$26.70.

The medieval town of Santander, located on the Bay of Biscay in the region known as Cantabria, traces its history to the twelfth century settlement and repopulation of the region by Christian kings. In later centuries, although not as important as other ports in Cantabria such as San Vicente de la Barquera, Castro Urdiales, or Laredo, or as prominent as Basque ports such as Bilbao, Fuenterrabía, and San Sebastián, the city and its extensive hinterland played a signal role in the affairs of late medieval and early modern Castile and Spain more generally. In the early 1970s Santander was one of those

not yet fully explored but important regions in peninsular history. In my first research trip there long ago, I was told, as was not unusual in those years, that the cathedral archival documentation "had been burned by the Reds." As with much Francoist propaganda, this assertion was a lie. Over the last three decades, a series of enterprising historians have rescued an impressive documentary data base and have begun the process of describing and explaining Santander's social and economic history.

Jesús Ángel Solórzano Telechea's book is the latest and most thorough of these efforts. Although methodologically the book follows a well-trodden path laid out by many studies that reconstruct the social and economic life of medieval Spanish towns there is much of value and originality here. Partly based on his own earlier works, this book is an ambitious and expansive work: it contains everything you ever wanted to know about medieval Santander and more. Rather than a history of the city, Solórzano's work focuses on three distinct but interrelated topics. First, he examines questions of rural and urban space, transfers of property, and production. Second, his work turns to the study of elites and oligarchical groups in the city through the use of extensive and detailed prosopographies and reconstructions of kinship networks. Finally, in a short chapter at the end, he focuses on strategies for the social reproduction of these same elites and the role women played within these strategies. This is not as simple as outlined here. Every topic serves as an opportunity to display a mastery of a vast documentary base, a sophisticated understanding of recent methodologies, and a willingness to explain his data through numerous graphs, tables, and charts.

Throughout this elegantly and expansively produced book, Solórzano never neglects the role of the church and the overlap, above all on questions of property and material possessions, between ambitious, rising urban patrician elites and the church. Nor does he neglect questions of honor and the bourgeoisie's deployment of its symbolic capital for social advancement. Similarly, his exhaustive study provides excellent descriptions of the same overlap between politics and familial interests, inheritance systems, onomastics, clothing, heraldic symbols, memory, and other topics now in vogue. The transition from testaments to purchases and property exchanges is also duly noted, described, and explicated.

In many respects, Solórzano's work only confirms what we already knew about urban societies in late medieval and early modern Castile. Nonetheless, his book adds important confirmation, through extensive and detailed case studies and his emphasis on patterns of social reproduction, to known strategies of property and political power acquisition in other parts of the peninsula. I fear his chapters are long; four chapters and a conclusion accommodate more than 450 pages of thick text. One must also lament the absence of an index in a book that emphasizes small details and family reconstruction. The vignettes that add so much to the book's success are lost to the casual reader. Yet, there is a great

deal here that is most commendable and that makes this book worthy of review and reading. Although following earlier models, the author shows a willingness to explore new issues, thus moving his description of the social and economic history of Santander to different interpretative and analytical stages than those occupied by earlier studies. His openness to other European historiographies is also to be noted, as is his careful treatment of women and their role within strategies of social reproduction. Centering his study on questions of space—spaces of production, spaces of power, spaces of social reproduction—Solórzano has produced a book that it is both innovative and informative. In the end, the mistrustful canon in charge of the cathedral archives has been given the lie. The “Reds” did not burn the church documents; the social and economic history of late medieval Santander can still be reconstructed very well indeed.

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CORDELIA BEATTIE. *Medieval Single Women: The Politics of Social Classification in Late Medieval England*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Pp. x, 179. \$80.00.

Historians have long recognized that single women had a role to play in medieval society and could, in certain circumstances, hold power and wealth in ways that escaped married women because of the latter's dependency on their husbands. Earlier literature focused particularly on widows, who were relatively numerous and accorded a well-defined status as independent members of society. Other groups also came under examination. Urban and mercantile historians, for example, have drawn attention to the more limited group of women known as *femmes soles*, who, although married, were legally recognized as independent when running a business and engaging in economic transactions. Religious historians have likewise documented the experiences of nuns and other women who either delayed or eschewed marriage altogether in order to pursue religious vocations and lives divorced from family entanglements. In recent years, scholars have begun to move beyond these traditional categories to investigate the experiences of single women in a wider range of social contexts, emphasizing groups that had been overlooked in earlier scholarship. Two groups have come in for special scrutiny in this regard: women who passed through a phase of singleness outside of their natal households prior to marriage and women who chose to remain single throughout their entire lives without obvious religious motivation.

With her new book, Cordelia Beattie moves scholarship forward in two significant ways. First, she presents a good overview of the range of options for singleness open to medieval women, giving scope to newer models emphasizing personal choice and opportunity without losing sight of earlier scholarship based on situational realities determined by law and economics.

Second, and more importantly, she investigates how late medieval people perceived and explained the single women in their midst. Her study is characterized in particular by an interest in the terminology and descriptive language used in contemporary sources to denote women who were not married, ranging from relatively familiar terms denoting widows, to less common and more ambiguous terms denoting single women who were not widows. Her study is thus mainly focused on issues of social designation and classification, which, she argues, not only reveal contemporary perceptions to modern historians but also served to shape the cultural context in which medieval people developed identities.

Beattie searches for linguistic clues in three main bodies of evidence: pastoral literature written largely by and for the clergy; fiscal and accounting documents generated by the English state, particularly the 1379 poll tax returns; and various guild records documenting the names and status of members. These sources are relatively well known and have been used by others interested in gender history; Beattie's main methodological contribution is less the opening up of new sources than the juxtaposition of sources that have previously been studied separately. Reading these sources against each other is the book's main strength as well as its main weakness. The author's close reading of the sources reveals hitherto unsuspected variety and flexibility in contemporary terminology and classification, but it also limits her ability to develop a clear and convincing conceptual framework that makes sense of society as a whole or of change over time. Beattie skirts around the problem by arguing that identity is situational and changeable, which, though certainly true, is not entirely helpful as an overarching interpretive device.

In spite of some shortcomings in its framing, the book is well worth reading for its many insights into the complex and multifaceted set of cultural values surrounding single women. The writing is clear and direct and the scholarship on which the book rests is thorough and well substantiated. Readers with a special interest in medieval society or late medieval England will find much of interest in Beattie's analysis, and the book could also be profitably read by scholars of women and gender with interests in other periods and places. Beattie's book demonstrates that much can be known about the lives of medieval single women and also suggests that much more still remains to be learned.

JAMES MASSCHAELE
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JENNIFER BRYAN. *Looking Inward: Devotional Reading and the Private Self in Late Medieval England*. (The Middle Ages Series.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2008. Pp. 270. \$49.95.

Jennifer Bryan's lucidly written and readable study examines English devotional writing in the period 1350–1530, focusing in particular on the language of selfhood and interiority. In its careful attention to the richness

and complexity of these texts, the book builds on such studies as Sarah Beckwith, *Christ's Body: Identity, Culture and Society in Late Medieval Writings* (1993), and Nicholas Watson's essays on Julian of Norwich.

Bryan begins with a description of contemplative life offered by the monk Richard Whytford in the early sixteenth century, as "a diligent inward beholding with desire of heart" (p. 7), and then uses these terms—inward, beholding, and desire—to organize the material covered in the first three chapters of the study. The first chapter lays out seven models of inwardness found in devotional writings by Richard Rolle, Nicholas Love's *Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus Christ*, *The Chastising of God's Children*, and *The Pricke of Conscience*. The emphasis here is on how the models of interiority associated with contemplative life and enclosure were adapted in texts explicitly directed to the laity. In the second chapter, Bryan turns to the "long-standing associations between vision and identity formation" (p. 76) to discuss devotional texts as mirrors. She focuses particularly on the *Myrrour of Oure Ladye* and its context—the monastery at Syon. The third chapter examines inwardness and desire in Passion meditations, arguing that these were "the major psychological narratives of the later Middle Ages" (p. 110). This chapter quite interestingly sets the poetry of John Lydgate against two devotional texts, *Talkynge of the Love of God* and the *Prickynge of Love*. The study then turns to two "case studies" in its final chapters: Julian of Norwich's *Showings* and the devotional poetry of Thomas Hoccleve. In the first of these, she argues for the influence of devotional writing on Julian's text. The second is a strong discussion of Hoccleve's poetry and how he adapted devotional models of interiority for political ends.

Although the study is impressively wide-ranging, its expansiveness comes at a cost. The first three chapters offer a homogenized overview of almost two hundred years of writing under the rubric of Whytford's terms; here the central argument is that late medieval writers thought about and came up with a variety of languages for interiority. While true, this is an observation with which everyone working in the field of late medieval literature would agree, and this reader found herself wishing for more of an argumentative edge. The work never gains any traction in relation to contemporary debates about selfhood/interiority and religious writing in this period. Although Bryan positions the study at the transition between the medieval and early modern period, she refers only in the endnotes to the important essays by both David Aers and Lee Patterson on the relationship between medieval and early modern selves (see "A Whisper in the Ear of Early Modernists" in *Culture and History, 1350–1600*, edited by David Aers [1992] and "On the Margin: Postmodernism, Ironic History, and Medieval Studies," *Speculum* 65 [1990]: 87–108, respectively). Throughout the study, Bryan uses terms—interiority, selves, self-fashioning—as if these have a universal meaning and do not need to be defined. At times, the study seems vaguely indebted to

modern theories of selfhood, but it never acknowledges these debts or discusses them in detail. For example, chapter two on mirrors seems to borrow terms from Jacques Lacan's famous discussion of the mirror stage (e.g., p. 81) but does not engage directly with Lacan or any other theorist. It is not, of course, necessary to invoke psychoanalytic terminology to discuss selfhood; one might, instead, use the terms of moral theology, as in Linda Georgianna's study *The Solitary Self: Individuality in the Ancrene Wisse* (1981).

Georgianna's study could have offered a model here, precisely because it locates the discussion of selfhood and devotional writing in a particular historical context, whereas Bryan's thematic focus on the interior is oddly disinterested in any kind of historicizing until she reaches the final chapter on Hoccleve. Although the study acknowledges the impact of Arundel's Constitutions in the discussion of Nicholas Love's *Mirror* and gives a cursory nod to Wycliffism/Lollardy, Bryan quickly sets these contexts aside. This reader was left wondering whether the author discovered any changes over this two-hundred-year period in the way in which selfhood could be imagined or described, whether in response to particular reading communities, the pressures of Lollardy, or the censorship described by the Constitutions.

In sum, this study serves as a useful introduction to an important concern in devotional writing—the interior—but readers will have to look elsewhere for discussions of why that concern should matter to us now and how the language of selfhood might have shifted in this period.

KATHERINE LITTLE
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TAKASHI SHOGIMEN. *Ockham and Political Discourse in the Late Middle Ages*. (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, fourth series, number 69.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 301. Cloth \$99.00.

William of Ockham's political thought has received almost constant attention throughout the last half of the twentieth century and into the present. In addition to treatments of Ockham in recent surveys of medieval political thought by Antony Black, Joseph Canning, and Janet Coleman, there have been influential studies devoted specifically to Ockham's political thought, including numerous articles by Brian Tierney and sections of his books on papal infallibility and natural rights, and the monographic studies of Jürgen Miethke and Stephen McGrade. Takashi Shogimen examines these and other scholarly assessments in his introduction, making the claim that they do not adequately examine the personal context of Ockham's writings between 1328 and 1337, nor do they see the common thread between that period and his anti-papal writings in the following decade. Shogimen emphasizes Ockham as a polemicist rather than a rationally coherent political theorist in that first period but argues that a consistent theological

approach underlay the long-recognized shift in Ockham's concern from the issue of papal heresy in John XXII's rejection of apostolic poverty to the issue of papal authority itself.

Chapter one revisits the poverty controversy as the scriptural and ecclesiological context for Ockham's polemical writings in the first decade after his flight from Avignon in 1328. In contrast to some earlier interpretations, Shogimen attempts to show that Ockham was not a Franciscan ideologue and that, far from incorporating elements of canonistic thinking, Ockham was opposed to the canonists. That leads, in turn, to discussions of Ockham's understanding of heresy (chapter two), based on Part I of his *Dialogus*, the specific problem of a pope erring on matters of the faith and falling into heresy, and of the mechanisms for identifying and responding to such a situation as a moral responsibility, indeed obligation of the Christian community (chapter three). In this context Shogimen revisits the issue of fraternal correction that McGrade touched on in his book on Ockham's political thought, and in doing so provides a useful history of the idea of fraternal correction in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Chapter four covers Ockham's understanding of the meaning and limits of papal *plenitudo potestatis*. Shogimen dates Ockham's shift from a concern over papal heresy to papal power with the accession of Jacques Fournier as Pope Benedict XII in 1334, grounding that shift in Ockham's theological (as opposed to a canonist) orientation. Chapter five examines Ockham's interpretation of the Petrine foundation of papal primacy, and the last chapter is devoted to Ockham's defense of human freedom, the place and authority of temporal governments, and the relationship of temporal to spiritual authority. In place of a theory of the separation of powers, Shogimen sees Ockham's position as "a theory of crisis management," in which under certain circumstances it is appropriate for one to intervene in the other to resolve a dispute that threatens the common good. For Shogimen, Ockham's political thought is, at heart, not so much a liberal or constitutional vision but a theological and especially an ethical one.

While Shogimen has utilized most of the relevant literature from the last half-century on Ockham's political thought and its dissemination, some important scholarship is missing, such as Miethke's edited volume on the dissemination of the political writings of Ockham and others in the late medieval period (*Das Publikum politischer Theorie im späteren Mittelalter* [1992]) and Francis Oakley's *Omnipotence, Covenant, and Order* (1984) and *Natural Law, Laws of Nature, and Natural Rights* (2005). Moreover, Shogimen's sharp division between a canonist approach to the issues of Franciscan poverty and papal power and the theological, biblical approach of Ockham would have been more balanced had he made more use of the work of Patrick Nold (the latter cited in notes but without corresponding effect on the text), who points out that Pope John XXII did have theological training and that his position on apostolic poverty and papal authority was based on his and oth-

ers' interpretation of biblical texts. The same may be said of Benedict XII, whose longest surviving work is his detailed commentary on the Gospel of Matthew. And in explaining Ockham's presence in Avignon, too much credence is given to George Knysh's hypothesis, which has found no acceptance among Ockham scholars (see Miethke's "Ockham-Perspektiven oder Engführung in eine falsche Richtung?" in *Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch* 29 (1994): 61–82).

Although Shogimen does not present a radically new view of Ockham either as a polemicist or political theorist and is much in agreement with the interpretation of McGrade, his well-written book examines particular issues in greater detail and depth than one finds in the earlier literature, and it is a welcome addition to our understanding of late medieval political thought.

WILLIAM J. COURTENAY
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CHRIS JONES. *Eclipse of Empire? Perceptions of the Western Empire and Its Rulers in Late-Medieval France*. (Cursor Mundi, number 1.) Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols. 2007. Pp. xvii, 415. €80.00.

Chris Jones's expanded version of his 2003 University of Durham doctoral dissertation displays an impressive command of historical detail and takes issue with a number of prevailing historical interpretations. The book seeks "to build up a tableau depicting the place occupied by the Empire and its rulers in French thought as a whole" (p. 8) in the century between 1240 and 1340, through a meticulous examination of French chroniclers' attitudes towards individual emperors, a reconsideration of Charlemagne's place in contemporary French thought, and a more wide-ranging analysis of how political treatises from the time of Philip IV fit the empire into their larger world-picture. This period, in which Capetian power waxed and imperial prestige waned, is generally supposed to have seen the triumph of the nascent nation-state over the older claims to universal sovereignty advanced by popes and emperors. But did French thinkers perceive this "eclipse of Empire" quite so clearly?

Jones's close reading of the sources reveals inconsistencies and absences more often than coherent ideologies. For example, in studying French chroniclers' perceptions of Emperor Frederick II, he shows that while clerical authors tended to castigate Frederick for his battles with the church, works aimed at a lay audience could put him in a positive light in order to stress ecclesiastical abuses. Thus French chroniclers used their portrayals of Frederick to promote multiple goals. Most specifically, authors associated with Saint-Denis produced an image of Frederick that made him a foil for the sanctity of Louis IX. In fact, the idea of the Empire appearing as a distorted reflection of the French kingdom is a recurring theme throughout the book. For instance, French authors recognized that the imperial office was elective, but equated these elections with moments in French history when a change of dynasty had

occurred, such as the election of Hugh Capet in 987. In this view each emperor was potentially the founder of a new dynasty, with inalienable rights to territorial inheritance. The fact that no strong imperial dynasty emerged after the death of Frederick II merely highlighted the comparative dynastic success of the kings of France.

The role of silence is exemplified in Jones's assessment of contemporary thought on Charlemagne. Here he takes issue with the view associated with Robert Folz, which would argue that because Charlemagne was a central figure in the French imagination of the time, interest in him must have led to interest in the relationship between France and the Empire. Although Jones admits that there were exceptions, he argues that for French authors Charlemagne had been first and foremost a French king. These authors were not unaware that Charlemagne had assumed the imperial crown, yet "the apparent absence of attempts to exploit the fact that Charlemagne and his descendants had been emperors, particularly with regard to the French kings' own relationship with the contemporary Empire, is perhaps the most striking aspect of the Carolingian imperial connection" (p. 169). Throughout the book, the use of this kind of negative evidence leads Jones to employ cautious phrases such as "there is little reason to think that," underlining the challenges inherent in making arguments based on what chroniclers failed to say.

Ultimately, Jones's most striking argument is that "[t]he eclipse of Empire in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries is indeed a reality, but one largely restricted to the minds of modern historians" (p. 362). There is some ambiguity here, since Jones demonstrates that French thinkers of all legal and philosophical positions agreed that at least *de facto*, if not *de jure*, emperors exercised no jurisdiction in the kingdom of France, and further shows that by the early thirteenth century a conception of the border between France and the Empire as a series of fixed points did exist. Moreover, Jones disagrees with historians (such as Joseph Strayer) who have argued that the French kings, particularly Philip IV, were engaged in a conscious attempt to expand the boundaries of their kingdom. Rather, for Jones, they merely sought to consolidate their control over "hitherto independent allods within the French kingdom" (p. 276), since imperial jurisdiction was actually "something which could not simply be ignored" (p. 290). All of this would seem to add up to a picture of emerging national sovereignty and at least an imagined uniform national jurisdiction. Yet in the author's view, "[a]n emphasis upon the autonomy of the French kingdom did not negate subscription to principles of universalism," an assertion that "casts serious doubts on the view that this period witnessed the birth of the concept of the independent 'nation-state'" (p. 355). If French authors would not concede that the emperor had any jurisdiction in France, for the rest of the world they were willing to accord him a hazy but necessary role as *Dominus mundi*. Writers within the "northern

French cultural milieu" apparently had every reason to imagine a world without an emperor. They simply preferred not to do so.

SEAN L. FIELD
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EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

JAMES Q. WHITMAN. *The Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Theological Roots of the Criminal Trial*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2008. Pp. ix, 276. \$40.00.

This book is a good example of historical research with definite practical relevance. James Q. Whitman's starting point is the problem implied by the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt." American juries are expected not to convict a person unless they have reached this stage of certainty. The Supreme Court considers it a constitutional standard, even though these words are absent from the Constitution. The reasonable doubt standard is widely regarded as an important safeguard for defendants' rights. No one, however, seems able to explain exactly when one has passed the stage of reasonable doubt, nor which doubts are reasonable and which unreasonable. Whitman's search for the origins of this phrase takes him back to late antiquity.

According to Whitman, two kinds of procedure operate within the criminal law. One is concerned with establishing factual proof. That is the type most common today, especially in the United States, where plea bargaining ensures that unclear cases are almost the only ones to go to court. In the Middle Ages, by contrast, fact-finding played a minor role. In the small communities concerned, everyone had a basic idea about what had happened and the *fama* of the actors involved. This was the case with revenge murders, for example, preferably carried out in front of many spectators. The problem was that witnesses were reluctant to make a statement under oath. This reluctance might stem from a fear of becoming vengeance victims themselves, but it had to do just as well with the salvation risks inherent to oath-taking. Historically even more important was the hesitation of judges. They often had moral qualms about sentencing a person to death, regardless of how clear the facts were. Theologians reinforced these qualms by arguing that a judge who passed an unjust judgment or merely rejoiced in sentencing someone to death made himself into a murderer. In all such cases the other set of trial procedures came into play: those aimed at securing moral comfort. The reasonable doubt standard originated not as a fact-finding device but as a test for moral comfort. As long as the doubt lingering on in the judge's bosom was unreasonable, he need not fear going to hell.

The argument is cogently presented with a richness of detail to which I can hardly do justice here. Whitman suggests that concern for the salvation of judges originated among the first Christian magistrates in the late Roman Empire, who were uneasy about doing more or less the same thing that their pagan predecessors had

done to Christian martyrs. Augustine and other church fathers eased their consciences: as long as the judge observed the correct procedures, "it was the law that killed the convict, not you." It should be added that well into the High Middle Ages concern about bloodshed was based on notions of ritual pollution rather than guilt. In any case, consciences continued to be troubled and Augustine's comforting words had to be repeated for centuries. Ordeals figure prominently in the discussion. These, too, were not fact-finding devices but procedures to ensure moral comfort. An ordeal took the burden of officially confirming what everyone already knew away from witnesses and judges and placed it on God. Indeed, the Lateran Council of 1215 that banned ordeals stated that they "tempted" God, refraining from any rationalist critique. In England the trial jury inherited the concern for the fate of souls of those who passed judgment, which finally led to the formulation of the reasonable doubt principle in the 1780s.

I have three reservations, which do not diminish my admiration for the author's accomplishment. First, I wonder to what extent medieval lay judges and magistrates partook of the worries about their salvation expressed mainly by clerical writers. As Trevor Dean showed in *Crime in Medieval Europe* (2001), judges were often allied to local factions, making corrupt judgments without an apparent concern for their own souls. Within popular culture the fear of hell was soothed by portraying the devil and salvation history in a comical manner. Execution rates were low, not so much because of theological qualms but because urban magistrates condoned revenge and believed in the private handling of conflicts.

My second point concerns Whitman's presentation of the inquisitorial trial procedure as the continental response to the ecclesiastical ban on ordeals. This ensures a perfect parallel: in England the jury, on the continent a coercive trial. As many scholars point out, however, the inquisitorial procedure was slow to establish itself as the principal one in criminal cases. Witch hunts did not begin until the 1480s, because their accusatory counterpart held sway until then. Incidentally, it was precisely in witchcraft trials that the water ordeal had its comeback, often at the request of defendants convinced of proving their innocence thereby.

The third critical remark has to do with chronology: the first five chapters take us no farther than the thirteenth century; chapters six and seven quickly jump to the late seventeenth century and on to the 1780s when the reasonable doubt rule was formulated. Religious worries still haunted jurymen then, Whitman affirms. But what about the spurt in civilization processes at that time, bringing in many countries a rise in sensitivity toward physical punishment? This was especially acute in England with its "Bloody Code" and mandatory capital punishment for most felonies (even though pardons were frequent). Historians of crime and justice have amply shown that prosecutors as well as juries in eighteenth-century England were reluctant to proceed in cases where hanging could be the result. Finally, it

would be important to know how the work of Peter Schuster relates to Whitman's argument. Schuster demonstrates that medieval authorities regarded the execution as a completely secular ceremony, denying the convict the sacrament of confession; by 1500 this had changed and execution acquired a decidedly religious element.

A technical objection concerns the absence of a bibliography. I cannot check, for example, whether Whitman has consulted Dean's or Schuster's book. My three reservations should be regarded as a call for further research. Whitman has written a well-argued and thought-provoking book, ending with a plea to reflect anew on the moral implications of sentencing.

PIETER SPIERENBURG
Erasmus University

VALENTIN GROEBNER. *Who Are You? Identification, Deception, and Surveillance in Early Modern Europe*. Translated by MARK KYBURZ and JOHN PECK. New York: Zone Books. 2007. Pp. 349. \$30.00.

This book originally appeared in German under the title *Der Schein der Person: Steckbrief, Ausweis und Kontrolle im Europa des Mittelalters* (2004). As the author notes, "up to the fifteenth century . . . *Schien* (sic) meant a proper, lucid, intangible image." Over the course of the early modern period, the meaning shifted; *Schein* came to mean "simulation, an appearance, in contrast to the essence of an object" (p. 220).

Official registrations of identity, Valentin Groebner maintains, have always been fantasies of order. In the late Middle Ages, municipal governments and ecclesiastical courts issued wanted posters that attempted to identify those on the lam by recording their appearances and, in particular, their clothing, scars, and complexions. Eventually early modern rulers required many of those under their authority—from beggars and Gypsies to merchants and ambassadors—to carry letters of safe conduct or other identity papers that ruling groups attempted to authenticate through the use of wax seals and watermarks. But the shortcomings of such a system quickly became obvious. It was the document and not its bearer that was certified. Early modern rulers tried to remedy this by registering the personal details of the person to whom the document was issued. Philip II of Spain, for example, sought to control emigration to the New World by putting into place a complex bureaucracy to make sure that only certified passengers (and no Jews and Muslims) boarded the ships bound for the Americas. But the system proved porous. Individuals forged papers and slipped onto the ships after dark. The use of false identities became widespread. Travelers, such as the physician Felix Platter in the late sixteenth century, were often chameleons: Protestant in one land and Catholic in another. Merchants easily bribed their way across borders or onto ships. Imposters were ubiquitous, often showing up with forged badges, wax seals, and papers. Authorities in Spain and elsewhere, therefore, not only created a census or archive of subjects but

also enabled subjects and eventually citizens to remake themselves in ways both legitimate (through naturalization) and illegitimate (through counterfeits and forged papers). So imperfect was this system that, in the late eighteenth century, Jeremy Bentham proposed the adoption of a more variegated nomenclature and even having each individual's personal details (name along with place and date of birth) tattooed on his/her body.

In our own era, as Groebner demonstrates in his engaging final chapter, similar paradoxes persist. The border guard authenticates not the tourist but her passport; the magnetic strip on our credit cards, meant to protect us, has made identity theft a major crime; and our own claims of identity are meaningless in the face of modern bureaucracy. These ironies are not likely to vanish in the future. In the Bush administration's push for the inclusion of biometric data in passports, Groebner glimpses the specter of medieval fantasies of identification and reminds us as well of the ubiquity of the *sans-papiers*, the undocumented, even in the most advanced societies. In the age of Big Brother, identity is likely to remain what it has been since the Middle Ages: a "battleground." Ultimately, even in the dystopia of biometrics, surveillance, Groebner argues, "achieves its effects not through administrative perfection, but through arbitrariness, unpredictability, intimidation, and particularly through the collaboration of neighbors and selfish informers" (p. 249).

This brief review cannot do justice to the rich texture of a book that deftly manages to bring together a history of bureaucracies with striking examples drawn from literature and memoirs to underscore—as Antonio Manetti's famous fifteenth-century novella "The Fat Woodcarver" suggests—that our identities depend profoundly on who others say we are. Individuality, therefore, is less something that, as Jacob Burckhardt believed, we assert than something that we are assigned. Yet we too play a role in our self-fashioning, since both groups and individuals are able to turn the bureaucracies back upon themselves and use the very techniques of official documentation to create false identities.

This book should interest not only historians but also philosophers and anyone concerned with human rights. Groebner smashes the myth that governments had few ways of keeping track of people before the emergence of photography and fingerprinting. His discussion of the medieval concept of complexion in chapter five ("Nature's Way: The Color of Things") brilliantly explores (despite the author's misdating of Galen) how profoundly different the late medieval understanding of the person is from our own. He contributes, in his nuanced history of the passport, which King Louis XI made obligatory for certain groups of non-nobles for the first time in the mid-fifteenth century, to a deeper understanding of citizenship and nationalism. And he demonstrates how important narratives—not only our own but also those of others—are for our sense of who we are.

JOHN JEFFRIES MARTIN
Duke University

FLORENCE BUTTAY-JUTIER. *Fortuna: Usages politiques d'une allégorie morale à la Renaissance*. Foreword by DENIS CROUZET. (Collection Roland Mousnier.) PUPS. 2008. Pp. 556. \$36.00.

This erudite and thought-provoking book challenges the view that the Renaissance's reformulation of humanity's relationship to God and the world was centered on a new conceptualization of *Fortuna*. In contrast with Aby Warburg and others who claimed that the Quattrocento downplayed the role of Providence while emphasizing the individual's capacity to endure and even prosper in the face of unpredictable change and turmoil, Florence Buttay-Jutier argues that Fortune was not an idea but "a banality" (p. 17). In six carefully argued chapters and a lengthy epilogue she shows that *Fortuna* was never a clearly defined concept but, rather, a rhetorical device and moral allegory, "an empty form" (p. 20) marked by multiple, polyvalent meanings that were reshaped to meet a variety of social, religious, and political concerns.

While *Fortuna* may have been conceptually empty, its history is nonetheless revealing, according to Buttay-Jutier. From Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy* onward, the figure of *Fortuna* incorporated a range of classical and Christian references, and whatever rupture there was between the Renaissance and the Middle Ages, she argues, was captured in changes in Fortune's uses, not its meaning. Identified by her iconic wheel, which elevated men to the heights of wealth and power only to bring them crashing down, medieval *Fortuna* was an "*image de mémoire*" that impressed prudence and contempt for the world on young Christian souls. Beginning in fifteenth-century Italy, *Fortuna's* visage began to change. The blindfolded woman in royal garb turning a wheel gave way to a more attractive figure. Blending attributes of Venus and Occasion, the Renaissance allegory of Fortune was often a nude, seductive young woman who balanced on a sphere floating on water while holding a wind-filled sail. This new image, which captured a compromise between the medieval confidence in Providence and the Renaissance's confidence in man spread northward to France by the early sixteenth century, first through the court of Francis I and then more broadly through missals and other printed works.

This new depiction, Buttay-Jutier stresses, did not signal a new idea of Fortune, nor was it a return to the ambiguously gendered classical goddess of fertility, military prowess, and royalty. Instead, the new blend of Venus and Occasion stressed the allegory's latent aspects, which had become more relevant in the era of the *condottiere*. In this context, Renaissance writers and artists transformed Fortune from a moral allegory into an element of political and polemical rhetoric.

The two main causes of this change were not, as many have claimed, new merchant sensibilities or the Italian wars. Rather, this book argues, that they reflect fundamental changes in Europeans' perceptions of time. With the widespread introduction of the mechanical

clock, the author notes, time became increasingly secularized and fragmented into discrete moments, making each "precious and counted" (p. 130). Time thus became a series of occasions requiring continuous judgments about the best course of action. This, in turn, fostered the second major factor behind *Fortuna's* politicization: the revival of an imperial ideology. Like Augustus and his successors, who transformed Fortune into a princely virtue that ensured perpetual victory, Renaissance writers and artists depicted *Fortuna's* favor as a sign of the ruler's elect status and his unmediated relationship with God. *Fortuna* thus became part of a deliberately political iconography. Depending on circumstances, it could legitimate political ruptures when a "new" prince took power through conquest or usurpation, or underwrite the authority of an established dynasty. Fortune also justified the seemingly sudden rise of families and individuals by casting them as exemplary figures while highlighting their humility and devotion to the ruler's service.

Fortune also proved useful in explaining the world and how one should behave in it, making it central to a new pedagogy of power. The book ends with an exploration of *Fortuna's* place in the period's changing historical and religious thought. Renaissance historians' use or avoidance of *Fortuna*, Buttay-Jutier argues, was not tied to their beliefs about Providence's role in human affairs. Fortune, she observes, could be reconciled with either position, not to mention any intermediate view. Meanwhile, *Fortuna* was readily adopted by both Protestants and Catholics despite suspicions about its pagan origins. This was partly because the allegory had long encapsulated fundamental questions about predestination and free will central to sixteenth-century religious conflicts. At the same time, it was also an effective "image of combat" with which to defame opponents.

This is an impressive book that ranges broadly across late medieval and Renaissance literature, philosophy, religion, art, and politics. Its argument is learned and confident. Nonetheless, two questions remain. How does this new understanding of *Fortuna* alter our understanding of the Renaissance? And what impact did Fortune's politicization have for the following period—most notably in the elaboration of absolutist ideology and rhetoric? These questions aside, scholars from across the disciplines will be richly rewarded by this history of a banality.

MICHAEL P. BREEN
Reed College

MARGARET MESERVE. *Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought*. (Harvard Historical Studies, number 158.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2008. Pp. 359. \$49.95.

Jacob Burckhardt, in his *Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (1860), celebrated the Italian humanists' development of an objective, critical approach to the world around them and to the texts that they read. In writing

history, for Burckhardt and other writers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the humanists made a break with their medieval predecessors, crusaders who saw history as a working out of God's inscrutable plan for humanity and who showed little skepticism regarding their sources. Renaissance historians, it was thought, developed and applied critical methods of source analysis and moved towards rational secular explanations of history: the Renaissance heralded the birth of the science of history. Recent scholarship on European perceptions of the Muslim world, on the contrary, strongly influenced by Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978), has shown how the humanists' portrayal of Muslims, far from being "objective" or "scientific," was colored by the political and military motivations of the day, in order to encourage or justify military opposition (or alliance) with the Ottomans or with a host of other Muslim polities (Mamluks, Safavids, etc.). At the outset of this well-crafted study, Margaret Meserve asks two questions: how and why did humanists use history writing to make sense of the "problem of Islam"? What do the histories they wrote tell us about their ambitions in Renaissance scholarly and political circles?

Through a careful, close study of how humanist authors wrote the histories of Turks, Arabs, and Persians, Meserve contextualizes their work. Writing history is a political act, she reminds us. Moreover, there was no such thing as a "professional" historian in quattrocento Italy. Meserve places each of the texts she analyzes in its specific contexts of politics and patronage: humanists struggled against clerical university professors, but perhaps above all among themselves, to consolidate the reputations on which their livelihoods depended. This helps explain, for example, how Giovanni Mario Filelfo and Giorgio Merula could invest much time and energy in a bitter dispute over the proper spelling of Turk (*Turci* or *Turcai*), even as Mehmet II conquered a foothold in southern Italy. "It was not just the future of Christendom that hung in the balance; academic reputations were also at stake" (p. 124).

European writers of history from at least the time of Isidore of Seville sought to understand the nature of peoples through their historical genealogies, and the authors of the quattrocento were no exception. To this they added their preference for using classically attested names to refer to peoples: hence, some authors eschewed the non-classical term *Turci* for the classical *Teucri* (Trojans). Yet most authors preferred granting the Turks a far less flattering pedigree, making them descendants of barbarian Scythes, particularly after the capture of Constantinople in 1453. Meserve shows how authors like Filelfo, Favio Biondo, and Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini perused medieval chronicles, extracted information useful to their image of Scythian/Turkish barbarism, and ignored or transformed passages favorable to the Turks. The Turks' putative Scythian forbears interested these chroniclers far more than their true predecessors, the Seljuk Turks of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, who carved out polities for themselves in Anatolia and Syria. Far from presenting a "secular"

point of view, some of these authors (many of them fervent advocates of crusade against the Ottomans) tapped into medieval apocalyptic traditions to associate the Turks with Gog and Magog, suggesting that their victories were part of a grand eschatological drama.

If the Turks were almost invariably painted in somber colors after 1453, Arabs and Persians were at times portrayed in a much more positive light. In 1444, Biondo had portrayed the Arabs and Turks as heirs to the ancient Persians; the struggle between Christendom and Islam was simply a continuation of this ancient struggle. Various later writers, however, portrayed ancient Persia as a flourishing civilization friendly to Christendom, and eastern rulers who opposed the Ottomans (Timur, Uzun Hasan, Ismail Safavi) were portrayed as new "Persian" kings who had cast off the yoke of the barbarous "Scythes."

Throughout, Meserve painstakingly traces the use of sources by these authors, noting what texts they read and how they read them: what they chose to reproduce, what they omitted, what they transformed. "Ultimately," she concludes, "the humanists took little interest in the accuracy or even the historical plausibility of the narratives of Islamic history they constructed" (p. 239). This rich, nuanced study is a significant contribution to Renaissance intellectual history, to the history of European perceptions of Islam, and more generally to the history of European historiography.

JOHN TOLAN
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KENNETH AUSTIN. *From Judaism to Calvinism: The Life and Writings of Immanuel Tremellius (c. 1510–1580)*. (St. Andrews Studies in Reformation History.) Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2007. Pp. xxiv, 223. \$99.95.

Kenneth Austin's book traces the life of Immanuel Tremellius, a noted sixteenth-century Hebraist and biblical scholar. Tremellius's life spans Europe geographically and culturally, connecting Jewish and Christian societies, and Christian denominations of the Reformation period. He was born a Jew in Ferrara around 1510 and studied in Padua. He converted to Christianity, first becoming a Catholic and later embracing Calvinism, and left the Italian peninsula, wandering across Reformation Europe. Among his stops, significantly, were Strasbourg, Basel, Cambridge, and Heidelberg.

Austin argues that Tremellius "had a profound and diverse impact upon early modern Europe," even though he is relatively unknown in modern scholarship (p. xii). Austin wants to rectify this "neglect." While the author does not make a strong case for Tremellius's impact on early modern Europe, Tremellius's life is still worth exploring. Indeed, Austin's biography provides an opportunity trace the complexities of European religious, cultural, and political history during this period through the life of a single person. It is the story of an intellectual during the sixteenth-century upheavals.

The first decades of Tremellius's life can serve as a

lens to explore both the understudied Italian Reformation and the connections between Italy's tiny Jewish community and its Catholic neighbors. Austin reminds us that Italy was not untouched by the new religious ideas, and while Tremellius is presented in his "Jewish context," that context was unmistakably influenced by Renaissance, which with Christian humanism was crucial for creating fertile ground for the new religious ideas that were to spring up decades later.

Tremellius's move to Strasbourg and his departure from it mirror political and religious developments in the city. So do his arrival and departure from England, where he was a Regius professor at Cambridge University. His career at Cambridge ended with the death of the Reformation-friendly King Edward VI and the accession of the Catholic Queen Mary Tudor in 1553. After some years of work as a tutor of Duke Wolfgang of Zweibrücken's children, Tremellius landed a job as a professor of "the Old Testament" at the Calvinist-leaning University of Heidelberg in 1561. He remained there until the university's patron, Elector Frederick, died in 1576. Frederick's successor purged Calvinist professors, replacing them with Lutherans. Tremellius then moved to Sedan in France to become a professor of Hebrew at a new academy under the patronage of Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne. Sedan is where Tremellius died in 1580.

Tremellius's life reveals the interconnectedness among European intellectuals during the early modern period. Although he gained teaching positions at existing or new universities and academies, he was also, much like the scientists or artists of the time, dependent on a network of patrons. In this context, Tremellius's biography provides a snapshot of the early modern formation, or, in some cases, further development, of institutions of higher education in France, England, and the Holy Roman Empire, as well as of the significance of existing networks of intellectuals and their patrons.

Tremellius's life may also serve as evidence of the interdependency of Jewish and Christian cultures and societies in early modern Europe. This becomes especially evident in regards to Hebraism, as converts from Judaism figured prominently as both private and university instructors of the Hebrew language and as "translators" of Jewish culture for Christian audiences. Yet this context is very much missing in Austin's book. For example, the question of Hebrew instruction for Christians is dealt with rather briefly (pp. 46–47). No mention is made of Antonius Margarita, arguably the most influential Jewish convert, who published a seminal work on Jewish customs, *Der gantz jüdisch Glaub* (1530); instead Paul Fagius is said to have "pioneered the study of Jewish ritual" (p. 48).

The Jewish context is also regrettably weak, as the author casts a very wide net, for instance, discussing expulsions from England or France without making clear their relevance to Tremellius. Troublingly, Italian Jews are described as "a group apart" (p. 10). As such, Austin's book is no different from a majority of works that deal with Jewish-Christian relations in premodern

Europe, tending to focus on differences and the separation between Jews and Christians. This is true even when these studies deal with converts, whose changed religious affiliation often resulted from closeness between the two groups, not their separation. In Tremellius's case, understanding the position of Jews in early sixteenth-century Italian states, and especially in Ferrara, might explain the choices he made in his life. Despite these shortcomings, Austin's book provides a fascinating review of the complexities of European history in the sixteenth century through the life of one man.

MAGDA TETER
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ADAM MOSLEY. *Bearing the Heavens: Tycho Brahe and the Astronomical Community of the Late Sixteenth Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xiv, 354. \$99.00.

Tycho Brahe (1546–1601) is the major figure in astronomy between Nicholas Copernicus's *On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*, which was printed in 1543, and Galileo Galilei's *On the Two Chief World Systems*, which appeared in 1632 and was condemned the following year. What made Brahe famous were the large instruments he built on the island of Hveen, some fourteen miles north of Copenhagen, where he carried out celestial observations for a period of twenty years. But he was also notorious for a distinctive feature of his face, owing to an incident that occurred in 1566 when he was a student at the University of Rostock in Germany. He quarreled with a fellow countryman, Manderup Parsberg, and this led to a duel fought with swords at twilight. Part of Brahe's nose was cut off. The story goes that he managed to construct an artificial one, some say of gold and silver, some say of putty and brass. Portraits show a diagonal scar across his forehead and a curving line across the bridge of his nose. The artificial nose excited great interest, and visitors flocked to Hveen.

Brahe admired Copernicus but could not bring himself to believe that the Earth was in motion, and he devised an astronomical system that became popular as a compromise between geocentrism and heliocentrism: all the other planets revolved around the Sun, but the Sun orbited the Earth. Brahe discussed his theory and his instruments in his correspondence, and it is from this source that Adam Mosley culls much new information to describe the astronomical community of the late sixteenth century. Brahe published a selection of the correspondence he had exchanged with an astronomically inclined prince, Landgrave Wilhelm IV of Hesse-Kassel, and his official mathematician, Christoph Rothman. Brahe gave the prince an account of his observations of the supernova of 1572, described his instruments, and asked him to compare his observations of the Sun with those he was making in Denmark. Brahe also wrote to Heinrich Brucaeus, who had been appointed to a chair of medicine at the University of Rostock in 1567 while Brahe was studying there. Brucaeus was one of the comparatively few learned men of the

time who disapproved of astrological calendars. He wrote, for instance, that weather predictions reminded him of Cato's saying of the Roman haruspices that he wondered if they could keep from laughing whenever they met each other. But although averse to astrology, he had no objection to an astronomer dabbling in medicine, and in one of his letters he asked Brahe to let him know if he was in possession of any remedy against epilepsy. The men also corresponded on astronomical matters: Brahe pointed out his difficulty in accepting the theory of Copernicus and commented on the errors of the available astronomical tables. Always anxious to increase his library, in many of his letters Brahe inquired about new books or asked his friends to procure them for him, especially ones about a new star or the recent comets. The biannual Frankfurt book fair and its catalogues played a key role in the identification of the works that Brahe received or requested. For instance, in 1585 Brucaeus wrote to inform him that no mathematical works have been published at the recent fair, and none were being carried by the local bookdealers.

In 1597 Brahe quarrelled with the king of Denmark, Christian IV, and decided to seek a job elsewhere. He packed his instruments and his printing press and sailed off with his family and a retinue of about twenty persons. He wandered through Germany for a couple of years until he took service with Emperor Rudolph II in 1599. He was given a castle outside Prague, where he was joined by Johann Kepler, the man who was to become his successor. Brahe realized Kepler's genius, but what he did not anticipate was that Kepler's interpretation of the observations of Mars that Brahe had made over a period of several years would lead not to a confirmation of his own astronomical system but to that of Copernicus. The scientific community that recognized this is well described in Mosley's book, which is rich in scholarly details and attentive to the different voices that were raised, not always in unison.

WILLIAM R. SHEA
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HELKE RAUSCH. *Kultfigur und Nation: Öffentliche Denkmäler in Paris, Berlin und London 1848–1914*. (Pariser Historische Studien, number 70.) Munich: R. Oldenbourg. 2006. Pp. 797. €79.80.

History, an old adage maintains, is written by the victors. While this statement is not, of course, invariably true of written histories (as numerous discourses of historical "lost causes" demonstrate), it is true to a much greater extent with regard to historical monuments, where state and municipal authorities have much greater latitude to control and shape the construction of national memory. Helke Rausch's study, adapted from her 2002 dissertation at the University of Heidelberg, examines the construction of nearly two hundred historical monuments in Paris, Berlin, and London from the revolutions of 1848 until the outbreak of World War I. This body of data gives her a novel vantage point from which to engage scholarly discourses

regarding nation-building, competing visions of national identity, and the alleged "peculiarities" of Germany's path to modernity.

The monuments that Rausch identifies, and the information she gathers regarding their design, financing, construction, dedication ceremonies, and public responses generated, are quite interesting. After a relative lull during the years 1848–1870, in which only a few dozen historical monuments were erected in these three capitals, the period from 1871–1914 saw a veritable boom in the construction of public memory. Citing Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger's *The Invention of Tradition* (1983), Rausch links this boom to the efforts of French, German, and British authorities to create a canonical vision of national identity in an age of mass politics and great power rivalry. Comparing commemorative practices in three different capitals, Rausch finds a remarkable degree of convergence with regard to the subject matter, tone, and reception of monuments. Official portraits of monarchs, statesmen, and military leaders made up the greatest share of the monuments in all three capitals, while artists and writers, academics and scientists, business leaders and philanthropists were also well represented. Women, with the exception of queens, empresses, and allegorical figures, were almost completely absent from the male-dominated memorial sphere, though Rausch offers a fascinating discussion of several failed efforts at commemoration of notable women in Third Republic France, including the writer and critic Germaine de Staël and the Commune heroine Louise Michel.

Rausch explicitly rejects the notion of a German *Sonderweg*, and particularly argues against the view expressed in George Mosse's *The Nationalization of the Masses* (1975) that the nineteenth-century German cult of the nation led directly to the aestheticization of politics under the Third Reich. Instead, she argues that the meaning of national identity was highly contested in all three capitals throughout the period of her study. The examples that she discusses clearly support such an argument. Berlin was indeed different from London and Paris, but London and Paris were also quite different from one another. The comparison between three case studies enables some surprising groupings. For example, during the period 1848 to 1870, it is the British case that appears exceptional, as both the Prussian monarchy and the French Second Empire were authoritarian states that sought to suppress revolutionary memories and establish a monolithic, conservative-nationalist vision of the nation's past and present. During the period 1871–1914, by contrast, it is the case of the French Third Republic that appears exceptional, as Rausch argues that the jingoistic, imperialistic public culture of late Victorian and Edwardian Britain increasingly mirrored that of Wilhelmine Germany.

Rausch further demonstrates that, within the cult of official commemoration, there were ongoing differences regarding how these monuments were to be "read." One such example concerns the commemoration of the German cultural heroes J. W. von Goethe,

Friedrich Schiller, and the Humboldt brothers, who were celebrated by the Kaiserreich as representatives of national greatness, while the waning progressive opposition embraced them as representatives of that "other Germany" defeated in 1848. Within Third Republic France, greater freedom of expression and deep political polarization contributed to a proliferation of dueling monuments, such as those to Joan of Arc and Voltaire, dedicated within a few years of one another and expressing radically different visions of what France should be. At the same time, Rausch notes the efforts of both sides to co-opt the other's monuments: for example, some French leftist republicans celebrated Joan as a "daughter of the people," while some French Catholics emphasized the piety of republican hero Louis Pasteur.

Like most doctoral theses, this book would have benefited from a greater degree of revision prior to publication. At seven hundred pages, it is rather too long, and the reader must trudge through an eighty-page literature review and a forty-page section on methodology before getting to the good stuff. The book's structure is also rather rigid. Each chapter is divided into four sections: case studies of Paris, Berlin, and London, followed by a comparison. Each new monument is described in more or less the same way, beginning with discussion of its sponsorship, moving to debates regarding its merits, design, and chosen location, and concluding with an account of its dedication ceremonies and the public reaction, if any, to its unveiling. By contrast, some of the most fascinating parts of the book occur when Rausch's narrative breaks out of this rigid structure to follow an interesting sidetrack. For example, this reviewer was intrigued by the examples of memorials that could not be built and unauthorized *lieux de mémoire* that emerged outside of official commemorative culture, such as the graves of the victims of the March 1848 uprising in Berlin or the Mur des Fédérés in Père Lachaise cemetery. Another surprising omission was the Sacré Coeur basilica—not a monument in the strict sense of the term, perhaps, but certainly central to the debates over commemoration and national memory in early Third Republic Paris.

Those reservations aside, this book offers a novel and insightful contribution to ongoing discourses regarding national identity and collective memory in late-nineteenth-century Europe, as well as debates regarding the German *Sonderweg* and the invention of tradition more broadly. It will be of interest to scholars in a variety of areas.

DAVID ALLEN HARVEY
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MACGREGOR KNOX. *To the Threshold of Power, 1922/33: Origins and Dynamics of the Fascist and National Socialist Dictatorships, Volume 1*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xvi, 448. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$22.99.

MacGregor Knox's study is a compelling and densely packed narrative of a dual process: the collapse of liberal regimes in Italy and Germany after 1918, and their replacement by new radical nationalist mass movements led by charismatic men. It is based on impressively wide knowledge of the secondary literature and the language of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler.

Knox is a leading scholar of the war-making capacities of modern Italy and Germany. Unsurprisingly the military is at the center of his account. The most authoritative chapter—a quarter of the book—treats the experience of World War I and conflicting efforts in the two countries to give it meaning. At the end, Knox attributes to the Italian and German armies “decisive” roles as “the prime mover” in the creation of the two dictatorships (pp. 395, 397). The other culprit, for Knox, was the failure of these two countries’ established political leaderships to adapt to mass politics. Knox’s recounting of the eruption of two mass political currents—socialist and Catholic—while elites failed to create a corresponding mass movement of their own is fine-grained and deeply informed. The third component of Knox’s analysis is ideology. In both countries myths about national destiny, the menace of internal and external enemies, and the legitimacy of aggressive expansion became dominant within the armies, the conservative elite, and even parts of the opposition. These ideologies predated the fascist and Nazi parties, and they exerted powerful sway throughout the period examined. With some asperity, Knox accuses those who downplay the role of ideology in this matter of assuming that Marxism constitutes the “ideal type” of ideology; of ignorance of the texts; or of the belief that “discourse” is a mere construction unrelated to decision making (p. 340).

Knox considers it “naïve reductionism” to believe that social class or economic interest determine political behavior (p. 315), but one might wish for nuance instead of dismissal. Rejecting the socioeconomic *Sonderweg* interpretation, he proposes a reformulated *Sonderweg* stripped of determinism and centered on political culture. “Politics and war led the way, society followed.” Each country’s history was unique. Italy and Germany differed profoundly, he notes, though they converged in their crippling fragmentation, the autonomy of their military, and the pervasiveness of aggressive nationalism. Although Knox compares pertinently the negative cases of France and Britain, he does so too briefly and generally to make this work structurally comparative.

Skeptical of concepts in general, Knox notes with satisfaction that the unique paths to fascism in each of Italy’s distinctive towns and regions seem “created to puncture generalizations” (p. 315). At the outset he waves aside the concept of generic fascism as unhelpful, though he finds some merit in the concept of totalitarianism. While he notes properly that the USSR and the western dictatorships “rested upon radically different political and social foundations” (p. 2) [why not add ideological?], Knox finds that V. I. Lenin and Joseph

Stalin “are best understood as totalitarians rather than ‘men of the Left’” (p. 306).

Although this seems unnecessary to his argument, Knox insists upon the continuity and immutability of the ideological forces that drive his account. He asserts that Mussolini pursued “a remarkably straightforward course” after November 1918, despite occasional demagogic gestures toward workers (p. 305). Indeed “the nineteenth-century concepts of Left and Right are actively misleading when applied to twentieth-century radical nationalist totalitarianism” (p. 306). One would think that a plausible claim to have transcended the Left-Right cleavage was crucial to the success of fascism.

Narratives by their very nature can make outcomes seem overdetermined. Insisting that other options were open, Knox gives them little credibility in the final decisions. The two heads of state chose to hitch the new mass nationalisms to conservative rule, but Knox has not proven that they were obliged to.

It is hard to agree with Knox’s conclusion that Paul von Hindenburg and a narrowing circle of his advisers were “not the primary sources of movement by stages from ailing democracy in spring 1930 to Hitler on 30 January 1933” (p. 397). The reader has been led to expect smoking guns in military hands. Instead we have only the familiar suspicion, unproven, that General Armando Diaz warned King Victor Emmanuel III against deploying the army at the time of Mussolini’s March on Rome, and an unsupported assertion that Generals Kurt von Schleicher and Werner von Blomberg acted as German Army “agents” in 1932–1933.

This book is the first of two volumes. One awaits the second with lively interest, knowing that war and ideology will be at the center of the demonstration and economic interest at the periphery, that the work will be impressively informed, and that it will be vigorously personal.

ROBERT O. PAXTON
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DEBORAH E. HARKNESS. *The Jewel House: Elizabethan London and the Scientific Revolution*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2007. Pp. xviii, 349. \$32.50.

This book is a welcome addition to the recent historiography of the scientific revolution that has highlighted the role played by artisans and commercial interests. Such studies have shifted attention away from the classic theoretical texts of early modern physics and mathematics, and from individuals of genius, and brought into focus studies of the whole range of nature as conducted by a very varied cast of characters. Far from being the novel concern of a pioneering new group of gentlemen scientists in the mid-seventeenth century, a fascination with nature, and its potential for human use and understanding, is now revealed as deep-seated throughout early modern society (or at least in its towns and middling and upper sorts). Indeed, the classic “scientific revolution” of the Royal Society and kindred

bodies can be seen as an attempt to control and redirect a passion for science that was all too pervasive, and to bring it into the trustworthy hands of an elite. Deborah E. Harkness's study picks up this very theme but moves its setting back into what she calls Elizabethan London (actually more "Jacobethan," as it runs into the 1610s). She highlights the new approach by choosing as her title not the "Solomon's House" of Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis*, but the "Jewel House," which was the title of a collection by one of her heroes, Sir Hugh Plat. The book's final chapter compares Plat and Bacon and argues that the latter's account of Solomon's House, far from being a vision of a new science, is actually an attempt to institutionalize in elite hands the multifarious scientific activities of Bacon's London contemporaries, as epitomized by Plat's publication. Bacon thus provided the ideal role model for the Restoration (and later) scientists who wished to forget the roots of science in the streets of London (and other trading and artisanal centers), and re-establish it as a "natural philosophy" fit for academies and learned societies.

Harkness sets herself the task of rediscovering this lost world of science and bringing to life some of the characters at its heart. She does this through a series of essays, each displaying a different group of Londoners associated with a different aspect of nature, who have somehow been forgotten by history. First we have the naturalists of Lime Street, whose internationally famed expertise and collections have been overshadowed by John Gerard's *Great Herbal* (1633), in which he had, so they claimed, stolen and mangled much of their work. Next we are introduced to a dispute over medical expertise between Valentine Russwurin and members of the Barber-Surgeons Company, who wished to discredit his practice in order to allow themselves to develop a blend of Paracelsian and orthodox medicine that could rival that of the physicians. The third essay considers the range of contributors to the mathematical knowledge of Elizabethan London as reflected in their publications, and especially the sophisticated instrumentation and mathematical literacy displayed in the works of the late 1580s and 1590s. The fourth essay uses the deliberately anachronistic concept of "big science" to highlight the interest of the state, largely in the person of William Cecil, in major technological undertakings in areas such as metallurgy central to its military and financial wellbeing, and how this underpinned whole areas of scientific activity. The next chapter shows us the state shaping science in a different way, through the "prison notebooks" of Clement Draper, cast into debtor's prison through failed ventures of the very kind Cecil was promoting, who found there, as on the streets of London, numerous sources of information, personal and in books, which allowed him to develop and test his interests in all of nature, but especially in chemistry. Draper's manuscript collections turn out to mirror those of his much more successful contemporary Plat, who also achieved fame, at least in his time, for publishing the most reliable and useful of what he had learned about nature in a series of successful books. All

of these essays contain excellent material, and their overall message is a powerful and generally convincing one.

However, the book has problems of presentation, which make it less of a landmark work than it might have been. Harkness frequently addresses her readers about what she is doing, and presents herself as an ethnographer, willing, unlike earlier historians, to listen to Elizabethans forgotten by history. Yet the book is surprisingly lacking in direct quotations from the marvelous range of primary material she has uncovered, so that we rarely get the chance to listen to her heroes. The book is clearly intended to reach a wider public as well as fellow academics, but this public would surely also have welcomed more detailed narratives of the episodes she uncovers; there would have been space for this (in what is not a long book) if Harkness were not so prone to repetition of her key themes, which are actually very clearly stated the first time. The range of reading and reference in the book is highly impressive and crosses time and space. The index, unfortunately, is distinctly selective, missing many places and people named in the text.

JONATHAN BARRY
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BRIAN P. LEVACK. *Witch-hunting in Scotland: Law, Politics and Religion*. New York: Routledge. 2008. Pp. x, 217. \$34.95.

Scotland, wrote an English commentator in 1650, was a "country very fruitful of witches." As Brian P. Levack observes in this thoughtful and incisive examination of the prosecution of witches in early modern Scotland, this claim was essentially true. With a population of less than one million, the kingdom executed around 1,500 people for witchcraft between the late sixteenth and the late seventeenth centuries, compared to around 500 executions in England, whose population reached four million by 1650. Thus "a Scottish woman was twelve times more likely than her English counterpart to be executed for witchcraft," and the drive to eradicate witches in Scotland can be regarded as a major European witch hunt.

Levack's analysis sets the Scottish experience of witch persecution against that of its southern neighbor and traces the pattern of witch-hunting in the British Isles within this larger framework. His text is therefore a work of comparative history as much as a study of Scottish witch trials, and it benefits greatly from this approach. Levack argues that differences in the legal, political, and religious circumstances of the two countries explain their divergent responses to the crime. During the 1640s, when the convulsions of civil war and revolution reduced differences between the kingdoms, English witch trials matched the brutal intensity of persecutions north of the border. Thus Levack's book contributes to the understanding of witch trails in both countries and goes some way to explain the usual mildness of English responses to the crime.

For Levack, the relative judicial autonomy of local communities in Scotland greatly intensified the persecution of witches. Trials were normally conducted by regional magistrates who petitioned the Privy Council in Edinburgh to permit their activities, which allowed for the relaxation of legal safeguards, such as the prohibition of torture, in the treatment of suspects. This localized judicial context was combined with the definition of witchcraft as an essentially religious crime, in which the accused were believed to have entered a pact with the Devil in order to perform destructive magic. Thus local elites and members of the clergy could link the uprooting of witchcraft to their broader ambition to create truly Christian and God-fearing communities. Despite the efforts of some Puritan divines, English witchcraft remained an essentially secular offense for most of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and witch trials were conducted by crown-appointed assize judges. There was therefore less potential for witch hunts to take place in the period before and after the English Civil War, when the collapse of central authority and the triumph of Puritan zeal briefly precipitated large-scale trials.

There is much in Levack's analysis that is attractive. He demonstrates that supporters of royal absolutism like the seventeenth-century Scottish jurist George Mackenzie—no less than his English counterparts Robert Filmer and Thomas Hobbes—espoused judicial skepticism in cases of witchcraft as part of a broader advocacy of strong central government. The decentralized nature of Scottish witch hunting suggests comparisons with similar episodes in mainland Europe, where local elites took the lead in eradicating the Devil's associates. In this respect the contrasting experiences of Scotland and England shed light on European witch persecutions as a whole.

Perhaps inevitably for such a complex subject, some aspects of Levack's study demand further investigation. One is the role of demonic possession in witch trials. Levack argues that the Devil played a larger role in witch beliefs in Scotland than in England, but cases of possession, which offered perhaps the most tangible and direct evidence of demonic activity, were commonly linked to witchcraft in England but virtually unknown in Scottish witch trials until the 1690s. This may be, as Levack suggests, because Scottish demonologists tended to view possession as a punishment from God. But it may also relate to another striking distinction between Scottish and English witch beliefs: the apparent absence of "familiar spirits" in Scotland. In English allegations the victims of witchcraft were often tormented—and sometimes "possessed"—by these creatures, whose existence appears to have been rooted in folklore. The relationship between "familiar spirits," witchcraft, and the Devil in the British Isles may be a profitable area for future research. Levack's analysis of Scottish witch trials will remain, however, a lucid and invaluable work.

D. J. OLDRIDGE
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KARIN BOWIE. *Scottish Public Opinion and the Anglo-Scottish Union, 1699–1707*. (Studies in History New Series, number 56.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press, for the Royal Historical Society. 2007. Pp. viii, 193. \$85.00.

The run-up to the tercentenary of the Act of Union in 2007 witnessed the publication of several new books on this most notorious and controversial of topics. What should be fascinating and of interest to the professional historian, student, and lay reader is that these books were researched and published without reference to each other. Within the wider contexts of modern British society and the historiography of early modern British history, contemporary and professional historical interest has largely been a Caledonian one. The tercentenary proved to be somewhat of a damp squib, and a "new" historiography of 1707 has mostly emanated from historians of Scotland.

Karin Bowie's book is an important part of this "new" historiography. She takes an innovative approach on a relatively unexplored topic: namely, public opinion in Scotland and the 1707 union. This is an important issue that has often been sidelined or marginalized in a partisan historiographical debate concentrated on the minutiae of the Scottish economy of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, magnate and high politics, and bribery. With the publication of this book, public opinion and its impact must be incorporated into the historiography, and in that sense we now have a greater understanding of the union issue outside the elites. This is a contribution to the historiography in terms of writing "history from below" as well as "history from above."

The book is structured in two distinct sections. Part one focuses on the public sphere in Scotland between 1699 and 1705. This section deals with politics and communications in postrevolutionary Scotland, oppositional politics and the government, and public opinion. Part one provides the wider conceptual and methodological framework for the book, as well as the existing preconditions and oppositional politics relating to the formulation and expression of public opinion that were to become so important for the union. In terms of chronology, 1699 is crucial, and Bowie convincingly shows how public outrage over the treatment of the Company of Scotland and the Darien Project was galvanized by an emerging Country Party opposition to attack the Court interest in Scotland. Indeed, this is a major strength and success of the book, and it makes a really important contribution to the historiography of the infamous Darien Project and our understanding of Scottish parliamentary politics in the latter sessions (c. 1698–1701) of the Scottish Parliament. Petitions and addresses, organized by the Country Party, were widespread and articulated the grievances of the nation and the Scottish localities against the failure of Darien and the negative effects of participation in the Williamite wars.

Part two of the book focuses on public opinion and the union, 1699–1705. This section deals with public

discourse on the union, public discourse on the union treaty, addresses against the treaty and crowds, and collective resistance to the treaty. This section continues with the theme of Country Party discourse and criticisms of the Anglo-Scottish dynastic union in the period to 1705, but the focus is on the negotiated treaty and its impact. Analysis of the public discourse for and against the treaty is provided. This fits into an established historiography of the "history of ideas" and how the debates over the union have contributed to this, but I suspect that there may well be more interest in Bowie's treatment of addresses against the treaty and crowds and riots. The Country Party's experience of managing addresses over Darien provided a useful apprenticeship for the management of anti-union addresses and petitions against the negotiated treaty of 1706. Nevertheless, the successful Court management of addresses and their political neutralization is also considered. Chapter six is the most comprehensive analysis of anti-union addresses to date. The same can also be said of chapter seven and its consideration of crowds and collective resistance. This work contains the most comprehensive analysis of resistance in the historiography to date and contributes to the wider context of the study of "the crowd" in Scottish history.

It can be argued that Bowie's book will appeal as well to a wider audience of scholars interested in issues such as print culture and public opinion. In terms of the specific historiography of 1707, however, the main strengths lie in the treatment of anti-union addresses and riots, as well as the role of the Country Party in the controversy over Darien in the late seventeenth century. There appears to be some confusion between the Cameronians and Hebronites in places, and perhaps more could have been made of the readership of the pamphlets that Bowie analyzes (in terms of public opinion), but overall this is a very good book.

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AMELIA RAUSER. *Caricature Unmasked: Irony, Authenticity, and Individualism in Eighteenth-Century English Prints*. (The University of Delaware Press Studies in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Art and Culture.) Newark: University of Delaware Press. 2008. Pp. 159. \$60.00.

In his seminal *Past and Present* review article "Seeing the Past" (1988), Roy Porter urged historians to pay careful attention to visual sources, and in particular to eighteenth-century English prints. Since then many scholars have engaged with these prints, employing a variety of theoretical approaches. In this book, the art historian Amelia Rauser makes an intriguing, revisionist argument: rather than slowly evolving over the course of the eighteenth century, engraved political caricature (i.e., prints that exaggerate their subject's physiognomy, such as those representing Charles James Fox with bushy eyebrows and five-o'clock shadow) emerged suddenly in the English public sphere around 1780.

Caricature largely replaced emblematic prints (designs that, for example, depicted Charles James Fox as an actual fox) as the dominant form of visual political commentary. Rauser identifies several key factors that explain this phenomenon and pays particular attention to the circulation of ideas of liberty during the War of American Independence. At the heart of her argument, following on from Dror Wahrman, is the concept of the development of the modern, autonomous self. This theory drives the book, and Rauser sets out the pattern of her argument early on, which makes for both clarity and, inevitably, some repetition, particularly at the beginning and end of chapters.

The book is structured around five main chapters ("Emblematic and Ideal Publicness"; "Character or Caricature?"; "Caricature and Authenticity: Artifice, Masculinity, and the Macaroni"; "Caricature and Individualism: The Crisis in Representation"; and "Caricature and Irony: Aestheticism, Embodiment and Subjectivity"), each of which focuses on a series of case studies. Rauser casts a thoughtful eye over her evidence, and her explication of individual designs is both elegant and judicious. Yet there remains the issue of representativeness. Rauser certainly discusses important, well-known images, for example William Hogarth's caricature of John Wilkes and Matthew and Mary Darly's series of "macaroni" prints, as well as many little-known ones, for example emblematic prints from the 1740s. Seventy-three images are reproduced in the book, and each of these is discussed in careful detail. Yet these remain only a fraction of the thousands of political and social satires produced in late eighteenth-century England, the "golden age" of political satire. Are the images discussed in the book truly representative of the larger market for political satire? As there is little discussion of the art market, production methods, and, most crucially, the consumption of these images, it is difficult to know what impact the designs discussed in the book really had, and whether, for example, they were more influential than other images.

Moreover, while clearly caricature did become more popular than emblematic designs, was this as pointed and politically significant a development as Rauser claims? As Rauser herself notes, many later prints combined elements of both caricature and emblem. More importantly, the link between public events (the American War) and changes in print design is assumed but never demonstrated. How did this development of the autonomous, private, modern self affect printmakers such as James Gillray and William Dent? Without such evidence, it is difficult, I think, to be certain that changes in print design were really due to developing theories of political liberty and personal autonomy (or at least that these were the most important factors behind the changes).

Rauser provides a fresh and original interpretation which deserves further scrutiny. One helpful way forward might be to compare the rise of caricature with other manifestations of the development of the autonomous modern self that seem to have occurred more

slowly over the eighteenth century (the rise of the novel) and/or even earlier (the representation of the interior "self" in self-portraits) and that were not restricted to England itself. Finally, following on from Ludmilla Jordanova's recent call in the *Historical Journal* for historians to take seriously the illustrations of publications involving images, I am happy to report that Rauser's book is well illustrated (the large format works very well, allowing individual prints to be reproduced in text on a generous scale). Glossy paper might have worked better than matte, yet on the whole the book's production values do justice to Rauser's argument.

CINDY MCCREERY
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RICHARD D. FLOYD. *Church, Chapel and Party: Religious Dissent and Political Modernization in Nineteenth-Century England*. (Studies in Modern History.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2008. Pp. xvi, 295. \$74.95.

It has long been claimed on the basis of merely anecdotal evidence that nineteenth-century English dissenters were supporters of liberal causes and candidates and that Anglican electors voted in favor of conservatives who were loyal to the established church. Richard D. Floyd's important study offers the first quantitative evidence at both the constituency and parliamentary levels to support that claim and expands the argument by positing a central role for religion in the emergence of the English two-party system. This book examines the influence of religion in the electoral politics of five parliamentary boroughs over five general elections between 1832 and 1847. Admittedly, the sample embraces a small number of boroughs, but they reflect a pleasing diversity; the number of voters ranges from about 800 in Durham to over 5,000 in Nottingham, and hence the selected boroughs are probably representative of the broader voting public. Dissenters in this study include all non-Anglican denominations, with careful consideration to both the older religious bodies (Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, and Quakers) and the newer Wesleyan and Methodist chapels.

The introduction and chapter one demonstrate the importance of religious subjects in the period following the Reform Bill. The numerical growth of Methodism and evangelical dissent leading up to the 1851 census was impressive, with about twenty percent of the population attending non-Anglican services, only slightly less than Anglican attendance. Beyond the growth of non-Anglican religion was the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts that provided dissenters with greater opportunities for political participation. Since the dissenters had a natural interest in ending church rates and acquiring admission to the universities, it was understandable that they would ally themselves with those candidates who expressed support for their concerns. Broadly speaking, the dissenters' support for greater religious liberty readily extended to such issues as free trade and the abolition of slavery. Other issues were certainly present in electioneering, such as the new

Poor Law, but Floyd concentrates on the issues of church and state that dominated debate in both the constituencies and Parliament.

Chapters three through seven examine the five boroughs with respect to the political orientation of the candidates and the national issues that clustered around the elections. Durham, for example, was a relatively small cathedral town, but it gained some notoriety from the fact that John Bright contested the borough in 1843, and along with T. C. Granger, another radical, Bright represented Durham through 1847—a remarkable turn of events, given the power of the Anglican Church and local traditional interests. The voters from five dissenting chapels were identified from the nonconformist registers of births and burials, and over the period of six elections they mustered between 8.8 and 11.6 percent of the voting electorate. These figures, however, represent only the dissenters that can be certainly identified on the basis of stringent criteria: the actual dissenting electorate in Durham was probably a third of the whole. Floyd makes solid use of local newspapers and the rich election ephemera, and there can be no doubt of the importance of religion in the outcome of the elections. Bright's speech to the Durham electors connected the monopoly in the economy to the monopoly in religion—Anglican clergy, he claimed, benefitted disproportionately from the Corn Laws—and in the July 1843 by-election, dissenters gave seventy-two percent of their votes to Bright (as compared to his Anglican support of fifty-two percent). Conversely, conservative candidates consistently favored the Anglican Church and its interests and garnered disproportionately high numbers of Anglican votes. Similar patterns of issues, interests, and voting are found in Nottingham, Ipswich, Bedford, and Exeter. The chapters are organized straightforwardly by chronology and election and by the electoral issues that surfaced.

The second part of the book (chapters eight through ten) looks at divisions within the House of Commons, and through a comparison with the politicization of the electorate makes the case for the growth of genuine partisan behavior and the development of the two-party system grounded largely in religious differences. Chapter eight examines some 200 division lists in Parliament where the votes of the thirty-five MPs who were returned for the five boroughs studied in part one centered around religious issues. Even though the study reveals a high level of absenteeism in Parliament, overall, liberal MPs cast 85.7 percent of the total possible votes in favor of issues of concern to dissent, and conservatives cast 84.7 percent of their votes for establishment causes. These patterns were statistically significant and consistent over the period of the four parliaments that were studied.

Chapter nine studies the proportion of partisan alignment related to religion in the constituencies by identifying dissenting voters in the poll books in four boroughs. The aggregated evidence shows that dissenters gave 81.7 percent of their votes to liberal candidates; in only three of the twenty-three elections in

which dissenters were identified did their support for liberal candidates fall below 75 percent of the total dissenting vote. On average, dissenters were 5.4 times more likely to vote for a liberal candidate than the wider electorate, and statistical analysis confirms that these variations were related to religion and not to chance. Moreover, this dissenting political discipline did not decline over time, though it is difficult to prove that it increased over time.

One of the more interesting new findings in this study is the political orientation of old dissent (Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists and Quakers) in relation to the newer branches of Methodism and Wesleyanism, the latter of which made up about half of the total of nonconformity. As evangelical views increasingly characterized old dissent, the former differences broke down, and Methodist and Wesleyan voters were, at least in some constituencies like Durham, more partisan in their support of liberal candidates than the old dissenters. While these new dissenters differed in the strength of their partisanship from borough to borough, they still voted overwhelming liberal in comparison to non-dissenters. Floyd concludes that both in Parliament and in the constituencies, a two-party structure or pattern, at least with respect to religiously oriented issues, was clearly in place in the fifteen years after the Reform Bill.

Two concerns with this study need to be registered. One possible defect is the absence of any control for socioeconomic variables. Admittedly, the difficulty of collecting and analyzing occupational and tax related data is so great that it might require a separate study, but the lingering worry that economic variables stand behind the religious differences cannot be assuaged without further research and analysis. If dissent was, in the words of Harold Perkin, the midwife of class, we need to know exactly how the economic discipline of the dissenters and their increasing wealth may have functioned in the political arena. A second concern is related to an equally complex and inherently difficult topic: namely, the question of individual voter behavior over time. We know that voter experience bears quite directly on voter discipline, and hence longitudinal analysis is begging to be done on this particular set of data. A crucial issue related to party discipline in municipal elections is the use of paper slates that were party oriented, a subject recently investigated by the late John A. Phillips. Once again, without detracting in the least from the significant accomplishments of this study, it is natural to ask the question of possible variables related to the frequent elections and the new experience of voters under the conditions of the first Reform Bill and the Municipal Corporations Act.

JAMES E. BRADLEY
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SHARON MARCUS. *Between Women: Friendship, Desire, and Marriage in Victorian England*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2007. Pp. x, 356. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$19.95.

Sharon Marcus's book received the 2007 Lambda Literary Award for the best book in LGBT studies. That her success merits comment is not because Marcus is an unworthy winner. This is a provocative exploration of the relationships between Victorian women, which should make historians rethink the paradigms within which they address *both* female friendship *and* gender and sexuality. What is striking is that Marcus deliberately rejects the very categories on which the Lambda rests. Her book "is not about lesbians; nor is it about the lesbian potential of all relationships between women. Indeed, if we take 'lesbian' to connote deviance, gender inversion, a refusal to objectify women or a rejection of marriage as an institution, then none of the relationships discussed here was lesbian" (p. 2). Paradoxically, this prize-winning example of "lesbian studies" is lesbian-less.

Marcus explores women's relationships in mid-Victorian Britain. She draws upon an astonishing range of sources. Memoirs, diaries, letters, and autobiographies are brought into conversation with conduct literature like Sarah Stickney Ellis's *The Daughters of England* (1842). Canonical novels are read alongside discussions of corporal punishment in the *Englishwoman's Domestic Review*, fashion plates, "doll tales," and anthropological studies of marriage. Victorianists will recognize much (though not all) of this material. Marcus overstates her archive's originality: historical studies of queer male culture *are* dominated by legal scandals and material, but that is not true of work on female sexualities. Lacking many "official" sources, historians like Martha Vicinus and Laura Doan have been far more creative in using lifewriting or fictional material. It is the breadth of research, and surprising—productive—juxtaposition of material that are Marcus's real strengths. Necessarily, the approach is interdisciplinary. Integrating close textual and visual readings with a historian's attentiveness to context and audience, Marcus ranges across disciplinary boundaries and archives in developing a bold reinterpretation of women's interrelationships.

This revisionist project is driven by a powerful critique of the paradigms within which historians have approached female friendships. Marcus identifies a dual problematic: "gender, kinship and sexuality . . . cannot be fully understood if we define them only in terms of two related oppositions: men versus women, and homosexuality versus heterosexuality" (p. 1). Convincingly, she suggests that gender historians have "paid relatively little attention to how relationships between women defined normative gender roles" (p. 9). Treating marriage and family and same-sex relationships as mutually exclusive means female friendship and lesbian love have been "conflated as essentially feminist alliances that helped women to subvert gender norms and rebel against the strictures marriage placed on women"—conceptualized as part of the same analytic field in a version of the "continuum theory" associated with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick or Carol Smith-Rosenberg. Yet approaching the bonds between women within a frame-

work derived from lesbian studies makes it hard to see “the differences between female friendship, female marriage and unrequited love between women; and to understand how friendship extended well-beyond an isolated ‘female world’” (p. 12).

In challenging this conceptual impasse, Marcus mirrors other recent work that is displacing contemporary categories of sexual identity from explorations of past intimacies. Like Doan or Seth Koven, she utilizes queer theory “to ask what social formations swim into focus once we abandon the preconception of strict divisions between men and women, homosexuality and heterosexuality, same-sex bonds and those of family and marriage” (p. 13). So what does “become thinkable” through this approach? “Socially-sanctioned” relationships between women were diverse; Marcus carefully differentiates among “Friendship, infatuation, marriage and women’s objectification of women” (p. 21). Victorian understandings of friendship, gender, and marriage were surprisingly “elastic.” Women could express “playful attraction and love” for one another “without radically changing the normative rules governing gender difference” (p. 27). Close readings of life-writing and novels like *Middlemarch* (1874) suggest love between women was considered complimentary rather than antagonistic to marriage, coexisting with courtship and persisting after the wedding day. Women with experience of being part of a same-sex couple—like feminist campaigner Matilda Hays—were active in debates around the Matrimonial Causes Act (1857). Drawing upon their own experiences and personal contacts with legislators and journalists, they lobbied for reform and sought to redefine marriage as a contract of equals—making it a more “plastic institution” (p. 194). Rather than being just objects of the male gaze, women were encouraged to “consume images of women”: “a reputable wife had to take an erotic interest in images of fashionable ladies . . . a proper girl had to worship at the altar of femininity by idolizing, caressing or tormenting her female doll” (p. 113).] Marcus’s sustained discussion of Victorian doll culture takes us far from anything recognizable as “lesbian” history. Rather than being on the margins of mid-Victorian culture, “female marriage, gender mobility, and women’s erotic fantasies about women were at the heart of normative institutions and discourses, even for those who made a religion of the family, marriage and sexual difference” (p. 13).

In conclusion Marcus observes how “the use of lesbian sexuality as the master term for understanding all other bonds between women was one of the defining gestures of twentieth-century feminism” (p. 257). As this book demonstrates, the “lesbian” has had a similar overdetermining influence on histories of sexuality. Looking for “lesbian” subjects “hidden from history” has generated much fine scholarship. Yet here, interweaving the sophisticated insights of queer theory with the rigorous study of the past, Marcus forces us to recognize how our own assumptions have constrained our ability to understand the complex ways in which the

Victorians made sense of relationships between women. In displacing the “lesbian” from its field of view, this book is a powerful shining example of what “becomes thinkable” if contemporary identity categories—even identity itself—are set aside. In effect, Marcus kicks out the conceptual foundations on which “lesbian and gay studies” rests. Might the Lambda prize committee members want to change their minds?

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LARA KRIEGLER. *Grand Designs: Labor, Empire, and the Museum in Victorian Culture*. (Radical Perspectives.) Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2007. Pp. xviii, 305. Cloth \$84.95, paper \$23.95.

Histories of design often end up reifying the relevant aesthetics, attacking or worshipping the designers, or isolating the institutions in which the commodities are housed and praised. Such texts cover coffee tables or fill the space adjacent to works of cultural theory. Rarely are there sincere attempts to provide a “total” narrative about design in a specific historical context. Where is the study in which the scholar defines, addresses, and connects design issues as seemingly disparate as copyright law, museum practice, artisanal creation and mechanical copying, and foreign trade? Those were apparently not so disparate for the Victorians, who have found their ally in Lara Kriegel’s bold and focused monograph. The book is a successful grand design itself, as the author buries for the foreseeable future myths about Victorian indifference to the many facets of creating and displaying the beautiful and useful, and its attendant association of the nineteenth century with ugly melodramatic statues and equally hideous painted iron bridges.

It turns out that both eminent and not-so-eminent Victorians were worried about whether or not their designs were beautiful, or ugly, and that public preoccupation is the centerpiece of Kriegel’s artfully illustrated and skillfully researched study of primarily London from the 1830s through the early 1870s. Once a crisis in design was proclaimed in light of what a variety of “others” (including the French, South Asians, and Chinese) were producing, then the game was on for those English men and women who designed, funded, crafted, displayed, and bought and sold.

There were many interesting reform battles in the nineteenth century, and Kriegel’s work convincingly makes the claim we should not ignore the battle over design reform, a struggle that took place not only in the factory but also in the museum, and not only in the newspapers but also in Parliament. To a great degree, that early and mid-Victorian battle culminated with government schools of design, copyright legislation, and, among other developments, the popular displays at the Great Exhibition in 1851 and its successor, the South Kensington Museum. Today’s visitors can walk amidst the legacy of design reform: the Victoria and Albert Museum.

Critics then and now might argue that design itself is a superficial matter, a question of surfaces and perceptions, but not of substance. Victorians of many parts and places appear to have disagreed, thinking that much was at stake in the question of design, including "a complex and long-standing engagement with labor and trade" (p. 4). Kriegel provides ample evidence of the diversity of interests converging on that "engagement" and design reform as she visits museum guidebooks, design manuals, illustrated newspapers, pattern books, and, among other suggestive sources, government reports. The prominent Henry Cole is here; so too are eager artists and struggling printers. It would be unimaginable to exclude Prince Albert. Kriegel's position is that it would be equally unimaginable to ignore visitors to the Crystal Palace, England's "laboring classes," or its government's civil servants, all of whom were part of "a notably wide range of figures," organizations, and institutions shaping design reform (p. 202). She effectively synthesizes those different interests, voices, and groups, making an important claim that perhaps we need to add "The Design Question" to the impressive list of questions annoying, challenging, and provoking the Victorians well before the obsession with design at the end of the nineteenth century. Students of the Arts and Crafts Movement in England and British India will find helpful preambles to their subjects, whether those are William Morris or traditional Indian artwares. *The Journal of Design and Manufactures* was in many ways reborn in the 1880s in the form of *The Journal of Indian Art and Industry*.

As part of the series on "Radical Perspectives," this volume addresses both historical and historiographical matters. Readers will be informed about how in practical terms taste was developed and spread, and, at the same time, learn about how to approach such problems as working historians. For example, the sections about Cole, Indian artisans and calicos, Chinese figures, free trade, fears of piracy and copyright protection, and the chapter about Bethnal Green are notably informative and will be of keen interest to students of nineteenth-century Britain and parts of its formal and informal empire. There is also much new of interest concerning the Great Exhibition and South Kensington Complex, both subjects of many previous studies, although Kriegel could have said more about design at the subsequent international exhibitions held at South Kensington in 1862 and the early 1870s. Did their relative lack of success imply a change in popular attitudes about design reform and the public display of industrial art?

Students of the Victorian era and perhaps many others will be equally attracted by the "total" approach that links issues often divided among cultural, social, economic, and legal histories. This is a rich cultural history made richer by the clear writing and organization, as well as the ways in which cultural questions are not separated from more traditional, often non-cultural matters such as class relations and institutional authority. Turning from "the linguistic turn," Kriegel comes back home to class. This work is thus the very pleasant fruit

of marrying cultural and social history, or close textual readings and broader social contexts. In nineteenth-century terms, Kriegel weds the "National Culture" and "The Social Questions." Perhaps more accurately, it is a return to the Old Victorian himself, Karl Marx, who surprisingly warrants only one reference in the impressive bibliography, but whose words about mechanization, labor, markets, commodities, society, and culture echo throughout the book. Broadly speaking, Kriegel uses her own analytical synthesis to help us better track and understand the continuities in thought and action from a recognizably English Utilitarian era to a somewhat post-Utilitarian Modernist era not far from the end of the Victorian age. The active and various roles of the "empire" in that particular history call for more discussion, particularly since that charged word is prominent in the book's title but less so in the text itself. Additionally, many in both periods were suspicious of if not downright antagonistic to the Crystal Palace and its contents, as well as to the working classes as producers and consumers of art. Their metropolitan and imperial dissenting voices, as well as that further development of empire itself, would provide small but welcome additions to Kriegel's successfully compelling grand design. This scholarship is impressive and challenging. But what harm could come from adding a few more well-fashioned Victorian ornaments, whether paisley or calico?

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MICHELLE ALLEN. *Cleansing the City: Sanitary Geographies in Victorian London*. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 2008. Pp. x, 225. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$24.95.

Nineteenth-century sanitary reform, once the province of heroic histories of reforming social and medical achievement, has acquired a more intellectually sophisticated scholarly literature over the past twenty-five years. No longer does Edwin Chadwick bestride the century like a colossus, brandishing an egg-shaped sewer: the canvas of the history of public health reform has been re-peopled with private individuals, medical men, medical officers of health, epidemiologists and bacteriologists, philanthropists, eugenicists, and politicians. Much of the work of repainting has been done within the field loosely known as the social history of medicine, which draws on a wide range of interdisciplinary influences in shaping its analyses. Following the emergence over the past decade of the related subdiscipline of medical humanities, medicine and literature has been developed as a topic in many university courses. Given trends in historical scholarship, and the rich Victorian literature relevant to the topic of sanitary reform, it is not surprising that cultural history should now be moving into this territory. Michelle Allen's disciplinary background is in English, and in this work she utilizes contemporary journalism, archival collections, and var-

ious literary sources to explore the theme of resistance to sanitary reform between 1840 and 1900.

In scholarly terms, this book is something of a mixed bag. Three "historical" chapters (on sewers, the river Thames, and the urban poor) are balanced by two "literary" chapters exploring, respectively, the role of the Thames in Charles Dickens's *Our Mutual Friend* (1865) and the significance of site and location in George Gissing's *The Nether World* (1889). Perhaps because of Allen's training in English, perhaps because of this reviewer's training in history, the "literary" chapters seem the more successful: the analysis is more secure and the writing fresher than in the rest of the book. The historical chapters and the historical afterword are a disappointment, being largely dependent on existing scholarship and offering little new in substance or interpretation. Occasional overgeneralization is also in evidence—the claim, for example, that water closets "remained the prerogative of the wealthier classes for most of the century" (p. 44) being somewhat misleading. By 1870 water closets had generally been installed in London housing of all types, even if the vast majority had no water laid on and had to be flushed using hand-pails (in wealthy homes as well as poor), and even if the poorest did at times treat theirs with disrespect, smashing up the china bowls and selling off the fittings.

Like the Victorian writers who supply her evidence, Allen is attracted specifically to the dark sides of London life: to the filthy, corrupt, and squalid. Yet the sanitary geography of nineteenth-century London encompassed far more than cesspools and sewers, the Thames, and the poor. In choosing to limit her account to these three sanitary geographies, Allen distorts her analysis. (She is not unaware of some distortion: she admits, for example, that those who appreciated "the unreformed, degraded river . . . as a site of the picturesque" [p. 76] were a minority.) Rivers, drains and sewers, and poverty were the sensationalist, problematic areas of city cleansing: they smelled wrong. So, too did mid-century city cemeteries and the on-going problems with disposing of dead animals (knackers yards) and of dust (vestry depots, riverside quays, and the enormous associated sorting and recycling operation that economic dust disposal involved), not treated here, although Allen does fit in a small speculation on the nature of the Golden Dustman's (*Our Mutual Friend*) dust. The geographies of wells and piped water, as integral as cesspools and sewers to the geography of cholera and typhoid, and of the city's green spaces—the "lungs of London"—go unmentioned. Of course, the addition of these particular geographies, with the extension of constant piped, and increasingly clean, water after 1870, the removal of bursting inner city graveyards, and the carving out of the city's recreational spaces might have diluted rather than enriched Allen's argument. They might also have involved more primary historical research, being less susceptible to literary treatment.

The title of this work is, therefore, to some extent misleading, since it presents only a partial picture of that cleansing. It also illustrates some of the dangers of

such interdisciplinary ventures as cultural history when, as seems to be the case here, they address a narrow rather than a broad scholarly audience. The historical chapters of the book are essentially informative, instructing those whose familiarity with London's Victorian social history is minimal. Resistance to sanitary reform is recognized in the existing historiography, if not explored in the detail given here. The disjunction of response to different components of that reform, if it existed, constitutes a more interesting and complex historical problematic than the simple existence of resistance to a few selected components.

ANNE HARDY

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SUSANNE TERWEY. *Moderner Antisemitismus in Großbritannien, 1899–1919: Über die Funktion von Vorurteilen sowie Einwanderung und nationale Identität*. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann. 2006. Pp. 278. €48.00.

Susanne Terwey has reworked her Munich University dissertation into a superb monograph, despite its inordinately long sentences, excessive repetition, and inadequate index. As a history of antisemitism, it is exceptional in that it deals with topics that most histories of antisemitism ignore, and, even more exceptional, the story Terwey tells is fully integrated with and illuminating of general British history in the period. Her bibliography is full and up-to-date, and her critiques of a number of standard works and authors are fair and penetrating; on Anglo-Jewish history she occupies a middle ground between the "warts and all" and "uniquely beneficent" historiographies.

British defeats and humiliations in the Boer War and Kaiser Wilhelm's posturings ignited British Germanophobia. Simultaneously there was an outburst of antisemitism over the "Jewish war" incited by, as J. A. Hobson famously said, "international financiers of German origin and Jewish race" (pp. 51–52). Jews, it was claimed, wire-pulled the Unionist government and manipulated the press in behalf of Jewish interests. Their "un-British" behavior stirred up demands to reform immigration and naturalization in theory and practice, and had the effect of denationalizing the extraordinarily successful, Anglicized Jews who were prominent in finance, politics, and society, making issues of their allegiance and assimilability. This fusion of Jews and Germanophobia became the dominant antisemitic leitmotif of the period in Britain; it turned incandescent during World War I, as was epitomized by the journalist Leo Maxse, a central figure here: "We emancipated the Jews and what do they do? They rule England and work for the enemy" (p. 239).

The settlement of approximately 145,000 Eastern European Jews in Britain since 1881 also raised the issue of immigration and stirred up a great public debate, culminating in the Aliens Act of 1905; unjustifiably, Terwey essentially ignores this first immigration law of the twentieth century. Despite its virulence, British antisemitism lacked any specific image of the Eastern

Jews; it focused on the very visible Anglicized Jews, whereas the Eastern Jews, concentrated in London's East End, were identified as a religious community and thus, in Terwey's view, shielded by the national tradition of religious pluralism.

Throughout the war the conservative press condemned the "naturalization conspiracy" and demanded that the obsolete and untrustworthy nationality law be drastically revised, invoking as criteria "the instincts of race, blood, and nationality" (pp. 126, 216). Terwey's pathfinding contribution is on the interplay of the two wars, antisemitism, and immigration, together with her presentation of the shift by 1919 in British nationality law away from *jus soli* (birthplace, a social and cultural definition of citizenship) toward *jus sanguinis* (descent and parentage, a biological or racial definition of national identity) that heralds the distinctly exclusionary postwar legislation. The archaic doctrine of "indelible allegiance," as Terwey also shows, exacerbated the conversion of citizens of German descent into "almost conspiratorial" enemies. One victim of such hysteria was Sir Francis Oppenheimer, a distinguished consular officer, who, in the face of a vociferous press campaign for "the rights of true-born Britons," was recalled with the explanation that British-born sons of naturalized subjects were ineligible for diplomatic posts. The equation of Jews with Germans provided the conservative press with the key to events in Russia: the overthrow of tsardom, Lenin's coming to power with German aid, and the separate Peace of Brest-Litovsk were portrayed as "made in Germany" and "by German Jews" (p. 148). The authors of the Balfour Declaration, as Terwey finely discerns, were in the grip of the same mythical notions of international Jewry and Germany, believing that under the banner of Zionism they would ensure the "good behavior" of the Russian Jews, detach them from Bolshevism, and bring them and thereby Russia away from Germany and back to the Allies.

Terwey is the first to explore xenophobic spy-invasion fiction, tales of conspiracy and sabotage that are thickly populated with sinister British Jews in high finance and government acting in Germany's cause. Terwey contrasts antisemitism in Germany and France with Britain, where there was a powerful taboo on acknowledging oneself an antisemite, and until the interwar period even extreme antisemites, like Maxse who insisted he had "nothing against Jews qua Jews," fervently denied being antisemites (p. 139). This reflects what Terwey calls "mutable racism" and helps to explain why antisemitism was a "latecomer," and why attempts to launch an antisemitic mass movement or party were "stillborn." Terwey insists, rightly, that antisemitism developed equally, if differently, on the Liberal left and Conservative right, arguing that parliamentary government and growing democratization afforded no barrier to antisemitism. Terwey makes a compelling, though not original, case for interpreting Benjamin Disraeli's government (1874–1880) as coinciding with the onset of modern British antisemitism. Paradigmatically the first among "non-Christians" to occupy the seats of

power, the "Hebrew" Disraeli threatened to fulfill the longstanding fear that Christian England faced extinction. For the entire period and especially the war years, Terwey's fresh review of the sources demonstrates that the Jewish community was not passive and inactive under harsh journalistic attacks but responded vigorously with rebuttals and litigation against slander.

Clearly, Terwey's book will compel substantial revisions in our understanding of British history 1899–1919.

FREDERICK M. SCHWEITZER
Manhattan College

MARK GREENGRASS. *Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in the French Kingdom, 1576–1585*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 423. \$120.00.

Recent scholarship has revised the classic interpretation of Henri III as a duplicitous, vacillating, and ultimately weak figure who presided over the collapse of royal authority in France. A more sympathetic picture has slowly taken shape, which depicts Henri as a sophisticated political operator leveraging, with some talent but from a weak position, aspects of kingship and royal authority in an effort to pacify and reform his kingdom after a series of devastating civil and religious wars. Mark Greengrass adds significantly to this reinterpretation by focusing on the neglected opening decade of Henri's reign, when it is often forgotten that contemporaries held out real hopes that the new king could bring both peace and revival to France. These hopes have long been seen as mere wishful thinking in light of the chaotic final years of Henri's reign following the death of his younger brother, which brought both a succession crisis and Catholic radicalism to the forefront of French politics. But as Greengrass quite rightly points out, this was not a foregone conclusion at the time and those involved, both the king and other notables, invested considerable effort pursuing pacification and reform during the 1570s and early 1580s.

This book focuses on the rhetoric deployed by the king and others in reform proposals, lectures, speeches, and debates. Through these sources Greengrass offers a different perspective on how political reform was discussed and understood than that of previous studies, which have relied primarily on aristocratic correspondence. However, this is not a study of ideas detached from events. Quite the contrary: the book focuses on the interplay of ideas with events, firmly grounding the rhetoric of set piece speeches and reform proposals in the contexts in which they were produced. Thus, chapters focus on the evolution of ideas as presented in a variety of environments from Henri's Palace Academy and king's council, to national assemblies like the Estates General of 1576 and the Assembly of Notables in 1584, to local and regional gatherings of notables.

Collectively, the chapters of this wide-ranging and scrupulously researched book provide a nuanced examination of competing reform programs articulated during the period and paint a picture of a general crisis of confidence among French notables with regard to their

political system. Through careful examination of the various forums where reform ideas were expressed, Greengrass shows how, on the one hand, national and local notables grappled with how best to stabilize and renew French society and, on the other, how the king and his advisers sought to engage with, shape and, channel these ideas. As for the king's authority and influence, Greengrass places considerable weight on how Henri drew on a set of moralizing ideas concerning self-discipline and the harmonization of the passions that held real currency among notables. He also examines how Henri, as a central part of his effort to create consensus for shared sacrifice, benefitted from a widely shared belief in and ideological commitment to reform using traditional consultative structures.

The debate among French notables included many components that cut to the core of the French political system, including the place of the Catholic Church, office holding, and privileges in the polity. While Greengrass sensitively presents the earnest efforts to envision and implement reform at national, provincial, and local levels, he ultimately concludes that the problems of the kingdom were easy to identify but difficult to fix. Thus, while Henri's reform effort mobilized sincere support, it was unable to accomplish its goals, leading to disillusionment with reform and Henri's rule.

This is a history of one of the most ambitious royal reform efforts of the sixteenth century, but one that has largely escaped close scholarly attention because it ultimately failed. Greengrass's careful analysis reveals how the consultative, persuasive, and performative features of French Renaissance monarchy were unsuccessfully leveraged by the last of the Valois kings. Moreover, Greengrass's conclusion indicates how the early Bourbons were both shaped by Henri III's reform agenda and how they sought to separate themselves from their Valois predecessor. This careful study of Henri's failed reform program provides unique insight into the rhetoric and realities of political life in sixteenth-century France and is a must read for anyone seeking to understand the French Wars of Religion and, more broadly, the political culture of early modern France.

ERIC NELSON
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JOSEPH CLARKE. *Commemorating the Dead in Revolutionary France: Revolution and Remembrance 1789–1799*. (Cambridge Social and Cultural Histories, number 11.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. x, 306. \$99.00.

As the seven volumes of Pierre Nora's *Les Lieux de mémoire* can attest, much of the recent historical writing on modern France has centered on how its people have remembered their past. According to Joseph Clarke, however, such scholarship has focused almost exclusively on political implications—as if remembrance were merely ancillary to the more relevant theme of nation building. Although he acknowledges

the indispensable role of politics in remembering the dead during the French Revolution, Clarke aspires to break new ground by examining “the private experience of remembrance,” including “the emotional needs and social responsibilities of the individuals, families and communities” confronted with loss (p. 5). Claiming that previous studies of memory of the revolution's dead have overemphasized republican *laïcité*, the author holds that a proper accounting of remembering the dead over the revolutionary decade must include greater consideration of popular religious culture.

Clarke begins his chronological narrative with pre-revolutionary remembrance of the dead on two levels. The late Enlightenment saw the elite's commendation of virtue in its memory of the deceased. René-Louis de Girardin's garden at Ermenonville—where Jean-Jacques Rousseau was buried in 1778—and the composition of elaborate elegies by France's most accomplished writers were especially indicative of this trend. Clarke then pivots toward the masses, arguing that popular memory of the dead remained rooted in traditional Christian beliefs and practice, and thus questioning whether dechristianization in France was as rife as often claimed. This contrast between the elite's penchant for virtue and popular religious culture enables the author to demonstrate how and why politicians and the people parted ways regarding remembrance of the dead during the Revolution. That divergence first became apparent in the commemoration of the Bastille's fallen *vainqueurs* but persisted for the remainder of the revolution. As Clarke shows in a funeral oration for dead *vainqueurs* given by the Parisian Abbé Claude Fauchet, the *menu peuple* saw in the revolution a providential moment in which God—not the people—dictated events. At the same time, though, revolutionary leaders grew reluctant in commemorating deceased *vainqueurs* for fear of sanctioning popular violence and contravening state goals.

Much of the study takes up the role of the Panthéon in official memory of the dead. Political polarization over commemoration, particularly regarding how notions of the sacred would figure into revolutionary remembrance, erupted with the pantheonization of François-Marie Arouet (Voltaire). Antoine-Chrysostôme Quatremère de Quincy's subsequent plans for the Panthéon were illustrative of revolutionary leaders engineering a memory all but dismissive of popular beliefs and practices. The state's attribution of martyrdom for Jacques-Guillaume Simonneau, Louis-Michel Lepeletier de Saint-Fargeau, and Jean-Paul Marat embodied, moreover, the ways in which officials employed a memory of the dead to achieve or maintain political and ideological priorities. Despite the Mountain's best efforts, according to Clarke, “an essentially Christian, if not exclusively Catholic, understanding of *immortalité* remained deeply ingrained in Parisian popular culture throughout the Terror” (p. 193). The author leaves little doubt that the same could be said of popular culture in the provinces as well. After Thermidor, official commemoration of the dead centered more on mounting

military losses, yet revolutionaries had no more success in creating a state-sanctioned memory than before the summer of 1794. Given the war's inflationary and logistical pressures, most official attempts to remember the military dead during the Directory period—including the granting of pensions to widows and orphans—were scaled back or abandoned altogether. All of which suggests to Clarke that the French Revolution not only failed to create a memory of the dead that the nation could accept, but also left popular beliefs and practices concerning the dead hobbled and extraordinarily estranged from those of the state.

When placed in scholarly context, Clarke's study covers ground already cultivated by the likes of Philippe Ariès, Mona Ozouf, Antoine de Baecque, and Avner Ben-Amos. Yet to his credit the narrative includes much more detail and nuance than these previous works. While Clarke's extensive mining of pamphlets and other published accounts from the Bibliothèque Nationale is highly commendable, and this reviewer is apt to agree with the author's contention that an official memory too contrived and designed for political purposes grew alienated from popular memory, his account lacks substantial evidence of remembrance of the dead among ordinary individuals. Even more unsatisfactory, however, is Clarke's Manichean depiction of official and popular memory—the implication being that there had to be unequivocal submission to either one extreme or the other. One could argue, though, that a real revolution in remembering the dead occurred once people were no longer beholden to the mnemonics of either a state or a church. Rather unintentionally, the French Revolution caused many not only to internalize a memory of their dead, but ultimately to take charge of it themselves.

EDWARD J. WOELL
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BARRIE M. RATCLIFFE and CHRISTINE PIETTE. *Vivre la ville: Les classes populaires à Paris (1ère moitié du XIXe siècle)*. Paris: La Boutique de l'Histoire. 2007. Pp. 584. \$34.00.

Nineteenth-century Paris has attracted the attention of talented urban historians such as Adeline Daumard, Jeanne Gaillard, and Gérard Jacquemet. The work of Barrie M. Ratcliffe and Christine Piette belongs to this august company. For those with the patience to read a book interlaced with lengthy discussions of obscure sources and abstruse social indicators, the reward is a remarkable portrait of the Parisian popular classes in the first half of the nineteenth century.

All serious researchers of this period confront the destruction of many records during the repression of the Commune. Recalling the "new social history" of the 1960s and 1970s, Ratcliffe and Piette are deeply suspicious that elite literature can tell us much about popular life. To fill this gap, they employ a staggering variety of systematic records from hospitals, poor houses, parishes, charitable societies, criminal courts, and gov-

ernment pawnshops as well as family councils and the odd social survey. They alternate thematic surveys of Parisian life with topical chapters on particular groups such as domestic servants, ragpickers, and aged, impoverished women.

Ratcliffe and Piette dispute the views of the widely known urban historian Louis Chevalier that Paris was a city on the brink—pre-industrial, isolated, despairing, violent, criminal, irreligious, suicidal, and psychopathic; Chevalier's Paris was filled with unassimilated migrants thrown on their own meager resources in isolated *quartiers*. Ratcliffe and Piette stress the continuity of urban trends between 1780 and 1880, emphasizing people's ability to negotiate, create, and ameliorate their situation.

The authors portray a growing Paris, the home of new factories and old workshops, a magnet for migrants. Sixty to seventy percent of the adult population of Paris was born outside the city. The migratory tide was large but not that different from earlier or later migration patterns. Migrants were not deviants; they were scattered throughout the city, intermarried with the local population, and maintained ties with kin who were also migrants to the city.

Paris was a city of contrasts. Alongside great wealth, two-thirds of the Parisian population was poor, defined as lacking reserves against unemployment, sickness, accident, or any interruption of work; of these, thirty percent were indigents, unable to meet minimum standards without outside help. The frontier between poverty and indigence fluctuated; young couples with large families went hungry until their children went to work or left home. Young families, abandoned mothers with children, aged women, and injured, sick, and unemployed workers all resorted to the many public and private charities and survived by cobbling together food from soup kitchens, medical services from public hospitals and hospices, money squirreled away in better times, money from mutual aid society funds and from government-supported savings accounts, cash on the spot from state-sponsored pawn shops, and earnings from small jobs, some on the very edge of begging.

Where Chevalier saw atomization, anomie, and desperation, Ratcliffe and Piette see organization, negotiation, and agency. Violent crime and infanticide were real but not exclusively the domain of migrants and their occurrence was infrequent. Elderly widows got by babysitting, mending clothes, and selling snacks in the street; their work was devalued but they remained part of everyday neighborhood society. Workers in the informal sector may have been despised, but they were not disorganized or desperate. Ragpickers developed a strong internal hierarchy, fought to monopolize favorable sites for trash gathering, and even bequeathed these sites to their children.

This study finds no sharp break in the fabric of urban life. A study of Paris and select Parisian *quartiers* shows that migrants were not isolated. Many friends and relatives lived nearby but, through work, migrants acquired ties to a larger world. Many working-class cou-

ples lived together unmarried, but the biggest single obstacle to marriage was the state-imposed difficulty of assembling the requisite paperwork. Similarly, few Parisians were yet irreligious; while many no longer observed the rites rigorously, an overwhelming number wanted their children baptized. Even suicides were relatively decorous, preferring privacy and the indoors to the drama of public death.

Ratcliffe and Piette have demolished Chevalier's view of a pathological Paris, a tinder box for psychopathic revolutionaries. But their portrait of a "normal" city in which long-term demographic and social trends changed only gradually, almost at a glacial, Braudelian pace, raises many questions. They find human agency in individual responses to want but devote little space to collective responses. Of course, Paris was the pre-eminent capital of social revolution in this period. The reader must ask how the extremely violent and sudden shifts in the attitudes of the popular classes in 1830 and 1848 can be reconciled with this slow-moving context? Is politics really so separated from political and social background? Answering the questions posed in this important book will shape debates over Parisian urbanization for a long time to come.

MICHAEL HANAGAN
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SIMON KITSON. *The Hunt for Nazi Spies: Fighting Espionage in Vichy France*. Translated by CATHERINE THANNY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2008. Pp. xix, 218. \$25.00.

The end of the Cold War brought huge dividends to the study of Soviet history, and some of these also spilled over into other national fields. In the mid-1990s, the Russians returned to France 1,400 boxes of Vichy counterespionage records, originally seized by the Germans in 1943 and captured by the Soviets at the end of the war, thus offering an unparalleled opportunity to explore a corner of Vichy's relations with the occupier that hitherto had been left largely to the memoirs of secret agents. Having combed through many of these records, Simon Kitson, a British historian who originally published in French, has now made his findings available in an English edition. The startling conclusion of this fascinating look at Vichy's efforts to mount counterespionage efforts in unoccupied France and North Africa is the degree to which the campaign was conducted, with vehemence and often brutality, primarily against Nazi Germany.

The Germans, as Kitson demonstrates in some detail, flooded France and French North Africa with spies. Most of these agents were French, and they were not difficult to recruit. Agents volunteered for ideological or sentimental reasons, a fair number were coerced or entrapped, but mostly the Germans could easily buy spies in a time of deprivation and desperation, using the huge sums that were transferred into German coffers in accordance with the terms of surrender. Well aware of what the Germans were up to, the French secret ser-

vices sought, to their limited abilities, to thwart them. Kitson is careful to point out that French counterespionage was directed at all potential threats, British, American, and Gaullist, as well as German. But he also is at great pains to show, and he does so quite persuasively, that the main target was German spies, and that while liaisons were opened with British and American agents, and while captured Allied spies were often treated gently, the one unadulterated thread running through the hunt for foreign spies was an abiding hatred of the German occupier and an identification of Germany as France's number one enemy. What, then, the reader will ask, does this book do to our understanding of Vichy and the central issue of collaboration?

Kitson has thought considerably about this matter, although, strangely, he does not interrogate Michael Marrus's and Robert Paxton's argument about the Nazis' need to rely on Vichy's support in the deportation of Jews (there were too few German police units) given that, all the while, prodigious espionage resources were being poured into France. Admittedly, the bulk of these spies were French, but it is equally surprising that Kitson, who is quite good at examining motivations in an era of occupation and warfare, is reluctant to inquire very much into what this might reveal about the collaboration of a nation. Nor does he have much to say about connections with the prewar years, even though the same confusion as to who was a refugee and who was a secret agent that preoccupied Vichy's spy hunters had also preoccupied police in the 1930s and had led to the internment of many Jews who had fled from the Nazis. Awash in terrific sources, Kitson is occasionally too wedded to these to draw wider comparisons.

Yet, when it comes to the central question of understanding the internal dynamics of the Vichy state, Kitson is spot on. Ever since Paxton's classic study, we have regarded Vichy's obsession with sovereignty as a pivotal factor in collaboration. In Paxton's treatment, such obsessions led to initiatives to fight the British in the colonies or, eventually, to doing Germany's dirty work. Kitson uncovers the dynamic's flip side: how pursuit of sovereign interests produced anti-German campaigns and, in this instance, a hunt for Nazi spies. Kitson skillfully winds through the ambiguities of this hunt. The military was far more fiercely anti-German than the civilian authorities, and correspondingly the secret services were more uncompromising in their targeting of German agents than the state. Yet at bottom there was more agreement than conflict. The spy chasers were patriots, but conservative ones who sought to operate within the framework of the Vichy settlement. Compromises from on high were made for diplomatic reasons, but there was no question that the government knew and sanctioned what its secret services were doing. In all cases, the intolerable was that German secret services should violate French prerogatives. As Kitson argues, there was no contradiction between collaboration in rounding up Jews and communists and the rounding up of Nazi spies. Many of the same urges that led Vichy officials to collaborate in the one were op-

erative in the other. Thus collaboration was always an outcome of a complex bundle of motivations. It is this thought-provoking message, even more than the extraordinary detail, that makes this book one more valuable examination into the historical and moral morass of Vichy.

MICHAEL MILLER
University of Miami

RICHARD IVAN JOBS. *Riding the New Wave: Youth and the Rejuvenation of France after the Second World War*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2007. Pp. xiv, 364. \$55.00.

The history of childhood and youth in contemporary France remains a curiously underdeveloped field: curiously because the young occupied such a vital place in the social policies and political imaginaries of interwar and postwar France. Richard Ivan Jobs's book breaks important ground in this respect, examining a broad and varied range of material, from programs for modernizing youth education to comic books, novels, and New Wave films, in order to explore the ways in which the idea of youth functioned as a mechanism of cultural reconstruction in post-World War II France. Jobs thus sets out to investigate the adult preoccupation with youth as a cultural concept and with young people as social actors. He is convinced that this preoccupation has much to tell us about the ways French society reimagined itself after four years of war, occupation, collaboration, and civil conflict, for the widespread invocation of "youth," innocent of the sins of its parents, enabled politicians and policymakers to imagine a modern France that might transcend its recent, morally ambivalent past. Finally, Jobs uses his study of the political, social, and cultural emergence of the category of youth to suggest that age categories might also be used as tools of analysis, "comparable to race, class or gender for exploring social and cultural meanings" (p. 3).

Jobs is acutely aware of the unclear and unstable nature of the category "youth": unclear because its age frontiers were constantly shifting, and unstable because in Fourth Republic France (1945–1958) youth's drive and energy carried both the promise of social regeneration and the threat of social and cultural degeneration. The internal instability of youth as a cultural category provides Jobs with the organizing principle of his book, which is divided into two parts, aptly titled "The Promise of Youth" and "The Problem of Youth." The first part draws primarily from prescriptive literature aimed at educating a rising generation of managers and homemakers in the culture and expertise of technocratic efficiency that would allow them to build and properly inhabit a modernized France. Jobs recounts with skill the fascinating and largely untold tale of educational reform after the Liberation, linking such reform to the broader project of economic and sociocultural modernization that animated social policy during the Fourth Republic. Although the author seems aware that the gendered figures being targeted were of middle

or lower-middle-class origins, I would have liked to hear him reflect on the ways in which the cultural construction of the category "youth" managed to finesse the question of the rural and urban working-class young people who made up such a large proportion of this age group. One suspects that this was accomplished rhetorically and on the terrain of "popular education"—that is, cultural and sports activities that sought to bring youth of all classes together under the banner of cultural democratization. But popular education remained a mere supplement to the existing, sharply hierarchical educational system that delivered class-based instruction through a system of *grandes écoles* for the bourgeoisie and public schools for the children of the people. The category of youth could thus enfold working-class adolescents in its cultural definition even as such youth remained largely excluded from the institutions that "renewed" the nation's economic and political elite.

Jobs's discussion of youth as a social problem opens with a review of the postwar construction of juvenile delinquency by experts in the juridical, social work, and medico-psychiatric fields, all of whom agreed that the war had deeply scarred France's young: "the black market, the spectacle of death, destruction, and misery caused grave emotional trauma for children and devalued their most essential human needs" wrote Jean Chazal, chief justice of Paris's Juvenile Court in a declaration that captured a wide segment of expert opinion on the question (cited on p. 146). Building on Sarah Fishman's excellent analysis of the rehabilitative turn in juvenile justice, a phenomenon that had its origins in key reforms that were realized during Vichy, Jobs shows how these reforms were institutionalized during the late 1940s and early 1950s. The author then moves rapidly to the question of cultural representations and popular perceptions of youth gone wild, both of which lie at the heart of the analysis in the second part of his book. Jobs offers a series of close readings of a broad and pertinent array of novels, films and comic books, producing a rich portrait of the temper of the times. I particularly enjoyed the chapter on "Sex and the Cynical Girl," in which the novels and personal history of Françoise Sagan and the films of Brigitte Bardot form two poles of a public discussion on the troubling moral and sexual cynicism of young women, a gendered pendant to the much-discussed problem of rising crime rates among young men. "For a woman, maintaining moral credibility was tantamount to a civic responsibility; it was intimately tied to her state-sanctioned function as mother of the republic," writes Jobs in his lucid conclusion to the chapter. For women—especially bourgeois women like Bardot and Sagan—were expected not only to populate the nation but to provide "virtuous continuity" through the transmission of a moral tradition (p. 228).

Extensively researched and engagingly written, this book does a fine job of demonstrating the multiple and shifting significations of youth in a nation that was obsessed with the dual task of reconstructing and mod-

ernizing both society and politics. Regrettably, however, one hears very little from the young people who populated this category, nor does one gain a very precise idea of what they might actually have been doing even as politicians and pundits were debating and discussing the problem and promise of youth. For it is the category of youth, as opposed to young people themselves, that is both the central object of analysis and the central actor in Jobs's narrative. Perhaps this is inevitable, for in even the best cultural histories, of which this is an excellent example, it is the cultural construction of categories that takes center stage. But such an approach gives too much voice to interested parties who shaped and manipulated categories for specific sociopolitical ends while consigning to silence those whom the categories were meant to embrace. This is nowhere more evident than in the discussion of the war in Algeria, a subject to which, in an eerie reflection of politicians' own reticence on the subject, the author devotes a mere seven pages. It would seem that a war that shaped the lives of an entire generation (nearly two million young men were called up, while thousands of young women and men protested in various ways France's "dirty war") played no role in shaping the discourses on youth that Jobs dissects with such skill. In tracing the destiny of a category, then, Jobs ends by reproducing the very gaps and silences, distortions, and rhetorical finessings of which the category was built.

But can one realistically ask that a book overcome the limits of its genre? After all, Jobs has authored a rich and well-executed cultural history that offers an original interpretation of the cultural and political significance of "youth" in Fourth Republic France. Intelligently organized, well-written, and based on exhaustive research, this very fine book should prove highly useful to anyone interested in the subject.

LAURA LEE DOWNS

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TAMARA CHAPLIN. *Turning on the Mind: French Philosophers on Television*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2007. Pp. xvi, 334. Cloth \$62.50, paper \$24.00.

Reading Tamara Chaplin's book about philosophy on television in France, one has the strong feeling that this should have been done before. After all, France is certainly unique in having so much air time devoted to the work of philosophers. Germany has a strong history of radio dramas; Britain's BBC is known for news reporting and broadcasting classical music. But the French have had many shows, from the 1950s onward, devoted to interviews with philosophers, biographies of philosophers, and debates among philosophers, to mention only the most prevalent formats.

Chaplin's topic is most welcome and her treatment of it is superb. She devotes a chapter to each decade, more or less, of philosophers on television, tracing changes to the formats, the topics, and the audience responses, and adeptly discussing the context of the shows. For instance, when the Gaullist regime engaged in controlling

French television, Chaplin explains how its politics favored shows on philosophy as part of its effort at consolidating the nation. She also demonstrates how the Fourth Republic's reform of France's educational structure related to television about philosophy. The book gives very clear depictions of the positions and achievements of the philosophers who appeared on television, from Gaston Bachelard and Jacques Lacan to Michel Foucault and Jean-François Lyotard. Finally, Chaplin presents a media analysis of the shows when this is apposite, explaining production, direction, and camerawork shot by shot. A wide variety of skills is used to excellent effect in this study.

In the first chapter, Chaplin confronts head-on the main argument against her work, one that is all too common: philosophy and television are incompatible because the former requires patient and quiet thought while the latter demands a continuous flow of exciting and entertaining images and sounds. In short, TV is superficial; philosophy is profound. The two could not be more in conflict. Chaplin counters this argument first with the simple evidence that French television has consistently presented shows about and with philosophers, shows that have attracted considerable attention from audiences. But her major argument is that, at least in France, philosophy and television have an elective affinity. Philosophy, she claims, is an embodied performance (going back to Socrates, I suppose) of the spoken word. It lends itself well, she insists, to a medium that is both aural and visual. In this regard I hear echoes of Plato's distrust of writing (and therefore print media), a position that Jacques Derrida spent a career refuting. But Chaplin does not carry the debate in this direction. If one accepts Chaplin's position, one can enjoy and benefit from the subsequent chapters that present excellent analyses of the variety of philosophical television in France.

While I greatly admire this pioneering work, there remain some doubts and some lines for further study. First, it is "philosophy" that Chaplin treats, and "French" philosophy at that. The terms "critical theory" and "poststructuralism" do not appear in the text, and the dissemination of "French philosophy" around the globe—especially in the United States, where it had arguably its greatest reception—is not her concern. In these regards, Chaplin's text comes across as a disciplinary exercise from the days when historians easily disregarded globalization and the Internet. Can one speak only of France today, especially when one speaks of cultural matters like philosophy? History as a field is too rigidly organized into national units so that questions that bleed beyond those borders get subordinated, if not totally forgotten, in the agenda. The fact is that many of the "French" philosophers had regular faculty positions in the United States with Derrida, Lyotard, and now Étienne Balibar teaching in English every year at the University of California, Irvine. In what sense are they then "French"? This problem arose with the migration of the Frankfurt School to the United States in the wake of the Third Reich. But it goes back surely to

the eighteenth century, when the *philosophes* spread the Enlightenment throughout Europe. There is something provincial about a discipline that shrinks its domain far too often to the borders of the nation.

Another topic for further exploration in this context is the role of media. Print appears in the volume primarily in relation to sales figures, and the Internet sneaks in only at the end. Film is present hardly at all. One could easily extend Chaplin's analysis in the direction of media studies. After all, the earliest "Internet" experience did take place in France in the form of Minitel.

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Irvine

CHARLES H. PARKER. *Faith on the Margins: Catholics and Catholicism in the Dutch Golden Age*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2008. Pp. xiii, 331. \$49.95.

Charles H. Parker's study of Dutch Catholicism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries provides a new perspective on the nature of religious pluralism in the Dutch Republic. In one sense, this is a study about the exceptional nature of Dutch history as Parker emphasizes the particular character of Dutch Catholicism, marked deeply by the secularization of church property and the Calvinist domination of public religious expression. A strength of the book, however, is that it also demonstrates the ways in which Dutch Catholicism shared in many of the developments that characterized early modern European Catholicism more generally.

Parker makes an important argument about the nature of religious persecution in the Dutch Republic. From the Catholic perspective, this was a society dominated by "heretics" from the 1570s on. Despite a historiography that emphasizes the tolerant nature of Dutch society and the haphazard nature of government enforcement of anti-Catholic laws, Parker insists that there was considerable anti-Catholic violence. Although sporadic, this was physical (especially against priests), verbally intimidating, and even included "very real financial violence" in that Catholic communities were sometimes forced to pay ransom to free imprisoned priests or fees to hold services (p. 50).

This intimidation and violence pushed Catholic practice out of public spaces and onto the margins of society. Catholic institutions and its hierarchy were destroyed and church property confiscated. Yet Parker argues that this situation had many salutary effects on Dutch Catholicism. Regular conflict with the Calvinists bred a strong sense of Catholic identity. With the traditional clergy gone or converted to Protestantism, the church was free to create a reformed, Tridentine-inspired pastorate trained at seminaries in Cologne and Leiden. Freed from the traditional benefice system, these priests were supported by local elites and local communities and performed their pastoral work, for the most part, effectively. This clergy, in turn, inculcated among the laity a more personal and individual-

ized piety that dovetailed well with late medieval Dutch traditions and led to a real Catholic revival in the first half of the seventeenth century. By about 1650, almost half of the population of the northern Netherlands was Catholic.

In part, the success of the Holland Mission, which was led by apostolic vicars based outside the Dutch Republic, was the result of official church policies based on Tridentine principles. Despite the destruction of the bishoprics and much of the parish structure, the vicars maintained the official notion that they wielded episcopal authority. They continually sought to establish stable parishes and enforced their jurisdiction against interference from regular priests, particularly the Jesuits. Although the Jesuit contribution was important, particularly outside the strongly Catholic regions of Holland and Utrecht, the Jesuits did not dominate the Holland Mission as they did Catholicism in England.

Parker, like most scholars of early modern Catholicism, also points to the strong role of local communities and elites in Catholic life. Because the clergy, poor relief, churches, and even the seminaries were all supported by the voluntary contributions of the Catholic people, the laity claimed and took a strong role in Catholic life. They respected and honored the indispensable place of the priests but also insisted on exercising oversight over their pastoral work. The Catholic elite was particularly important, often providing political cover for priests and less influential Catholics. Much of the clergy came from elite families, and these priests often served in their hometowns, reinforcing the strong local character of Dutch Catholicism that also came from a sense of oppression and minority status.

This well-researched study is in some ways quite traditional. Perhaps because of his sources, Parker writes most persuasively about the education and experience of the secular clergy and about the role of top Catholic officials. His discussions of the role of the laity are less dense, although they contain important insights. He describes, for example, the large number of "spiritual virgins," women who lived semi-surreptitiously in convent-like communities, taught catechism, and ministered to the poor. These women were essential to a broad educational program that led to the Catholic revival of the early seventeenth century. Elite women were also important in supporting the seminaries that trained Dutch priests and often played a central role in organizing local religious life.

The focus on the clergy, however, may lead to an overemphasis on the oppression of Catholics in the Dutch Republic. Was this as much of a "faith on the margins" as the priests themselves believed? As Parker himself discusses, the secularization of church property, the destruction of the benefice system, and the abolition of monasticism were never accepted by the church hierarchy, which always linked the material position of the church with its pastoral mission. Yet the Catholic laity, especially women, and many dedicated priests rebuilt Catholicism without institutions and property, and it fared well in direct competition with an

aggressive and activist Reformed Church. Perhaps Dutch Catholicism was less marginal than historians have long believed.

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DIANE L. WOLF. *Beyond Anne Frank: Hidden Children and Postwar Families in Holland*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 391. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$21.95.

In her fascinating book on hidden Jewish children in the postwar Netherlands, sociologist Diane L. Wolf poses the question: "How are lives reshaped and families reconstituted in a postgenocidal setting" (p. 35)? Wolf aims to construct an intimate history of "the effects of Shoah" by exploring the social and emotional dynamics of family reunion, reconstruction, or its absence after 1945. Drawing upon English and Dutch-language scholarship, Wolf sketches the modern history of Jews in the Netherlands and political debates surrounding the postwar placement of Jewish children. The empirical heart of her book is interviews conducted with seventy survivors (thirty-nine women and thirty-one men living in the Netherlands, U.S., and Israel) who ranged in age from under one year to their mid-teens when they went into hiding with non-Jewish Dutch families.

Of the 3,500 children who survived the war hiding in the Netherlands, just over forty percent were reunited with one or both parents. Nearly sixty percent were orphaned; of these, three-quarters were placed in Jewish foster homes or sent to Israel and one-quarter grew up in non-Jewish settings, typically remaining with their hiding family. Wolf devotes a chapter each to children reunited with one or both parents, children adopted by related and unrelated families, and children growing up in orphanages. Yet how were postwar placements decided? And how does Wolf retrospectively evaluate them?

Wolf's answers are not crystal clear, but she suggests that family reunions, particularly involving one surviving parent, were conditioned by gender norms. Widowed fathers were typically denied guardianship until they remarried. Mothers, in contrast, usually succeeded in reclaiming their children unless their material circumstances or mental health was deemed poor. One girl was raised in an orphanage only to learn, when poised to marry, that her noncustodial mother was alive. Sometimes siblings were split up and sent to distant relatives or foster families, even on different continents; other children were not even informed that siblings had survived. Because researchers have not been permitted to consult individual files, Wolf can offer no detailed analysis of the rationale or discussions behind individual placement decisions. Beyond general patterns, we have little insight into how, exactly, the process worked and who supported what outcome.

Like scholars before her, Wolf is critical of the role of the Dutch state and special state commission that made placement decisions. "In no other European

country was the state so involved in Jewish family reunification," she asserts, "and nowhere else was it made so difficult for Jewish parents and kin to reclaim their children" (p. 9). Initially, the commission sought to avoid recognizing distinctions of race or religion, although its membership included a large Jewish minority. This approach was a direct reaction against, and a conscious attempt to nullify, the discriminatory ethnoracial classifications imposed by the Nazis. Many surviving Jews found the practical application of this principal at best insensitive and at worst antisemitic. Although the commission complied with the tradition of religion-based child welfare work in deciding postwar placements, its narrow definition of Jewishness, which required proof of the deceased parents' membership in a synagogue, kosher household, or Zionist commitments, proved controversial. Because Dutch Jews were highly assimilated and secularized by the interwar period, they insisted that the commission recognize a more expansive definition based upon Jewish cultural identity rather than strict religious practice. Through *L'Ezrat ha-Yeled* (To the Aid of the Child), activist Dutch Jews worked in organized, if informal, ways to convince Dutch hiding families to turn over Jewish orphans they hoped to adopt so the children could be raised by Jewish families. Due to the comparatively high percentage of Dutch Jews murdered, Jewish members of the commission came to insist that "the good of the collective" take precedence in placement decisions and youth welfare work.

Wolf explicitly endorses Jewish minority rights in deciding the children's placements, yet her book poignantly reveals the unintended costs of a collectivist approach for individual children. Among interviewees placed in Jewish group homes, teenage girls had the happiest recollections due to the companionship of other girls who had undergone similar ordeals. They felt cared for, understood, and bonded better with such peers than others did with surviving parents or with new foster or adoptive families. In contrast, most Jewish orphanages for boys were overtly political and trained their charges to be practicing Jews and good Zionists, which resulted in boys' more negative assessments of collective life. Some described being removed by Jewish social workers from loving hiding families with the promise they would be adopted by Jewish families. Instead they were "warehoused" in "cold," "militarist," or "punitive" Jewish orphanages and prohibited contact with their hiding families (pp. 333–334). They felt physically and emotionally abandoned for a second time and complained about being subjected to Orthodox teachings and a substandard education that adversely affected career prospects. One boy was incensed about being shipped to Israel "illegally" and against his will, only to be recruited into the army and another war.

Wolf's most original and provocative chapters explore the dynamics of reconstituted families as experienced by hidden children and assess the stresses and long-term effects of postgenocidal family life. The results are surprisingly somber. When reunited with sur-

viving parents, children found them cold or detached, troubled, and unable to cope. Interviewees told sad tales of emotionally inaccessible, unresponsive, disturbed, or distracted mothers and fathers unable to nurse their own psychic and physical wounds, let alone address—or even acknowledge—those of their children. Intergenerational communication was at low ebb in many households, and interviewees bristle at the memory of not being consulted about wartime and postwar plans for their future. Children sent to live with relatives after 1945 described being moved from adequate or even loving environments to un-nurturing or, at worst, abusive ones. According to Wolf, children taken in by relations or by unrelated Jewish families did not fare well, and physical abuse was “the most common pattern.” In sum, such experiences both “deconstruct particular images of Jewish families as safe havens” and suggest that despite the specifics of postwar placement, “normal” family life remained an unrealized dream (p. 188).

Wolf counterintuitively concludes that children who did best and suffered least were those who remained with their hiding families and experienced the fewest “ruptures” in their primary relationships. Noting the range of “possible problematic outcomes” when biology, religion, or ethnicity are “privileged above all,” she argues that what mattered most was a continuous “connection with a caring adult” and attention to a child’s individual needs, history, and circumstances (pp. 337–338). Oddly, Wolf’s conclusion never stimulates her to confront the paradox of her own passionate commitment to collectivist Jewish rights that opens her book. Probing that paradox might have illuminated some significant social legacies of racialized Nazi violence on postwar child welfare work. It might also have encouraged Wolf to begin to historicize her own ideological commitments.

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DAVID BLACKBOURN and JAMES RETALLACK, editors. *Localism, Landscape, and the Ambiguities of Place: German-Speaking Central Europe, 1860–1930*. (German and European Studies.) Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 2007. Pp. viii, 278. \$65.00.

Since at least 1990 with the publication of Celia Applegate’s *A Nation of Provincials*, no discussion of the modern German nation has been able to neglect the crucial notion of *Heimat* (homeland). The concept defies precise English translation. *Heimat* refers to the provincial, local, and endemic—the very soil and landscape, language, and cultural modes of homegrown traditions and hence, to modernizing Germans, everything that kept them mired in the past. Nationalists tried to redefine and reclaim *Heimat* for their own goals, and the concept proved fluid enough to lend itself to the nation in its imperial, democratic, and authoritarian forms and survive them all. The key to its longevity lies, perhaps, in the words of an imperial nationalist: “We are no longer

searching for the *Heimat* as a place, but within ourselves, in the districts of our souls” (p. 229).

Historians of modern Germany have recovered the persistent significance of localisms. In the engaging introduction to this rich collection of essays, both the possibility of a mythical, local “authenticity,” and the polarization of national versus local are rejected as analytical frameworks. Editors David Blackbourn and James Retallack emphasize instead questions of scale, both in the sense of weighing significances and in terms of bringing national and natural borders into comparative study (pp. 8, 15). Subnational spaces, such as regions defined by forms of economic production or religious affiliation, were places where the distinctiveness of localisms lent themselves in diverse ways to nationalisms.

The book fittingly opens with Applegate’s depiction of imperial musical culture. Ranging from Richard Wagner’s Bayreuth to expressions of religious piety in a secularizing age, Applegate urges readers to consider musical performances, not only the composition or composers, as a mode of national identity formation. Musicians still play an evocative role in her argument: Clara Schumann characterized artists as the definitively homeless, with reference to Franz Liszt’s apparent inability (or lack of desire) to fit into a national musical culture. Reinserting the aspect of longing into the conception of *Heimat*, Applegate’s theme is continued with variations in Jennifer Jenkins’s essay, which advocates reincorporation of *Heimatkunst* into the canons of modernism. Usually depicted, at the time and since, as the antithesis of modern art, *Heimatkunst*’s practitioners at the Worpswede artists’ colony emphasized the constructedness of “nature” in modernist ways.

Jenkins’s revisionist argument is supported by other contributions that pay close attention to how “nature” or “the natural” was constructed by the *Heimatlers* in landscape design, forestry, and nature conservation. Blackbourn and Thomas Lekan review the German penchant for finding “nature in their own backyards,” valuing the cultural as much as the cultivated landscape, in contrast to an American environmentalist “wilderness hangup” (pp. 166, 185). The multivalent concept of *Kultur*, indicating cultural production as well as landscape cultivation, was invoked by nationalists to authorize colonization in the name of a superior German talent for land use, foreshadowing genocide (p. 157). Comparative historical links between American and German contexts are fascinatingly elaborated throughout both chapters, as well as in Retallack’s discussion of Julian Hawthorne’s 1870s Saxon travelogue, in which “Dresden is best seen in a rear view mirror” (p. 94). He argues that Hawthorne had the Civil War in the mirror as well, reflecting American concerns about localism (states’ rights) in a consideration of Saxon provincialism.

Borderlands provide much arable soil for the investigation of German identity formation. Saxony offers Caitlin Murdock a lens on border-region *Heimat* sensibilities, in her discussion of tourism promoting the lo-

cal scenery, and its link to toy manufacture, in the case of the famous Erzgebirge Christmas figurines. Eric Kurlander's contribution contrasts liberal political practices in Alsace and Schleswig-Holstein to show how *völkisch* nationalism diverted progressive liberals back toward the homeland in one borderland but not the other. Tara Zahra recounts how German nationalists in Bohemia attempted to crush "national hermaphroditism" by segregating fluently bilingual Czechs and Germans and supporting German-only instruction in local schools. That this type of *völkisch* nationalism, so thoroughly discredited after the Nazi era, appealed even to liberals, offers a salutary reminder that localism makes strange political bedfellows: as Thomas Kühne argues, localism's role in electoral campaigns could support democratization equally as well as authoritarianism.

German national identity in the modern era has been a hybrid product of globalized localisms. Germans took their *Heimat* sensibilities with them as they migrated or colonized, and relied on them in their new homes, as Pieter Judson's chapter on Südmark activism and German resettlement in south Styria shows. Given the effectiveness of the recalibration of scale advocated by the editors, it comes as a surprise that the only illustration in the book offers a retrograde image of the volume's attempted revision of focus: a map of the German empire in 1871–1918 (pp. 10–11) offers only the older-fashioned vision of a "small Germany"; so much for Bohemia, south Styria, and all those migrant and colonizing Germans. The map returns us from the transnational to the geographically bounded nation.

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STEFAN-LUDWIG HOFFMANN. *The Politics of Sociability: Freemasonry and German Civil Society, 1840–1918*. Translated by TOM LAMPERT. (Social History, Popular Culture, and Politics in Germany.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2007. Pp. x, 413. \$70.00.

Among the bizarre stories of trench life in World War I, Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann's book provides yet another: German Freemasons convening in "field lodges" on the Western Front to reaffirm their universal values of brotherly love. A "loving hatred" against the enemy, wrote a Mason, deepened the ideals of Freemasonry, for Germany's cause also served the enemy's interests. German world leadership, he continued, bound "the best of all nations in all ages in the name of humanity" (p. 278). Although such rhetoric might appear to be self-serving hypocrisy, nineteenth-century burghers did not view nationalism and cosmopolitan humanity as antinomies. For Freemasons in particular, nationalism and universal freedom informed their bourgeois civility, a moral-political relationship that envisioned progress and international harmony. Because such idealism perished as a bitter travesty in Flanders Fields, crossing the temporal divide to comprehend this mental universe is particularly difficult.

Hoffmann's book meets this challenge, exploring the

precarious balance with which nineteenth-century Freemasonry embraced ideals of universal humanity in an era of growing social, political, and cultural exclusivity. In doing so, the book is more than a monograph of German lodges and their social worlds; it also meditates on the larger paradoxes that embodied bourgeois civil society in the last half of the nineteenth century. For this reason, Hoffmann's book, first published in German as *Die Politik der Geselligkeit* (2000), is a valuable addition to anglophone historiography, a contribution all the more augmented by its comparisons to British, French, and American Freemasonry. Because Anglo-English scholarship mostly focuses on the Freemasonry of the Enlightenment, the order's relationship to modern exclusionary politics has not been rigorous. Hoffmann, however, persuasively dispels the notion that Freemasonry withered as a social force in the nineteenth century.

Divided into three sections, the book examines Freemasonry and civil society, its culture of self-improvement, and its belief in "nationalism as moral universalism." Originally a dissertation for Reinhart Koselleck, a renowned historian who fashioned a new method for studying the historical meanings of concepts (*Begriffsgeschichte*), the book grounds notional concepts of civil society, virtue, humanity, and cosmopolitanism in social practice over the course of the century. In addition to assessing extensive correspondence and print material, Hoffmann exhaustively mined lodge rolls to compile serial data on Freemasonry's social composition. (He examines lodges primarily in Prussia, Saxony, and Hamburg, but integrates other regions as well.) The result is a felicitous blend of social, intellectual, and political history that enables the reader to view Freemasonry as social structure, cultural formation, and political force. Hoffmann's set of methodological skills makes for model reading in graduate seminars, especially with Tom Lampert's crisp, lucid translation.

During the *ancien régime*, Masonic ideals and secret rituals qualified as progressive and enlightened; they espoused a civil society that upheld equality, virtue, and rational governance. In the nineteenth century, Hoffmann argues, Freemasonry's sociocultural role changed. Although lodge culture remained a "laboratory of civility," it became an asylum from politics, a social field that, in cultivating moral and civil freedoms, constituted a "metapolitical realm" that shunned party politics. The Revolution of 1848 emphatically underscored this "flight from politicized society," when lodges rejected the revolution's spirit of reform and remained secret, stratified, and inured to democratization, a trend that only strengthened after 1871 (pp. 61–62). Hoffmann presents, then, critical paradoxes. Masons advocated equality but retained elitist membership. They embraced tolerance, but their anti-Jewish, anti-Catholic, and anti-democratic tendencies undercut this ideal. They advocated a self-governing society yet remained deeply suspicious of mass politics. Finally, their "moral universalism" offered a vision of human-

itarianism, whose understanding of civility, nation, and humanity turned on the political construction of stranger and outsider. Although not the first to point out the ideological aporia of national liberalisms, Hoffmann parses the political grammar of Freemasonry's ideals and practice with exceptional sensitivity.

The inconsistencies and evolving character of German Freemasonry loom large as themes. Despite Freemasonry's disdain toward Jews and Catholics, members of both religions nonetheless participated in lodge life in certain regions. While one-third of Hamburg's Apollo lodge members were Jewish in the last third of the century, the conservative lodges of Prussia and Saxony mostly kept Jews at a distance. Kaiser Wilhelm I's enthusiastic patronage of Prussian lodges, however, conferred a distinct social conservatism. Unlike France and Italy, which hosted only liberal, secular lodges, and Great Britain and Scandinavia, which mostly possessed conservative lodges, Hoffmann points out that "only in Germany did these two camps co-exist in close proximity" (p. 110). Overall, Hoffmann's quantitative analysis reveals a trend of embourgeoisement. Membership of the lower middle class declined over time, as did that of nobles, pastors, and officials. By the end of the century, the professional and merchant classes constituted Freemasonry's core. Although the lodges' networks and social connections certainly aided businessmen economically, Hoffmann notes that material gain alone does not explain the bourgeois attraction to Masonry. Rather, the intimacy and exclusivity of its fraternity offered a form of sociability not found in other associations (p. 123).

The book's final sections build out this allure for Masonic fellowship, showing how rites of masculinity and a reverence for society's moral constitution provided the groundwork of a civil religion that promised not only the cultivation of the self but also the ethical renewal of society. The "intimate and sacred space" of lodges provided a "re-enchantment of modernity" with a mystical vision of general moral improvement through individual virtue. Contra Friedrich Meinecke and Norbert Elias, Hoffmann argues that the emphasis on individual virtue and the readiness for sacrifice intensified the link between national identity and moral universality. The nation was a vehicle toward, not a solvent of, cosmopolitanism.

When Leipzig's League of Patriots, whose core membership consisted of Masons, erected the Monument of the Battle of Nations (1898–1913), the largest memorial in Europe before 1914, they did so not as a celebration of war but as the emblem of a "new understanding of nationalism and universalism" (p. 267). It is this brand of civil nationalism that Hoffmann wishes to consider. Alongside the tub-thumping jingoism of Wilhelminian mass politics, Masons and other high-minded bourgeois Germans cultivated another moral-political vision of the nation, whose depth of idealism is indeed difficult

to plumb. Hoffmann's brilliant book permits us to comprehend this mental universe.

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ROBIN JUDD. *Contested Rituals: Circumcision, Kosher Butchering, and Jewish Political Life in Germany, 1843–1933*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2007. Pp. xii, 283. \$45.00.

In this book, Robin Judd provides a history of two central blood rituals practiced by Jews in Germany during the nine decades between 1843 and 1933. Her decision to synthesize the histories of circumcision and kosher butchering is very clever. The parallels are uncanny, as both rituals define Jewish affiliation and require special ways of cutting flesh. Moreover, as various German governments extended control over religious life, both rituals underwent scrutiny by those who questioned their medical and physical consequences. Judd pays close attention to how Jewish organizations defended these rituals when state officials, animal protectionists, and antisemites campaigned to regulate or even forbid them. Her work brings neglected episodes in medical, civic, and religious history into sharp focus and thereby helps us better understand Jewish life during these crucial nine decades. This is no mean feat, considering the great attention historians have paid to understanding how much and what kind of agency Jews possessed in Germany before the Nazi era.

Judd's story begins with shifts in Jewish practices. With the emergence of Reform and Liberal Judaism, declining religious observance created delicate problems for Jewish leadership. Judd illuminates the quandary of why and how secular Jews could defend rites that they themselves were often discarding. A common trope was the medical argument that circumcision was healthy for the penis and kosher butchering was kind to the cow. Another defense was that Jews had the right as a religious minority to observe traditional rituals with minimal if any state control, regardless of medical critiques offered by outsiders.

Judd argues that kosher butchering attracted more debate and legislative action than did circumcision. Social reformers and especially animal rights activists questioned kosher butchering from a number of angles, even after new devices were invented to improve the technique. The central issue was whether the state should mandate stunning the cow prior to killing it. Judd places these debates about Jewish practices into the larger context of the *Kulturkampf*, the campaigns against Catholic practices immediately following German unification in 1871. Indeed the *Kulturkampf* established a precedent for state officials to judge Jewish rituals. But by the 1880s, Judd argues that it was the defense of kosher butchering that galvanized Jewish self-defense. In this way she challenges the standard view that it was the rise of explicitly antisemitic parties in the 1890s that stimulated Jewish elites to create self-defense organizations.

Once those antisemitic parties appeared on the German stage, they complained that Jewish rituals were especially cruel to baby boys and cows. An especially disturbing attack was that these rituals prepared Jews for the so-called ritual murders of young Christians. In spite of this nasty rhetorical conjunction, Judd argues that antisemitic campaigns against kosher butchering did *not* lead in any direct way to the eventual Nazi ban of the practice or the Nazi genocide. On the contrary, kosher butchering was rarely made illegal before the Nazi era and even gained explicit protection under the law in 1917.

One of Judd's great challenges in the book is to bring three important constituencies to life across cities and decades: Jewish defenders of the rites, animal protectionists, and antisemites. The animal protectionists occupy a key position between Jewish defense and antisemitic opposition, but by and large Judd fails to do them justice. To be sure, she affirms that protectionists should not be labeled antisemitic just because they worked with antisemites on particular campaigns. Yet this point is confusing, in part because we remain too ignorant about the social composition of the protectionist movement.

Readers of this well-researched and conceptually sophisticated book are left with some troubling questions. The double analysis of the two rituals is uneven, partly because Judd largely dismisses circumcision early on in her narrative. Throughout the book, Judd tends to portray debates in vague language, aggregating various players and favoring the passive voice. She concentrates more on discourses and discussions than on actual policy decisions and the important background of changing religious practices. By paying little attention to how much pain the rituals may have caused to baby boys or cows, she tells the story from the vantage point of Jewish defense, which is understandable. But a more even-handed approach might have rendered her book more useful for those in other fields considering the problem of the rights of religious minorities in modern states.

Judd is altogether up-to-date in her ambition to use her micro-history investigation to unsettle easy deterministic interpretations of antisemitism in German history. Judd intends to show that Jewish experience in Germany was not necessarily unique, a most laudable goal. Yet in the end she seems to confirm peculiarity by pointing out that the debates over these two rituals *were* more intense in Germany than elsewhere. On another front, she aims to question the typical narrative by pondering the implications of Jewish elites defending rituals that were becoming increasingly anachronistic for many Jews themselves. For the classic narrative assumes that emancipation led to assimilation and assimilation itself was problematic for antisemites. Yet we can well wonder whether the two rituals provide a wide enough canvass to unsettle the dominant line of interpretation. Moreover, in many of her formulations Judd herself tends to reinforce the notion that anyone who criticized Jewish rituals was functionally antisemitic.

That such a wise and careful scholar such as Judd

should find it difficult to overturn the dominant way of explaining Jewish fate in modern Germany shows how difficult is the task of historians in this field. Judd is to be praised for expanding our map of this past and bringing an unjustly neglected topic to life. Every one of the issues she examines remains with us today, for there are no easy answers when it comes to preserving ethnic diversity in modern societies.

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LARS FISCHER. *The Socialist Response to Antisemitism in Imperial Germany*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xix, 252. \$80.00.

In his important study, Lars Fischer offers a significant contribution to the ever-growing debate concerning the presence of antisemitism in German society prior to the Holocaust. Building upon the work of Shulamit Volkov, who suggests that "antisemitism was 'transmitted' from Imperial Germany to the Weimar period . . . through the persistence of a cultural system of norms, vocabulary, and associations that were, for the most part, not avowedly antisemitic," Fischer examines similar "shades of gray" among Wilhelmine Social Democrats. He reveals how previous scholars have misinterpreted the socialist response to antisemitism in German society and political life (p. xiii). According to Fischer's painstaking analysis of various Social Democratic texts and speeches, socialists in their challenge to political antisemitism often falsely combatted it by perpetuating antisemitic stereotypes themselves. Such kernel-of-truth, philosemitic, or anti-antisemitic approaches merely served to reinforce antisemite claims that, in some instances, actually contributed to alerting readers and listeners to obscure antisemitic writings and ideas that they might otherwise have ignored. Ultimately Fischer concludes that Social Democracy's "dealings with antisemitism were excruciatingly inept" (p. 16).

Throughout his work, Fischer aims to challenge previously held interpretations concerning the encounter between socialism and antisemitism. Central to this point is the emphasis scholars have placed on the significant influence of Karl Marx on the Socialist movement, articulated in his two-part essay "*Zur Judenfrage*" (*On the Jewish Question* [1844]). Fischer counters this claim by showing how widely unavailable the essay became after Prussian authorities confiscated most copies of its first publication. In addition, Fischer reveals that socialists misinterpreted "*Zur Judenfrage*" in three significant ways by arguing that Marx had "equated Jews with capitalism," inextricably linked Jewish emancipation and assimilation, and viewed Jewish legal equality as a "right that Jews needed to earn by supporting the claims of other social and political groups to emancipation" (p. 39). This leads Fischer boldly to conclude that "Socialists' preconceptions regarding 'the Jews' clearly did shape their understanding of '*Zur Judenfrage*,' but '*Zur Judenfrage*' in no way shaped their

stance vis-à-vis 'the Jews,' which would have been no different had 'Zur Judenfrage' never been written" (p. 39).

Fischer reveals such preconceptions among Social Democrats through a series of case studies. The case of Hans Leuß provides one example. In 1888, Leuß had publicly embraced antisemitism by becoming editor of *Das Volk*, the party paper of Adolf Stoecker's Christian Social Party. He soon left Stoecker's fold and joined the militantly antisemitic German Social Party. However, in 1894 his political career temporarily ended when he perjured himself in court. After enduring forty months in jail, he re-entered society, supposedly leaving his antisemitic views behind him. The Social Democrat and later founder of the German Communist Party (KPD) Franz Mehring reached out to Leuß by helping him publish a selection of poems in the socialist paper, *Die Neue Zeit*. Mehring was one of many socialists who viewed antisemitism as beneath him yet regularly brandished it. In accepting the character reference of Hellmut von Gerlach, a known "star in the antisemitic movement," which endorsed Leuß, Mehring could easily dismiss Leuß's antisemitic past as no more "than a youthful aberration" (p. 115). Mehring was not alone, as Fischer reveals; Karl Kautsky, the founder and editor of *Die Neue Zeit*, also welcomed Leuß. Leuß never really departed from his antisemitism but rather simply altered the manner in which he hated Jews. Fischer explains, now he hated them "not as individuals but only as a community precisely because of their merits" (p. 136). Ironically, Fischer shows that following the revolutions of 1918 and 1919, Leuß became firmly entrenched in the Social Democratic camp and even died "a sort of SD lord of the manor" as the resident magistrate of Stargard (p. 145).

Fischer also describes how Social Democrats of Jewish heritage engaged in philosemitism through their prose and speech. The published works of the noted Jewish socialist Eduard Bernstein exemplify such development. Fischer shows that Bernstein's 1917 *Die Aufgaben der Juden in Weltkrieg* (*The Jews' Tasks during the World War*), underscored the Jews' "supposedly natural propensity for cosmopolitan patriotism" in a failed effort to explain Jews' relationship to modern Europe (p. 200). Fischer concludes that such rhetoric only served to reinforce negative antisemitic stereotypes rather than to combat them.

According to Fischer, not all socialists approached "the Jewish Question" with the same ingrained negative insensitivity. Fischer, for example, points out in his conclusion how Rosa Luxemburg surpassed "all her peers and contemporaries" in her ability to "establish an explicit and unambiguous differentiation between perception and reality" toward "the Jewish Question" (p. 222). Luxemburg, however, stands alone in Fischer's work. All the other figures he introduces at one time or another engage in some form of antisemitic stereotyping and propagating. Fischer's work fully supports his conclusion that Social Democrats "share the responsibility for rendering German society susceptible to Nazi antisemitism and preparing the ideological seedbed

from which the Shoah could grow" (p. 228). Such a conclusion concerning the activities of the Social Democrats during this time period strips right in front of us any illusion of their innocence.

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ERIC D. WEITZ. *Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2007. Pp. xi, 425. \$29.95.

Eric D. Weitz has written a splendid book. He presents Germany's first experiment with democracy, the fourteen years of the Weimar Republic, as a dramatic tale of possibility, contingency, innovation, and catastrophe in which Germans negotiated a "tension-bound world of modernity" (p. 4). Art, politics, and culture were linked, and creativity was synonymous with change and transformation.

Weitz reminds us that it would be a "travesty to see Weimar only as a prelude to the Third Reich" (p. 5). Weimar collapsed not because of elements of continuity from the imperial period or even Weimar's inability to make a clean sweep with some of the authoritarian institutions of the Kaiserreich. Rather, it was the economy. Weimar, Weitz concludes, "lost the middle class in the inflation"—as it watched its investments and savings become worthless—"and the working class in the stabilization"—as wages declined, employers undermined the revolutionary gain of the eight-hour day, and intermittent unemployment became the rule, not the exception (p. 145). This makes even more remarkable the period of relative stability the republic enjoyed in the mid-1920s, but it came to a decisive end with the onset of the Great Depression. Again, the economy is a crucial variable; without the devastating effects of this economic crisis, Adolf Hitler might well have never made it through the door of the chancellor's office.

Weitz commits about twenty percent of this book to an excellent summary of the major outlines of Weimar's economic and political history. By taking nothing for granted, he ensures that this book will reach well beyond the audience of experts in twentieth-century German history. But his central project is to tell that *other* story of Weimar, one in which artists like Hanna Höch employed photomontage to explore the politics of sexuality in representations of the "new woman," Bertolt Brecht and Kurt Weill saw no point in making theater if they were not also making politics, and architects like Bruno Taut and Walter Gropius insisted on the connection between a transformative radical politics and designs for living that would allow working-class families to escape the dismal urban blight that characterized the Imperial period. The goals of these artists and architects were hardly modest, and as Weitz simply puts it, "Weimar art was about the totality of being and was infused with powerful, utopian visions of transforming society—and humanity—once and for all" (p. 170).

Weitz also illuminates the relationship between technological developments in photography and the possi-

bilities for new forms of creativity in the work of artists like László Moholy-Nagy and August Sander, and he emphasizes the ways in which radio and illustrated newspapers transformed how Germans could connect to a world well beyond their borders. He concludes that "Germans in the Weimar era were living through the greatest transformation of media culture since Johannes Gutenberg invented the movable-type printing press in the late fifteenth century" (p. 247), and his riveting account makes clear this is no exaggeration.

This study offers insightful treatments of writers and social commentators like Thomas Mann, Siegfried Krauss, and Martin Heidegger, but Weitz's discussion of Weimar body culture and sexual reform movements is no less central to his broadly conceived Weimar culture than Heidegger's ruminations on the meaning of being. He reminds us that "war and revolution had caused a tectonic shift in moral and sexual values" (p. 298). His is a book that we can read with enormous pleasure and from which we can all steal shamelessly as we seek to make our students understand that Germany in the 1920s was characterized as much by the "military precision" (p. 313) of the Tiller Girls, the popular dance group, as by the military precision of jack-booted paramilitary stormtroopers, as much by Erich Mendelsohn's designs for department stores that were palaces of consumption as by the Hofbräuhaus in Munich.

I know of no other book about the Weimar Republic that accomplishes so much so elegantly. And perhaps because he does so much so well, I am left wishing that Weitz had said a bit more on some subjects. In his discussion of Weimar's sexual revolution, there is room to elaborate on the centrality of a burgeoning male homosexual and lesbian subculture in Berlin and other major cities, the political activism of homosexual rights groups, and the emergence of a language of homosexual desire and identity. These tendencies could easily be added to the list of transformative possibilities that Weimar enabled—and the list of things that the conservative right, the church, and the Nazis found particularly abhorrent. And although Weitz acknowledges that in many ways Weimar culture and Berlin are synonymous, it would be interesting to hear a bit more about how Berlin's influence reached into the provinces, and how conservative reactionaries in areas outside the capital wrote off Berlin as woefully cosmopolitan and precisely for that reason not properly German.

Weitz argues convincingly that Weimar created a "social-intellectual world that proved mutually inspiring and supportive," a unique whole that was bigger than the sum of its parts (p. 294). What it made possible could not be recreated in exile, and it would certainly get no second lease on life in either East or West Germany after the end of World War II. Appreciating Weimar's unique qualities and extraordinary accomplishments is something Weitz allows all of us to do with this fine book.

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JOHN ALEXANDER WILLIAMS. *Turning to Nature in Germany: Hiking, Nudism, and Conservation, 1900–1940*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2007. Pp. x, 354. \$55.00.

Joining the chorus of recent works that have as their center analyses of the rich variety of reform movements of the late Wilhelmine Empire is a fine contribution by John Alexander Williams. In this book Williams combines several historiographical trends that explore the nuance, fragility, and potential of early twentieth-century reform movements. These works also serve to remind that Germany's descent into barbarism after 1933 was by no means a foregone conclusion. This departure from teleology is welcome and provides a fresh analytic framework to assess the alternative modernities present in the reform endeavors of Wilhelmine social and political life. At the heart of all work on the reform movements of this era is an understanding of contemporaries' sense of decline (often symbolized by the metropolis) and the identification of a solution (frequently involving nature).

Williams's study fits the formula exactly. After establishing the contemporary sense of anomie in all of its various permutations, the author reveals the escape hatch, which he terms the turn to nature. Turning to nature is not a reactionary, anti-modern returning to nature, a departure from the modern world into the mythological past, but a quite peculiar narrative available for any class or political ideology to construct in their effort to heal a wounded German social and political body. Thus nature can be variously defined as the environment (either rural, landscaped, or unspoiled), the body, a crowded Berlin schoolroom, and even human nature. Williams's turn to nature is a forward-looking embrace of nature that tightened the bonds of social identity (loosened by the urban experience), strengthened class solidarity (weakened by industrial capitalism), or returned respectability to bourgeois cultural elites (lost during war and revolution). It is a compelling thesis.

Williams focuses on the three most popular manifestations of turning to nature, namely nudism, hiking, and conservation. In each case his investigation further proceeds along two parallel tracks. One track explores the organizational history of these movements, including their composition and efforts to draw Germans to nature. The second track focuses on the ideology of these movements, in particular the manner by which leaders constructed the "ideal narratives of turning to nature" (p. 15). This book is very much a cultural history. (Indeed some of the weakest sections are those that attempt social history; the author is on much firmer footing when not dealing with questions of group composition or organizational history.) Turning to the individual sections, one can see in greater relief the hits and misses of Williams's approach.

The first section is a miss. Williams illustrates the narrative of the turn to nature among socialists who became naturists, either as nudists or as hikers in orga-

nized clubs. To overcome the damage inflicted by industrial work, some socialists turned to the naked body while others joined with their fellows to explore the countryside in hiking groups. Restricting himself to socialists blinds Williams, however, to the broader nudist movement, its appeal across class and political divides, and ultimately to a more convincing explanation for the embrace of eugenics and sex reform. Despite their organizational success, the socialist hikers could not escape the internecine political struggles of the age, and their efforts to build political solidarity through rambling came to naught.

It is the second section that is a hit, where Williams's work is at its best. Always volatile, debates about youth reached a fever pitch as fears of Germany's decline combined with a moral panic over questions of youth sexuality and the emerging concept of adolescence as a distinct stage in human development. The famed youth-led, liberationist *Wandervogel* clashed with adult-led, heavily supervised youth cultivators for nothing less than the soul of Germany's youth. The meaning of nature, unlike in the previous section, is here heavily interrogated, as each group turned to youth hiking to achieve its particular goal in shaping Germany's youth. This struggle continued up until the Nazification of Germany, and Williams carefully traces the contours of the debates about youth, nature, and politics well into the Nazi era.

Finally, Williams turns his attention to conservation, a mostly middle-class activity. Struggling to make sense of a realigned political galaxy, bourgeois conservationists constructed a turn to nature, both to restore the social order and to recompose a fractured national identity. In part, the conservationists desired to bring rebellious youth and workers back to their proper place in the order of things. Though numerous groups turned to it for succor, nature was no panacea for the ills of a modern society, though their efforts reveal the complexity of meaning of nature in the modern age.

CHAD ROSS

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LISA PINE. *Hitler's "National Community": Society and Culture in Nazi Germany*. London: Hodder Arnold. 2007. Pp. x, 262. \$29.95.

For decades, Richard Grunberger's *The 12-Year Reich: A Social History of Nazi Germany, 1933–1945* (1971) remained the standard work on German society under the Hitler regime. This long volume was based upon extensive primary research that provided the documentary basis for its interpretations and brought to life the social experiences of the German people. Grunberger was also one of the few at that historiographical stage to address this generally neglected dimension of German history in such a broad interpretive manner. His scope ranged from bureaucracy, women, and children to medicine, sex, humor, and food. Subsequently, the field of German social history witnessed the proliferation of specialized scholarship, which significantly ex-

panded both the breadth and dept of our understanding of social institutions, policies, and the experiences of average people (*Alltagsgeschichte*). But no new general social history emerged encompassing that abundant new research, as Pierre Ayçoberry's *The Social History of the Third Reich, 1933–1945* (1999) fell far short of fulfilling that need. Lisa Pine attempts to provide such an updated synthesis, to combine it "with fresh insights and interpretations" (p. 2), and to expand her study into cultural as well as social history.

Conforming to particular currents in social and cultural studies, Pine presents her main theme as that of identity formation through a process of inclusion and exclusion from the Nazi-aspired *Volksgemeinschaft* (national community). It was to be a cohesive and homogeneous community of racially pure, healthy, and sociopolitically like-minded fellow Germans. Unfortunately, with the exception of an introductory paragraph, she thereafter never really pursues this supposedly central interpretive thesis of identity, nor integrates it in any substantive way in the text that follows or in her conclusion. She devotes the rest of her introduction to a historiographical survey of German social and cultural history, followed by a detailed outline of each chapter's content and a brief inadequate summary of Nazism and its seizure of power.

Pine's organizational structure mirrors rather closely the themes quite familiar to any German historian who has followed the interpretive trends over the last twenty years. The Nazis strove to create the national community through, on the one hand, consensus and conformity and, on the other, coercion, terror, and surveillance. Restoration of public order and economic recovery, together with the enticements of a classless society devoid of its previous social ills and conflicts and the propaganda-created Führer myth were reinforced by the Gestapo, fear of concentration camps, and legalized oppression. But ultimately these approaches and policies culminated in an atomized rather than a homogeneous society. Pine traces this duality (with its inner contradictions) through those she identifies as "inside" the national community, devoting separate, though very brief, chapters to the educational system, youth groups, women and the family, churches, and the Wehrmacht. In contrast to these categories, subsequent chapters involve the "outsiders" excluded from the national community: Jews, Gypsies, "asocials" and disabled, sexual nonconformists, and dissenters and resisters. Her final chapters deal with what she classifies as "cultural life": radio and press, cinema and theater, art and architecture, and music and literature.

Despite Pine's introductory claims the book provides no new insights beyond those in the literature she has read. She relates information from others without seeming to have internalized it herself or transformed it into an original synthesis, if there is any true synthesizing at all. This book requires as well a better conceptual framework furnishing a more adequate understanding of the national community in terms of Nazi ideology and objectives. And by merely paralleling the

work of others, Pine never provides the reader with a deep feeling for what it might have been like to live in such complex times, nor delves into significant areas of social life not encompassed by recent analytical debates. For example, we are left with a social history that, ironically, covers the institutions of the churches in Nazi Germany without offering any understanding, or even basic information, of religion and its role in the lives of Germans in such times. These problems are accentuated by Pine's presentation and style. Instead of a smooth narrative, her descriptions are too often fragmented by qualified credits to others' scholarship: as so and so argued or emphasized. And chapter introductions and conclusions, like the book's final section, are essentially redundant summaries rather than integrating or culminating thematic developments.

The strength of Pine's book, and its major contribution, is in summarizing the essential information and interpretations of an impressive array of article and book-length studies. In this respect, it is certainly the most up-to-date work of its kind and offers convenient access for non-specialists to concise renditions of what various scholars have recently disclosed and argued. Nonetheless, a new social (cultural) history of Nazi Germany is yet to be written.

JOSEPH W. BENDERSKY

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KEVIN P. SPICER, *Hitler's Priests: Catholic Clergy and National Socialism*. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 2008. Pp. xv, 369. \$34.95.

Until the last two decades, research concerning German Catholicism was carried out mainly by a group of German Catholic scholars who might aptly be described as the German Catholic research establishment. The work of this group, concentrated chiefly in research institutes such as the Kommission für Zeitgeschichte and published by publishing houses such as those of F. Schöningh and M. Grünewald, has been characterized by the lack of any critical approach to German Catholicism, particularly in the twentieth century. Their investigations fail, even today, to make any use of critical sociopolitical methods of research. The lack of a modern critical approach to Catholic history is very evident in the following case: the present Catholic establishment, its historians, and its publishing houses have insisted that the Catholic Church milieu was the chief force of resistance within the Third Reich. The church's war on National Socialism is still the main preoccupation of German Catholic historians dealing with the twentieth century. Kevin Spicer's book tries to show the other (dark) side of the Catholic milieu between 1933 to 1945, mainly by studying the main public opinion leaders of this milieu, the priests. One has to admire his efforts, although the results are not quite convincing.

While the Catholic milieu (e.g. agencies, associations, organizations, and of course personalities) officially denounced the involvement of priests in Nazi Party activities in March 1933, a small number of priests

(138 of the more than 30,000 priests who served in Germany, not to mention Austria) who were dubbed "brown priests" publicly backed the party. Fifty-three of them were card-carrying members, forty-two held one or more doctorates, and twenty-eight left the priesthood, often to marry or to work in the party or state organizations. So, Spicer studies around sixty priests who were "real" National Socialists.

Spicer shows how each "brown priest" justified his support for the Nazis. One of the book's heroes, Father Richard Klein, identified the three traits that motivated his support: an obsession with nationalism, a hatred of communism, and a belief in the compatibility of Catholicism and National Socialism. True, as Spicer shows, most priests harbored nationalistic desires to restore Germany's greatness after defeat in World War I. Most of them were rabid antibolsheviks, and some of them sympathized with the party's racial antisemitism. But, whatever their reason, Spicer explores how all of them were able internally to reconcile Catholic teachings with Nazi doctrine, especially after 1938, the year of the Anschluss, the Munich Agreement, and, most importantly, the year when the regime was trying for tactical reasons to reconcile with the Catholic establishment.

Spicer's study draws extensively on new source material from government agencies and Nazi and church archives. The book includes a master list of the "brown priests," their biographical details, and personal motivations for supporting or joining the Nazi Party. Although these represent a wide and varied swath of sources, they are not quite convincing. The real question is how representative these "brown priests" were for German Catholicism. We know quite well today that certain circles within the German Catholic establishment supported some elements of Nazi doctrine (I have written extensively on Catholic historians; in the 1960s Guenther Lewy wrote on Catholic bishops and their toleration of certain aspects of Nazi policy; and Gerhard Besier has demonstrated the degree of nationalist sentiment within the Catholic establishment during the Third Reich). So Spicer's story comes as no surprise, especially considering his sample size.

It is also not quite clear what Spicer meant by Nazi priests. True, over fifty of them were Nazi Party members, but we know not how actively they participated alongside the SS in Nazi actions against Jews and Gypsies or at the eastern front. The case of Albert Hartl (which Spicer describes in detail), who married a leading member of the League of German Girls and occupied an important position in Heinrich Himmler's SS, is not a representative one. By contrast, how should we treat priests who rejected Nazi ideology as a whole but identified themselves with Nazi antisemitism, or rejected the latter but were rabid anticommunists and thought that (at least until 1943) Adolf Hitler was the only leader who could stop Joseph Stalin?

Spicer devotes many pages to the efforts of the church to control and fight priests who supported Nazism. The priest Albanus Schachleiter, for instance,

who is pictured on the cover of Spicer's book wearing his Benedictine cloak and giving the Nazi salute, caused the church much trouble before he was finally exiled to a remote village. Schachleiter, a friend of Hitler, was honored with a state funeral when he died in 1937, but by then he had lost all ecclesiastical influence and authority. These cases raise the question of just how influential Nazi priests were, and, except in Schachleiter's case, the degree to which Nazi Party officials took them seriously.

Spicer tells an interesting story. His book sharpens our view of the inner mechanism of the German Catholic Church during the Third Reich, but, due to the unrepresentative cases on which it focuses, it cannot claim to describe characteristic German Catholic behavior toward the Nazis. This task, it seems, awaits another historian.

ODED HEILBRONNER

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JAY W. BAIRD. *Hitler's War Poets: Literature and Politics in the Third Reich*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2008. Pp. xiii, 284. \$80.00.

Jay W. Baird has undertaken a thankless and dirty job, which makes him the academic equivalent of Mike Rowe. The study of Nazi literature has its roots in the period from 1933 to 1945 among antifascists such as Georg Lukacs. Writing about the mass of literature of the Nazi period today is simply uninteresting. Of much greater fascination for literary critics are the so-called "ambivalent" figures such as Gottfried Benn or Ernst Ringer. The latter has become so representative of this type that even the "right-wing" rock band "Stahlgewitter" (the title of his first best-seller) evokes him to legitimize their position in contemporary German culture.

Baird looks at six writers, staggering them from the oldest Rudolf G. Binding (1867–1938) to Josef Magnus Wehner (1891–1973), Hans Zoberlein (1895–1964), Edwin Erich Dwinger (1898–1981), Eberhard Wolfgang Möller (1906–1972), and Kurt Eggers (1905–1943). Do not bother looking them up in virtually any history of German literature written over the past fifty years; while all are "classics" of the Nazi period, they have (with the possible exception of Binding) been banished into the forgotten recesses of German literature. (I own a volume of Binding's poetry published in the early 1940s with the pages devoted to poems on the Third Reich removed so that it could be sold after 1945.) Sure, they were popular, but they arguably do not represent "real" literature in Germany from 1933 to 1945. For that we need to look to writers such as Ringer or Jan Petersen, the "man in the black mask," who remained in the underground in Germany after 1933, or writers such as Gertrud Kolmar who were murdered as Jews in the death camps. The fact that the writers presented by Baird were actually read by millions and thus shaped and were shaped by the Nazi culture

in which they functioned is ignored. They do not represent the "real" Germany, which lies elsewhere.

Baird does a commendable job in accounting for the life and times of these writers and shows how they were exemplary in their own time. He traces the continuities between their creative and ideological lives before 1933 and the smooth passage of right-wing German literature from the imperial and the Weimar world to that of the Nazi state. He reflects enough of the inner party debates after 1933 (Joseph Goebbels versus Alfred Rosenberg on modernism) so that the writers he discusses are well integrated into the cultural politics of the day—from 1933 with Binding heralding the triumph of a new and pure literature to the world of the Eastern campaigns during which Eggers wrote from the Russian front about the struggle against Bolshevism. Yet as we see that Baird's gaggle of Nazi writers of the Third Reich did not originate after 1933, it also, sadly, did not vanish after 1945. The fabled *Nullpunkt*, the total collapse and vanishing of Nazi culture and ideology, is shown to be more wish than reality by the postwar career of writers such as Dwinger.

Baird's book is a substantial addition to the study of the mainstream culture of Germany after 1933. Yet he has a problem: when you select writers for such an undertaking they need to have some "quality," not simply a negative one, that makes them compelling enough to spend your time with them. This is Rowe's problem as well. Baird's discussion of Möller needs to make some aesthetic claim for Möller's work. Möller turns out to lend a "strangely seductive intellectual accompaniment to national Socialist ideology" (p. 167). According to Baird, "Möller was an uncompromising purist, a modern Icarus who flew far too close to the sun" (pp. 167–168). Like Rowe at the end of every episode, Baird feels it necessary to rescue, at least to some degree, the dirty job that he is doing. But it is neither necessary nor prudent to do this with a writer such as Möller. Even if one were to assume that the metaphor of Icarus (with Adolf Hitler as the sun?) is somehow appropriate, it is not the historian's job to rescue Möller but to describe his trajectory. Möller's work—especially his drama *The Frankenburg Dice Game*, which was written to appear at the time of the 1936 Berlin Olympics as a sign of the resurgent German culture—is unreadable. His work is not a cultural "problem" such as that posed by Louis-Ferdinand Céline or T. S. Eliot. The antisemitism that structured much of Möller's work, as with Céline, makes it unpalatable, but he remains little more than a hack. That he was the scriptwriter for *Jud Süß* (1940), the most notorious and successful antisemitic film of the day, may make his work worth examining from the standpoint of cultural history, but not based on any seemingly transcendent aesthetic value. The attempt to "rescue" him by positing him as an Icarus trying to reach the heavens and falling because of his attempt makes one slightly queasy. Indeed, Möller's drama was officially promoted by the state, which saw it as the acceptable, "high culture" image that they wanted the world to see in 1936. Möller had won the national prize

for literature, the Stefan George Prize, in 1935. George himself, who died at the end of 1933, had resisted the blandishments of Goebbels to return to Germany as the face of the new German culture. Goebbels settled for poor copies such as Möller. No Icarus, unlike perhaps George's disciple Claus von Stauffenberg, who attempted to assassinate Hitler in the July 1944 plot and was murdered for his pains.

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SUSAN TEGEL. *Nazis and the Cinema*. London: Hambleton Continuum. 2007. Pp. x, 324. \$34.95.

The last ten years have seen a fundamental shift in the scholarship on film in the Third Reich. Thus it is all the more surprising that the work of the historians and non-historians cited by Susan Tegel in the bibliography seems to have had little impact on the conceptualization of her book. According to the preface, this study sets out to give an overview of the treatment of Jews in Third Reich cinema and to examine the relationship between "film and state policy with particular regard to the Jews" (p. x). Situating this inquiry in the larger historical context of early German cinema, the first four chapters locate the origins of the Nazi propaganda effort in the political, economic, and cultural configurations of the Wilhelmine and Weimar years, including the close ties of the Universum Film AG (UFA) studio to right-wing politicians. The next three chapters focus on the *Gleichschaltung* (forced coordination) of the film industry in 1933 and the initial politicization of cinema that found expression in ill-fated *Kampfzeit* (early Nazi movement) films such as *Hitlerjunge Quex* (1933) and that culminated in the making of Leni Riefenstahl's infamous 1934 Nuremberg party rally film, *Triumph des Willens*.

The second half of the book traces the alignment of cinema with the Jewish question from the indirect approach to Jewish representations between 1934 and 1938 to the more overtly antisemitic imagery in two historical comedies, *Robert und Bertram* (1939) and *Leinen aus Irland* (1939). The filmic effects of stereotyping are explored further in three films made in preparation for the Final Solution: *Die Rothschilds* (1940), *Jud Süß* (1940), and *Der ewige Jude* (1940). Yet as Tegel shows, antisemitic figures and tropes are also central to the so-called state-commissioned films made during World War II, as seen in the racialized imagery of the colonial film, the historical film, and the biographical film. The book ends with a brief discussion of concentration camp films that connects the infamous Theresienstadt films commissioned by the Nazis to the first documentaries made by the Allies after the liberation of the camps.

Tegel's work offers a comprehensive, accessible introduction to the cinema of the Third Reich through the lens of antisemitism. What it does not do is contribute to the scholarly work on fantasy production, mass culture, and Nazi ideology initiated by Eric Rentzschler, Erica Carter, Lutz Koepnick, Antje Ascheid,

Mary Elizabeth O'Brien, and myself. Especially the recent analyses of the central function of gender in popular genre films during the Third Reich could have allowed Tegel to develop a more nuanced reading of the function of race. Instead her approach is based on vague assumptions about the power of film propaganda and the function of antisemitic stereotypes that are never fully explained and that, in their implicit belief in the identity of propagandistic intentions and effects and the full transparency of filmic representations, do not go beyond the early work of David Welch and Dorothea Hollstein. She neither uses her plot synopses to explore the narrative structures, affective investments, and audiovisual effects in which antisemitic stereotypes operate, an approach taken by most film scholars, nor does she approach the uses of film propaganda from the side of institutional practices (film production and exhibition) and the ongoing negotiations among the Propaganda Ministry, filmmakers, and audiences that reveal the dependency of all film propaganda on the entire ensemble of media technologies and political discourses and that have been examined by historians working on film propaganda (e.g., Klaus Kanzog). For all of these reasons, this book may be useful as a survey text in college teaching, but it contributes little to the ongoing scholarly debates on Third Reich cinema.

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ATINA GROSSMANN. *Jews, Germans, and Allies: Close Encounters in Occupied Germany*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2007. Pp. xv, 393. \$35.00.

In the variegated and highly politicized social landscape of postwar Germany, defeated Germans, victorious Allies, and Jews occupied parallel worlds on the same territory. However, as Atina Grossmann demonstrates in this ambitious and impressive examination of the "historic triangle" (which builds on earlier journal articles and chapters in edited volumes), Jews, Germans, and Allies interacted in ways that were complex and loaded with meaning. They debated issues of guilt, compensation, and memorialization, as well as the very future of Jewry in Germany. Economic interaction became commonplace, and despite widespread protestations of revulsion and mutual antipathy, Jews, Germans, and Allied forces often had social and sexual relations with one another. Grossmann seeks to interpret the multiple meanings of these entanglements with a particular focus on gendered experiences "of the body, of sexuality and reproduction" (p. 4). For this examination, she focuses on American-occupied Bavaria, site of the largest transient Jewish population, and Berlin, under four-power occupation and site of intense debates on the future of German society.

Widespread rape occurred in eastern Germany, while German women in the American occupation zone engaged in pragmatic fraternization, and all across Germany mothers worried how to support their families in

a country wracked by want and experiencing an extreme shortage of adult men. In this atmosphere, the lines between rape, prostitution, and consensual sex occasionally were blurred. Stories of rape were incorporated matter-of-factly into accounts of the postwar months, at least until soldiers returned home and remasculinized German society. Women expressed no guilt or shame over what they had experienced and presented themselves as heroes. In western Germany, bans on fraternization became untenable, and "relationships between male occupiers and German women . . . went a long way in transforming the perception of Germans from ruthless aggressors to sympathetic victims" (p. 74).

Berlin forms a particular focus of the study. As Allied officials and foreign correspondents reveled in the city's permissive atmosphere, German civilians experienced great misery. They portrayed themselves as victims of injustices: "first of the Nazi regime that lured them into war, and then of the [Allied] bombings, expulsions, harsh denazification, and ruined society that were the results of defeat" (p. 40). A popular narrative of "poor Germany" emerged, and competition between Jews and Germans arose for claims to victimhood and control of memory. For Jews, official recognition of their affiliation, formerly a ticket to hell, became "a ticket to freedom," with scarce goods and services "doled out according to calibrations of victimization or guilt" (p. 90). Jews also struggled to regain their expropriated former homes or frozen bank accounts. With few means of supporting themselves, they depended directly or indirectly on the Allies and the worldwide Jewish community for survival. While German-born Jews debated whether to leave or to rebuild German Jewish life, Berlin remained little more than a way station for East European Jews.

The largest concentration of Jews in Germany was in American-occupied Bavaria, and displaced persons camps eventually formed all-Jewish microsocieties where no Jews previously had lived. Primarily of East European origin, Jewish displaced persons (DPs) saw their mere presence in Bavaria as revenge on the Germans, and they flaunted their personal, familial, and collective success. Jews resented renewed antisemitism in daily life, while Germans resented the confiscation of their homes for DPs and blamed Jews for the ills of postwar Bavaria, including the black market, although in reality Jewish-German economic ties proved mutually beneficial. The U.S. army generally supported the Jews, and Jewish army chaplains flouted regulations to provide critical aid to their coreligionists, even when the latter proved unruly. Zionism soon became an important factor in Jewish life in Bavaria. The DPs' political representation cultivated an overtly Zionist sensibility, and DPs considered it an obligation to proclaim their desire to go to Palestine, even if they personally intended to go elsewhere.

In overt contrast to the high rates of infant mortality and abortion among non-Jewish Germans, the Jewish population in Germany had one of the highest birth-rates in the world. There was a rush of weddings, partly

out of desire to replace what was lost and partly out of desire for affection or stability in midst of despair. Marriage and pregnancy also represented an affirmation of life and femininity. But many young, single Jewish women, without the benefit of experience or guidance from older female relatives, became pregnant and sought abortions. By contrast, some Jewish men, not desiring a serious relationship with a Jewish woman, opted for less complicated sexual liaisons with German women. Even all-Jewish families had close contacts with Germans, constructed around issues of reproduction. The baby boom necessarily brought Jews into contact with German doctors and nurses, birth registrars, cleaners, and nannies.

The flourishing of Jewish life and Allied favor of Jews vis-à-vis Germans began to diminish as the 1940s ended. Germans became allies in the nascent Cold War. Jews felt less at home in Germany, and many emigrated. They were tired of Germans' comparisons of hardship in postwar Berlin to the horrors of Auschwitz, and renewed antisemitism was making itself felt in daily life. The remaining Jews organized themselves politically for life outside the DP camps.

Despite legend and conventional wisdom, there was intense interaction between Jews and Germans. Germans and Jews have both overlooked or forgotten this episode in their joint history, which Grossmann brings to life with a particularly fascinating examination of gendered experience and sexuality.

JAY HOWARD GELLER
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PAUL STEEGE. *Black Market, Cold War: Everyday Life in Berlin, 1946–1949*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xix, 348. \$80.00.

In this innovative study of Cold War Berlin, Paul Steege offers a "history from the inside out" that seeks to explore "why and particularly how everyday life mattered for the way the Cold War worked" (p. 15). While "ordinary people" in the streets of Eastern European capitals have long been recognized as having ended the Cold War in 1989, this book seeks to restore their agency in making it. Drawing on the methodology of the history of everyday life (*Alltagsgeschichte*), the book locates the meaning of the Cold War in the spaces "betwixt and between" the "grand events" of the Cold War, such as the Berlin blockade and the formation of two German states. In their struggles for survival under adverse conditions, Berliners managed to frustrate persistently the attempts of authorities—both German and Allied—to exert effective control over their lives and, in so doing, gave their own meaning to the unfolding of the Cold War in what ultimately became its symbolic capital.

The central problem for ordinary Berliners, as Steege demonstrates convincingly, was continued material scarcity. A depleted and destroyed housing stock, lack of heating material, and, above all, virtually ubiquitous food shortages defined the realities of everyday life for

most Berliners in all four sectors. Due to the insufficient provisions of the official ration system, Berliners turned to the black market, which the author sees as providing “everyday power to shape their world in spite of occupiers’ municipal authorities and party political leaders’ various claims to power” (p. 56). In particular, Berliners frustrated the political ambitions of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), not primarily due to their ideological rejection of communism but out of a keen sense of the party’s inability to ease the hardships of everyday life. Ordinary Berliners delivered a crushing electoral defeat to the SED in the Greater Berlin municipal elections of October 1946, and they also remained largely immune to the SED’s (not always credible) promises of a “potato democracy.”

The agency of ordinary Berliners in shaping the escalating Cold War became especially apparent when Soviet authorities blocked access routes to West Berlin in response to the introduction of a separate currency in the West, thus ushering in the Berlin blockade from June 1948 to May 1949. Steege’s account of the everyday history of the blockade constitutes the most original section of the book as well as the centerpiece of his argument. The blockade, as he shows persuasively, was by no means as total and as complete as it has often been portrayed. Berliners were not just passive victims (or beneficiaries) of superpower actions but, through their everyday practices, continuously subverted the dichotomous structure that the superpowers sought to impose on them. West Berliners managed, for example, to circumvent insufficient Soviet border controls and continued to forage into the Soviet zone in search of additional food supplies. They also did not hesitate to use Eastern European currency in spite of having exchanged their savings for Western currency. In fact, as Steege claims, it was only *after* the Berlin blockade ended that the superpowers assumed greater “definitional authority” over the contours of the Cold War in Berlin (p. 296).

Much of Steege’s attempt to locate the functioning of the Cold War in the realities of everyday life is laudable and innovative. His analysis elucidates not only the meaning that the Cold War assumed for ordinary people but also highlights their agency in making the Cold War divide. At times, however, the precise links between popular action and elite politics are not easily apparent, in part because the voices of ordinary people remain conspicuously absent from longer stretches of the narrative. The notion of “Berliners” as collective subject occasionally appears somewhat reified and homogenous with little attention to internal differentiations either according to classical social markers (class, gender, religion, etc.) or, for that matter, to distinct wartime experiences. Finally, it would have been interesting to extend the author’s analysis of Eastern European Communists’ inability “to control” ordinary Berliners more thoroughly to Western authorities as well. In this context, one also wonders about the virtually complete absence of the Christian churches as both alternative sites of authority as well as providers

of material welfare. Still, despite these shortcomings, this study represents a much-needed and brave attempt to integrate the history of everyday life into the international history of the Cold War. It succeeds in demonstrating the extent to which the material desires of ordinary people limited the ideological and political ambitions of the superpowers in Cold War Berlin. By focusing on the local origins of a global conflict, this book offers an alternative interpretation of the unfolding of the Cold War. It should be essential reading for anybody interested in the everyday social realities of the Cold War.

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PAMELA E. SWETT, S. JONATHAN WIESEN, and JONATHAN R. ZATLIN, editors. *Selling Modernity: Advertising in Twentieth-Century Germany*. Foreword by VICTORIA DE GRAZIA. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2007. Pp. xx, 364. \$24.95.

In keeping with the spirit of a book on modern advertising, the cover displays a sketch of the iconic BMW 502 series automobile, first marketed in 1954. The corporation’s enduring and immediately recognizable logo is placed discreetly near the car. As the volume’s editors observe, advertising is globally ubiquitous, and German branding has assumed transnational reach for over a century.

After a short introductory survey, the volume’s uniformly excellent essays make a compelling and coherent case for several trends in twentieth-century advertising that mirror unique developments in Germany but also reflect wider transformations in the industrialized world. One key point is that the production of goods and services together with attendant advertising was often linked to politics. Obviously this nexus was especially evident during years of Nazism and, later, East German (GDR) Communism. In a well-known passage of *Mein Kampf* (1925), Adolf Hitler wrote: “What, for example would we say about a poster that was supposed to advertise a new soap and that described other soaps as ‘good’? We would only shake our heads. Exactly the same applies to political advertising” (p. 182). The present volume’s second important theme is Germany’s ambivalence toward advertising. On numerous occasions—from the Wilhelmine era through the 1980s—advertising has been artistically avant-garde, cleverly formulated, and visually striking. Yet Germans frequently had reservations about the “Americanization” of advertising and worried about the homogenizing effects that mass consumption would have on the population.

Kevin Repp begins by discussing the Janus-faced attitudes of turn-of-the-century observers, reflecting on whether advertising was an art or whether ads simply symbolized the “disfigurement” of the German landscape. Repp focuses on two features of advertising, the first being the architecture of the famed Berlin depart-

ment store, Wertheim, designed by Alfred Messel. Second, he describes advertising posters that increasingly pared down images to their essence for visual effectiveness. The iconic images of Lucian Bernhard's posters advertising women's shoes or elevating the lowly match to totemic status served as inspirations to generations of commercial artists. Yet Repp intriguingly concludes that advertisers ultimately wanted to separate the aesthetic from the commercial and to privilege advertising simply as inherently informational and materially beneficial.

Corey Ross's fascinating exploration of the Americanization of German advertising after World War I describes the efforts of large ad agencies such as J. Walter Thompson to enter the German market. Cultural differences, partly conditioned by Germany's defeat and post-World War I studies of war propaganda, affected the nature of interwar "advertising psychology" (p. 59). But Ross's rich essay also describes the various obstacles to market penetration resulting from the fragmentation of the German press, language barriers, and different attitudes between Americans and Germans toward specific merchandise. Using Pond's beauty cream as one example, Ross notes that German women were far more reluctant than American women to use the product simply because a celebrity endorsed it. But if health benefits were stressed, German women's attitudes were far more positive.

Other essays include an introduction to one of Germany's most influential theoreticians, the "godfather of German branding," Hans Domizlaff. Holm Friebe describes Domizlaff's notion of branding and marketing as exemplified in his *Markentechnik*, published in the 1930s and serving as a guide ever since. Friebe analyzes this foundational work but also connects Domizlaff's patronizing attitude toward the masses to the larger unsettled milieu of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Michael Imort carefully describes the symbolic relationship of the German forest to German values seen in forestry journals published in the 1930s. Shelley Baranowski deftly analyzes one of the most popular programs, *Kraft durch Freude* or KdF (Strength through Joy), a massive National Socialist undertaking that organized leisure activities (such as cruises and outings) and promoted workplace improvements. She demonstrates that despite the Nazis' ostensible anti-materialism, KdF employed advertising techniques that "reflected and anticipated popular desires" (p. 135). Jeff Schutts's essay on marketing Coca-Cola tells an unlikely tale of what appeared to be the quintessentially American beverage, first marketed in Germany in 1929 and becoming Germanized by the late 1930s through clever distribution techniques at festivals and as an antidote to hangovers from heavy drinking. By setting up stalls at trade fairs, garden shows, and other venues, Germans began associating Coca-Cola with pleasurable activity and not necessarily as symbolic of Americanization.

The challenge of rehabilitating Germany's post-World War II reputation can be seen in Guillaume de Syon's examination of Lufthansa's efforts to increase

tourism to West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s. He provides some telling examples of corporate management experimenting with various ideas, such as the possibility of outfitting female flight attendants in Bavarian dirndls, similar to other national airlines wanting to give passengers an exotic experience before landing on foreign soil. He concludes that Lufthansa's advertising aided in the airline's growing positive reputation, which would also mirror that of postwar West Germany.

From Lufthansa's flights skyward, Elizabeth Heineman's essay on Beate Uhse and the growth of the pornography industry, including the selling of condoms and creating the world's first "shop for marital hygiene" (p. 217), again reveals the interrelationship between politics and advertising. Heineman demonstrates how Uhse's own biography and its careful construction mirrored postwar anxieties about gender, sex, and liberalism—from court trials to capitalistic enterprise through catalog sales. Robert Stephens uncovers the West German government-fabricated 1972 anti-drug campaign employing comic strips to convey to teens the dangers of drug use. He concludes that despite clever advertising, the policy was a dismal failure (p. 257). The "war on drugs" ad campaign did not necessarily result in the public's embrace of "rational choice" by changing a particular lifestyle.

Equally fascinating essays describe the GDR's difficulty with reconciling consumer demands and advertising that generated these very demands, leading to shortages and government criticism (Anne Kaminsky). Greg Castillo recounts the positive publicity in the construction of East Berlin's showcase street, the *Stalin-alley*, considered to be a socialist *Gesamtkunstwerk* but also site of protests during the 1953 uprisings. When the GDR erected the Berlin wall in 1961, the name was changed discreetly to the *Karl-Marx-Allee*. The final piece by Rainer Gries analyzes the growth of self-service in both East and West Germany—seen as a form of liberation as well as "product communication" (p. 318). In lieu of actual salespersons educating customers about merchandise, products themselves were to project values. In this streamlined, efficient system, customers had freedom of choice.

The volume fully realizes the aim of outlining a myriad of trends in twentieth-century German advertising. The accompanying images—photographs, ads, and posters—likewise properly link the visual to the texts. The contributions furthermore demonstrate the larger and more complex interactions between German political history and the history of consumption mediated by changing trends in advertising. Edited works often contain essays that range widely in quality and depth of research. But this collection's chronological and thematic investigations make for a coherent and continually fascinating, well-told story.

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CAROL POORE. *Disability in Twentieth-Century German Culture*. (Corporealities: Discourses of Disability.) Ann

Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2007. Pp. vii, 407. \$70.00.

This work is a major contribution to disability history in Germany, since it covers much more than the Nazi period, which has received the lion's share of attention among historians working in this field. Carol Poore provides keen analysis of cultural representations of disability in twentieth-century German culture. Yet her book does far more. It challenges moral sensibilities by raising thought-provoking questions: What is the proper cultural and societal response to disability? Is disability a socially constructed category, as many disabled activists, including this author, believe? Why did German and American attitudes to disability in the late twentieth century differ, and how did the Nazi past bear on this difference?

Poore effectively engages three main issues throughout the book: the way that the disabled have been portrayed in high culture, especially literature, painting, and film; the way nondisabled people have interacted with disabled people; and the way that disabled people have organized themselves to push for greater rights. In the final chapter, she discusses her own experiences as a disabled American woman (needing crutches after contracting polio as a child) in Germany, where she lived and visited in 1970 and thereafter.

Since a great deal has already been written about disabled veterans after World War I and eugenics before and during the Nazi period, some of the ground Poore covers in the opening chapters is well-trodden by historians. However, she makes a significant contribution to our understanding of disability during the Weimar and Nazi periods by discussing representations of disability in the fine arts. Most of the expressionist artists in Weimar that depicted disability did so to critique militarism. Such representations were consigned to "Degenerate Art" exhibits during the Nazi period, when officially sponsored art exulted in the healthy, strong, and virile. The Nazis did continue, however, to popularize pictorial representations of the disabled, but the purpose of these pictures was to stir up revulsion toward these people, whom the Nazis targeted for exclusion and elimination.

After the collapse of Nazism, attitudes and public policy toward the disabled gradually improved. However, attitudes shaped by Nazi propaganda persisted into the postwar era. Poore considers the theme of the most popular German film of 1951, *Die Sünderin* (*The Sinner*), hauntingly reminiscent of the Nazi pro-euthanasia film, *Ich klage an* (*I accuse*). In the 1950s the West German government (FRG) followed policies designed to help the disabled, but in institutions segregated from the rest of society. The disabled had little or no input into these policies. The 1960s-1970s were a turning point, as disabled activists insisted that they should have a voice in shaping policy. They also pressed for and sometimes protested for greater integration into German society. Though remarkable gains have been made in German society in the ensuing years, they often came

later than in the United States. In one respect Germany is still way behind the United States and most of Europe in integrating the disabled into society: about ninety-three percent of disabled children in Germany are educated in segregated schools.

In East Germany (GDR) the socialist ideal of full employment helped integrate the disabled into the workplace. However, all in all the GDR was unable to provide as much accommodation for the disabled because of the persistent economic shortages in comparison with the FRG. Though some authors in the GDR treated disabled people sensitively, generally attitudes toward the disabled were worse in the GDR than in the FRG.

The final chapter contains the author's reminiscences and reflections on the way she was treated in Germany. When she first lived in West Germany in 1970-1971, she was shocked by how Germans stared and asked embarrassing questions, which she had not experienced very much in the United States. After reading this chapter, I wished Poore had spent more time in the earlier chapters discussing the feelings of the disabled. Although she discusses the goals and ideals of many disabled activists, she never really conveys adequately their plight. Perhaps in the Weimar and Nazi periods this was not possible because of lack of sources. However, Poore notes that many disabled people began writing memoirs and accounts of their struggles in the 1970s and thereafter, without providing enough detail for us to understand their feelings. Personal reflections are important. When I first read Poore's description of the angry and embittered response of some disability activists in the 1970s-1980s, I only understood in a very limited way what they were facing. After reading her own story, I understood much better.

This work is a rich introduction to disability history in twentieth-century Germany, and hopefully it will stimulate further work in this field. Though I do not know if Poore will achieve her stated goal of placing the history of disability in the center of German cultural history, I am confident that she has demonstrated its importance.

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MICHAEL STANISLAWSKI. *A Murder in Lemberg: Politics, Religion, and Violence in Modern Jewish History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2007. Pp. vi, 152. \$21.95.

Sometimes a single event sheds light on an entire historical era. Clearly Michael Stanislawski sees the murder of Reform Rabbi Abraham Kohn in Lemberg (now L'viv, Ukraine) on September 6, 1848 as one such epoch-revealing occurrence. Kohn died from eating soup that had been poisoned, probably by Abraham Ber Pilpel, who, Stanislawski argues, objected to Kohn's innovations in ritual practice. For Stanislawski the murder reveals tensions within the Lemberg Jewish com-

munity, in particular between traditional Jews and new trends in Judaism that challenged old practices and beliefs. The city of Lemberg provides a unique case study because of its overwhelmingly traditional community located within the Austrian state where the Jewish Reform movement had numerous adherents (mainly, of course, in the western, German-speaking part of the state). Thus the story of Kohn's murder in mid-nineteenth-century Lemberg provides a snapshot of the frictions engendered by the transition to "Jewish modernity."

Stanislawski's book is divided into two parts. In the first, longer section, he gives a background on Lemberg, Galicia (the province within which the city is located), and on Reform Judaism in Eastern Europe (Warsaw, Budapest, and elsewhere) before turning to Rabbi Kohn and the murder itself. Kohn, like most Reform rabbis, was a German speaker trained in a Bohemian Gymnasium and had served as rabbi for a decade in Hohenems, Tyrol, before moving to Lemberg. In his writings, Kohn challenged various time-honored Jewish practices such as rending garments at a burial, not wearing leather on Yom Kippur, and requiring married women to don special head coverings. Identifying himself as both European and German, Kohn argued that such outmoded (and lacking in halakhic justification) practices should be rejected and abolished as undignified.

When arriving in Lemberg in 1844, Rabbi Kohn moved cautiously, not wishing to alienate the mainly Orthodox and traditional community. But his German (not Yiddish) sermons, modern clerical dress (resembling a Catholic priest more than a traditional rabbi), and appointment as *Kreisrabbiner* (district rabbi) galvanized Orthodox resistance to him. In early 1848 Rabbi Kohn was attacked and beaten up but declined to allow the authorities to press forward with an investigation. Then in September of that revolutionary year, someone entered the rabbi's kitchen and added poison to the soup pot, killing the rabbi and his youngest child.

The final section of Stanislawski's book examines the archival dossier on those accused of the murder. Several witnesses claimed to have seen the traditionally dressed Pilpel around the rabbi's apartment, but in the end the court ruled that the evidence was too circumstantial to convict him. Despite appeals by Rabbi Kohn's widow, Pilpel and several other members of the "Orthodox party" that had clashed with Kohn were acquitted.

For Stanislawski, this murder deserves historians' attention, because it represents one of the rare cases of a Jew murdering another Jew for ostensibly (politico-)religious reasons. According to Stanislawski's interpretation, Kohn clearly was murdered by an Orthodox Jew (or by one acting for a conspiracy) to prevent the introduction of reform practices into Jewish life in Lemberg. While such a motive is plausible, not all readers will be convinced that the evidence presented here establishes such a crime beyond a shadow of a doubt.

But whether or not one accepts Stanislawski's ver-

dict, the book is well worth reading. For specialists, it provides a little-known incident with a strong argument. For those less familiar with the history of East European Jewry, this short book may serve as an easy and interesting introduction wrapped in a murder mystery. One way or the other, Stanislawski's study is a stimulating work and deserves broad readership.

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TIMOTHY SNYDER. *The Red Prince: The Secret Lives of a Habsburg Archduke*. New York: Basic Books. 2008. Pp. viii, 344. \$27.95.

Timothy Snyder's book is a very good read: it is fast-paced, clearly written, and with enough dramatic episodes to entice readers to keep on going. Few academics manage to produce such engaging narratives. It is also a highly ambitious book: Snyder attempts to weave together a biography of a largely forgotten Habsburg archduke with the story of East Central Europe in the past century and the emergence of Ukraine as an independent nation. However, the stylistic skill and metaphorical richness that make the book so legible come often at the expense of analytical precision. Thus, although the book contains parts with great insight, especially regarding the fluidity and complexity of national identifications, it ultimately opts for a sentimental tone that masks its scholarly contributions.

The spine that holds the book together is the story of Archduke Wilhelm von Habsburg (1895–1948), an aspirant—and occasional conspirator—for a nonexistent Ukrainian throne, whose colorful life ended in a dank Soviet prison in Kiev. Although his father, Archduke Stefan, had dreamed of a resurrected Polish crown linked through him and his children to the Habsburg monarchy, Wilhelm was attracted from his teen years to the tales and political aspirations of Ukrainians living in Habsburg Galicia. Commanding Ukrainian troops during World War I, Wilhelm came under the influence of Andrei Sheptytskii, the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, who advocated the creation of a Ukrainian political entity led by a member of the Habsburg family. In the chaotic situation following the Russian Revolution, it seemed that such an outcome might indeed come to pass: the so-called "Bread Peace" signed in February 1918 between Ukrainian negotiators on one side and Habsburg and German diplomats on the other recognized a Ukrainian state on the lands formerly controlled by the Russian Empire. The Habsburg monarchy, in a secret protocol, promised to create a Ukrainian crownland in Eastern Galicia and Bukovina. Wilhelm, now presenting himself also as Vasyl Vyshyvanyi, wrote to his mentor Sheptytskii: "for me as a Ukrainian, and I do feel myself as a Ukrainian, [the signing of the Bread Peace is] one of the most beautiful days of my life" (p. 98).

Nevertheless, a Ukrainian state did not last beyond 1918. Following years of hunger, continuous warfare, and large-scale pogroms, the areas nowadays controlled

by Ukraine were divided among Poland, the Soviet Union, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. Wilhelm, whose own Habsburg monarchy dissolved in the fall of 1918, became involved during the early 1920s in dubious radical-right and monarchist schemes in Central and Eastern Europe. When these did not work out, Wilhelm found his way in the late 1920s to Paris, devoting his time to the pleasures of city life. Fleeing France in June 1935 to avoid a five-year prison sentence for a scam to which he may have been only an unwitting accomplice, Wilhelm moved to Vienna and became a Nazi sympathizer. Wilhelm "now opposed a Habsburg restoration in Austria . . . [seeing it] in essentially Nazi terms: as Jewish, illegitimate and doomed" (p. 200). He was convinced that an independent Ukraine would become a reality only as a fascist state. However, by 1942 "German indifference to him and the Ukraine undermined the previous attractions of fascism" (p. 217). In collaboration with Western espionage agencies, Wilhelm worked during the latter part of the war for Ukrainian nationalist causes, continuing to do so in the postwar years. On August 26, 1947, he was seized by Soviet agents in the Vienna South Railway Station. He died in a Soviet prison from tuberculosis a year later.

Although Wilhelm von Habsburg seems to have been present at a few important historical junctures in the history of Central and Eastern Europe, it is not entirely clear to the readers whether he was aware of the complex dilemmas inherent in these situations. More often than not Wilhelm seems to have been a pawn in a game played by others. Part of the problem lies in the fact that important parts of his life are not well documented despite the author's painstaking research in archives and libraries. Thus it is up to Snyder to speculate about Wilhelm's feelings and intentions, not always very convincingly. This is particularly evident in the brief sections of the book that deal with Wilhelm's sexuality and homosexual relationships. These regrettably rely more on innuendo than on reflection, casting this undoubtedly consequential part of Wilhelm's life as an odd curiosity.

Snyder's book is based on impressive research in a plethora of languages. It combines original research about Wilhelm von Habsburg with the relevant secondary literature about the dynasty and the region. However, this study seems ultimately intended for the general public rather than specialists of East Central Europe. It relies much too often on the nostalgic image of *fin-de-siècle* Austria-Hungary, portraying the final decades of the Habsburg monarchy in golden hues. It seldom engages critically with the aspirations and actions of Polish and Ukrainian nationalists and downplays atrocities committed in the name of Poland and Ukrainian self-determination. The book ends unexpectedly with a passionate call for the integration of Ukraine into the European Union and through this into the narrative of European history. By rescuing from oblivion the adventurous tale of one cosmopolitan, nationalist, and quintessentially European archduke, Snyder

der aims to demonstrate that Ukraine too shares the commonalities and traumas of European history.

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THOMAS KUEHN, *Heirs, Kin, and Creditors in Renaissance Florence*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2008. Pp. xvii, 237. \$60.00.

Thomas Kuehn has carved out a place for himself as an expert on Renaissance law, in particular the instruments of Italian law that allowed Florentines to promote their families and fortunes. This book examines repudiation of inheritance, a feature of late medieval civil law that drew upon Roman precedent. It demonstrates that same careful legal analysis and study of the application of the law that characterized Kuehn's earlier works on the *mundualdus* (a Lombardic provision in the law that required a male advocate for women appearing before the courts), the laws of illegitimacy, and laws of emancipation.

This book presents over 11,000 cases of repudiation, most of them Florentine, but some from other parts of Tuscany, from 1365 to 1564. In the preface Kuehn stresses the importance of inheritance and kinship as context for the proclivity of Florentines to develop strategies for turning inheritance law to their advantage. The main body of the text defines repudiation in the context of family inheritance law as interpreted in the medieval *Ius Commune* (the continental common law tradition based upon Roman precedent). Turning to case law, Kuehn demonstrates the wide-ranging applicability of repudiation through reference to particular cases. Chapter four discusses the registry of repudiations instituted by a concerned civil government. Kuehn then turns to the *Catasto* (census) study of 1427 compiled by David Herlihy and Christiane Klapisch-Zuber (now online) to compare recorded repudiations of estates to family wealth. Then, employing Anthony Molho's study of the *Catasto* of 1480, Kuehn carries this analysis forward in time. Chapter six deals with repudiation as an inheritance practice, including the fate of unclaimed estates, and the last chapter concludes with a discussion of the litigation and consilia that resulted from disputes.

Throughout Kuehn demonstrates the flexibility of repudiation as a strategy. If a mother's or brother's will was repudiated, it might well be in favor of a dowry for an unmarried sister or in the interest of underage heirs. Other repudiations, like that of a father's estate or of other paternal kin, often allowed an heir to avoid debts that more than cancelled out the value of the property inherited. Estates accepted as inheritance could not be revoked once the act was notarized. By contrast, a revocation might sometimes be reversed, which gave this legal instrument a degree of flexibility. As one might expect, repudiations were heavy in cases of intestacy (lack of a will and testament) (p. 133). Between maneuvering for the sake of other family members' interests and avoidance of debt, this book explores a host of

other possibilities. All center on Renaissance Florentines' deeply felt need to protect family wealth. Repudiations were not limited to Florence or to Tuscany, although Florentines appear to have been highly adept at making this component of law work in their interests.

Repudiations were employed so often in Florence that they earned the disapproval of legal experts like Paolo di Castro (ca. 1360–1441), who based his opinion on the work of the great legist Bartolo da Sassoferrato. Both viewed repudiations as “hateful” and “empty” (p. 28). This did not prevent Florentines from making use of them when it suited their purposes, and the very complexity of inheritance law encouraged this. At times heirs were emancipated so that they might repudiate an inheritance. Co-heirs employed repudiation when they encountered complex problems with inheritances, as did heirs who had joined religious orders, making an inheritance communal property. The entire Dominican convent of San Niccolò di Prato had to meet to repudiate their share in the will of Cilia Guidalotti. By their act, duly notarized and coupled with other repudiations, the five heirs of this meager estate were reduced to one granddaughter in need of a dowry (p. 163).

Cases such as these suggest that repudiations lent the strictures of inheritance laws some valuable flexibility and on those grounds it was a benign, even a positive, feature of inheritance law. Still, civil government was much more wary of repudiations than this interpretation warrants, and indeed, Kuehn shows that by the sixteenth century repudiations led to some sharp business practices and even cases of outright fraud. There appears to have been adequate reason for the commune to register and police the practice of repudiation. A strength of Kuehn's study is the constant attention paid to the dynamic of family and individual purposes, to the complexities of generational transmission of wealth, and to how family property played into the commercial development of Renaissance Florence.

SUSAN MOSHER STUARD
Haverford College

TAMAR HERZIG. *Savonarola's Women: Visions and Reform in Renaissance Italy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2008. Pp. xvi, 333. \$35.00.

Girolamo Savonarola's legacy remains disputed territory to this day. Is he best understood as an Observant forerunner of Martin Luther, a divinely inspired critic of Italy's social decline, a protagonist—however atypical—of the history of Florentine (and Italian) republicanism, or simply a censor run amok? In this book, Tamar Herzig examines some of the earliest struggles over his reception, as she uncovers an understudied female line of transmission for Savonarola's cult. In the crucial three decades following the Dominican's execution and the condemnation of his followers in 1498, she argues, several holy women played central roles in the promotion of Savonarolism outside of Florence. Their memory was subsequently suppressed by the Florentine Savonarolans, known as the *Piagnoni* or Wail-

ers, intent on purging the friar's legacy of any questionable elements. This tightly focused, densely researched book takes Savonarolan studies on a salutary excursion outside of Florence. Along the way it deepens our understanding of the networks and intense religiosity of the women who defied his orders of silence and invisibility.

Building on the work of Lorenzo Polizzotto and others on Savonarola's special relationship with Florentine women, Herzig proposes a more solid tradition of female transmission of the Savonarolan cult beyond Tuscany. Only outside of the conservative *Piagnoni* circles, she argues, did women have full opportunities to share in the prophet's sanctity. This “chain of succession” (chapter two) began with Colomba Guadagnoli, a contemporary of Savonarola's who quoted his visions from her tertiary convent in Perugia. In the two generations after Savonarola's death, Colomba's imitators fanned out across northern and central Italy, emerging most strongly in the principalities of the Po Valley. From the tertiary convents they founded, the Dominicans Colomba Trucazzani in Milan, Lucia Brocadelli in Ferrara, Stefana Quinzani in Soncino (Brescia), Osanna Andreasi in Mantua, and others all borrowed visionary images and religious language from Savonarola, particularly his *Compendio di Rivelazioni* (1495), and echoed his criticisms of the church hierarchy. Herzig melds a close reading of chronicles, hagiographies and other accounts of their religious teachings with an impressive archival reconstruction of personal networks.

During the early years of the sixteenth century, the friar's hometown of Ferrara, under the Savonarolan Duke Ercole I d'Este, formed the central cradle of Savonarolism. The heart of the book concerns the holy woman Lucia Brocadelli's career there. In 1499 Duke Ercole wrested Brocadelli away from Viterbo, where she had already established a reputation for sanctity, installed her in Ferrara as prioress of a new convent, and made her his resident prophetess. Herzig explores the partially hidden Savonarolan clues embedded in Brocadelli's visions and situates her at the center of a whole web of Ferraran support for the friar. But Brocadelli's prominence depended on her princely patron, and when Ercole died in 1505, the hostile Dominican congregation of Lombardy quickly undermined the nun's authority and silenced her. Only after Duke Alfonso's death in 1534 was Brocadelli's reputation restored; she composed her own book of revelations, modeled on Savonarola's, just before she died in 1544.

These Dominican women are contextualized as a substantial wing of the larger movement of the “living saints,” analyzed by Gabriella Zarri in her now classic article by that title. The living saints, holy women of various orders but generally observant tertiaries, lent their legitimacy and sanctity to the princes and cities with which they were associated during the Wars of Italy, until about 1540, when their voices evaporated. Herzig links their demise not only to the changing political situation, following Zarri, but also to changes within the Savonarolan movement. As the ecclesiastical

climate changed at mid-century, the *Piagnoni* shifted strategies, from defending Savonarola's prophetic powers to defending the orthodoxy of his doctrines; women's voices, Herzig argues, could contribute less to the latter efforts. At the same time, the now-rehabilitated *Piagnoni* worked to stress the continuities between the friar's project and Tridentine reform. They "purged earlier Savonarolan sources of allusions to subversive visions, which could be deemed as entailing disobedience or doctrinal heterodoxy" (p. 186) and rewrote the biographies of associated women to conform to current Tridentine standards of docility.

Savonarolan studies have often been confined to the Florentine ambit; this book's case that the *Piagnoni* could not have survived without the sometimes hidden pockets of Savonarolism outside of Tuscany is an important corrective. This transregional approach raises interesting questions. How much of the Savonarolan legacy was specific to Florence and how much could be exported to other contexts? As Herzig shows, the republican elements of Savonarola's thought and action conveniently disappeared once the movement went on the road to princely courts. To what extent, and how, was its apocalyptic, moralizing search for a New Jerusalem connected with the wider currents of reformist prophecy that Ottavia Niccoli has shown were prevalent across Italy during the agonies of the wars? The larger context is somewhat elided by Herzig, for whom the Savonarolan strain dominates the foreground. Nonetheless this is a valuable contribution to our understanding of female sanctity at the turn of the sixteenth century.

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MASSIMO MAZZOTTI. *The World of Maria Gaetana Agnesi, Mathematician of God*. (Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Mathematics.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2007. Pp. xx, 217. \$49.95.

On December 6, 1749, the Paris Academy of Sciences praised a book aimed at young people on the then new mathematical field of calculus, calling it "the best made in the field." The book was Maria Gaetana Agnesi's *Istituzioni analitiche ad uso della gioventù*, which had been published that same year. A French translation was to be published in 1775. This accolade from the Academy of Sciences would have been extraordinary enough applied to any book in the difficult new field. Yet to have it offered to the work of a woman mathematician was rare indeed. The woman was Agnesi from Milan, famous among her contemporaries not just for her mathematical prowess but for her linguistic abilities (she spoke Latin, Greek, Hebrew, and French), and for the intellectual skills displayed at her famous *conversazione*.

Massimo Mazzotti's book shows that Maria Agnesi was more than just one of the child prodigies with which the eighteenth century was dotted—the most famous being Wolfgang and Nannerl Mozart. Her learning and

intellectual abilities, for example, carried on past adolescence, while many a prodigy's did not. She was also more complex. In 1752, at her father's death, Agnesi renounced the majority of her legacy, ended her work in mathematics, and entered a life of charitable good works at the new Pio Albergo Trivulzio.

Ravaged by years of war, and living through the time Franco Venturi has called the "crisis of the old regime," Milan saw an enormous increase in poverty and crime. At the Pio Albergo Trivulzio, Agnesi worked with the indigent elderly, prostitutes, and street children. During the French occupation of the city, it was from there that she was buried in a mass grave in 1799.

Agnesi's abrupt switch from mathematics to charity work is a caesura in her life that demands explanation. For Mazzotti, this can be explained by her adherence to the Catholic Enlightenment. Although the Catholic Enlightenment also occurred in South Germany and Naples, Mazzotti examines here its northern Italian face. This Enlightenment had little connection with the more well-known Milanese Enlightenment of Cesare Beccaria and the Verri brothers and their reforming journal *Il Caffè*, which began publication in the same year, gathering around it young intellectuals characterized by social and political reformism. This was an Enlightenment which came into being after the mid-century, around the very time of Agnesi's choice to renounce her previous life as a mathematician, and with which she had little to do. Rather, Agnesi was involved in the Catholic Enlightenment, overwhelmingly an early century phenomenon. Gathered around the historian Ludovico Antonio Muratori, who died in 1750, and the reformist Pope Benedict XIV, who died in 1758, the years of its decline exactly coincide with Agnesi's 1752 decision to end her mathematical work and begin work at the Pio Albergo.

Mazzotti gives a detailed account of the Milanese Catholic Enlightenment, which was centered on Muratori and his desire to address the boundaries of freedom in theology, liturgy, and Catholic education. Hostile to Jesuit pedagogy and theology, Muratori held that mental exercise was essential to spiritual life, and saw mathematics as the most certain form of knowledge. Mazzotti argues persuasively that it was in this milieu that Agnesi found support both for her life as a mathematician and for her work with the poor. Thus, her break with mathematics may not have been such a caesura after all. Charity was the highest value in this milieu, which was characterized by the principles set forth in Muratori's *On Christian Charity* (1723). For Muratori, charity was "the supreme virtue," and could be identified with divine grace (p. 41).

Far less convincing is Mazzotti's account of Agnesi as a learned woman. Eighteenth-century Italy saw the emergence of a whole generation of women who had high social status, prodigious learning, and, often, poetic talent: Agnesi, who was offered the post of lecturer in mathematics at the University of Bologna (it is unclear whether she performed the duties of the post); Laura Bassi, who was offered a university chair;

Francesca Manzoni; and Gaetana and Clelia Borromeo, to cite a few examples. Their lives and work have been explored with bravura by historians like Paula Findlen and Marta Cavazza. But, as Londa Schiebinger has written, in the case of Italy "little is known about why women professors were acceptable to the Church and university," when they certainly were not in the rest of Europe. Perhaps a way into this question would be first of all to examine what made Italian universities and learned societies so different from those in the rest of Europe, and then to ask whether the learned women were so different in fact from European contemporaries such as Voltaire's companion, the Marquise du Châtelet.

This book is both a life and a times; it will have many readers.

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JOHN A. DAVIS. *Naples and Napoleon: Southern Italy and the European Revolutions (1780–1860)*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. vi, 372. \$120.00.

When did the *Mezzogiorno* become the *Mezzogiorno*? Generations of historians have researched and debated the origins of Italy's "Southern Question," or the problem of southern Italy's political, economic, and social backwardness relative to an apparently more developed North. In the process, backwardness became a kind of master narrative. This narrative was outlined in the interwar writings of Benedetto Croce and Antonio Gramsci, reinforced by the development theories of the 1960s and 1970s, and expressed in novels like Carlo Levi's *Christ Stopped at Eboli* (1945) and Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa's *The Leopard* (1955–1956). Through the medium of cinema and television, the academic picture of a land outside history, caught in the grip of a feudal past, reached a mass audience and, as John A. Davis tells us, "turned the South into a universally recognizable metaphor of pre-modernity" (p. 6).

The book under review lays down a comprehensive challenge to this popular and scholarly orthodoxy. Indeed, for the past three decades, Davis has been a leading member of the group of *meridionalisti* ("southernists") who have offered us a different, much more vibrant and modern picture of southern Italy, and his book represents one of the highpoints of their achievement. The "neat contrasts" between a liberal, modernizing North and a corrupt, backward South are, Davis argues, misleading "anachronisms" (p. 8). Equally, the idea that modernization was imposed on the corrupt and indolent Neapolitans, first by Napoleon Bonaparte and subsequently by the liberal North, is largely mistaken; instead, according to Davis, the reforms of the French were driven by processes of change from within the South "and shaped from below" (p. 9). Far from being a passive periphery to the Age of Revolutions, Naples and its kingdom were "at the center of the political storms that swept through Europe" after 1789, and the changes experienced there "mirrored, and in

many cases even anticipated" those occurring farther to the north (pp. 12, 15).

Davis's main theme is the conflict and instability produced by modernization, and he traces this process from the reforms of mid-eighteenth-century Naples, through the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, to the restoration of the monarchy and Italian unification (1815–1860). In effect, the book's title is somewhat misleading. Of its 300-odd pages, only 130 are dedicated to Napoleon, and more specifically to Napoleon's brother-in-law Joachim Murat, while an almost equal amount of space, and some of the book's most impressive and detailed research, is given over to absolutist Naples, the Republic of 1799, and the vicious counterrevolution that followed it. Moreover, in the course of Davis's account, we learn almost as much about the provinces—of brigands in the Silva forest, and royalist revolt in Teramo—as we do about events in the capital city of Naples.

Davis may represent a new wave in southern historiography, but his analysis is really no more positive than his predecessors. At the least, his narrative does not make for happy reading. Before 1799, the Neapolitan reform movement provoked elite resistance and a rapid increase in elite factionalism. The fall of the monarchy in 1799 was caused by a prolonged financial crisis, the loss of political support within the ruling elites, and military disaster. The republican experiment collapsed into civil war, while the counterrevolution "exacerbated older conflicts," further alienating both the masses and the landowners from the old regime (p. 121).

The Napoleonic regime brought even greater upheaval with the abolition of feudalism, a new system of central and local government, new law codes and schools, and military conscription. But while the scale of these sweeping changes is undeniable, their impact was often contradictory. As Davis comments, the most important promise of the Napoleonic Empire was "order," "but disorder was its most constant companion in southern Italy" (p. 209). Administrative centralization did not so much increase state power as allow elites and interest groups in the provinces to carve out new positions for themselves. The new bureaucratic structures were too thin on the ground to work effectively. By the Restoration (after 1815), the political innovations of the preceding decades "had left southern Italy caught uneasily between an older agrarian order that had been seriously destabilized and newer forms of bureaucratic power that were in large part still to be created" (p. 319).

So we are still left, in the end, with the South as failure. Yet such a pessimistic conclusion should not detract from the importance of this book. With it, Davis has recast the Southern Question as a story of change: a story of conflict over change and the drastic consequences of change. The old, backward South, timeless and passive in the face of its more dynamic neighbors, is nowhere to be seen in these pages, and the origins of what Davis terms the "Southern Problem" are located firmly a century later, with the agrarian crisis of the

1880s. Thus, Davis has laid out the contours of a new approach to, and interpretation of, the history of southern Italy. In so doing, he has set a benchmark for research on Naples, Napoleon, the Age of Revolutions, and the Southern Question for future generations of scholars to meet.

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STEVEN C. HUGHES. *Politics of the Sword: Dueling, Honor, and Masculinity*. (History of Crime and Criminal Justice.) Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 2007. Pp. xv, 360. Cloth \$64.95, DVD \$9.95.

Only recently has the Italian post-Unification period attracted sustained interest in the English-speaking world. Steven C. Hughes's book provides a valuable contribution to our understanding of the specifically Italian path to modernity and, like other recent studies, stresses the importance of such key concepts as "invented tradition," "imagined community," "gender," and "identity." Hughes therefore brings to Italian studies not only an underanalyzed period of Italian history (the years between 1860 and 1920) but a methodology that has long been familiar to French or German studies (see, for example, Robert Nye's *Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France* [1993] and Ute Frevert's *Men of Honor: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel* [1995]). This methodology may be described as a confluence of historical and cultural studies, sensitive to the constructed nature of historical gendered subjects, to their power relations, and to those discourses of knowledge that describe and sustain such relations. This is an approach that owes much to Michel Foucault's work. Foucault insisted on the investigation of what he called "submerged knowledges," by which he meant not only the discourses that had been elided by "national histories"—the voices of workers and peasants, and the insane, criminal, and sexually aberrant elements of society—but also those discourses that seemingly appear as peripheral to the making of the nation-state.

This book concerns the construction of a normative, "honorable" masculinity, a masculinity considered appropriate for the ruling elite after the creation of the Italian nation-state in 1861. Hughes focuses on what could be considered a quirky "side issue" of Italian history, one that indeed affected only a small minority in the project of "making Italians": the duel. Nevertheless, the duel—so Hughes convincingly argues—"figured prominently in the construction of men's social and political identities during much of Italy's modern history" (p. 315). Using the duel as his analytic lens, Hughes describes the construction of the Italian ruling class, one that saw itself as embedded in a code of chivalry deriving from a long Italian tradition of masculine honor. This code was understood as personal and in conflict with more modern notions of the state, insofar as the latter is conceived as the representative of more

general interests. The real merit of Hughes's analysis is that he aligns the duel to Italian liberalism, whereby the new national elites learned "how to handle their new freedoms" by using the duel as "a means of both setting limits on behavior and legitimizing their own status in society" (p. 329). Hughes insists that even if the duel was an Italian invention from the Renaissance, its return as a normative practice among the ruling elite constituted not an appeal to traditionalism but a factor in the construction of a modern ruling class. Dueling was a crucial element by which upper-class men transformed themselves into the rulers of modern Italy. This construction was grounded in the idea of "honor": the duel provided two critical components for the construction of a modern ruling class: a technique for personal combat and a corpus of knowledge, one associated with juridical-ethical discourses, the latter associated with a modern and revamped code of chivalry. The duel "aided in the creation, legitimization, and empowerment of a new elite that self-consciously set itself apart from the rest of society by using exclusive chivalric concepts of honor and its defense" (p. 112). Dueling was crucial not only for the creation of Italy but also of Italians—or at least of those Italians destined to rule the new nation.

Dueling and its grounding in the honor code allowed for the consolidation of Italy's ruling class as embodied in "honorable masculinity." Hughes takes us through the history of nineteenth and early twentieth-century dueling practices, manuals, and codes and demonstrates how, despite its formal illegality, it provided both an alternative mechanism to the resolution of political conflicts and a class identity that separated itself from the honor code of the working and peasant classes. He convincingly demonstrates the connection between the ideology of chivalry, Italian liberalism, and the latter's particular penchant for "transformism"—the personalization of politics instead of the creation of stable political parties.

The symbol for upper-class dueling was the sword; for the lower classes it was the pocketknife. Particularly interesting is Hughes's chapter on the role of dueling under fascism. He demonstrates that dueling played an important role in Benito Mussolini's violent rise to power, since fascism was able to exploit the duel's semi-legal status. Once in power, however, Mussolini had to suppress the duel and convert individual violence into mass violence. Significantly, so Hughes argues, the saber was replaced by the working-class knife.

This work provides a valuable addition to our knowledge of post-Unification Italy and to its construction of Italian masculinity. It will be required reading for all students of Italian modernity. My single reservation concerns Hughes's analysis of honor—a notoriously difficult concept in the modern Italian landscape. How is this honor different from but also reliant on the honor of peasants and the urban working classes? How is it different from yet similar to feminine honor? How does masculine honor place itself vis-à-vis sexual chastity, which was after all an important component of the self-

control so wonderfully traced by Hughes? And finally, if honor is something that in the modern era must be *acquired*, what then constitutes its specific economy?

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JOHN GOOCH. *Mussolini and His Generals: The Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922–1940*. (Cambridge Military Histories.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Pp. x, 651. \$35.00.

In this study John Gooch seeks “to marry two hitherto largely separate approaches to the history of Fascist Italy [military and diplomatic history] in order to see how they fit—or do not fit—together and to explain why things happened as they did and produced the outcomes they did” (p. 2). The result is a detailed account of the doctrinal and organizational development of the Italian armed forces under Fascism and a superficial analysis of foreign policy. Gooch has divided his book into eight chapters, each covering a specific period, from chapter one (“The Beginning of the Fascist Era, 1922–1925”), which deals with Benito Mussolini’s early, and quite negligible, impact on the structure and doctrines of Italy’s armed services, to the slide to war following the conclusion of the Pact of Steel between Italy and Germany in May 1938 (chapters seven and eight). Each chapter has topical sections that deal with foreign policy and the plans, organization, and doctrines of Italy’s armed forces. Gooch is largely unsuccessful in his attempts to integrate foreign and military policy, but his summaries of two decades of complex discussions between Mussolini and his service chiefs are fascinating. However it is sometimes difficult to connect the dots because analysis is minimal, tables and maps are few, and the combination of a chronological organization for chapters and a topical one for subchapters creates a repetitious and disjointed narrative. But these are minor problems in such an ambitious work. More serious is the bias that runs through Gooch’s work, because it affects his reading of the hundreds of documents and secondary sources he has consulted.

According to Gooch, while “Anglo-Saxon historians, led by Denis Mack Smith and Donald [C.] Watt,” believe that Fascist foreign policy was “a gigantic bluff carried out by a blustering and incompetent poseur” prone to violence and “bereft of any principle save the acquisition and maintenance of power,” others, including “Renzo De Felice, Mussolini’s foremost Italian biographer,” view the Fascist leader as “an industrious and politically adroit realist who sought for as long as possible to ‘balance’ between the rising power of Nazi Germany . . . and the extant power of Great Britain.” Gooch notes similar differences of opinion regarding the armed forces, with some arguing that Mussolini backed his “imperialist ambitions not with force, but with propaganda and bluff” and others that “a shortage of resources” was “chiefly responsible for the military inadequacies of Fascism” (pp. 1–2).

Gooch claims to be nonpartisan, but he views Mack

Smith and Giorgio Rochat as the “doyens” of English and Italian history, he frequently cites proponents of the “Anglo-Saxon” school but gives short shrift to De Felice and his “pupils,” and he believes that if “politically competent and certainly not a fool,” Mussolini was also “single-minded and brutal,” displaying a “rationality” that resembled that of Joseph Stalin, not that of “a Chamberlain or an Eden” (pp. 1–3). Nor is his judgment surprising. Like MacGregor Knox, who attributes Italy’s “less than dazzling performance” in the world wars to “institutionalized military incompetence,” Gooch has argued elsewhere that Italy displayed “common patterns of [military] inadequacy which can be discerned in both the liberal and the fascist state” (“Italian Military Incompetence,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 5: 2 [1982]: 258–265, here p. 264). This work, which views Italians through a British lens, simply confirms his earlier assumptions. Dino Grandi, Gooch muses, “subconsciously—or consciously” sought “to usurp England’s role in shaping the European balance of power” (p. 131); he appears to believe that “the Italian soldier was not the equal of his German counterpart” (p. 449); and he discounts both Germany’s rush to war and Italy’s futile efforts to brake its impatient ally (pp. 451–518).

Those who do not agree with Gooch (and I am one of them) will find reasons not to be persuaded by his arguments, from his failure to discuss secondary works that have drawn different conclusions from the same sources that he has consulted to his tendency to impute and assume intentions and reactions (see pp. 5, 8, 22–23, 99, 123–126, 199, 387); his failure to distinguish public rhetoric from private beliefs and actual policies (pp. 161–164, 180–187); his tendency to dwell on Italian failures and downplay their successes; and his rhetoric, e.g., referring to Italian concerns over Malta and Alexandria as “paranoid suspicions” (p. 387) and an Italian ambassador as “a typical Fascist diplomat who regarded his hosts with a combination of paranoiac suspicion and ideological hubris” (p. 196).

They will also note an incongruity between his evidence and his conclusions. While Gooch rejects the argument that “a shortage of resources” crippled the Italian armed forces in favor of interpretations that argue the Fascist regime spent its money “on the wrong things,” he presents an Italy hamstrung by shortages of raw materials and hard currency and concludes that the “relative weakness of the [Italian] air force was in part a reflection of the industrial weakness of Italy” (pp. 3, 166–167). Similarly, Gooch believes that an Italian-German alliance was inevitable, owing to the ideological similarities of the two regimes, Mussolini’s fascination with Adolf Hitler, and their partnership in Spain (pp. 191, 318, 451), but his discussion suggests that not until after 1935 did Mussolini and his military advisers assume that England would be an enemy and Germany an ally, that Italy and Germany competed in Southeastern Europe, and that Italy sought to “hermetically seal” its border with Germany after concluding a military alliance with Berlin (pp. 189, 391).

There is much that is debatable in Gooch, including his suggestion that “the best answer” regarding “which factors” influenced Mussolini probably “lies somewhere in the [historiographic] middle ground” (p. 385). His interpretation will certainly appeal to those who already agree with the “Anglo-Saxon” view of the Fascist regime; for those who do not, it is a useful reference work to complement studies by De Felice and his pupils, among others.

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NANCY M. WINGFIELD. *Flag Wars and Stone Saints: How the Bohemian Lands Became Czech*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2007. Pp. xviii, 353. \$49.95.

This fascinating look at the wealth of cultural manifestations that helped to make the Bohemian lands Czech should be read by more than the usual suspects—that is, historians of the Habsburg Empire and what used to be called Eastern Europe. In particular, those interested in the development of German national identity as well as cultural historians would likely profit from an acquaintance with Nancy M. Wingfield’s work. The former should for reasons given by the author: “What many historians have treated as two separate phenomenon—the construction of the Czech and German nations—is analyzed in this study as a larger single phenomenon because Czech and German nationalism worked off one another, responded to one another, and borrowed from one another” (p. 2). This interplay is amply demonstrated in the book, which covers the years 1880 through the communist period (with the conclusion containing a few words dealing with the post-1989 era), although it focuses above all on the Habsburg era and interwar period (at four chapters apiece). Cultural historians may appreciate how numerous aspects of culture were put to work for—or deemed nationally relevant by—the German and Czech (or Czechoslovak) nations. The flags and monuments of the title are but the tip of the cultural iceberg: commemorations, celebrations, and demonstrations; dress and adornment; architecture, music, and even film all are shown to have repercussions for the process of national differentiation.

The titular “Bohemian Lands” are defined to include the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Margravate of Moravia, and the tiny Austrian part of the Duchy of Silesia. Nonetheless, greatest attention is given to Bohemia proper; coverage of Moravia features its capital Brunn/Brno, “the largest predominantly German-speaking city in the Bohemian Lands,” where Czechs agitated for a second Czech university (the subject of chapter three). Silesia—given its different national makeup—hardly figures in this story, which privileges the relationship between Czechs and Germans, although it notes the way Jews were often subsumed under the latter category—at least, by Czech nationalists. (How Germans felt about this inclusion is less clear.)

While Wingfield acknowledges the original fluidity and multiplicity of identities in the Bohemian Lands, she focuses on the ways that nationally conscious Germans and Czechs increasingly saw themselves as distinct nations challenging for hegemony over the same territory. She demonstrates, for example, how the (historically nonnational) Habsburg emperor Joseph II at around the time of his centennial in 1880 was transformed into the symbol of German nationalism. A proliferation of mass-produced monuments in his honor served as German rallying points and Czech objects of attack (discussed in chapter one and elsewhere in the book).

One is struck by the violence of Czech and German clashes over cultural issues throughout the period of Czech-German coexistence. Not only were monuments attacked; deaths occurred and martyrs were made on both sides. Chapter two details the extensive (if not yet deadly) violence—in Vienna as well as the Bohemian Lands—that resulted from the proposed elevation of the Czech language within Bohemia; Germans in the empire and even Wilhelmine Germany protested the ordinances put forth by the Polish Count Kasimir Felix Badeni that would have compelled imperial civil servants to function in Czech as well as German. To what extent Badeni’s attackers (particularly those from Wilhelmine Germany, such as Theodor Mommsen) were motivated by the perceived Polishness of this highly placed imperial civil servant remains unclear, although the author does provide some tantalizing evidence. (The only weakness of this lavishly illustrated and competently edited book appears to be several typographical errors in the spelling of Polish toponyms as well as a mistranslation of the title of the Slovak national anthem.)

In the interwar period, decennial celebrations of the Emperor Franz Joseph I (chapter four) gave way to a new pantheon of heroes and holidays as well as vigilante justice meted out to statues of Joseph II by Czech Legionnaires (all elaborated in chapters five and six). Wingfield argues that “the central government . . . attempted to enforce an aural and visual landscape that complemented the Czech (-oslovak) identity of the new republic,” and that it essentially dissuaded Germans and others (for example, those sensitive to its anticlerical stance) from participation (p. 141). Her treatment of the aural landscape, whether reflected in the public singing of songs or in films (protests against German-language “talkies” are covered in chapter seven), is particularly fine, as is her depiction of the topography of protests (with the help of several excellent maps). Ultimately, Wingfield shows how only in the aftermath of World War II were signs of German culture obliterated. The Bohemian Lands had become Czech—only to become communist soon afterward (the subject of chapter nine).

All told, this is a well-researched, highly nuanced treatment of nationally inflected cultural manifesta-

tions, one that sheds light on German as well as Czech nationalism.

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NICK MILLER. *The Nonconformists: Culture, Politics, and Nationalism in a Serbian Intellectual Circle, 1944–1991*. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press. 2007. Pp. xvi, 380. \$44.95.

Over the last five years, in articles and reviews, Nick Miller has been pushing historians and other scholars to ask the question: can Serbian intellectuals be held accountable for “the creation of one of the most intolerant and narcissistic national movements that I know of” (p. xiv)? While not answering this question for all Serbian intellectuals, Miller lays out the case for three influential Serbian literary and cultural figures: a novelist, Dobrica Ćosić; a painter, Mića Popović; and a literary critic and playwright, Borislav Mihajlović Mihiz. Each traveled a different path to Serbian nationalism. Ćosić was certainly more central than the others in the creative processes associated with Serbia’s “descent into obtuse and exclusivistic nationalism.” However, Miller argues that Popović and Mihiz led Ćosić to “his final destination, as a revivalist and a nationalist” (p. 348). In Miller’s capable hands, the four-decade cultural and intellectual journey they took to nationalism is understandable and explainable, and their embrace of Slobodan Milošević was a predictable outcome of “their perceptions of the nature and the needs of the Serbian nation” (p. 359). Miller concludes that not only was their support for Milošević logical and expected, in fact, it was their cultural production and intellectual leadership that prepared the groundwork.

Miller details the intellectual and cultural debates and dilemmas of postwar Yugoslavs as experienced by Mihiz, Popović, and Ćosić. He is at his best when analyzing the source material available to him: the writings of his subjects and their contemporaries, the paintings of Popović, and the nonconformists’ political and cultural vicissitudes. His early chapters introduce Mihiz and Popović as men who, by arguing for free creative expression, rejected the wholesale adoption of socialist realist forms and institutional/administrative pronouncements requiring an engaged art and literature, but who were also willing to give communism a chance. Ćosić was an insider and loyal Communist Party member, who committed himself to the Titoist communist ideal (p. 84), especially to the hope that a new Yugoslav socialist identity would trump national ones (p. 97). By the late 1960s they all were wrestling with the failure or limits of Titoism.

Ćosić grew disillusioned when his vociferous defense of a new blended socialist culture fell victim to what he believed to be the nationalism of others, and later when Serbia’s leading communist, Aleksandar Ranković, was removed from the office of vice-president of Yugoslavia in 1966. Mihiz, in his second career as a playwright, used stories from Serbian folk traditions in his plays to

critique the lack of freedom in communist Yugoslavia and the extreme nationalism of others (p. 143). Popović turned to depicting the effects of communism on the everyday lives of Yugoslavs through his “Scenes Paintings.” Featuring a guest worker named Gvozden, Popović believed these paintings to be “true socialist realism” because Gvozden “stood as a universal symbol of alienation in the modern world” (p. 163). Only in the late 1970s did Gvozden become distinctly Serbian.

Like another astute observer of Serbian intellectuals and nationalism, Jasna Dragović-Soso, Miller sees the reasons behind the transformations and choices of Ćosić, Popović, and Mihiz as contingent and structural. The structural causes were rooted in the evolution of the Yugoslav federal system toward a more decentralized system in the 1970s and the contingent ones based on the emergence of an autonomous Kosovo and Albanian desire for cultural autonomy. To many, the psychological effect of this devolution and loss of status among Kosovar Serbs was unclear. However, Miller points out that Ćosić, who had already explored the spiritual ramifications of a “fragmented” Serbia in his novels, saw in the decisions of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia an attempt to keep Serbs spatially fragmented.

Miller focuses the last third of his book on the nonconformists’ transformation from principled “free-thinkers” and advocates of free expression to enablers of the Serbs’ “cathartic embrace of Kosovo as a reflection of all of the ills faced by Serbia” (p. 277). Eventually their creative processes led to a new articulation of Serbianness—one that emphasized the negative effect of Yugoslavism and Titoism on Serbs, the Serbophobia of their neighbors, Serbian culpability in their own victimization, and the need for a Serbian renaissance (p. 309). To speak of such things, Miller argues, was simply an exercise in the freedom of thought. He states, “Kosovo turns into just another occasion for the defense of freedom of expression. . . . Speech repressed became, by definition, good speech” (p. 267). With this logic, the vitriolic and poisonous 1986 memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts comes as no surprise.

Miller situates his work within the “ethnosymbolic” approach on nationalism and rejects the notion that Serbs were captive to their history or duped by state agents. He concludes that these intellectuals revived Serbian symbols and myths as a way to create a Serbian identity beyond Titoism, and that Ćosić’s vision of national regeneration drew support from Serbian intellectuals and the masses alike. Missing from this discussion is John Hutchinson’s work on cultural nationalism and moral regeneration. Hutchinson’s work would support Miller’s contention that Serbian intellectuals, especially Ćosić, were responsible for creating in the public imagination a Serbianness that allowed Serbs to rally around anyone who promised to stand up for Serbs. However, Miller provides no evidence for why or how Ćosić’s vision, influenced by others, took hold among Serbs.

While not answering all of the questions he raises, Miller demonstrates that the cultural lives and works of these nonconformists resulted in an articulation of what it meant to be Serbian, an identity clearly "rooted in and growing out of their [Serbian] twentieth-century experiences" (p. 359). With this statement, Miller is telling his readers that with a different set of structures, contingencies, and cultural actors Serbs can forge a new identity to meet the challenges of the world in the twenty-first century.

MELISSA BOKOVOY
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IOANNIS D. STEFANIDIS. *Stirring the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945–1967*. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2007. Pp. xiv, 300. \$99.95.

This richly documented and courageous study positions itself primarily in the field of modern Greek history but also offers insight on the history of American empire and the mechanisms of national chauvinism. The title and the preface are refreshingly explicit about the book's focus and two central arguments, each of which challenges accepted orthodoxy. Ioannis D. Stefanidis argues, first, that Greek political culture remained heavily shaped by irredentism long beyond the Asia Minor catastrophe of the 1920s (when consensus reports that irredentism died); and, second, that Greek anti-Americanism has roots that extend earlier than the colonels' junta of 1967 (when consensus reports it was born).

At the heart of the book is a close study of the interplay between wider geopolitics—in particular, the impact of the global decolonization movement—and public debate within Greece between 1950 and 1964. After an introduction that summarizes key views on Greek political culture from anthropology and political science—defining political culture as "a constructed set of core values, beliefs and attitudes . . . shared by a decisive majority of citizens" (p. 2)—chapter one offers a historical overview of key concepts in Greek formulations of identity, including the influence of the classical legacy, religious Orthodoxy, and Social Darwinism. Chapter two discusses how such concepts informed the practice of post-World War II organizations—many comprised of self-styled exiles or refugees—that renewed Greek claims to territory in Albania and Macedonia. The remaining substantive chapters of the book then trace the evolution and development of the movement for *enosis* (the incorporation of Cyprus) within Greece. Rather than getting drawn into a detailed narrative of events on the island, Stefanidis focuses on the representation and debate of the issues by Greek scholars, politicians, newspaper editors, and the public, who initially drew primarily on existing narrative frames of martyrdom and historical exceptionalism. From the mid-1950s, he argues, Greek public opinion was further shaped by the influence of anticolonialist rhetoric and the experience of U.S. intervention in the region, fu-

eling an anti-Americanism that is apparent in populist writing and images of the time. Chapter nine discusses the longer social life of stereotypes in Greece, and an appendix-like chapter ten presents tabular material from U.S. Information Agency surveys in Greece.

Stefanidis's work is welcome evidence of the vitality of critical scholarship in Greece. This book mobilizes an impressive range of British, American, and (mainly) Greek archival material, including surveys, official reports, and media coverage, to diagnose the pathologies of *ethnikophrosyni*, or "loyalty to the nation." His language is blunt and forthright in asserting the enduring power of conservative-traditionalist elements in Greek public opinion. He presents pompous headlines declaring Greece's entitlement to Cyprus, racist cartoons demeaning ex-colonial UN members, and self-righteous denunciations of great-power hypocrisy as symptoms of a public discourse locked in nineteenth-century modes of "small nation" nationalism. In a provocative preface and conclusion, he points to contemporary Greek recalcitrance over Macedonia, in particular, as the latest in a series of "fits of self-delusion" (p. 278) in which Greek political leaders become "hostages to their own maximalist rhetoric" (p. xi).

Notwithstanding the book's focus on international relations and political arbitrage, the description has a thick, ethnographic feel to it, further enhanced by adroit usage of visual materials. As a result, a reader can identify as decisive turning points seemingly banal or quotidian details of U.S. intervention in Greece. Citizens resented what they saw as U.S. attempts to buy them off with financial assistance: as one of Stefanidis's Greek newspaper sources put it, sometimes people want self-determination, not vegetable markets (p. 202). Diplomatic memos that equated Turkish and Greek interests in Cyprus, road accidents involving U.S. military personnel, or an ambassador's attempt at "straight talk" that drew attention to the plight of Greece's own national and religious minorities all further fueled the Greek public's perception of the "Ugly American" as immortalized in William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick's best-selling 1958 book, and referenced by the incoming U.S. ambassador to Greece, seeking to put relations on a better footing, in 1962 (p. 221).

Between the surveys in which Greeks saw Americans as "simple or naïve" to the recurring Greek experience of would-be great-power "saviors" backsliding, Stefanidis provides important insight for scholars of post-World War II history seeking either to trace the connections between anti-Americanism and national or religious consciousness or to analyze critically the patterns of U.S. tone-deafness in policymaking. At the same time, the book also invites further research on comparative national mythmaking. From the materials assembled here, Thermopylae emerges as template for the Serbian myth of Kosovo and Alexander's march as prototype of Adolf Hitler's "Drang nach Osten," reminding us of the multiple iconicities and refractions of what might easily be read as Greek exceptionalism. This

is, in short, a stimulating and exemplary work that combines thematic significance, empirical richness, and political engagement.

KEITH BROWN
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SERGEY A. IVANOV. *Holy Fools in Byzantium and Beyond*. Translated by SIMON FRANKLIN. (Oxford Studies in Byzantium.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. xi, 479. \$99.00.

Sergey A. Ivanov's learned book presents a very peculiar kind of holy man (and a few exceptional holy women) whose lifestyle seems to invert and question social norms: the holy fool who lives in a town or city and acts in unpredictable, provocative, sometimes even violent ways in order to disguise his true character as a deeply pious and repentant sinner. The extreme humility displayed in his paradoxical behavior leaves observers in a state of uncertainty about the potential of the divine to reveal itself in this world. This type of holy man enjoyed great popularity in Orthodox Christianity, first in Byzantium and later in Russia—all the way to the present day.

In a book of impressive scope and erudition, Ivanov presents detailed documentation about the tradition of holy foolery in Orthodox Christianity, an immense achievement that alone earns the book a place in every college and university library. There is even a short epilogue about similar practices in the medieval West, in Judaism, and in Islam. Ivanov has studied texts and manuscripts in Byzantine Greek, Old Church Slavonic, and Russian and traced the cult of individual holy fools through the ages. To document holy foolery at the time of its greatest popularity in seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth-century Russia, he consulted court records and the accounts of foreign travelers.

A work of such breadth and length does not leave much space for the sketching in of historical context or the proper introduction of individual authors, which the reader is expected to supply on her own. As a result, one wishes for more explicit and thorough analysis of the way in which holy fools operated in different societies and different periods of time, giving specificity to their actions and purposes. What is presented is a master narrative, largely based on hagiographical texts, of an evolution that traces the provocative behavior of these liminal figures from antiquity to nineteenth-century Russia, with a long interlude in Byzantium.

The antecedents for the Christian holy fool are the Old Testament prophets, the Cynic philosophers, and the apostle Paul's encouragement to become "fools for Christ's sake" (cf. 1 Corinthians 1:20). The technical term in Greek for a holy fool, *salos*, appeared for the first time in the early fifth century to describe individuals who, in order to hide their sanctity, sought self-abasement, assumed menial tasks within a monastic community, or endured the punishment for false accusations of rape but were eventually found to be "secret servants" of God.

The stories of Symeon the Fool and of Andrew the Fool form the core of the book. Symeon lived in the Syrian city of Emesa in the mid-sixth century and became the subject of a *vita* about a century later. Symeon's behavior was outrageous, provocative, and miraculous all at once. He walked around the city pulling a dead dog behind him, beat people without provocation, surprised women in the bathhouse without experiencing any bodily stirrings, and threw nuts during a church service. All of this was done to disguise the fact that, under that off-putting façade, there hid a true holy man capable of healing the possessed and foretelling the future. A similar tale was told in the tenth century about Andrew the Fool, who was purported to have lived in fifth-century Constantinople. Ivanov suggests that times of relative social and political stability especially encouraged the subversive presence of a *salos* or the production of a *vita* to promote his cult.

The translations of the hagiographies of Symeon and Andrew into Russian, expertly traced by Ivanov, were instrumental in bringing this kind of saintly conduct, known as *iurodstvo*, to the Slavic world. This phenomenon occupies the second half of the book, where holy fools appear in interaction with tsars and nobles, as members of monastic communities, and as naked, long-haired ascetics who walk village roads and city streets, beg for alms, and mutter prophesies. Their popularity in the eighteenth and nineteenth century was such that it inspired many of the great Russian novelists.

Ivanov is insistent that holy foolery is, in its essence, not intended to challenge existing power structures or the established social order, although it was often prohibited by church and state authorities alike. The conduct of mendicant friars and especially of Francis of Assisi thus does not qualify as holy foolery, precisely because it led to the creation of a new monastic order. Instead, the challenge posed by holy fools is directed to the individual observer who is left with the troubling inability to discern sanctity in disguise and the simultaneous reassurance of the presence of the divine in unexpected places.

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SUSAN K. MORRISSEY. *Suicide and the Body Politic in Imperial Russia*. (Cambridge Social and Cultural Histories.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pp. xv, 384. \$99.00.

The goal of this erudite book is "to rethink the grand narrative" of suicide by way of a case study of Russia from the seventeenth century until 1914 (p. 5). Recent historiography has concentrated on the secularization of suicide in the modern period or the positivist triumph of science and medicine over religious thought. For Susan K. Morrissey, the practice of suicide, which implicitly constituted a "defiant" act against the political order, and its regulation are just as important as the diverse cultural meanings attached to it. She warns her

reader against the medical trivialization of suicide as the product of an abnormal mind and reminds us that self-murder can be simultaneously profane and sacred, in spite of various cultures' insisting on the separation of suicide and martyrdom. Her holistic approach goes beyond other studies of suicide in the modern era and, in the case of Russia, Irina Paperno's narrower but powerful analysis, *Suicide as a Cultural Institution in Dostoevsky's Russia* (1997). By putting religion and moral notions back into the discussion of modern suicide, Morrissey illuminates a more complicated world wherein a potentially immoral and diseased population had to be guided and treated by various governmental, religious, and scientific regulations and responses, and where theological ideas co-mingled with those of medicine, sociology, and statistics. In so doing, she pinpoints the political dimensions of self-murder, beginning with the Russian Old Believers' self-immolation at the end of the seventeenth century rather than revolutionaries' martyrdom in the early twentieth century. Morrissey's interdisciplinary and inclusionary approaches stress continuity rather than radical progressions from one type of suicide model to another, as older understandings of suicide constantly adapted to new cultural contexts.

Through a plethora of primary published and archival sources, Morrissey identifies differing types of self-murder, including suicide of honor, sentimental suicide, suicide of boredom (which was exacerbated in autocratic Russia), political suicide as an explicit form of protest against tyranny or an expression of individual dignity, revolutionary suicide, epidemic suicide, and finally prison suicide. Self-murder could be public performance, an infectious disease, or an act of immorality in both the Muscovite and imperial periods, a curse that by the mid-nineteenth century represented educated Russians' uncertainty about having adopted Western sensibilities and culture. In other words, multiple meanings of suicide overlapped and contradicted each other.

At the same time, changes in suicide did occur, as exemplified by regulation. According to Morrissey, the codification of Russia's laws in 1835 and promulgation of the 1845 Criminal Code resulted in the further criminal regulation and legal prosecution of suicide. However, that peak in regulation and prosecution was quickly tempered by the slow decriminalization of suicide as a result of the 1845 code's greater leniency toward suicide as an offense that jurists and officials no longer equated with murder. Although decriminalization did not triumph until after 1917, courts became more reluctant to find suicides and attempted suicides guilty. Here Morrissey is better at charting the changes than in explaining why those changes came about. The reader has to wait for later chapters to see the ways in which rising notions of sensibility, medical professionalization, state paternalism, and statistical representations eventually softened attitudes toward suicide. The Orthodox Church's growing reluctance in the early nineteenth century to impose institutional penances of incarceration and reformatory education in monaster-

ies does not figure in the discussion as a reason for the change of heart. Morrissey mentions penances for attempted suicide but seems unaware that the church was unable to enforce institutional penance. If a penitent did not appear at a monastery, the church had little recourse. Contrary to the distinction the author makes between state-mandated corporal punishments and spiritual remedies for attempted suicides prior to 1845, church penances actually fused physical hardships (fasting, full body prostrations, and sometimes hard labor) with prayer; thus, the contradiction the author sees between corporal punishment and spiritual remedies also characterized the penance regiment itself.

Both the strengths and weaknesses of this complex book lie in its exploration of the multiple meanings of suicide and the re-examination of all modern Russian history through the lens of suicide. Morrissey is at her best in providing vignettes and teasing out individual meanings from her dizzying array of examples. She is masterful, for example, at deconstructing the rare suicide note or in demonstrating how medical science's influence over the judiciary had resulted in an abused peasant woman's suicide being interpreted as a product of her unstable mind rather than the physical violence to which she had been subjected. The author's depictions of revolution as fusing political and religious elements and post-1905 schools as sites of epidemic suicides are superb. However, Morrissey is less successful in fleshing out the larger arguments that are crucial for the creation of a new master narrative.

CHRISTINE D. WOROBEC
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IGAL HALFIN. *Intimate Enemies: Demonizing the Bolshevik Opposition, 1918–1928*. (Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 2007. Pp. 416. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$27.95.

This is Igal Halfin's third analysis of Bolshevik discourse, following *From Darkness to Light: Class, Consciousness, and Salvation in Revolutionary Russia* (1999) and *Terror in My Soul: Communist Autobiographies on Trial* (2003). All three books are part of a growing body of scholarship that reasserts the centrality of ideology, in particular of what it meant to "speak Bolshevik," to our understanding of Soviet history. Like the author's previous book, this work strives to identify the scope and development of what Halfin, in adapting Foucault, calls the "hermeneutics of the soul," the process by which party members attempted to glean one another's state of consciousness and, ultimately, their true understanding of and underlying loyalty to the revolutionary cause. Halfin boldly asserts that previous accounts of the intraparty conflicts of the 1920s have failed to take seriously the intricate language battles that occurred and have mistakenly ascribed the course of events to (primarily cynical) personal antagonisms. He aims to transcend what he sees as "the reductive understanding

of language widespread in current scholarship" (p. 28), although for the most part he does not name names.

Halfin is a skilled and determined analyst of linguistic usage, and the best parts of this book provide ample insight into how party members said what they said, how critical terminology such as "Democratic Centralism," "factionalism," and, of course, "opposition" were deployed and altered over the course of the decade. At the end of the Russian Civil War, "opposition" was utilized to describe not a quality of character, or even a particular way of thinking, but specific, situational disagreements. Even when V. I. Lenin or other leading Bolsheviks upbraided members of the Workers' Opposition, the implication was usually that these were comrades who had strayed from the correct path, not traitors amid the vanguard of the proletariat. Gradually, as internecine debate became more serious, the tone shifted, and by the time of the struggle with the United Opposition in late 1927, oppositionists were dangerous, deviant, and, eventually, no different than counterrevolutionaries. Halfin explores in great detail the progression of language that made this possible, both at the highest levels of leadership and in two case studies, at the Communist University in Leningrad and the party cell of the Tomsk Technical Institute. The book makes prolific use of both published stenographic records and archival sources, although it would be helpful to have more detail in the footnotes concerning the archival documents used.

While Halfin's accounts of these disputes are very thorough, at times the book hews a bit closely to the stenographic records that constitute its main sources. In particular, the retelling of the battles over Trotskyism and Zinovievism in chapter four involves a painstakingly thorough blow-by-blow account. And while Halfin's fundamental point that historians have too often dismissed Bolshevik discourse as a cynical ruse is well taken, it does not therefore necessarily follow that we cannot surmise that oppositionists did, at times, under interrogation, use language for their own ends—even while maintaining strong convictions within the framework of Bolshevik discourse. Indeed, Halfin himself subsequently attempts to read the "omissions, distortions, and insinuations" (p. 304) in the language in order to get more fully at intention (and therefore the subject himself or herself). Moreover, as the author notes, the questions of how and when former oppositionists were insincere in their recantations were the subject of considerable explicit attention on the part of the majoritarian "hermeneuts."

More generally, treating discourse on opposition within the Communist Party in isolation from events, and from other avenues of Bolshevik discourse, suggests that these linguistic games took place in an already mostly closed system of signs and signifiers. One needs to step back only slightly to note, for example, that much of the language used to classify oppositionists in the late 1920s (their incorrigibility, their deviousness) was quite similar to that which had been used in attacks against Mensheviks and Socialist Revolution-

aries in the early 1920s. (Which is, of course, why the charge of "Menshevism," invoked already by Zinoviev in 1923, had such resonance.) The abundance of religious and medical metaphors within the disputes also demonstrates the continued influence of "external" discourse: that is to say, Bolshevik discourse was not as hermetically sealed as it is sometimes made to appear here.

The book contains a few more editorial errors than a scholarly work of this magnitude should. Some are minor—the White émigrés are referred to as "immigrants" (p. 18)—while others are a bit more problematic—the notorious founder of the secret police Feliks Dzerzhinskii is identified as "Jan Dzerzhinskii" (p. 109). For a work of this complexity, one might also have hoped for a more systematic, inclusive index.

In short, Halfin's study is a highly ambitious, extensively researched, theoretically sophisticated work that does not fully deliver on its promises. Experts in the field will, however, find the descriptions and analysis of Bolshevik discourse on the opposition intriguing and provocative.

STUART FINKEL
University of Florida

SIMON PIRANI. *The Russian Revolution in Retreat, 1920–24: Soviet Workers and the New Communist Elite*. (BAS-EES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, number 45.) New York: Routledge. 2008. Pp. xiv, 289. \$160.00.

This volume examines the relationship between Moscow workers (rather than Soviet workers, as the title suggests) and Communist Party activists and elites during the transition from the Russian Civil War to the New Economic Policy (NEP) era. In this regard, it complements and supplements recent studies of the period such as those of Diane Koenker, Jonathan Aves, and Kevin Murphy. Simon Pirani approaches his topic from a basically Marxist perspective and utilizes as criteria the concepts of participatory democracy and the historical role (in the Marxist sense) that workers seemed to have achieved during the 1917 revolutions. Those who fear that this approach will be too delimiting and open to bias can be reassured. Pirani skillfully navigates the straits of conflicting political convictions as he wields his above-mentioned dual criteria to reveal quite mercilessly how Communist Party leaders and elites imposed hierarchical, bureaucratic, and repressive structures on the workers and the soviets. Even those who do not share the author's enthusiasm for what October 1917 seemed to portend will hardly be disappointed in this incisively sketched portrait of the utter betrayal of 1917's promise (the preceding phrase models the author's critiques).

The first two chapters outline, respectively, the harsh realities of working-class existence as the civil war came to a close and the high expectations of a new wave of party members who had served in the war and returned to the cities at the close of the conflict. The third chap-

ter evaluates whether or not the wave of strikes, peasant disturbances, and the Kronshtadt Rebellion constituted a revolutionary situation and concludes that, as serious as all these phenomena were, they did not. The following three chapters, at the heart of the study chronologically and conceptually, examine a situation in which workers and new party cadres maneuvered for political gains against the backdrop of gradually improving material conditions and a hardening of the Communist Party leadership's political stance. The Tenth Party Congress suppressed the Democratic Centralists and Workers' Opposition, groups that had pushed the ideas of genuinely participatory soviets and new power for workers through their unions. Even after the Tenth Party Congress, less well-known formations within the party such as Workers' Truth and the Workers' Group arose with similar orientations and also were ultimately suppressed. The final two chapters chart the rise of a social contract version of Soviet worker politics under NEP, in which participatory politics were off the agenda in exchange for a better standard of living; and the consolidation of a new party elite ready to do the bidding of the party leadership. Pirani judiciously utilizes the now customary (and rich) available archival and other primary sources, as well as a very wide array of secondary sources, which, when appropriate, he engages interestingly.

Pirani devotes nonjudgmental attention to the outlooks and activities of the other socialist parties, the Socialist Revolutionaries, the Mensheviks, and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, which at one time historians had essentially written out of the post-1918 narrative. Also of interest is his counter-postmodernist insistence that the Communist Party and its ideology evolved, not necessarily for the better, in reaction to socioeconomic realities. For all the author's disarming even-handedness, his orientation sometimes colors his analysis. For instance, his argument that the extraordinarily grave events of 1921 did not equate a revolutionary situation, although not completely implausible, is also not entirely convincing. Had matters progressed just a little more, the Communists would have found themselves out of power, and we would unhesitatingly call it not just a revolutionary situation but a revolution. In a similar vein, Pirani does not think that workers' acquiescence in the NEP social contract solely reflected repression, as claimed by some hostile contemporary commentators. Instead, he argues, workers accepted what was the best possible deal at the time. Yet, given the repeated application of repression over the previous four years, workers could hardly have reached any decision without an acute awareness of its possible renewal. Without fear of violence inflicted upon them, what would workers have done? Pirani's own evidence suggests they would have removed the Communists from power forthwith in favor of participatory worker power. Whether or not that would have led to desirable or sustainable results remains an open question. What room would there have been for the peasantry and the laboring intelligentsia in this vision of the workers' historical role?

Such argumentation aside, this is a very interesting, informative, and clear discussion of highly significant phenomena in the development of the Soviet system, the richness of which is only touched upon here. The author's agendas are not hidden and the information and analysis he offers are compelling, no mean feats in such ideologically freighted territory.

MICHAEL MELANCON
Auburn University

AMY NELSON. *Music for the Revolution: Musicians and Power in Early Soviet Russia*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2004. Pp. xvi, 330. \$48.00.

In the decade after the 1917 Russian Revolution, Soviet musicians "understood that music's influence on the emotions made it a powerful mobilizing device" (p. 104), but they discovered that it was extraordinarily difficult to harness music to revolutionary ideology both because of music's abstract nature and the high level of musical expertise that was an essential prerequisite for this task. As a result, Soviet political authorities neglected music in comparison to art and literature, and, until now, historians of Soviet culture have generally followed suit. Amy Nelson's important monograph tackles the Soviet musical establishment head-on, however, and is an innovative model of sustained analytical engagement with music as a historical source. Not only has Nelson scoured the archives and the contemporary periodical literature to document the key debates about Soviet music between 1917 and 1932, but she also provides musical examples of important trends and clearly explains their significance, making both musicians and their music central to her arguments.

Nelson's work is innovative in other respects; she presents a necessary and long-overdue reevaluation of the role of musicians in the early Soviet state, reminding readers that the Soviet authorities' approach to music differed from their approach to literature and art and that the realities of musical life were much "more complicated than simply a 'taming of the arts'" (p. 2). She convincingly argues that musicians enjoyed "more latitude in regulating their affairs" than other cultural figures and that radical musical groups received "less encouragement 'from above'" than did radicals in other cultural arenas (p. 9). Because of their irreplaceable expertise, prerevolutionary musical elites played an especially prominent role in the development of early Soviet musical culture.

In addition to arguing for the unique position of music vis-à-vis the other Soviet arts, Nelson also challenges longstanding narratives about the "doomed" musical avant-garde and its increasing loss of power in the 1920s to left-wing advocates of a proletarian musical culture. She demonstrates that "modernist" composers (including those in the Association for Contemporary Music) were not outsiders in the 1920s but held key positions in the Soviet musical bureaucracy, actively participating in the regulation of Soviet musical life and the establishment of Soviet musical education. Conversely, the

proletarian musicians were fragmented into three rival groups: the Russian Association of Proletarian Musicians (RAPM), the Organization of Revolutionary Composers, and the Production Collective of Student Composers (Prokoll). These groups engaged in constant infighting and failed to engage the public with their new versions of Soviet music. Nelson argues that the influence of RAPM was not increasing during the 1920s and suggests that the real winners in the musical popularity contest of the 1920s were the purveyors of light genre music such as gypsy songs, urban ballads like *Little Bricks* (1925), and the fox-trot. Although both avant-garde and proletarian musicians considered such music "philistine," it was widely popular among peasants and proletarians alike.

Nelson's work acknowledges the extent to which pressure built on the musical community in the course of the 1920s. She shows that Soviet musicians, like their counterparts in literature and the arts, did partake in contentious debates throughout the 1920s over whether to preserve and popularize the "bourgeois" musical legacy of the past, what forms new revolutionary music should take, and whether this new music had to be genuinely popular in order to be revolutionary. Nelson argues, however, that during the years of the New Economic Policy (NEP), the Sovietization of central institutions like the Moscow Conservatory was primarily carried out by well-placed prerevolutionary professionals who, like their more traditional colleagues, both valued artistic excellence and believed it was their mission to bring culture to the masses. Nelson catalogues the variety of musical events during 1927 (celebrations of Ludwig van Beethoven's centennial and the tenth anniversary of the revolution) to show the enthusiastic adoption of Beethoven as a model for revolutionary composers and the success of the experimental conductor-less orchestra Persimfans, but also the frustrations about the slow pace of development of truly Soviet works of music and revolutionary "mass songs" to challenge popular light genres.

The book concludes with a reinterpretation of Joseph Stalin's "Cultural Revolution" (1928–1932), a time of social and political upheaval that profoundly transformed Soviet culture. Most accounts of this period emphasize the radical attacks on the old intelligentsia by proletarian culture organizations such as the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP). Nelson convincingly argues that, unlike RAPP, the RAPM was never hegemonic and, although old specialists "came under fire," they "played an important and often winning role in many of the period's most critical encounters." Nelson asserts that in music, "expertise and ability were to prove more essential than ideology or social origin" (p. 210).

Nelson's work is a powerful reminder of the contingency and complexity of Stalinist historical contexts; she shows that the effects of repressive measures such as purges and class warfare were far from uniform across various Soviet cultural milieus. Her study demonstrates strong continuities between the tsarist and

Soviet musical establishments across the revolutionary divide and well into the Stalin period.

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DANIEL KOWALSKY. *Stalin and the Spanish Civil War*. (Gutenberg-e.) New York: Columbia University Press. 2004. Electronic book. Site access \$49.50.

With this e-book, Daniel Kowalsky enters the historiographical debate over whether or not the Soviet Union abandoned the Spanish Republic midway through the Spanish Civil War. Kowalsky questions the recent verdict of revisionist scholarship, which asserts that Joseph Stalin deserves blame for the demise of the Republican cause. Kowalsky refutes the abandonment thesis; instead, he sees Stalin's involvement in the Spanish Civil War in the "context of failure" and thinks it should be "defined more by impotence than puissance." Extensive use of the Russian State Military Archives enabled the author to show that the degree of Soviet military aid was substantial indeed, that it was more so for the first year of the war than at any other time, and that it slowed steadily from late 1937 on. He speculates that Stalin tapered off aid when it was most needed in an effort to win over the West.

The most compelling point the author makes regarding his thesis relates to the failed diplomacy between Spain and the USSR. Time after time Stalin hesitated to create the kind of close ties that the Soviets would have needed in order to manipulate Spain and bring it under its influence through diplomatic channels. In 1937, Stalin recalled the Soviet ambassador and never replaced him, which greatly impeded communications and cooperation between the two countries. Yet, other areas of potential Soviet influence and dominance or subversion of the Republic, such as its influence over the Spanish Communist Party and the Republic's security apparatus, are omitted.

Kowalsky's study includes three very fine chapters on the mass mobilization of the Soviet people in support of humanitarian assistance to the people of the Spanish Republic, including the evacuation of three thousand orphans to the USSR, and one chapter on cultural exchanges. However, the relevance of these issues to the book's thesis is unclear. Kowalsky convinces the reader that the Soviet domestic propaganda campaign was taken very seriously and to great lengths, but he never explains the purpose of it. We are not told what Stalin got out of it or what he expected to get out of his population's attachment to the drama in Spain. Kowalsky claims the solidarity campaign represented a home front victory for Stalin, without identifying what was won or relating it to the ultimate demise of the Spanish Republic.

Kowalsky's chapter on the transfer of Spanish gold to the USSR to pay for armaments shows that the USSR did not gain a windfall profit at the expense of the Spanish, as some have claimed. Yet, how this fact plays into support for his thesis is not explained, unless the author

mentioned it in order to convince his audience that Stalin was not guilty of every evil of which he has been accused. The chapters on the direct military involvement of Red Army, Navy, and Air Force advisers, again backed by solid archival work, demonstrate that the contributions they made were important, even vital in some situations, but in no way gave the USSR the kind of leverage over the Spanish that some have maintained. In fact, the author shows the military effort of the USSR was beset by chronic problems inhibiting cooperation such as language difficulties—there was always a shortage of translators—and cultural and social problems. Domineering and patronizing attitudes on the part of Soviet advisers also contributed to a certain level of ineffectiveness.

The author only hints at direct answers to the issues of Stalin's position of weakness and the context of failure. The weaknesses are primarily the difficulties the Soviets faced in transporting armaments to Spain through the Nationalist blockade and closed French-Spanish border; the self-imposed secrecy of the involvement of Soviet servicemen in the fighting; and language, cultural, and social barriers. It is impossible for the reader to judge the context of failure, because we are not told what the measure of success would have been from Stalin's perspective, which is precisely the major obstacle to advancing the historiographical debate: no one knows what Stalin's intentions were in the first place. Nevertheless, Kowalsky's work leads one to agree that Stalin was working from a position of weakness—that the long arm of Stalinist manipulation and control was simply not long enough to dominate in Spain, if indeed that was his intention. The most important contribution of this book is made inadvertently: it shows that Stalin was at all times working from a position of indecision. Evidence of Stalin's indecisiveness and lack of definite purpose does more to undercut the abandonment thesis than any argument yet put forth. Kowalsky's efforts are to be commended and the book is overall a worthwhile read, but it leaves the reader with more questions than answers.

The electronic features of this book are quite good, consisting of photos, video clips, and audio clips. The footnoting features are first rate.

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MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

SIDNEY H. GRIFFITH. *The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque: Christians and Muslims in the World of Islam*. (Jews, Christians, and Muslims from the Ancient to the Modern World.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2008. Pp. xiii, 220. \$35.00.

Sidney H. Griffith's timely book surveys the intellectual legacy of those Christians living under Muslim rule who wrote in Arabic, as opposed to Greek, Syriac, Coptic, Armenian, or Latin, during the Abbasid caliphate (750–1258). As the author sees it, the lingering tendency on

the part of modern scholars to write off the experience of the so-called "Oriental churches" as irrelevant to the dominant narrative of church history has not only done a disservice to our understanding of the past, but has deprived the modern world of the chance to benefit from the experiences of those medieval Christians who engaged Islam from the inside.

The book begins with a historical overview of the rise of Islam within its largely Christian Near Eastern context. The Eastern churches that had struggled to define themselves vis-à-vis the orthodoxy pronounced at the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon found more latitude under Muslim rule. Indeed, the so-called Nestorian, Jacobite, and Melkite churches would achieve their fullest bloom on Muslim soil, articulating their differences from each other as well as from Islam in Arabic. In the process of rendering their sacred texts into Arabic and mounting apologetic responses to the ever-present threat of Islamization, theologians from these churches were obliged not only to understand Islam but to adopt its theological vocabulary and its theological discourse (*kalam*) for their own purposes.

The earliest Arabic Christian *apologia*, an anonymous treatise on the Trinity written around 755, exemplified many of the themes and techniques that would dominate Arabo-Christian apologetics for the next five centuries, including its reliance on the "vocabulary and thought patterns of the Qur'an" (p. 56). By the middle of the eighth century, each of the dominant Eastern churches under Islamic rule had produced a theologian of its own who wrote in Arabic: the Melkite Theodore Abu Qurrah (d. ca. 830), the Jacobite Habib ibn Khidmih Abu Ra'itah (d. ca. 851), and the Nestorian Ammar al Basri (d. ca. 850). A century later, the Coptic church would add the works of Severus ibn al-Muqaffa (d. 987) to the growing body of Arabic Christian apologetic, although the bulk of Egyptian writings of this type would not appear until the thirteenth century. Not as prolific, Spanish Christian theologians are known to have written in Arabic as early as the late ninth century, with actual texts surviving from the twelfth century.

The agenda of these apologists was for the most part consistent with those of their non-Arabic speaking counterparts: to defend the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation, the two principal targets of Muslim polemic, and to undercut Islam by challenging the status of its prophet, decrying its lack of miracles, and disparaging its supposed reliance on force to win converts. As Griffith sees it, such texts were designed not only to "sustain the faith of Christians living in that world" but also to "commend the reasonable credibility of Christianity to their Muslim neighbors in their own religious idiom" (p. 105). With this dual purpose in mind, it is not surprising that the arabophone apologists distinguished themselves from their Greek and Latin counterparts by soft-pedalling their critiques of Islam, dispensing with the unbridled invective that characterized Christian views of Islam from a distance.

As Griffith observes, many of the arabophone Christian intellectuals who left behind apologetic treatises

were active participants in the philosophical revolution that Abbasid Baghdad was experiencing at the time. The Nestorian physician and philosopher Hunayn ibn Ishaq (d. 873), best known for overseeing a prolific team of translators in Baghdad, participated in an influential epistolary debate about Muhammad's status as a prophet. Yahya ibn Adi (d. 974), a Jacobite student of al-Farabi, was renowned in Baghdad as a logician but spent much of his time composing works in defense of Christian doctrine. Though none of these Christian philosophers ever gave an inch as far as his religious affiliations were concerned, Griffith is right to draw attention to the philosophical common ground that Muslim and Christian intellectuals shared and the possibilities this presented for interfaith dialogue.

Although a work of history, this book does not shy away from drawing lessons designed for a twenty-first-century audience. The experiences and writings of Arabo-Christian philosophers like Hunayn ibn Ishaq and Yahya ibn Adi embody for Griffith a kind of philosophically based *convivencia* that he believes points the way toward a modern reprise. He calls on Christians living under Muslim rule today to revive their proud heritage and "lead their coreligionists in the rest of the world into a renewed Muslim/Christian dialogue" (p. 4). The unique experience of this community, on the one hand cultivating good relations with Muslims and on the other making sense of their own traditions using the very idiom of Islam, has given its members a special kind of wisdom from which Christians living in other parts of the world could benefit. One does not have to share this level of optimism to appreciate the value of Griffith's book.

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CHRISTOPHER MACEVITT. *The Crusades and the Christian World of the East: Rough Tolerance*. (The Middle Ages Series.) Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2008. Pp. vi, 272. \$49.95.

This important book offers a major reappraisal of how crusaders interacted with the indigenous Christian communities with whom they came into contact in the East. Christopher MacEvitt is keen to set aside the commonly held view that the Franks treated the local Christians as heretics and second-class citizens, arguing that, at least in the twelfth century, there was a considerable measure of mutual respect and cooperation, and that the gulf between the Frankish Catholic Christians and the rest of society under Latin rule (in which Eastern Christians probably outnumbered Muslims) would not have been unbridgeable. That is not to say that everything was always cosy, but the perceived differences between the Franks and the Melkites, Armenians, and Jacobites, to mention only the more numerous of the various groups, were more a matter of language than religious belief. What was achieved was a working arrangement in which the different religious or ethnic groups coexisted in what MacEvitt calls

"rough tolerance." In this respect the Franks proved far more amenable to the adherents of the non-Chalcedonian Christian confessions than the Byzantines had been.

The chapters dealing with northern Syria are particularly impressive. The author's analysis of the relations between the counts of Edessa, the princes of Antioch, and the local Armenian warlords explains much of the political and military dynamics of their shared struggle against Turkish encroachments. It was by working with the local Christians and adopting a style of rule not so different from that of the various Armenian chieftains that the Franks succeeded in maintaining their authority, at least until the fall of Edessa in 1144, an event that weakened the position of all the Christian groups significantly. Less persuasive, although still of considerable interest, is the discussion of the situation further south in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. The lack of surviving sources generated by the Melkites or other indigenous Christian groups there, and the fact that Eastern Christians appear infrequently in the Latin sources, create problems of interpretation. MacEvitt attempts to get the most out of what little there is, but alternative conclusions to questions such as the status and role of Meletos, the bishop of Gaza, could be advanced, while the evidence he adduces for Frankish patronage of Melkite religious foundations in Palestine is tenuous. It is a pity no use was made of the recent edition of John of Ibelin's *Le Livre des Assises* (2003): the new reading (especially pp. 138–139) would have bolstered the arguments MacEvitt advances.

It is a measure of the importance of this book that the reader is left wanting more. In particular the growth of Latin intransigence toward the Eastern confessions might have been explored further, although admittedly such an enquiry would go beyond the author's self-imposed time span into the thirteenth century. In this connection it would have been interesting to know how MacEvitt, who has made such an excellent analysis of the works of Matthew of Edessa and Michael the Great (or Michael the Syrian), understands William of Tyre. William wrote with the purpose of justifying the achievements of the Latins in the East in the eyes of Western prelates: was that sufficient reason for making the Eastern Christians almost invisible in the pages of his magnum opus, and how did his ambivalent attitude to the Byzantine Empire relate to this question? Moving beyond the end of the Third Crusade, mention is made of Jacques de Vitry as representative of a harsher attitude toward Eastern Christians, but how did the Fourth Lateran Council and the rise of the mendicant orders contribute to creating a new climate of opinion? In Cyprus, occupied by the Franks from 1191, it looks as if the rulers allowed "rough tolerance" to govern relations between the separate Greek and Latin hierarchies for the next thirty years; it was only in the early 1220s that Pelagio Galvani, the papal legate fresh from leading the Fifth Crusade to humiliating defeat, insisted on the subordination of the Orthodox to the Latins, setting the two main religious groups on the island

on a damaging collision course. In light of the experiences of Latin Syria, should these developments surprise us? MacEvitt is to be congratulated on a fine study; let us hope he will return to these and other issues.

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NANCY L. STOCKDALE. *Colonial Encounters among English and Palestinian Women, 1800–1948*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 2007. Pp. xi, 246. \$59.95.

Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) opened an intellectual door to scholars who both lauded and critiqued his study of the construction of the "Orient" by a "West" seeking to dominate and control peoples and territories. That book, for all its merits and faults, led to Nancy L. Stockdale's study on English and Palestinian women in Palestine throughout the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. Since Said's work many have written about the English in Palestine, but Stockdale's study follows those scholars (Sarah Graham-Brown, Meyda Yegenoglu, Mohja Kahf, Reina Lewis, and Billie Melman) who have critiqued *Orientalism* for not dealing substantially with gender. Stockdale's work resembles Melman's in topic and in time period, but while Melman presents a "counternarrative to patriarchal Orientalism" (p. 5) that in some ways exonerates English women from the imperial project, Stockdale rejects the notion "that European women could not be implicated . . . because of the subordinate social and political positions" back at home (p. 6). Women had an equally decisive role to play—indeed, Stockdale calls it complicity—in the grand imperial project.

Stockdale examines remarkable sources written by English women from diverse religious and socioeconomic backgrounds to elucidate the meeting point of English women in Palestine with local Muslim, Christian, and Jewish Palestinian women. She examines travel literature at a time of increased English travel to the Holy Land, tourists' correspondence, and the chronicles and letters penned by resident missionaries and the wives of British officials, especially after the onset of the British Mandate. These accounts reaffirm the nature of Orientalism but, in contrast to Said's sources, they were all written by (English) women. Cautious yet confident in her analysis, Stockdale peppers her narrative with substantial quotations that depict the Orientalist attitudes, racism, and sense of superiority that English women felt due to their European, English, and Protestant background.

Over seven chapters the book examines the meeting places of English and Palestinian women by considering the "biblical" nature of contemporary Palestinians, with no distinction to their religion or consideration for their then-present reality. That trope has gained traction among scholars seeking to understand the nineteenth-century history of foreigners in Palestine and how they viewed the local inhabitants of the region, and

by now should become part of accepted wisdom on the subject. Stockdale covers specific arenas of encounter, including harems and missionary establishments, with one specific missionary institution, the Protestant Orphanage at Nazareth, which became embroiled in scandal in the late nineteenth century, receiving its own chapter. In a scintillating reversal of perspective, this particular chapter analyzes the ways in which Palestinian women perceived the English women who came to Palestine seeking to modernize, civilize, educate, and bring the "true" faith to those unlucky enough not to have been born English and Protestant. Relying on Palestinian women's writings and interviews with them, Stockdale shows how the English women's project met with only partial success. Indeed, many Palestinians learned English, and some even converted to Protestant Christianity, but others faced and thus reported having experienced "a legacy of social, religious, and political displacement" (p. 11) as their English education distanced them (both Muslims and Jews) from aspects of traditional Palestinian society while reminding them of their racial difference: they could be equal before Christ but not equal to the English (p. 153). An insightful aspect of this chapter is the way that the author reads in the English women's texts signs of Palestinian responses to the former's presence in Palestine. Stockdale recognizes the difficulties of examining Palestinians' responses within English texts, owing to the filtering process inherent in examining foreign texts for indigenous responses.

In highlighting women's roles in Britain's imperial project, Stockdale also covers the religious and ethnic diversity that existed in Palestine and has largely been lost as a result of nineteenth-century imperial adventures, something that she clearly laments. There is room for criticism of the book: lack of translations of (sometimes incorrect) Arabic transcriptions, repetition in the narrative, a few copyediting errors, and a conclusion that reads more like an epilogue or notes for future research. Overall, however, this theoretically well-grounded study complements a growing body of research that examines English-Palestinian relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries just as it adds to the body of works that explore imperial/colonial and postcolonial moments in history. Further, it adds to our knowledge of foreign women's involvement in "empire" while it lifts the curtain on the ways that local women received and responded to the former's actions. Scholars in multiple fields, including women's and gender studies and comparative colonial and postcolonial studies as well as Middle Eastern history, will benefit from this well-researched and well-written book.

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WELDON C. MATTHEWS. *Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab Nationalists and Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine*. New York: I. B. Tauris. 2006. Pp. 342. £59.50.

In her review of Yehoshua Porath's seminal book, *The Emergence of the Arab Palestinian National Movement, 1918–1929* (1974) in the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Elizabeth Monroe noted: "In general, the story he tells is not new. We all know that 'as Zionism gathered momentum so did the opposition to it,' that the Palestine Arabs were at the time run by notables, and that 'the source of this aristocracy's authority was traditional and not democratic.'" Three and a half decades later the bookshelf dedicated to the history of Palestine is far heavier, and producing an original book on the Mandate period has become a much more difficult task.

Weldon C. Matthews, well aware of the impressive literature on Palestinian history, has made extensive use of it and of the Arab press and memoirs, as well as of Zionist and British archives, in order to analyze the internal dynamics of the Palestinian Arab political system. He focuses on the young generation of nationalist activists, supported by a handful of veteran nationalists, who in the early 1930s—inspired by the example of Mohandas Gandhi in India—decided to adopt the policy of non-cooperation.

In the eight chapters that comprise this book, readers are invited to accompany these activists from the inception of Arab nationalism in the late Ottoman period until the Palestine Arab revolt of 1936–1939. Most of the book is dedicated to the short-lived al-Istiqlal (independence) Party and its endeavors to create a "public sphere" in Palestine, to spread the word of nationalism, and to call the Palestinian leadership to transparency and accountability. The activists of al-Istiqlal struggled for independence for the Palestinian Arabs, advocated the unity of the Arab world, and tried to pursue these aims by maneuvering among various Arab leaders. More frequently than not, they were disappointed: most Arab leaders gave priority to their own personal or local-national interests. In Palestine itself, the nationalists struggled against the British High Commissioner's proposal to establish a legislative council and distanced themselves from sectarian politics: they were fully aware that "creating sectarian institutions"—the Supreme Muslim Council under the mufti Hajj Amin being the most important of them—and establishing "mock parliaments" were British methods that served to enhance imperial control and to thwart the development of national identity. Matthews convincingly compares this with policies implemented in Egypt and India.

According to Matthews's thesis, the success of these activists, many of whom were educators and journalists, in creating and channeling public opinion was instrumental in mobilizing the population against the alliance between the traditional leadership and the British. This new public opinion, together with economic deterioration and intensifying Jewish immigration, forced the leadership, and in particular Amin al-Husayni, to sever its intimate ties with the mandatory government. Moreover, Al-Husayni and his colleagues were manipulated to position themselves as the leaders of the 1936 Arab revolt. Hence the nationalists achieved their goal: the

collapse of the colonial control system, which was based on local mediators. It is worth mentioning, however, that according to few sources, both Zionists and Arabs, the role of the Istiqlalists in this move was important but rather limited, since Hajj Amin was playing a double game with the government; and while pretending to cooperate with it, he also established secret cells of *mu-jahidin* preparing the nation to the armed struggle. The fact that the success in mobilizing Palestine's Arabs to rebel also led to suppression of the revolt and to the destruction of Palestinian society (during the revolt, and more so in 1948), a fact mentioned only briefly at the end of the book, lies outside the scope of the discussion. However, one cannot but think of the trap in which colonized people found themselves: they paid a heavy price if they did not resist, and they paid a heavy price when they did. In Palestine the situation was further complicated due to the existence of a rival national movement: namely, Zionism.

While the struggle with Zionism is put aside in this book because the Istiqlalists themselves gave priority to the struggle against the British, religious aspects of Palestinian Arab nationalism are dealt with throughout the book, although often underestimated. One should not view religiously motivated *jihād* as the essence of the Arab struggle against colonialism, yet one cannot neglect Islam's crucial part in shaping Arab nationalism. And while it is true that the Istiqlalists did not use Islam in order to mobilize the masses, Hajj Amin al-Husayni did, as was evident in dozens of popular gatherings that were organized by his followers throughout the country in 1935. This is an important way of "constructing a nation" through "popular politics" that one expects would be mentioned in a book with such a title. However, as a book dedicated mostly to the Istiqlalists and their circle, it presents a rich, detailed account of this particular school of Arab nationalism that can serve not only students of Palestinian history but those of anticolonial movements in general.

HILLEL COHEN

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

CHEIKH ANTA BABOU. *Fighting the Greater Jihad: Amadu Bamba and the Founding of the Muridiyya of Senegal, 1853–1913*. (New African Histories Series.) Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 294. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$26.95.

Cheikh Anta Babou's new book on the Murid order is a welcome addition to the literature by a young scholar whose contribution is part of a new wave of publications on Senegal that share certain features: attention to the precolonial period, interest in the specifically religious elements of Sufi Islam and its history, and greater use of internal sources and oral interviews. At the same time each of these works has a different focus, with Babou focusing on the figure of the order's founder, Amadu Bamba. Babou begins by reminding readers

that the influence of Paul Marty relegated the founder to a secondary role as followers, and especially key disciples, were seen as the true founders of the movement in its social and economic dimensions. With a few exceptions Babou's focus works well, giving us the best and most detailed portrait of the life and thought of Bamba to date. From his perspective as an insider and a member of the Mbakke family, Babou informs us about the history of Bamba's larger family network as well, marshalling a rich array of informants and interviews to fill gaps in our understanding of debates and conflicts that heretofore have received little attention. The central argument of the book is that Bamba's novel approach to education shaped the Murid order in fundamental ways and offers an explanation for key features of the order.

The book is divided into an introduction and seven chapters. The first chapter gives a good overview of the history of Islam among the Wolof. The second chapter focuses on the history of the Mbakke family, including an examination of fissures and conflicts that shaped resistance to Bamba's mission in the family in the 1880s. The third chapter is largely biographical, tracing the founder's life and education until his arrest in 1895. Chapter four, misleadingly titled "The Founding of the Muridiyya," is the central chapter of the book, discussing Bamba's philosophy of education. Here the key concept is *tarbiyya*, a Sufi term that focuses on education that shapes character rather than conferring knowledge. While the rest of the book's chapters are organized in a chronological narrative, chapter four considers evidence from all periods, including evidence that goes well beyond the life of the founder, to argue that *tarbiyya* is the key to understanding Murid education and the emphasis on work that led to the development of working schools (*daara tarbiyya*), usually attributed to Shaykh Ibra Fall. Instead, Babou argues that their source was in the founder's ideas, which is a way of countering the argument of Marty that the disciples were more important than the founder (p. 105). Chapter five analyzes the conflicts between the Murid order and the French, and chapters six and seven offer Babou's formulation of David Robinson's arguments about the Murid path to accommodation. This leads to an original discussion of how the Murid order worked to create a Muslim space within the French colonial regime during the founder's forced residence in Diourbel.

The Bamba-centric focus of the book leads to occasional problems. Babou argues that the Murid order did not grow and faced some setbacks during the seven year exile of the founder to Gabon ([1895–1902], pp. 130–131, 139). This seems less a judgment informed by evidence than a product of the book's argument about the central role of the founder. As a result Babou attributes Bamba's return not to pressure from his disciples, but to the intervention of the newly elected deputy, Francois Carpot. The consistency of argument disappears when Babou argues that seven months later, when Bamba was arrested for the second time in 1903, a key reason was that "Murid sheikhs were emerging as the

legitimate leaders of the population" in rural areas (p. 148). This hardly seems possible if the order did not make progress during his years of exile.

In a number of key arguments Babou gives agency to French colonial officials rather than to unruly social forces or pressures from below. On Bamba's arrest in 1895 he argues that the "evidence suggests that Merlin and the administrator Leclerc were the masterminds behind the arrest and deportation of Amadu Bamba" (p. 125). In 1903, the "immediate cause" of Bamba's exile to Mauritania was "Roume's new Muslim policy" (p. 143). These judgments about causation are all the more surprising because they appear in contexts where the groundwork for more complex explanations has been surveyed.

Babou's study is particularly rewarding for its treatment of the founder's life and ideas, set against the background of the Mbakke family's history. The focus on education and *tarbiyya* offers an interpretation of the social action of the Murid order that is grounded in Sufi thought. The attempt to explain everything with reference to the founder or the actions of French colonial officials is less convincing but will certainly stimulate further discussion.

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DIANA JEATER. *Law, Language, and Science: The Invention of the "Native Mind" in Southern Rhodesia, 1890–1930.* (Social History of Africa.) Portsmouth: Heinemann. 2007. Pp. xxi, 273. \$27.95.

In a series of brilliantly observed vignettes, Diana Jeater describes the process through which missionaries in southeastern Zimbabwe went about translating sections of the Bible into the local language. In his 1908 report an American missionary translator described a painstaking process of language study involving the careful examination of idioms and cultural references. Amazingly enough, however, the language in question was not Chindau, the language spoken in the Chimanimani district that is the subject of this book, but Greek! In fact, the missionaries approached their translation effort as comparative linguistic work, regarding it as more important to understand the world in which the Bible was first written down than the spiritual worlds of the people they aimed to convert to Christianity. The translation work involved only limited contact with an "Ndau helper" to confirm correct word choice. This story puts the poignant reality of European contact with Africans in Southern Rhodesia into stark relief. As Jeater shows with persuasive clarity, the work of translation—both literal and metaphorical—that is the central subject of her book rarely involved any serious effort to comprehend the linguistic and cultural contexts in which Africans moved; rather, it focused almost exclusively on finding efficient ways to convey European or Christian ideas and regulations. Hence, while there was much translation, there was little communication.

If Africans, to navigate colonial society, had to struggle to comprehend not only the premises of European culture but also an increasingly rigid version of local culture that Europeans developed, Europeans remained in many respects remarkably irrelevant to the inexorable processes of local social and cultural change.

Introductory chapters outline the complicated historical context into which Europeans intruded in the 1890s and position the book in relationship to recent work by Derek Peterson, Paul Landau, and Jean and John Comaroff that explores the interplay between language and hegemony in colonial Africa. But rather than asking "how far Africans bought into a European consciousness," Jeater became more interested in "how far—and when—white people engaged with an African consciousness" (p. xix). Chimanimani offered a complex and unusual mix: African communities speaking a Shona language reflected a history of Zulu overlordship that European invaders representing the British South Africa Company were only too willing to capitalize on. Added to this were a substantial influx of Dutch-speaking settler farmers and American missionaries, black and white, with their Zulu assistants, all involved in the expropriation of land and efforts to reduce local people to tenants and workers.

Jeater develops her arguments in three chronological phases, across which Africans steadily fade into the background, reflecting the increasing confidence of European officials, missionaries, and farmers in their ability to define and understand "the African." Although there is extensive scholarship on the "invention" of customary law and on the missionary encounter, Jeater's highly original approach is to examine Christian conversion and court proceedings together through the prism of translation broadly understood. The first period, which lasted until around 1910, was characterized by relatively close contact between Europeans and Africans, in particular as some whites gained fluency in the local language. Among the most linguistically adept were poor Dutch-speaking farmers; but their pivotal role as official translators would become highly problematic from the British perspective. The processes of evangelism and the development of a colonial legal system were both marked by the utter failure on the part of whites to comprehend African society and their lack of desire to do so. From Jeater's point of view the story is less about the invention of customary law than it is about the failure of Europeans to grasp the basic principles of African legal systems and their consequent irrelevance in legal disputes. What she does a less convincing job of explaining is why it was then that Africans kept seeking out important white figures to act in judicial roles.

The second phase, the 1910s and 1920s, was marked by the systematic development of texts codifying colonial religious and legal practice in local languages—in 1919, after twenty-five years in the field, white missionaries finally began preaching in Chindau. Predictably whites became steadily less interested in African society and language, and in the third phase carefully separated

themselves from the people surrounding them. In these circumstances, feeling frustration with the failure of Africans to behave as was imagined they should, colonial officials turned to experts to understand the "native mind." By the 1930s, the linguistically adept white farmer or official had been largely supplanted by academic experts as authorities on African culture and language, and Africans themselves were entirely marginalized in the codification of knowledge about their own societies.

This is a book that by design will make many readers uncomfortable. The author turned to a study of white knowledge in response to her own concern with her status both as an outsider and as an authority on the history of a country whose own scholars have been denied the opportunities and resources to conduct research. Jeater implicitly asks foreign researchers to consider how different are their roles than those of the "meddlesome professors" described in her final chapter of that name, who set about defining a "native mind" that was much more an invention of their own theoretical design than it was a reflection of any deep comprehension of local society.

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KENNETH W. HARROW. *Postcolonial African Cinema: From Political Engagement to Postmodernism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2007. Pp. xv, 268. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$25.95.

Preceded by a substantial corpus of critical essays and books, Kenneth W. Harrow's provocative new study is the latest installment of his sustained interrogation of African film criticism and cinema. He enunciates his project in the first sentence of the book's preface: "It is time for a revolution in African film criticism . . . Time for new voices, a new paradigm, a new view—a new Aristotle to invent the poetics we need for today" (p. xi). No less than a call for a new African "cinematic order," Harrow's daunting undertaking is a critical "space-clearing" exercise whose objective is to revisit and dispense with prevailing assumptions about African film criticism with its legitimization of filmmaking practices that he asserts "have not substantially changed in forty years" (p. xi).

The book comprises a lengthy introduction and nine chapters. In the introduction and first chapter, Harrow proffers a theorized delineation of *cinéma engagé*, a "socially conscious, politically conscientized" cinema opposed to the colonial/neocolonial project, mapping its historical evolution and nascent expression in Ousmane Sembène's first wave of films. The second chapter—a case study of *cinéma engagé*—examines the film *Xala* (1975), Sembène's trenchant critique of the Senegalese bourgeoisie. Chapter three further elaborates the *engagé* stance, complicating it by new "phantasmagoric" approaches in the work of Cameroonian filmmakers Bassek Ba Kobhio and Jean-Marie Teno. Later chapters

address films by Djibril Diop Mambèty, Jean-Pierre Bekolo, Souleymane Cissé, and Dominique Loreau, among others, whose practices embody principles of *engagé* cinema, but in less schematic terms. In the final chapter, he examines two “unstudied gems” of African cinema, *Un Certain matin* (1991) and *Parlons Grand-Mère* (1989). This chapter is Harrow’s delineation of an African postmodernism derived from the encounter of globalization with the African specificity, the consequence of which, he asserts, has been “both the disintegration of the possibilities to create a widely viewed, serious, politicized African cinema, and the explosion of a popular and accessible African video-cinema that eschews the earlier values of engagement” (p. xv).

By contesting the “truisms” and “authorized” accounts of African films, Harrow destabilizes their representations of Africa and the claims of “authenticity” they confer. In counterpoint, he argues the case for an African postmodernism that rejects the discourse of absolutes and simplistic binaries, enlisting “fantasy, desire, the gaze, and their inscriptions” to the catalog of cinematic concerns and practices, while deploying them to readings of ideology and the political.

However, the study is not unproblematic. A case in point is the assertion that globalization is the *sine qua non* for an African postmodernism. If the historical moment we are now living is dominated by the cultural forces of global homogeneity that are leveling and deterritorializing the planet while creating ever-widening social and economic inequality, what prospect is there for an African postmodernism that is “not yet another invention of the West”? Similarly, if globalization is something more than an economic and political process of integration, constituting a new form of neocolonial subjugation, can it be resisted by a film practice that denies the very principles and approach of *cinéma engagé*?

Another concern arises in Harrow’s exclusive reliance on past and present African films to make his case for a new cinematic order. The analytical rigor of his arguments would have profited by conversation with a parallel emerging cinematic movement: diasporic cinema, which shares similar thematic concerns with contemporary African cinema, including the conjunction of global capitalism, migration, and postcoloniality. Other profitable comparisons could have been made with the New Latin American cinema movement. Examining these distinctive cinematic formations for confluences of shared assumptions and artistic practice would be useful and strengthen his case.

No less important to Harrow’s case is that it relies largely on the work of francophone filmmakers, relegating anglophone, lusophone, and Arab-Muslim African filmmakers to the margins of his study. In the case of the lusophone countries, they have yet to develop a film tradition. Among anglophone ones strong traditions have emerged in Nigeria and, especially, post-apartheid South Africa.

Finally, it is unclear to this reader whether psycho-analytical approaches to African cinema yield much that is serviceable for explaining the African “predicament.” Notwithstanding increasing urbanization and the palpable cultural and material affects of the West on Africa and Africans, the continent and its peoples are largely rural and adhere to their distinctive traditions and cultural practices.

While not suggestive of a paradigm shift, this is an important work of analysis, contributing to the corpus of scholarship on African film and revitalizing debates about its purpose, role, and future.

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Collected Essays

These volumes, recently received in the *AHR* office, do not lend themselves readily to unified reviews; the contents are therefore listed.

COMPARATIVE/WORLD

JEFFREY A. AUERBACH and PETER H. HOFFENBERG, editors. *Britain, the Empire, and the World at the Great Exhibition of 1851*. Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2008. Pp. xviii, 219. \$99.95.

PAUL YOUNG, *Mission Impossible: Globalization and the Great Exhibition*. KYLIE MESSAGE and EWAN JOHNSTON, *The World within the City: The Great Exhibition, Race, Class and Social Reform*. LOUISE PURBRICK, *Defining Nation: Ireland at the Great Exhibition of 1851*. EWAN JOHNSTON, "A Valuable and Tolerably Extensive Collection of Native and Other Products": New Zealand at the Crystal Palace. PETER H. HOFFENBERG, *Nothing Very New or Very Showy to Exhibit? Australia at the Great Exhibition and After*. DAVID C. FISHER, *Russia and the Crystal Palace in 1851*. JOHN R. DAVIS, *The Great Exhibition and the German States*. DEBBIE CHALLIS, *Modern to Ancient: Greece at the Great Exhibition and the Crystal Palace*. FRANCESCA VANKE, *Degrees of Otherness: The Ottoman Empire and China at the Great Exhibition of 1851*.

POONAM BALA, editor. *Biomedicine as a Contested Site: Some Revelations in Imperial Contexts*. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. 2009. Pp. ix, 197. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$26.95.

HIBBA ABUGIDERI, *Colonizing Mother Egypt, Domesticating Egyptian Mothers*. POONAM BALA, "Defying" Medical Autonomy: Indigenous Elites and Medicine in Colonial India. FLAVIO COELHO EDLER, *Medical Knowledge and Professional Power: From the Lusco-Brazilian Context to Imperial Brazil*. MARIOLA ESPINOSA, *The Invincible Generals: Yellow Fever and the Fight for Empire in Cuba, 1868–1898*. AMY KALER, *The White Man in the Bedroom: Contraception and Resistance on Commercial Farms in Colonial Rhodesia*. ANGELIKA C. MESSNER, *Translations and Transformations: Toward Creating New Men in Early Twentieth-Century China*. LAURENCE MONNAIS, *Rejected or Elected? Processes of Therapeutic Selection and Colonial Medicines in French Vietnam, 1905–1939*. MARTHA EUGENIA RODRIGUEZ, *Articulating Medical Ideas: Medicine and Medical Education in New Spain*. RUSSEL STAFFORD VILJOEN, *Disease, Doctors and De Beers Capitalists: Smallpox and Scandal in Colonial Kimberley (South Africa) during the Min-*

eral Revolution and British Imperialism, c. 1882–1883. SALLY WILDE, *Submitting to Surgery in the 1890s: Four Vignettes*.

TONY BALLANTYNE and ANTOINETTE BURTON, editors. *Moving Subjects: Gender, Mobility, and Intimacy in an Age of Global Empire*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2009. Pp. 353. Cloth \$70.00, paper \$27.00.

RACHEL STANDFIELD, *Violence and the Intimacy of Imperial Ethnography: The Endeavour in the Pacific*. DAVID HAINES, *In Search of the "Wahaen": Ngai Tahu Women, Shore Whalers, and the Meaning of Sex in Early New Zealand*. ELIZABETH VIBERT, *Writing "Home": Sibling Intimacy and Mobility in a Scottish Colonial Memoir*. CHARLOTTE MACDONALD, *Intimacy of the Envelope: Fiction, Commerce, and Empire in the Correspondence of Friends Mary Taylor and Charlotte Bronte, c. 1845–55*. FRANCES STEEL, *Suva under Steam: Mobile Men and a Colonial Port Capital, 1880–1910s*. FIONA PAISLEY, *Performing "Interracial Harmony": Settler Colonialism at the 1934 Pan-Pacific Women's Conference in Hawaii*. MICHAEL A. McDONNELL, "Il a Epousé une Sauvagesse": Indian and Métis Persistence across Imperial and National Borders. KERRY WYNN, "Miss Indian Territory" and "Mr. Oklahoma Territory": Marriage, Settlement, and Citizenship in the Cherokee Nation and the United States. CHRISTINE M. SKWIOT, *Genealogies and Histories in Collision: Tourism and Colonial Contestations in Hawaii, 1900–1930*. KATHERINE ELLINGHAUS, *Intimate Assimilation: Comparing White-Indigenous Inter-marriage in the United States and Australia, 1880s–1930s*. ADRIAN CARTON, "Faire and Well-Formed": Portuguese Eurasian Women and Symbolic Whiteness in Early Colonial India. DANA RABIN, *The Sorceress, the Servant, and the Stays: Sexuality and Race in Eighteenth-Century Britain*. KIRSTEN MCKENZIE, *Social Mobilities at the Cape of Good Hope: Lady Anne Barnard, Samuel Hudson, and the Opportunities of Empire, c. 1797–1824*. ADELE PERRY, *Islands of Intimacy: Community, Kinship, and Domesticity, Salt Spring Island, 1866*. MICHELLE T. MORAN, *Telling Tales of Ko'olau: Containing and Mobilizing Disease in Colonial Hawaii*. TONY BALLANTYNE and ANTOINETTE BURTON, *The Intimate, the Translocal, and the Imperial in an Age of Mobility*.

STEFAN BERGER, LINAS ERIKSONAS, and ANDREW MYCOCK, editors. *Narrating the Nation: Representations in History, Media and the Arts*. (Making Sense of History, number 11.) New York: Berghahn Books. 2008. Pp. xii, 348. \$95.00.

ALLAN MEGILL, Historical Representation, Identity, Allegiance. CHRIS LORENZ, Drawing the Line: "Scientific" History between Myth-making and Myth-breaking. MARK BEVIR, National Histories: Prospects for Critique and Narrative. ANN RIGNEY, Fiction as a Mediator in National Remembrance. JOHN NEUBAUER, The Institutionalisation and Nationalisation of Literature in Nineteenth-Century Europe. LINAS ERIKSONAS, Towards the Genre of Popular National History: Walter Scott after Waterloo. SIGRID WEIGEL, Families, Phantoms and the Discourse of "Generations" as a Politics of the Past: Problems of Provenance: Rejecting and Longing for Origins. WULF KANSTEINER, Sold Globally – Remembered Locally: Holocaust Cinema and the Construction of Collective identities in Europe and the US. HUGO FREY, Cannes 1956/1979: Riviera Reflections on Nationalism and Cinema. HEIDEMARIE UHL, From Discourse to Representation: "Austrian Memory" in Public Space. MICHAEL WINTLE, Personifying the Past: National and European History in the Fine and Applied Arts in the Age of Nationalism. PHILIP V. BOHLMAN, The Nation in Song. PETER SEIXAS, "People's History" in North America: Agency, Ideology, Epistemology. JIE-HYUN LIM, The Configuration of Orient and Occident in the Global Chain of National Histories: Writing National Histories in Northeast Asia.

KAREN HAGEMANN, SONYA MICHEL, and GUNILLA BUDDE, editors. *Civil Society and Gender Justice: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*. (European Civil Society, number 4.) New York: Berghahn Books. 2008. Pp. xi, 324. \$95.00.

KAREN HAGEMANN, Civil Society Gendered: Rethinking Theories and Practices. REGINA WECKER, Dilemmas of Gender Justice: Gendering Equity, Justice, and Recognition. JANE RENDALL, The Progress of "Civilization": Women, Gender, and Enlightened Perspectives on Civil Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain. GISELA METTELE, The City and the Citoyenne: Associational Culture and Female Civic Virtues in Nineteenth-Century Germany. KAREN OFFEN, Feminist Campaigns in "Public Space": Civil Society, Gender Justice, and the History of European Feminism. GUNILLA BUDDE, The Family—A Core Institution of Civil Society: A Perspective on the Middle Classes in Imperial Germany. MARGRIT PERNAU, Veiled Associations: The Muslim Middle Class, the Family, and the Colonial State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century India. PAUL A. GINSBORG, "Only Connect": Family, Gender, and Civil Society in Twentieth-Century Europe and North America. MANFRED GAILUS, Necessary Confrontations: Gender, Civil Society, and the Politics of Food in Eighteenth- to Twentieth-Century Germany. SONYA O. ROSE, "Good" vs. "Militant" Citizens: Masculinity, Class Protest, and the "Civil" Public in Britain between 1867 and 1939. BELINDA DAVIS, Civil Society in a New Key? Feminist and Alternative Groups in 1960s–1970s West Germany. KRISTEN R. GHODSEE, Civil Society-by-Design: Emerging Capitalism, Essentialist Feminism, and Women's Nongovernmental Organizations in Postsocialist Eastern Europe. SONYA MICHEL, The Rise of Welfare States and the Regendering of Civil Society: The Case of the United States. MARILYN LAKE, Fellow Feeling: A Transnational Perspective on Conceptions of Civil Society and Citizenship in "White Men's Countries," 1890–1910. BIRGIT SAUER, Bringing the State Back In: Civil Society, Women's Movements, and the State.

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

KARL S. HELE, editor. *Lines Drawn upon the Water: First Nations and the Great Lakes Borders and Borderlands*. (Aboriginal Studies.) Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press. 2008. Pp. xxiii, 351. \$85.00.

EDMUND J. DANZIGER JR., "We have no spirit to celebrate with you the great [1893] Columbian Fair": Aboriginal Peoples of the Great Lakes Respond to Canadian and United States Policies during the Nineteenth Century. PHIL BELLFY, Cross-Border Treaty-Signers: The Anishnaabeg of the Lake Huron Borderlands. MARK MEUWESE, From Intercolonial Messenger to "Christian Indian": The Flemish Bastard and the Mohawk Struggle for Independence from New France and Colonial New York in the Eastern Great Lakes Borderland, 1647–1687. KARL S. HELE, The Anishnaabeg and Métis in the Sault Ste. Marie Borderlands: Confronting a Line Drawn upon the Water. ALAN KNIGHT and JANET E. CHUTE, In The Shadow of the Thumping Drum: The Sault Métis-The People In-Between. DAVID T. McNAB, "Those freebooters would shoot me like a dog": American Terrorists and Homeland Security in the Journals of Ezhaaswe (William A. Elias [1856–1929]). LISA PHILIPS and ALLAN K. MCDUGALL, Shifting Boundaries and the Baldoon Mysteries. RICK FEHR, The Baldoon Settlement: Rethinking Sustainability. CATHERINE MURTON STOEHR, Nativism's Bastard: Neolin, Tenskwatawa, and the Anishnaabeg Methodist Movement. MICHELLE A. HAMILTON, Borders Within: Anthropology and the Six Nations of the Grand River. NORMAN SHIELDS, The Grand General Indian Council of Ontario and Indian Status Legislation. UTE LISCHKE, "This is a pipe and I know hash": Louise Erdrich and the Lines Drawn upon the Waters and the Lands.

JEFF ROCHE, editor. *The Political Culture of the New West*. Foreword by DAVID FARBER. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2008. Pp. xii, 384. Cloth \$40.00, paper \$24.95.

ROBERT A. GOLDBERG, The Western Hero in Politics: Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and the Rise of the American Conservative Movement. R. DOUGLAS HURT, Agricultural Politics in the Twentieth-Century American West. KAREN R. MERRILL, The Illusions of Independence: Texas Oilmen and the Politics of Postwar Petroleum. DARREN DOCHUK, "They Locked God outside the Iron Curtain": The Politics of Anti-communism and the Ascendancy of Plain-Folk Evangelicalism in the Postwar West. MICHAEL STEINER, The Politics of Place: Carey McWilliams and Radical Regionalism. IGNACIO M. GARCÍA, Latinos in the Politics of the West. BRADLEY GLENN SHREVE, The Evolution of Modern American Indian Politics. SCOTT H. TANG, Becoming the New Objects of Racial Scorn: Racial Politics and Racial Hierarchy in Postwar San Francisco, 1945–1960. AMY L. SCOTT, Remaking Urban in the American West: Urban Environmentalism, Lifestyle Politics, and Hip Capitalism in Boulder, Colorado. ANDREW G. KIRK, Free Minds and Free Markets: Counterculture Libertarians, Natural Capitalists, and an Alternative Vision of Western Political Authenticity. JOHN P. HERRON, The Call in the Wild: Nature, Technology, and Environmental Politics. DAVID M. WROBEL, The Politics of Western Memory.

EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

DAVID W. GUTZKE, editor *Britain and Transnational Progressivism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2008. Pp. 258. \$84.95.

DAVID W. GUTZKE, *Historians and Progressivism*. DAVID W. GUTZKE, *Progressivism in Britain and Abroad*. BERNARD ASPINWALL, *The Civic Ideal: Glasgow and the United States, 1880–1920*. BERNARD ASPINWALL, *Democracy and Drink*. IAN TYRRELL, *Transatlantic Progressivism in Women's Temperance and Suffrage*. DAVID W. GUTZKE, *Britain's "Social Housekeepers"*. ROBERT HAMILTON, *Social Settlement Houses: The Educated Women of Glasgow and Chicago*.

CHARLES IVAR MCGRATH and CHRIS FAUSKE, editors. *Money, Power, and Print: Interdisciplinary Studies on the*

Financial Revolution in the British Isles. Newark: University of Delaware Press. 2008. Pp. 242. \$56.00.

CHARLES IVAR MCGRATH and CHRIS FAUSKE, *Money, Power, and Print: Interdisciplinary Studies on the Financial Revolution in the British Isles*. JAMES E. HARTLEY, *The Chameleon Daniel Defoe: Public Writing in the Age before Economic Theory*. STEPHEN TIMMONS, *The Hearth Tax and Finance in the West Country, 1662–92*. RICHARD KLEER, "Fictitious Cash": *English Public Finance and Paper Money, 1689–97*. ARNE BIALUSCHEWSKI, *Greed, Fraud, and Popular Culture: John Bretholt's Madagascar Schemes of the Early Eighteenth Century*. J. ALAN DOWNIE, "Gulliver's Travels," the Contemporary Debate on the Financial Revolution, and the Bourgeois Public Sphere. CHRIS FAUSKE, *Misunderstanding What Swift Misunderstood, or, the Economy of a Province*. CHARLES IVAR MCGRATH, *The Irish Experience of "Financial Revolution," 1660–1760*. EOIN MAGENNIS, *Whither the Irish Financial Revolution: Money, Banks, and Politics in Ireland in the 1730s*.

Documents and Bibliographies

Books listed were recently received in the AHR office. Works of these types cannot normally be reviewed by the AHR.

COMPARATIVE/WORLD

MICKENBERG, JULIA L., and PHILIP NEL, editors. *Tales for Little Rebels: A Collection of Radical Children's Literature*. Foreword by JACK ZIPES. New York: New York University Press. 2008. Pp. xii, 295. \$32.95.

ASIA

BUCHANAN, SHERRY. *Mekong Diaries: Viet Cong Drawings and Stories, 1964–1975*. Assisted by NGUYEN TOAN THI, TRAN THI HUYNH NGA, and NAM NGUYEN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2008. Pp. 257. \$30.00.

SARKAR, SUMIT, and TANIKA SARKAR, editors. *Women and Social Reform in Modern India: A Reader*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2008. Pp. vii, 550. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$29.95.

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

ALLEN, CHARLES MAXWELL. *Dispatches from Bermuda: The Civil War Letters of Charles Maxwell Allen, United States Consul at Bermuda, 1861–1888*. Edited by GLEN N. WICHE. (Civil War in the North.) Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 2008. Pp. xvii, 251. \$32.00.

CARANO, STEVE. *Not without Honor: The Nazi POW Journal of Steve Carano*. Edited by KAY SLOAN. With accounts by JOHN C. BITZER and BILL BLACKMON. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press. 2008. Pp. xxi, 159. \$29.95.

GARCÍA, MARIO T., editor. *A Dolores Huerta Reader*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2008. Pp. xxix, 350. \$27.95.

GRIERSON, BENJAMIN H. *A Just and Righteous Cause: Benjamin H. Grierson's Civil War Memoir*. Edited by BRUCE J. DINGES and SHIRLEY A. LECKIE. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 2008. Pp. xi, 449. \$34.95.

HALPIN, HENRY ROSS. *Adventures in the West: Henry Ross Halpin, Fur Trader and Indian Agent*. Edited by DAVID R. ELLIOTT. Foreword by RICHARD J. PRESTON. Toronto: Dundurn. 2008. Pp. 239. \$26.99.

HERMAN, JAN K. *Navy Medicine in Vietnam: Oral Histories from Dien Bien Phu to the Fall of Saigon*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company. 2009. Pp. vii, 357. \$55.00.

HOEBEL, E. ADAMSON, et al. *Comanche Ethnography: Field Notes of E. Adamson Hoebel, Waldo R. Wedel, Gustav G. Carlson, and Robert H. Lowie*. Compiled and Edited by THOMAS W. KAVANAGH. (Studies in the Anthropology of North American Indians.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, with the American Indian Studies Research Institute, Indiana University, Bloomington. 2008. Pp. xiv, 542. \$55.00.

JACKSON, WILLIAM J., editor. *The Wisdom of Generosity: A Reader in American Philanthropy*. Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press. 2008. Pp. xxxiv, 427. \$34.95.

JACOBS, HARRIET A. *The Harriet Jacobs Family Papers*. Edited by JEAN FAGAN YELLIN. Two-volume set with CD-ROM. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2008. Pp. lxxxii, 396; xxxix, 929. \$125.00 the set.

LAWSON, STEVEN F., editor. *One America in the 21st Century: The Report of President Bill Clinton's Initiative on Race*. Foreword by JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2009. Pp. xl, 121. \$20.00.

ROOSEVELT, THEODORE. *Bull Moose on the Stump: The 1912 Campaign Speeches of Theodore Roosevelt*. Edited by LEWIS L. GOULD. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2008. Pp. xi, 220. \$34.95.

STONE, WILLIAM. *Bitter Freedom: William Stone's Record of Service in the Freedmen's Bureau*. Edited by SUZANNE STONE JOHNSON and ROBERT ALLISON JOHNSON. Introduction by LOU FALKNER WILLIAMS. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 2008. Pp. xxxii, 117. \$29.95.

VAN DER DONCK, ADRIAEN. *A Description of New Netherland*. Edited by CHARLES T. GEHRING and WILLIAM A. STARNA. Translated by DIEDERIK WILLEM GOEDHUY. Foreword by RUSSELL SHORTO. (The Iroquoians and Their World.) Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2008. Pp. xxii, 176. \$40.00.

WASHINGTON, GEORGE. *The Papers of George Washington. Revolutionary War Series, 18: 1 November 1778–14 January 1779*. Edited by EDWARD G. LENGEL. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 2008. Pp. xxxv, 712. \$85.00.

WASHINGTON, GEORGE. *The Papers of George Washington. Presidential Series, 14: 1 September–31 December 1793*. Edited by DAVID R. HOTH. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 2008. Pp. xxxvi, 741. \$85.00.

EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

BLANCHARD, JOËL, editor. *Commynes et les procès politiques de Louis XI: Du nouveau sur la lèse-majesté*. Paris: Éditions Picard. 2008. Pp. 183. €32.00.

DE MÉZIÈRES, PHILIPPE. *Une épître lamentable et consolatoire: Adressée en 1397 à Philippe le Hardi, duc de Bourgogne, sur la défaite de Nicopolis (1396)*. Edited by PHILIPPE CONTAMINE and JACQUES PAVIOT. Assisted by CÉLINE VAN HOOBEBECK. Paris: Au siège de la société. 2008. Pp. 268. €46.00.

ZIOLKOWSKI, JAN M., editor and translator *Solomon and Marcolf*. (Harvard Studies in Medieval Latin, number 1.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2008. Pp. xvii, 451. Cloth \$40.00, paper \$25.00.

EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

- BRECKMAN, WARREN, editor. *European Romanticism: A Brief History with Documents*. (The Bedford Series in History and Culture.) Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's. 2008. Pp. xv, 217. \$14.95.
- DARWIN, CHARLES. *Charles Darwin: The Beagle Letters*. Edited by FREDERICK BURKHARDT. Introduction by JANET BROWNE. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2008. Pp. xxx, 470. \$32.00.
- GORBACHEVSKY, BORIS. *Through the Maelstrom: A Red Army Soldier's War on the Eastern Front, 1942–1945*. Edited and translated by STUART BRITTON. Foreword by DAVID M. GLANTZ. (Modern War Studies.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2008. Pp. xix, 453. \$36.95.
- VOLYNSKY, AKIM. *Ballet's Magic Kingdom: Selected Writings on Dance in Russia, 1911–1925*. Translated, edited, and foreword by STANLEY J. RABINOWITZ. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2008. Pp. xliii, 288. \$35.00.

Other Books Received

The following books were recently received in the AHR office. Books listed here do not include works scheduled for review.

METHODS/THEORY

- BENSON, VIRGINIA O., and RICHARD KLEIN. *Historic Preservation for Professionals*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 2008. Pp. x, 242. \$35.00.
- BROPHY, JERE, JANET ALLEMAN, and BARBARA KNIGHTON. *Inside the Social Studies Classroom*. New York: Routledge. 2009. Pp. x, 301. \$41.95.
- GENOWAYS, HUGH H., and MARY ANNE ANDREI, editors. *Museum Origins: Readings in Early Museum History and Philosophy*. Walnut Creek, Calif.: Left Coast Press. 2008. Pp. 344. Cloth \$69.00, paper \$34.95.
- HALAVAIS, ALEXANDER. *Search Engine Society*. (Digital Media and Society Series.) Cambridge: Polity. 2009. Pp. v, 232. Cloth \$64.95, paper \$19.95.
- SINGER, ALAN J. *Social Studies for Secondary Schools: Teaching to Learn, Learning to Teach*. Assisted by THE HOFSTRA NEW TEACHERS NETWORK. 3d ed. New York: Routledge. 2009. Pp. xvii, 423. \$54.95.
- SMITH, FREDERICK H. *The Archaeology of Alcohol and Drinking*. Foreword by MICHAEL S. NASSANEY. (The American Experience in Archaeological Perspective.) Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 2008. Pp. xvii, 195. \$24.95.
- of Faith and Doubt. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2008. Pp. x, 233. \$30.00.
- LYNCH, MICHAEL, et al. *Truth Machine: The Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2008. Pp. xxii, 391. \$37.50.

ASIA

- EBREY, PATRICIA BUCKLEY. *Accumulating Culture: The Collections of Emperor Huizong*. (A China Program Book.) Seattle: University of Washington Press. 2008. Pp. xxii, 495. \$65.00.
- PECK, GRAHAM. *Two Kinds of Time*. Foreword by ROBERT A. KAPP. Paperback edition. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 2008. Pp. xxv, 725. \$28.95.
- SULTAN-I-ROME, . *Swat State (1915-1969): From Genesis to Merger: An Analysis of Political, Administrative, Socio-Political, and Economic Developments*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2008. Pp. xv, 363. \$50.00.

OCEANIA AND THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

- ANDERSON, WARWICK. *The Collectors of Lost Souls: Turning Kuru Scientists into Whitemen*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2008. Pp. 318. \$24.95.

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

- ADAMSON, MELITTA WEISS and FRANCINE SEGAN, editors. *Entertaining from Ancient Rome to the Super Bowl: An Encyclopedia*. In two volumes. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 2008. Pp. xiv, 291; xi, 294-596. \$199.95 the set.
- BAKER, CHARLOTTE, and JENNIFER JAHN, editors. *Postcolonial Slavery: An Overview of Colonialism's Legacy*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 2008. Pp. xxi, 181. \$52.99.
- BLANNING, TIM. *The Triumph of Music: The Rise of Composers, Musicians and Their Art*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2008. Pp. x, 416. \$29.95.
- BYRNE, JOSEPH P., editor. *Encyclopedia of Pestilence, Pandemics, and Plagues*. In two volumes. Foreword by ANTHONY S. FAUCI. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 2008. Pp. xxv, 433; xvii, 436-872. \$199.95 the set.
- CRANE, CATHY, and NICHOLAS MUELLNER, editors. (1968) *Episodes of Culture in Contest*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 2008. Pp. xviii, 208. \$69.99.
- GILMAN, SANDER L. *Fat: A Cultural History of Obesity*. Cambridge: Polity. 2008. Pp. 237. Cloth \$64.95, paper \$22.95.
- HASSAN, ROBERT. *The Information Society*. (Digital Media and Society Studies.) Cambridge: Polity. 2008. Pp. xiii, 266. Cloth \$62.95, paper \$24.95.
- HEMPTON, DAVID. *Evangelical Disenchantment: Nine Portraits*
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- ALLERS, KEN JR. *The Fog of Gettysburg: The Myths and Mysteries of the Battle*. Nashville, Tenn.: Cumberland House. 2008. Pp. 288. \$16.95.
- ANDERSSON, RANI-HENRIK. *The Lakota Ghost Dance of 1890*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2008. Pp. xxii, 437. \$50.00.
- BANNER, STUART. *Who Owns the Sky? The Struggle to Control Airspace from the Wright Brothers On*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2008. Pp. 353. \$29.95.
- BROWN, NIKKI L. M., and BARRY M. STENTIFORD, editors. *The Jim Crow Encyclopedia*. (Greenwood Milestones in African American History.) Two-volume set. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 2008. Pp. xxviii, 428; 915. \$225.00 the set.
- BRULLE, ROBERT V. *Engineering the Space Age: A Rocket Scientist Remembers*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press. 2008. Pp. xviii, 268. \$24.00.
- CALARCO, TOM. *People of the Underground Railroad: A Biographical Dictionary*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 2008. Pp. xxx, 377. \$75.00.
- CHAR, ANTOINE. *Deadline America*. Montreal: Hurtubise HMH. 2007. Pp. 236. \$24.95.

- CODDINGTON, RONALD S. *Faces of the Confederacy: An Album of Southern Soldiers and Their Stories*. Foreword by MICHAEL FELLMAN. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2008. Pp. xxiii, 288. \$29.95.
- COHEN, NORM. *American Folk Songs: A Regional Encyclopedia*. Two-volume set. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 2008. Pp. xxi, 387; vi, 743. \$149.95 the set.
- COLLEY, DAVID P. *Decision at Strasbourg: Ike's Strategic Mistake to Halt the Sixth Army Group at the Rhine in 1944*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 2008. Pp. xiii, 251. \$34.95.
- CRAVEN, WAYNE. *Gilded Mansions: Grand Architecture and High Society*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. 2009. Pp. 383. \$59.95.
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REVIEWS

TO THE EDITORS:

One of the main purposes of an academic review is to tell readers what a book is about—as well as, of course, to assess its scholarly significance. In the case of my *Lost People: Magic and the Legacy of Slavery in Madagascar* (AHR, October 2008, 1279–1280), one might imagine historians in particular would be interested in the fact that this is the first ethnographic work that makes full use of the nineteenth-century Malagasy archives, integrating information from government documents from the pre-colonial Merina kingdom with oral histories, and genealogical records preserved from the colonial period, to first reconstruct what local politics in one small community (Betafo) was like 150 years ago, and then systematically compare that picture with how that past is now remembered by rival social groups in the same community today. The archives that make this possible are a unique treasure: a compendium of tens of thousands of documents from the nineteenth-century Merina kingdom, including everything from administrative correspondence to property censuses, grievances, trial transcripts, and local records of the sale of slaves. In Betafo, they provide a fascinating complement to an historical memory full of stories about magical battles, scandalous murders, self-destructive passions, and secret assignations with amorous ghosts. The book itself is in large part a character study of individuals—an ancient astrologer, a disgraced aristocrat, a Trotskyist banana salesman . . . —who simulta-

neously narrate their versions of Betafo's history, and act as historical characters in their own right.

A reader of Gwyn Campbell's review of my book would never learn any of this. He would instead be treated to a stream of condescending swipes directed mainly at subordinate clauses, deteriorating by the end to what can only be described as personal insult.

I'll ignore the latter. Neither will I elaborate on Campbell's evident complete ignorance of both the normal practice of ethnographic fieldwork and current standards of ethnographic writing. Neither will I dwell on his innumerable misreadings and errors of fact (can Campbell really be unaware that the revolt of 1895 started not in Arivonimamo but in Amboanana?), or his puzzling inability to understand that the meanings of words change over time (he faults my use of terms based on how they were used in the nineteenth century, despite the fact that I repeatedly emphasize that I am reporting how they were used in one community between 1989 and 1991). I will not even dwell on the very strong evidence that Campbell has not actually read the book (e.g., accusing me of "allowing" an "outsider" from the capital named Miadana to participate in conversations with residents of Betafo, when not only was Miadana a resident of Betafo, but her family's relation to the rest of the community is the subject of *two entire chapters* of the book).

Let me instead proceed directly to Campbell's chosen home ground of conflict—his area of presumed professional expertise.

Campbell spends much of the review faulting my observations on nineteenth-century slavery. While these observations make up a tiny proportion of the book, they are based on not-insignificant original research: a survey of Malagasy-language local registers, records of testimony in criminal trials, internal government correspondence, and other documents from the royal archives of the time (mainly AKTA, FF, and IIICC series), balanced against the accounts of foreign observers and present-day oral memory. Campbell, however, dismisses my knowledge of the history of slavery as "patchy at best," backing this up with a series of quibbles on slave origins. Most of these are based on misreadings (i.e., pretending that my denying all slaves were from Betsileo means I think none of them were); others would not make sense to anyone familiar with

the archival material. A few are especially telling. I'll focus on just one. Campbell claims that my estimate that slaves constituted about 40 percent of the Merina population in the 1840s is based on a mere two documents from Betafo itself, and that "records for Imerina as a whole" indicate otherwise. Really? What records would these be? My estimate is in fact based on the comparison of an extensive sampling of documents from across Imerina, mainly those stemming from a household-by-household property census carried out by the Merina government between 1840 and 1842. These, as I note (p. 403 n. 16), are now preserved in the EE and IIICC series of the national archives. Campbell, who has written extensively on demography, has never cited any of this census material, or, in his published work, given any indication that he is aware of its existence. How could anyone claim to be an authority on nineteenth-century Merina demography without showing any awareness of the survival of the Merina census? Well, here's a hint: his book *An Economic History of Imperial Madagascar, 1750–1895* contains a bibliography specifically of demographic sources (Appendix C, pp. 344–346) that does not cite a single text written in the Malagasy language. In fact, his book never cites any government documents from the royal archives, of any kind. Neither does it cite any of the voluminous nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century published work in the Malagasy language (the *Firaketana*, *Tantara ny Andriana*) except, occasionally, in French translation. Campbell's "historical record" thus consists almost entirely of the observations of foreigners.

I have never met Campbell, never before tangled with him intellectually, and have no idea why he chose to write such an extraordinarily ungracious and uncharitable review. But since he did, and since he decided to make an issue of command of historical material, I see no reason not to point out the obvious. To write a book like Campbell's is a little like writing a history of Tudor enclosure movements without making use of a single primary text written in English, or an economic history of Weimar Germany using only documents in Italian or Chinese. It could be done. It might even be interesting in its own way to see what such things looked like entirely from foreigners' perspectives. But for an historian who has built his authority on such unusual qualifications to write scathing reviews accusing others of ignorance of the primary sources is a little like someone sitting on a pile of dynamite flicking matches at random passersby.

To borrow a phrase from Campbell's own review: "be warned!"

DAVID GRAEBER

GWYN CAMPBELL RESPONDS:

Further to David Graeber's letter concerning my review of his book *Lost People*, the vehemence and scope of his response are salient reminders of the gap which exists between the disciplines and methodology of anthropol-

ogy and history. I am not an anthropologist, I am a historian, and thus was asked to comment upon his book in terms of the criteria applied to works of history. I am, however, familiar with the leading anthropologists working in the field, and will simply re-state that he has not the rigour of Lambek, Evers, or Feeley-Harnik. Nor does he possess the impressive prose style of historian Pier Larson—although passages of his glowing review of his own book (as included in his rebuttal of my review) are strongly reminiscent of the latter. Let me assure Graeber that I read every word of his 469-page tome, including the many asides, allusions, imaginings, and hypotheses which constitute this impressionistic treatment of a complex subject. If my critique stung, it is only because his lax approach to historical methods and definitions rankles. Surely the purpose of academic review is to flesh out our differences and, hopefully, begin to bridge the gap between two important roads, leading to a fuller understanding of a rich and complex subject.

Turning to my own book, *An Economic History of Imperial Madagascar, 1750–1895*, as Graeber does at length, it is alarming how little he understood, although given his demonstrated unfamiliarity with historical analysis, perhaps not surprising. His main point is that my book should have been based upon the royal Merina archives. Of course I consulted these archives, but as my research proceeded, I realized that they were highly problematic, for two main reasons. Firstly, they possess virtually no information about economic activity in the two-thirds of Madagascar largely independent of Merina rule, or the substantial commercial relations of this vast area with the wider regional economy, including Réunion and other French-held islands, South Africa, Mozambique, and Zanzibar. Secondly, and more critically, the Merina economy rested not on slavery but on fanompoana, a system of unremunerated forced labour for the state applied to all non-slave subjects. Fanompoana meant that all Merina officials derived a living by exploiting what privileges their office could offer. Consequently, official reports and statistical returns were systematically falsified. In addition, many Merina garrisons—the main instruments of information-gathering—were for much of the period isolated, often under siege from hostile Sakalava or Bara war bands—who increasingly from the late 1870s also launched devastating raids into the imperial heartland. Indeed, what was at best a ramshackle and highly corrupt administration had largely crumbled by the 1880s.

By assuming that the Merina court possessed an efficient bureaucracy with accurate records, Graeber underscores his ignorance of Malagasy history. The Merina royal archives are a hopelessly inadequate basis for forming an accurate picture of economic activity in Madagascar. Because of this, it is incumbent upon the historian to also research as wide a variety of other sources as possible. Graeber comes close to making a fetish of Malagasy language sources, which he implies are largely confined to the royal Merina archives. (The *Firaketana*, by the way, is an incomplete secondary work

of limited use published in the late 1930s.) It may therefore come as a surprise to him to learn that much of the correspondence and many reports found in the main missionary archives—which again I consulted—are in Malagasy, as are some in the local consular archives. These, and a wide-ranging number of other rich sources, also contain material written in a variety of European languages by people—many of them traders or missionaries—who had a profound knowledge and experience of Madagascar, and whose competitive interests it served to give as accurate as possible a picture of the island's material conditions and commercial activity. The overwhelmingly positive reviews of my *Eco-*

nomic History (see <http://indianoceanworldcentre.com/people/director.php>) I consider to be testimony to the final result.

Finally, regarding his attempt at damnation by colourful analogy, let me say that David Graeber's approach to historical research is rather like writing a history of the Tudor enclosure movements by meditating on the possible identity of Shakespeare's Dark Lady—potentially interesting, but in the end, not terribly useful.

GWYN CAMPBELL
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
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
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
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
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

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


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

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
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



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



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
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


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
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
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

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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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


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
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
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
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



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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